CHAPTER VII.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.--OUTLINE OF THE CONTROVERSY RESPECTING FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Question early Discussed.--The question respecting human freedom, was very early a topic of inquiry and discussion. It enters prominently into the philosophy of all nations, so far as we know, among whom either philosophy or theology have found a place. It is by no means confined to Christian, or even to cultivated nations. It holds a prominent place in the theological systems and disputes of India and the East, at the present day. The missionary of the Christian faith meets with it, to his surprise, perhaps, in the remotest regions, and among tribes little cultivated. It is a question, at once so profound, and yet of such personal and practical moment, that it can hardly have escaped the attention of any thoughtful and reflecting mind, in any country, or in any age of the world.

The Greek Philosophy.--Among the Greeks, conflicting opinions respecting this matter prevailed in the different schools. The Epicureans, although asserting human liberty in opposition to the doctrine of universal and inexorable fate, were, nevertheless, necessitarians, if we may judge from the writings of Lucretius, whose idea of liberty, as Mr. Stewart has well shown, is compatible with the most perfect necessity, and renders man "as completely a piece of passive mechanism as he was supposed to be by Collins and Hobbes." This liberty is, itself, the necessary effect of some cause, and the reason assigned for this view is precisely that given by modern advocates of necessity, namely, that to suppose otherwise, is to suppose an effect without a cause.

On the other hand, the Stoics, while maintaining the doctrine of fate, held, nevertheless, to the utmost liberty of the will. With the consistency of these views, we are not now concerned. Epictetus is referred to by Mr. Stewart, as an example of this not unusual combination of fatalism and free-will.

The Jewish Sects.--Very similar was the relation of the two rival sects among the Jews, the Sadducees and the Pharisees, the former holding the doctrine of human freedom, the latter of such a degree, at least, of fatality, as is inconsistent with true liberty.

The Arabian Schools.--Among no people, perhaps, has this question been more eagerly and widely discussed, than by the Arabians, whose philosophy seems to have grown out of their theology. When that remarkable book, the Koran, first aroused the impulsive mind of the Arab from his idle dreams, and startled him into consciousness of higher truth, the very first topic of inquiry and speculation about which his philosophic thought employed itself, seems to have been this long-standing question of human ability and the freedom of the will. The Koran taught the doctrine of necessity and fate. A sect soon arose, called Kadrites, from the word kadr, power, freedom, holding the opposite doctrine, that man's actions, good and bad, are under the control of his own will. From this was gradually formed a large body of dissenters, as they styled themselves, and in maintaining these views on the one side, and opposing them on the other, the controversy became more and more one of philosophy, and for some three centuries, with varied learning and skill, Arabian scholars and philosophers disputed, warmly, this most difficult and abstruse of metaphysical questions. Fatalism seems ultimately to have prevailed, as, indeed, a doctrine so congenial to error, and to every false system of religious belief, would be quite likely to do, where any such system is established.

The Scholastics and the Reformers.--Among the scholastic divines of the middle ages, some held to the liberty of the will, while many allowed only what they called the liberty of spontaneity, i. e., power to do as we will, in opposition to liberty of indifference, or power over the determinations of the will itself.

Among the moderns, the Reformers differed among themselves on the matter of liberty, the Lutherans, with Melanchthon, opposing the scheme of necessity; Calvin and Bucer maintaining it, as the necessary consequence of their views of divine predestination.

Distinguished modern Advocates of Necessity.--Among the philosophical writers of the last and the present century, a very strong array of eminent names is on the side of necessity. Hobbes, Locke--who is claimed, however, by each side--Leibnitz, Collins, Edwards, Priestley, Belsham, Lord Kames, Hartley, Mill, advocate openly the doctrine of necessity.

Doctrine of Hobbes.--The views of Hobbes seem to have given shape to the opinions of subsequent advocates of this theory. The only liberty which he allows, is that of doing what one wills to do, or what the scholastics called the liberty of spontaneity. Water is free, and at liberty, when nothing prevents it from flowing down the stream. Liberty he defines, accordingly, to be "the absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent." A man whose hands are tied, is not at liberty to go; the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; while he who is sick or lame, is at liberty, because the obstacle is in himself. A free agent is one who can do as he wills.

This is essentially the view of freedom adopted by the later advocates of necessity, and almost in the same terms it is the view of Collins, Priestley, and Edwards.

Doctrine of Locke.--It is, also, Locke's idea of freedom. Liberty, he says, is the power of any agent "to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other." This extends only to the carrying out our volitions when formed, and not to the matter of willing or preferring; power over the determinations of the will, itself, is not included in this definition.

Locke Inconsistent.--In this, Locke was inconsistent with himself, since, in his chapter on power, he seems to be maintaining the doctrine of human freedom. The liberty here intended, it has been justly remarked by Bledsoe, is not freedom of the will, or of the mind in willing, but only of the body; it refers to the motion of the body, not to the action of the mind.

Locke expressly says, "there may be volition where there is no liberty;" and gives, in illustration, the case of a man falling through a breaking bridge, who has volition or preference not to fall, but no liberty, since he cannot help falling. In this, again, Locke is inconsistent, since, elsewhere, he distinguishes between volition and desire or preference, while here he does not distinguish them.

There can be no doubt that Locke supposed himself an advocate of human freedom, for such is the spirit of his whole treatise, especially of his twenty-first chapter; at the same time, it must be confessed, his definitions are incomplete, and his language inconsistent and vacillating, so that there is some reason to class him, as Priestley does, with those who really adopt the scheme of necessity without knowing or intending it.

View of Leibnitz.--Leibnitz was led to adopt the doctrine of necessity from his general theory of the sufficient reason, that is, that nothing occurs without a reason why it should be so, and not otherwise. This principle he carries so far as to deny the power of Deity to create two things perfectly alike, and the power of either God or man to choose one of two things that are perfectly alike. This principle presents the mind as always determined by the greatest apparent good, and establishes, as its author supposed, by the certainty of demonstration, the absolute impossibility of free agency.

View of Collins.--Collins maintains the necessity of all human actions, from experience, from the impossibility of liberty, from the divine foreknowledge, from the nature of rewards and punishments, and the nature of morality. He takes pains to reconcile this doctrine with man's accountability and moral agency, and is careful to define his terms with great exactness. Thus the terms liberty and necessity are defined as follows: "First, though I deny liberty in a certain meaning of the word, yet I contend for liberty as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases. Secondly, when I affirm necessity, I contend only for moral necessity, meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks and watches, and such other beings, which, for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity".

Coincidence of Collins and Edwards.--The coincidence of these views and definitions, and, indeed, of the plan of argument, with the definitions and the arguments of Edwards, is remarkable. No two writers, probably, were ever further removed from each other in their general spirit and character, and in their system of religious belief; yet as regards this doctrine, the definitions and views of one were those of the other, and as Mr. Stewart has justly remarked, the coincidence is so perfect, that the outline given by the former, of the plan of his work, might have served with equal propriety as a preface to the latter.

Views of Edwards.--No writer has more ably discussed this question than the elder Edwards. He is universally conceded to be one of the ablest metaphysicians, as well as theologians, of modern times. His work on the Freedom of the Will is a masterpiece of reasoning. At the same time, as to the character and tendency of the system therein maintained, the greatest difference of opinion exists. By some he is regarded as a fatalist, by others he is claimed as an advocate of human freedom. There is some ground for this difference of opinion. No writer, from Plato downward, was ever perfectly self-consistent; it would be strange if Edwards were so. That the general scheme of necessity, maintained by Edwards, tends, in some respects, to fatalism,--that the ablest champions of fatalism, and even writers of atheistic, and immoral views, have held essentially the same doctrine, and maintained it by the same arguments--must be conceded; that such was not the design and spirit of his work, that such was not his own intention, is perfectly evident.

Main Positions of Edwards.--The definitions of Edwards, as we have already seen, are the same with those of Collins and Hobbes. He understands by liberty merely a power to do as one wills. The mind is always determined by the greatest apparent good. The motive determines the act, causes it. The mind acts, wills, chooses, etc., but the motive is the cause of its action. That the mind should be the cause of its own volitions, implies, he maintains, an act of will preceding the volition, that is a volition prior to volition, and so on forever in an infinite series. This argument, the famous dictum necessitatis, has been considered in a previous chapter. Now, to say that motive is the producing cause, and volition the effect, especially if the connection of the two is of the same nature as that between physical causes and effects, as Edwards affirms, is certainly to say that which looks very strongly toward fatalism.

Necessity, what.--Edwards maintains the doctrine of necessity. But what did he mean by moral necessity? The phrase is unfortunate, for reasons already suggested--it does convey the idea of irresistibility, of something which must and will be--in spite of all contrary will and endeavor. This, however, he is careful to disclaim. He means by moral and philosophical necessity simple CERTAINTY, "nothing different from certainty." "No opposition or contrary will and endeavor," he says, "is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself." Now we must allow him to put his own meaning upon the terms he uses; and to say that under given circumstances, there being given such and such motives, inclinations, and preferences, such and such volitions will certainly follow, is not to say that the will is not free in its action--is not to shut us up to absolute fate--is not, in fact, to say any thing more than is strictly and psychologically true. In defending himself from this very charge, he uses the following explicit language in a letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland: "ON THE CONTRARY, I have largely declared that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of necessity IMPROPERLY; and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's wills is more properly called certainty than necessity; it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence." "Nothing that I maintain supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; free with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that could possibly enter into the heart of man to conceive." This is explicit, and ought to satisfy us as to what Edwards himself thought of his own work, and meant by it. Still a man does not always understand himself, is not always the best judge of his own arguments, is not always consistent with himself, does not always express his own real opinions, nor do himself justice, in every part of his reasonings. This is certainly the case with Edwards. We are at a loss to reconcile some passages in his treatise with the foregoing extract, e. g., the dictum necessitatis; also his declaration that the difference between natural and moral necessity "lies not so much IN THE NATURE of the connection as in the two terms connected." This is an unfortunate admission for those who would shield him from the charge of fatalism. If the necessity, by which a volition follows the given motive, is, after all, of the same nature with that by which a stone falls to the earth, or water freezes at a given temperature, it is all over with us as to any consistent, intelligible defence of the freedom of the will.

If, moreover, the doctrine of Edwards leaves man full power, as he says above, to will and to choose as he pleases, what becomes of the dictum, which makes it impossible for the mind to determine its own volitions?

Does not distinguish between the Affections and the Will.--It should be remembered that Edwards does not distinguish between the will and affections. This distinction had not, at that time, been clearly drawn by writers on the philosophy of the mind. The twofold division of mental powers, into understanding and will, was then prevalent; the affections, of course, were classed with the latter. Hence there is not that definiteness in the use of terms which modern psychology demands. Had Edwards distinguished between the affections and the will, it must have given a different cast to his entire work. Even Locke, whose philosophy Edwards follows in the main, had distinguished between will and desire, as we have already seen; but in this he is not followed by Edwards, who, while he does not regard them as "words of precisely the same signification," yet does not think them "so entirely distinct that they can ever be said to run counter."

Views of the later Necessitarians.--Of the views of the later advocates of necessity, Priestley, Belsham, Diderot, and others, of that school, we have already spoken in a previous chapter. They carry out the scheme, with the greatest boldness and consistency, to its legitimate consequences, fatalism, and the denial of free agency and accountability. God is the real and only responsible doer of whatever comes to pass, and man the passive instrument in his hand. Remorse, regret, repentance, are idle terms, and to praise or blame ourselves or others, for any thing that we or they have done, is merely absurd.

Advocates of the Opposite.--On the other hand, the doctrine of the freedom of the will has not wanted able advocates among the more recent philosophical writers. In general it may be remarked, that those who have treated of the powers of the human mind, as psychologists, have, for the most part, maintained the essential freedom of the will, while the advocates of the opposite view have been chiefly metaphysicians, rather than psychologists, and, in most cases, have viewed the matter from a theological rather than a philosophical point of view. Among the more recent and able advocates of the freedom of the will, are Cousin and Jouffroy, in France, Tappan and Bledsoe, in our own country. Previously, Mr. Stewart, in his appendix to his "Active and Moral Powers," had concisely, but very ably, handled the matter, and earlier still, Kant, in Germany, had conceded the liberty of the will as a matter of consciousness, while unable to reconcile it with the dictates of reason.

View of Hamilton.--Substantially the same view is taken by the late Sir William Hamilton, who, by general consent, stands at the head of modern philosophers, and who accepts the doctrine of liberty as a fact, an immediate dictum of consciousness, while, at the same time, he is unable to conceive of its possibility, since "to conceive a free act, is to conceive an act which, being a cause, is not, in itself, an effect; in other words, to conceive an absolute commencement;" and this he regards as impossible. At the same time, it is equally beyond our power, he thinks, to conceive the possibility of the opposite, the doctrine of necessity, since that supposes "an infinite series of determined causes," which cannot be conceived. But though inconceivable, freedom is not the less a fact given by consciousness and is to be placed in the same category with many other facts among the phenomena of mind, "which we must admit as actual, but of whose possibility we are wholly unable to form a notion."

Remarks upon this View.--The difficulty here presented,--if I may venture a remark upon the opinions of so profound a thinker, and the same is true of Kant,--turns evidently on the peculiar idea of freedom entertained by those writers, namely, that in order to be free, an act of the will must be wholly undetermined, not itself an effect, but an absolute commencement. Any influence, from any source, going to determine or incline a man to will as he does, renders the act no longer free. Such freedom is certainly inconceivable; and what is more, impracticable; it exists as little among the possibilities of the actual world, as among the possibilities of thought. We never act, except under the influence of motive and inclination; and if acts thus performed are not free then no acts that we perform are so.

View of Coleridge.--This eminent disciple of the earlier German philosophy, derives from Kant the view of freedom now explained, and carries it to the furthest extreme. All influence and inclination are inconsistent with freedom. The disposition to do a thing renders the will, and the act of the will, no longer free. A nature, of any kind, is inconsistent with freedom. This, of course, shuts out all freedom from the actual world. Nor is it possible to conceive how even the acts of Deity can be any more free than ours, on this supposition; nor how, if any such freedom as this were supposed to exist, an act thus performed, without any motive, or any disposition or inclination on the part of the agent, could be a rational or accountable act.

Views of Cousin, and Jouffroy.--Cousin and Jouffroy while by no means denying the influence of motive upon the mind, place the fact of liberty in the power which the mind has of being itself a cause, and of putting forth volitions from its own proper power. The law of inertia, contends Jouffroy, which requires a moving force proportioned to the movement of a material body, does not apply to the human mind, and "to apply this law to the relation which subsists between the resolutions of my will and the motives which act upon it, is to suppose that my being, that I myself, am not a cause; for a cause is something which produces an act by its own proper power." Cousin, in like manner, places liberty in the absolute and undetermined power of the will to act as cause; and "this cause, in order to produce its effect, has need of no other theatre, and no other instrument than itself. It produces it directly, with out any thing intermediate, and without condition; ... being always able to do what it does not do, and able not to do what it does. Here, then, in all its plenitude, is the characteristic of liberty."

View of Tappan.--One of the ablest defenders of the freedom of the will in our own country, Mr. Tappan, in his review of Edwards, takes essentially the position just explained. All cause lies ultimately in the will. It is this which makes the nisus or effort that produces any event or phenomenon. Of this nisus the mind or will is itself the cause, and, as such, it is self-moved. It makes its nisus of itself, and of itself it forbears to make it, and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its objects, it has the power of selecting, by a mere arbitrary act, any particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted for in itself alone.

Position of Bledsoe.--Similar is the position of Mr. Bledsoe, one of the most recent reviewers of Edwards, a writer of marked ability and candor. He denies, however, that volition is the effect of any thing, whether motive of mind, in the sense that motion of the arm is an effect. It is activity, action, the cause of action, but not effect. In distinction from most writers of the same theological views, he denies that the will is self-determined, or that it is determined at all, and by any thing. It is the determiner, but not the determined.

REFERENCES.

Among the authorities which have been consulted in the preparation of this work, the following may be referred to, with profit, by the reader who desires to pursue the subject further.

I. THE INTELLECT.

A. ON THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES IN GENERAL.

Locke.--Essays on the Human Understanding.

Reid.--Essays on the Intellectual Powers. Walker Ed.

" Works.--By Hamilton, with notes and dissertations.

Dugald Stewart.--Philosophy of the Human Mind. Bowen Ed.

" Philosophical Essays.

Brown.--Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind.

The works of Upham, Wayland, Winslow, Mahan, may also be consulted, with profit.

Cousin.--Cours de, 1828. Id., 1829.

" Fragments Philosophiques.

Jouffroy.--Mélanges Philosophiques. Nouvelles Mélanges.

" Esquisses de D. Stewart. Préface.

Descartes.--Méditations. Id., Discours de la Métnode.

Leibnitz.--Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain.

Malebranche.--Recherche de la Vérité.

Royer Collard.--OEuvres de Reid. Fragments.

Damiron.--Cours de Philosophie.

Hegel.--Encyklopädie der Philosoph. Wissenchaft.

Rosenkrantz.--Psychologie.

Kant.--Anthropologie. Kritik Reiner Vernunft.

" Kritik der Urtheilskraft.

Aristotle.--Metaphysics.

" On the Soul.

Plato.--Republic.

Cicero.--Tusculanæ Questiones.

B. ON THE SPECIFIC FACULTIES.

I. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers.

Hamilton.--Supplementary Dissertation, Note D.

O. Wight.--Philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton. Part II.

Stewart.--Philosophical Essays. Ess. II.

Brown.--Philosophy of Human Mind.

Mill.--Analysis of Human Mind.

A. Smith.--Essays on Philosophical Subjects. Of the External Senses.

Young.--Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy.

Comte.--Philosophy Positive.

Müller.--Elements of Physiology.

Tissot.--Anthropologie.

Maine de Biran.--Nouvelles Considerations sur les Rapports, etc.

Jouffroy.--Nouvelles Mélanges Philosophiques.

Royer Collard.--Fragments in Jouffroy's OEuvres de Reid.

Tortual.--Die Sinne des Menschen.

Buffier.--Traité des Premières Vérités.

Amédée Jacques.--Psychologie. Manuel de Phil. à l'usage des Coll.

Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques. Art. Sens.

Aristotle.--De Anima. Parva Naturalia.

J. Barth. Saint Hilaire.--Psychologie de Aristotle. Notes and preface.

II. MEMORY.

Stewart.--Intellectual Philosophy.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers. (Walker.)

Brown.--Philosophy of Human Mind.

Mill.--Analysis of Human Mind.

Abercrombie.--On Intellectual Powers.

Hume.--Treatise on Human Nature. Book I. Part I.

Aristotle.--Parva Naturalia.

Barthèleme Saint Hilaire.--Psychologie d'Aristotle. Part II.

Malebranche.--Recherche de la Vérité. Liv. II.

Rosenkrantz.--Psychologie.

Hegel.--Encycl. Phil. Wissench. Dritter Theil.

III. IMAGINATION.

Stewart.--Intellectual Philosophy.

Brown.--Philosophy of Human Mind.

Rauch.--Psychologie. Part II.

Sidney Smith.--Sketches of Philosophy.

Mill.--Analysis of Human Mind.

Amédée Jacques.--Manuel de Philosophie. Psychol. V.

Rosenkrantz.--Psychologie. Die Einbildungskraft.

Hegel.--Encyc. der Phil. Wissenchaft. Dritter Theil. L's Einbildung.

IV. ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZATION.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers.

Brown.--Philosophy of Human Mind.

Stewart.--Intellectual Philosophy.

A. Smith.--Considerations on First Formation of Language.

J. S. Mill.--System of Logic.

Whewell.--Philosophy of Inductive Sciences.

James Mill.--Analysis of Human Mind.

Thomson.--Laws of Thought.

Cousin.--Elements of Psychology. (Henry.)

Hume.--Treatise of Human Nature. Book I. Part I.

V. REASONING.

Hamilton.--Supplementary Dissertation, Note A.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers.

Stewart.--Intellectual Philosophy. Part II.

Locke.--On the Human Understanding. Book IV.

Whewell.--Philosophy of Inductive Sciences.

Buffier.--Premières Vérités.

Brown.--Philosophy of Human Mind.

Mill.--System of Logic.

Hamilton.--Discussions on Philosophy. (Turnbull Ed.) Article IV, Logic; also Appendix II. A and B.

Baynes.--New Analytic of Logical Forms.

Descartes.--Discours de la Méthode.

Condillac.--Art de Penser.

Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques. Logique.

Pascal.--Pensées--de l'Art de Persuader.

Port-Royal.--Logique.

Aristotle.--Organon.

VI. INTUITIVE CONCEPTION.

FIRST PRINCIPLES.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers. Essay VI., cap. III.

Hamilton.--Dissertation A. §§ 3, 4, 5.

Stewart.--Intellectual Philosophy. Part II., cap. I.

Coleridge.--Aids to Reflection.

Mill.--System of Logic. Book II., caps. V. and VI.

Buffier.--Premières Vérités. Part I., cap. VII.

TIME, SPACE.

Cousin.--Cours de Philosophie. Tome II., Leçons XVII, XVIII.

" Idem. Elements of Psychologie. Henry. Cap. III.

Locke.--Essay on the Human Understanding. Book II., cap. XXVI.

Stewart.--Philosophical Essays. Essay II., cap. II.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers. Essay III., cap. II.

Mill.--Analysis of the Human Mind. Cap. XIV., § V.

Roger Collard.--Fragments, IX., X.

Kant.--Kritik rein. vernunft. Transcend. Æsthet. Part I., § II.

Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques. Temps. Espace.

Hegel.--Encyclop. Philosoph. Wissench. Tsweiter Theil. Erst. Abschnitt.

IDENTITY.

Locke.--Essay, etc. Book II., cap. XXVII.

Cousin.--Review of do. as above. Eléments Psychologie, cap. III.

Reid.--Intellectual Powers. Essay III., cap. III.

Mill.--Analysis, etc., cap. XIV., § VII.

Whately.--Logic--Appendix. On Ambiguous Terms.

Butler.--Dissertation on Identity.

CAUSALITY.

Mill.--System of Logic. Book III., cap. XXI.

Whewell.--Philosophy of Inductive Sciences. Part I. Book III.

Locke.--Essay. Book II., cap. XXVI.

Tappan.--On the Will. Cap. II. Cause.

Bowen.--Metaphysics and Ethics.

Maine de Biran.--Examples des Leçons de Philosophie de Laromiquière.

Cousin.--OEuvres de Maine Biran. Preface.

As above. El. Psychologie. cap. IV.

THE BEAUTIFUL.

Kames.--Elements of Criticism.

Alison.--On Taste.

McDermot.--On Taste.

Stewart.--Philosophical Essays. Part II.

Brown.--Philosophy of the Human Mind. Emotions of Beauty.

Jouffroy.--Cours d'Esthetique.

Cousin.--Philosophy of the Beautiful. (Daniel, Trans.)

Kant.--Kritik der Urtheilskraft.

Hegel.--Cours d'Esthetique. (Benard, Tr.)

THE RIGHT.

Stewart.--Active and Moral Powers. (Walker Ed.)

Brown.--Philosophy of the Human Mind. Ethical Science.

Butler.--Sermons.

Paley.--Moral Philosophy.

Adam Smith.--Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Upham.--Mental Philosophy. Vol. II.

Winslow.--Elements of Moral Philosophy.

Wayland.--Moral Philosophy.

Whewell.--Elements of Morality.

Jouffroy.--Introduction to Ethics. (Channing, Tr.)

" Cours de Droit Natural.

Emile Saisset.--Manuel de Philosophie à l'usage des Coll. Morals.

Descartes.--Lettres.

Cicero.--De Officiis.

Aristotle.--Nicom. Eth.

Plato.--Republic and Gorgias.

II. THE SENSIBILITIES

Stewart.--Active and Moral Powers. (Walker Ed.)

Reid.--Faculties of the Human Mind. Essay III.

Brown.--Philosophy of the Human Mind. Emotions.

Upham.--Mental Philosophy. Vol. II.

Cogan.--On the Passions.

Descartes.--Les Passions de l'Âme.

Condillac.--Traité des Sensations.

Damiron.--Cours de Philosophie. De la Sensibilitè.

Jouffroy.--Mélanges Philosophiques. De l'Amour de Soi.

Aristotle.--On the Soul. Books II. and III.

III. THE WILL.

Edwards.--On the Will.

Tappan.--Review of do.

Day.--Review of do.

Bledsoe.--Examination of do.

I. Taylor.--Essay introductory to do.

Tappan.--On the Will. and do. on Moral Agency.

Mahan.--On the Will.

Upham.--On the Will.

Reid.--On the Faculties of the Human Soul. Essay IV.

Belsham.--Philosophy of the Human Mind.

Mill.--System of Logic. Book VI., cap. II.

Mill.--Analysis of the Human Mind. Cap. XXIV.

Cogan.--Ethical Questions. Question IV.

Stewart.--Active and Moral Powers. Cap. VI.

Reid.--Essays on Active Powers. Essay II.

Locke.--On the Human Understanding. Book II., cap. XXI.

Hamilton.--Philosophy of the Conditioned, cap. II., § 1. (O. W. Wight.)

Jouffroy.--Introduction to Ethics, § IV.

Leibnitz.--Essays de Théodicée.

Cousin.--Fragments Philosophiques. Preface.

Amédée Jacques.--Manuel de Phil. Psychologie. Volonté. XV.-XVII.

Maine de Biran.--OEuvres. Vol. IV.

" Controversy with Clarke.

Cousin.--Psychologie. (Henry, Tr.) Cap. X.

Damiron.--Psychologie. Liv. I., § II., cap. III.

Emile Saisset.--Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques. Art. Libertè.

* * * * *

Transcriber's note:

Many omissions of punctuation have been silently corrected, as have obvious typographical errors.

Variations in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have been retained.

Inconsistencies in headings are as in the original.

Duplicated section headings on consecutive lines have been removed.

The section General Observations (page 94 and 162) has been added to the Table of Contents.

References has been added to the Table of Contents.

Corrections include:

Page 55 "as that two straight lines should enclose a space" the "a" is missing in the original and has been added.

Page 89 "The soul seated in its presence-chamber, the brain, can cognize nothing beyond and without, for nothing can get except where it is present." the first letter of "get" is missing. It has been assumed that get is the most likely intention.

Page 435 No reference to Memdelssohn has been found. It is possibly a reference Moses Mendelssohn.

Page 568 "In order to do this, there is needed an influence from without," The "do" is missing and has been added. The text is arbitrary about spacing of e. g. and i. e., as the spaced variant is in the majority, it has been used throughout.

The author has wrongly spelled Leibniz as Leibnitz throughout. This has been retained.

The references to M'Dermot in the text have been changed to McDermot to conform with the References. Likewise M'Cosh (p534) is almost certainly James McCosh.