CHAPTER III.. Freedom of the Will.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Problems respecting the Will.--Our attention has thus far been directed to the psychological facts respecting the will, in itself considered, and also in its relations to the other mental powers. It becomes necessary now, in order to the more complete understanding of the matter, to look at some of the disputed points, the grand problems, respecting the human will, which have for ages excited and divided the reflecting world. The way is prepared for these more difficult questions, when once the simple facts, to which our attention has already been directed, are well understood. These questions are numerous, but, if I mistake not, they all resolve themselves virtually into the one general problem of the freedom of the will, or, at least, so link themselves with that as to admit of discussion in the same connection.

Freedom, what.--In approaching this much-disputed question, it is necessary to ascertain, in the first place, what is meant by freedom, and what by freedom of the will, else we may discuss the matter to no purpose. Various definitions of freedom have been given. It is a word in very common use, and, in its general application, not liable to be misunderstood. Every one who understands the ordinary language of life, knows well enough what freedom is. It denotes the opposite of restraint; the power to do what one likes, pleases, is inclined to do. My person is free, when it can come and go, do this or that, as suits my inclination. Any faculty of the mind, or organ of the body, is free, when its own specific and proper action is not hindered. Freedom of motion, is power to move when and where we please Freedom of speech, is power to say what we like. Freedom of action, is power to do what we like.

Freedom of the Will, what.--What, then, is freedom of the will? What can it be but the power of exercising, without restraint or hindrance, its own specific and proper function, viz., the putting forth volitions, just such volitions as we please. This as we have seen, is the proper office of the will, its specific and appropriate action. If nothing prevents or restrains me from forming and putting forth such volitions as I please, then my will is free; and not otherwise.

Freedom of the will, then, is not power to do what one wills, in the sense of executing volitions when formed that is simple freedom of the limbs, and muscular apparatus, not of will--a freedom which may be destroyed by a stroke of paralysis, or an iron chain;--it is not a freedom of walking, if one wills to walk, or of singing, or flying, or moving the right arm, if one is so disposed. That is freedom, but not freedom of the will. My will is free, not when I can do what I will to do, but when I can will to do just what I please. Whatever freedom the will has, must lie within its own proper sphere of action, and not without it; must relate to that, and not to something else. This distinction, so very obvious, has, nevertheless, been sometimes strangely overlooked.

Is, then, the human will free, in the sense now defined? Let us first notice some presumptions in favor of its freedom then the more direct argument.

§ I.--PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF FREEDOM.

The general Conviction of Freedom a Presumption in its Favor.--1. It is a presumption in favor of freedom that there is among men, a very general, not to say universal conviction of freedom. It is a prevalent idea, an established conviction and belief of the mind. We are conscious of this belief ourselves, we observe it in others. When we perform any act, or choose any course of conduct, we are impressed with the belief that we could have done or chosen differently, had we been so disposed. We never doubt or call in question this ability, in regard to the practical matters of life. The languages and the literature of the world bear witness to the universality of this belief. Now this general conviction and firm belief of freedom constitute, to say the least, a presumption, and a strong one, in favor of the doctrine. If men are free to do as they like, then they are free to will as they like, for the willing precedes the doing; and if they are not thus free, how happens this so general conviction of a freedom which they do not possess?

The Appeal to Consciousness.--The argument is sometimes stated, by the advocates of freedom, in a form which is liable to objection. The appeal is made directly to consciousness. We are conscious, it is said, of freedom, conscious of a power, when we do any thing, to do otherwise, to take some other course instead. Strictly speaking, we are conscious only of our present state of mind. I may know the past; but it is not a matter of consciousness; I may also know, perhaps, what might have been, in place of the actual past, but of this I am not conscious. When I experience a sensation, or put forth a volition, I am conscious of that sensation or volition; but I am not conscious of what never occurred, that is, of some other feeling or volition instead of an actual one. I may have a firm conviction, amounting even to knowledge, that at the moment of experiencing that feeling, or exercising that volition, it was possible for me to have exercised a different one; but it is a conviction, a belief, at most a knowledge, and not, properly, consciousness. I am conscious of the conviction that I am free, and that I can do otherwise than as I do; and this, in itself, is a presumption, that I have such a power; but I am not conscious of the power itself. It may be said, that if there were any restraint upon my will, to prevent my putting forth such volitions as I please, or to prevent my acting otherwise than I do, I should be conscious of such restraint; and this may be very true; and from the absence of any such consciousness of restraint, I may justly infer that I am free; but this, again, is an inference, and not a consciousness. One thing, however, I am conscious of, that my actual volitions are such, and only such, as I please to put forth; and this leads to the conviction that it is in my power to put forth any volition that I may please.

Our moral Nature a Presumption in Favor of Freedom.--2. It is a further presumption in favor of the entire freedom of the will, that man's moral nature seems to imply it. We approve or condemn the conduct of others. It is with the understanding that they acted freely, and could have done otherwise. We should never think of praising a man for doing what he could not help doing, or of blaming him for what it was utterly out of his power to avoid. So, also, we approve and condemn our own actions, and always with the understanding that these actions and volitions were free. There may be regret for that which was unavoidable, but never a sense of guilt, never remorse. The existence of these feelings always implies freedom of the will, the power to have done otherwise. Let any man select that period of his history, that act of his whole life, for which he blames himself most, and of which the recollection casts the deepest gloom and sadness over all his subsequent years, and let him ask himself why it is that he so blames himself for that course, and he will find, in every case, that it is because he knows that he might have done differently. Take away this conviction, and you take away the foundation of all his remorse, and of self-condemnation. The same thing is implied, also, in the feeling of obligation. It is impossible to feel under moral obligation to do what it is utterly and absolutely out of our power to do.

This View maintained by Mr. Upham.--"There are some truths," says Mr. Upham, "which are so deeply based in the human constitution, that all men of all classes receive them, and act upon them. They are planted deeply and immutably in the soul, and no reasoning, however plausible, can shake them. And, if we are not mistaken, the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as a condition of even the possibility of a moral nature, is one of these first truths. It seems to be regarded, by all persons, without any exception, as a dictate of common sense, and as a first principle of our nature, that men are morally accountable, and are the subjects of a moral responsibility in any respect, whatever, only so far as they possess freedom, both of the outward action, and of the will. They hold to this position, as an elementary truth, and would no sooner think of letting it go than of abandoning the conviction of their personal existence and identity. They do not profess to go into particulars, but they assert it in the mass, that man is a moral being only so far as he is free. And such a unanimous and decided testimony, bearing, as it absolutely does, the seal and superscription of nature herself, is entitled to serious consideration."

Also by Dr. Reid.--Dr. Reid, also, takes essentially the same view. He regards it as a first principle, to be ranked in the same class with the conviction of our personal existence and identity, and the existence of a material world, "that we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our will." It is implied, he maintains, in every act of volition, in all deliberation, and in every resolution or purpose formed in consequence of deliberation. "It is not more evident," he says, "that mankind have a conviction of the existence of a material world, than that they have the conviction of some degree of power in themselves, and in others, every one over his own actions, and the determinations of his will--a conviction so early, so general, and so interwoven with the whole of human conduct, that it must be the natural effect of our constitution, and intended by the Author of our being to guide our actions."

Consequences of the Opposite.--3. The consequences of the opposite view afford a presumption in favor of freedom.

If the will is not free, if all our liberty is merely a liberty to do what we will to do, or to execute the volitions which we form, but we have no power over the volitions themselves, then we have no power whatever to will or to act differently from what we do. This is fatalism. All that the fatalist maintains is, that we are governed by circumstances out of our own control, so that, situated as we are, it is impossible for us to act otherwise than as we do. From this follows, as a natural and inevitable consequence, the absence of all accountability and obligation. The foundation of these, as we have already seen, is freedom. Take this away, and you strike a fatal blow at man's moral nature. It is no longer possible for me to feel under obligation to do what I have absolutely no power to do, or to believe myself accountable for doing what I could not possibly avoid. Morality, duty, accountability, become mere chimeras, idle fancies of the brain, devices of the priest and the despot, to frighten men into obedience and subjection.

This View sustained by Facts.--These are not random statements. It is a significant fact, that those who have undertaken to deny accountability, and moral obligation, have, almost without exception, I believe, been advocates of the doctrine of necessity. Indeed, it seems impossible to maintain such views upon any other ground; while, on the other hand, the denial of the freedom of the will leads almost of necessity to such conclusions. "Remorse," says Mr. Belsham, "is the exquisitely painful feeling which arises from the belief that, in circumstances precisely the same, we might have chosen and acted differently. This fallacious feeling is superseded by the doctrine of necessity."

Equally plain, and to the same effect, are the following passages from the correspondence of Diderot, as quoted by Mr. Stewart: "Examine it narrowly, and you will see that the word liberty is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive of a being acting without a motive, than we can of one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves.... We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they will and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished.... The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous.... Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom."

These Opinions not to be charged upon all Necessitarians.--It is not to be supposed, of course, that all who deny the freedom of the will, adopt the views above expressed. Whether such denial, however, consistently followed out to its just and legitimate conclusions, does not lead to such results, is another question.

§ II.--THE DIRECT ARGUMENT.

Another Mode of Argument.--Thus far we have considered only the presumptions in favor of the freedom of the will. We find them numerous and strong. The question is, however, to be decided not by presumptions for or against, but by direct argument based upon a careful inquiry into the psychological facts of the case. To this let us now proceed, bearing in mind, as we advance, what are the essential phenomena of the will, as already ascertained, and what is meant by freedom of the will as already defined.

The Will free unless its appropriate Action is hindered.--It is evident that, if we are right in our ideas of what freedom is, the will is strictly and properly free, provided nothing interferes with, and prevents, our putting forth such volitions as we please and choose to put forth. The specific and appropriate action of the will, as we have seen, is simply to put forth volitions. Whatever freedom it has, then, must lie within that sphere, and not without it, must relate to that, and not to something else; whatever restraint or want of freedom it has, must also be found within these limits. My will is free, when I can will to do just what I please.

Strength of Inclination, no Impediment.--If this be so, then it is clear, 1. That mere strength of inclination can by no means impair the freedom of the will. Be the inclination never so strong, it matters not. Nay, so far from interfering with freedom, it is an essential element of it. Freedom presupposes and implies inclination. One is surely none the less free because very strongly inclined to do as he likes, provided he can do what he wishes or prefers. This is as true of the action of the will as of any other action.

The Source of Inclination, of no Consequence to the present Inquiry.--2. It is evident, furthermore, that freedom has nothing to do with the source of my inclinations, any more than with their strength. It makes no difference what causes my preference, or whether any thing causes it. I have a preference, an inclination, a disposition to do a given thing, and put forth a given volition--am disposed to do it, and can do it--then I am free, my will is free. It is of no consequence how I came by that inclination or disposition. The simple question is, Am I at liberty to follow it?

The Interference must be from without, and must affect the Choice.--It is evident, moreover, according to what has now been said, that if there be really any restraint upon the will, or lack of freedom in its movements, it must proceed from something extraneous, outside the will itself, something which comes in from without, and that in such a way as to interfere, in some way with my choice; for it is there that the element of freedom lies. But whatever interferes with my choice, interferes with my willing at all; the act is no longer a voluntary act. Choice is essential to volition, the very element of it. In order to an act of will as we have seen, there must be liberty to choose, deliberation, actual preference. Volition presupposes them, and is based on them. Whatever prevents them, prevents volition. Whatever places me in such a state of mind that I have no preference at all, no choice, as to any given thing, places me in such a state that I have also no volition as to that thing. The question of freedom is forestalled in such a case, becomes absurd. Where there is no volition, there is of course no freedom of volition, nor yet any want of freedom. Freedom of will is power to will as I like, but now I have no liking, no preference.

The Supposition varied.--But suppose now that I am not prevented from choosing, but only from carrying out my choice in actual volition; from willing, according to my choice. Then, also, the act is no longer properly a volition, an act of will, for one essential element of every such act, viz., choice, is wanting. I have a choice, indeed, but it is not here, not represented in this so-called volition, lies in another direction, is, in fact, altogether opposed to this, my so-called volition. There can be no such volition. The human mind is a stranger to any such phenomenon, and if it did occur, it would not be volition, not an act of the will, not a voluntary act. Whatever, then, comes in, either to prevent my choosing, or to prevent my exercising volition according to my choice, does, in fact, prevent my willing at all. If there be an act of the will, it is, in its very nature, a free act, and cannot be otherwise. Allow me to choose, and to put forth volition according to my choice, and you leave me free. Prevent this, and you prevent my willing at all.

The Limitation, as usually regarded, not really one.--Those who contend that the will is not free, place the limitation back of the choice. Choice is governed by inclination, they say, and inclination depends on circumstances, on education, habits, fashion, etc., things, in great measure, beyond our control; and while these circumstances remain the same, a man cannot choose otherwise than he does. To this I reply, that, as we have already seen, the will is strictly and properly free, provided nothing interferes with, and prevents, our putting forth such volitions as we choose to put forth. Is there, then, any thing in these circumstances which are supposed to control our choice, and to be so fatal to our freedom, is there in them any thing which really interferes with, or prevents our willing as we choose? Does the fact that I am inclined, and strongly so, to a given choice, prevent me from putting forth that choice in the shape of executive volition? So far from this, that inclination is the very circumstance that leads to my doing it. All that could possibly be contended, is that the supposed inclination to a given choice is likely to prevent my having some other and different choice. But that has nothing to do with the question of the freedom of my will, which depends, as we have seen, not on the power to choose otherwise than one is inclined, or than one likes, but as he likes. What force, I ask again, is there in any circumstance, or combination of circumstances, which go to mould and shape my inclinations and my disposition, and have no further power over me, what force in them, or what tendency, to prevent my willing as I choose, as I like, as I am inclined? Nay, if my will acts at all, it must, as I have shown, act in this way, and therefore act freely.

Freedom of Inclination not Freedom of Will.--But suppose I have no power to like, or to be inclined, differently from what I do like, and am now inclined? I reply, it matters not as to the present question. The supposition now made, takes away or limits, not the freedom of the will, it does not touch that; but the freedom of the affections. Can I like what I do not like--and can I put forth such volitions as I please or choose--are two distinct questions, and again I repeat that the freedom of our will depends, not on our having this or that particular choice, but on our being able to carry out whatever choice we do make into our volitions; not on our being able to will otherwise than we choose, nor yet on our ability to choose otherwise than we do, but simply on our being able to will as we choose, whatever that choice may be.

Are the Sensibilities Free.--Have I, in reality, however, any freedom of the affections, any power under given circumstances, to be affected otherwise than I am, to feel otherwise than I do? I reply, the affections are not elements of the will, are not under its immediate control; are not strictly voluntary. It depends on a great variety of circumstances, what, in any given case, your affections or inclinations may be. You have no power of will directly over them. You can modify and shape them, only by shaping your own voluntary action so far as that bears upon their formation. By shaping your CHARACTER which IS under your control, you may, in a manner, at least, determine the nature and degree of the emotions which will arise, under given circumstances, in your bosom.

The two Questions entirely distinct.--But, however that may be, it has nothing to do, I repeat, with the question now under discussion. The freedom of the affections, and the freedom of the will, are by no means the same thing. We have already seen that there may be a fixed and positive connection between my inclinations and my choice, and so my will, and yet my will be perfectly free. This is the main thing to be settled; and there seems to be no need of further argument to establish this point; and if this be so, it decides the question as to the freedom of the will.

Bearing of this View upon the divine Government.--The view now taken, leaves it open and quite in the power of Providence, so to shape circumstances, guide events, and so to array, and bring to bear on the mind of man, motives and inducements to any given course, as virtually to control and determine his conduct, by controlling and determining his inclinations, and so his choice; while, at the same time, the man is left perfectly free to put forth such volitions as he pleases, and to do as he likes. There can be no higher liberty than this. To this point I shall again revert, when the question comes up respecting the divine agency in connection with human freedom.