Part 40

The council of war assembled on the night of the 1st of July at the head-quarters at Lavillette, under the presidentship of the Prince of Eckmuhl. Care was taken, it appeared, to keep away some suspected generals; and not to neglect calling those officers, whose principles, moderation, or weakness, was known. All the marshals present in the capital were admitted; and they, who had lately refused to fight, did not refuse to come to capitulate.

The committee, in order to prevent all political discussion, had stated the questions, to which the members of the council were to confine their deliberations: but this precaution, as might be supposed, did not prevent their entering familiarly into the moral and political considerations, that might influence the defence or surrender of the place besieged. Marshal Soult pleaded the cause of Louis XVIII.; and was eagerly seconded by other marshals, and several generals, who, though they entered into the council under the national colours, would willingly have gone out of it with the white cockade.

It is impossible, to recapitulate the opinions, given in turn or confusedly by the fifty persons, who were called to take a share in this great and important deliberation. Their speeches, or rather their conversation, turned alternately on Paris and on the Bourbons.

"We are told," said the partisans of Louis XVIII. and the capitulation, "that Paris, covered without by an army of eighty thousand men; and defended within by the federates, the sharpshooters, the national guard, and an immense population; might resist the efforts of the allies for twenty days at least. We are told, that its immense extent will render the arrival of provision easy. We admit the possibility of all this: but what will be the ultimate effect of this resistance? To allow the Emperor Alexander, and the Emperor of Austria, time to arrive.... The allies, we know perfectly well, promise to leave us the power of choosing our sovereign: but will they keep their promises? and what conditions will they annex to them? Already Wellington and Blucher have announced, that they will require guarantees, and fortified towns, if Louis XVIII. be rejected. Is not this equivalent to a formal declaration, that the allies are resolved, to retain that sovereign on the throne? Let us voluntarily rally round him, therefore, while we still can. His ministers led him astray, but his intentions were always pure: he knows the faults he has committed; he will be eager to repair them, and to give us the institutions yet necessary, to consolidate the rights and liberties of the people on bases not to be shaken."

"This reasoning may be just," answered their opponents; "but experience, of more weight than any reasoning, has convinced us, that we must not rely on empty promises. The hopes you have conceived rest on conjecture, or on the word of the agents of the Bourbons. Before we surrender ourselves into the hands of the King, he must make known to us the guarantees, by which we are to be secured. If they be agreeable to us, then we may deliberate but if we open our gates without conditions, and previous to the arrival of Alexander, Wellington and the Bourbons will make a jest of their promises, and oblige us to submit to the will of the conqueror without pity. Besides, why should we despair of the safety of France? Is the loss of a single battle, then, to decide the fate of a great nation? Have we not still immense resources, to oppose to the enemy? Have the federates, the national guard, and all true Frenchmen, refused to shed their blood in defence of the glory, the honour, and the independence of their country? While we are fighting under the walls of the capital, the levy in mass of the patriots will be arranged in the departments: and when our enemies see, that we are determined to defend our independence, they will rather respect it, than expose themselves to a patriotic and national war for interests not their own. We must refuse, therefore, to surrender; and place ourselves in a situation, by a vigorous defence, to give the law, instead of receiving it."

"You maintain," it was replied, "that we may raise in mass the federates and the patriots. But how will you arm them? we have no muskets. Besides, can a levy in mass be organised on a sudden? Before you could have a single battalion at your disposal, Paris would have under its feeble ramparts sixty thousand Bavarians, and a hundred and forty thousand Austrians more to fight. What will you do then? You must ultimately surrender: and the blood you will have shed will be lost without return, and without utility. But will not that we shall have spilt of the enemy fall on our own heads? Will they not make us expiate our mad and cruel resistance by a disgraceful capitulation? If the allies, at the present moment, think themselves strong enough to refuse you a suspension of hostilities, what will they do, when they have their twelve hundred thousand soldiers on our territory? The dismemberment of France, the pillage and devastation of the capital, will be, perhaps, the fruit of the rash defence you propose to us."

These considerations, the force of which was generally felt, were unanimously approved. It was acknowledged, that it would be unquestionably most prudent, not to expose the capital to the consequences and dangers of a siege, or of being taken by assault. It was acknowledged, too, at least by implication, that, the return of the Bourbons being inevitable, it was better to recall them voluntarily, under good conditions, than to leave to the allies the act of restoring them. But the members did not think proper, to explain themselves on this delicate subject; and accordingly confined themselves to laconic answers of the questions proposed by the committee.

Questions proposed by the Committee of Government to the Council of War, assembled at la Villette, July the 1st, 1815.

"1st. What is the state of the intrenchments raised for the defence of Paris?--Answer. The state of the intrenchments, and their supply of ordnance, on the right bank of the Seine, though incomplete, is in general satisfactory enough. On the left bank the intrenchments may be considered as null.

"2d. The army, can it cover and defend Paris?--Ans. It may: but not indefinitely. It ought not to expose itself to a want of provision, or to have its retreat cut off.

"3d. If the army were attacked on all points, could it prevent the enemy from penetrating into Paris on one side or the other?--Ans. It would be difficult for the army to be attacked on all points at once: but should this happen, there would be little hope of resistance.

"4th. In case of a defeat, could the commander in chief reserve, or collect, sufficient means, to oppose a forcible entry?--Ans. No general can answer for the consequences of a battle.

"5th. Is there sufficient ammunition for several battles?--Ans. Yes.

"6th. In fine, can you answer for the fate of the capital? and for how long a time?--Ans. We can warrant nothing on this head.

(Signed) "The Marshal Minister at War, "The Prince of ECKMUHL.

"July the 2d, 3 o'clock in the morning."

The answer of the council of war was transmitted immediately to the Tuileries, and there became the subject of a long and profound deliberation.

In fine, after having weighed the advantages and dangers of a protracted defence; after having considered, that Paris, without hope of succour, and surrounded on all sides, would either be taken by assault, or forced to surrender at discretion that the army, without any means of retreat, would find themselves perhaps reduced to choose between the disgrace of surrendering themselves prisoners, and the necessity of burying themselves under the ruins of the capital; the committee decided unanimously, that Paris should not be defended, and that they would submit to deliver it into the hands of the allies, since the allies would not suspend hostilities at any other price.

General Ziethen, who commanded Prince Blucher's advanced guard, was informed of this determination by the Prince of Eckmuhl. He returned him the following answer:

"To the Prince of Eckmuhl.

"July the 2d.

"Monsieur General,

"General Revest has communicated to me verbally, that you demand an armistice, to treat of the surrender of Paris.

"In consequence, M. General, I have to inform you, that I am in no way authorized to accept an armistice. I dare not even announce this demand to his Highness Marshal Prince Blucher: but however, if the deputies of the government declare to my aide-de-camp, Count Westphalen, that they will surrender the city, and that the French army will surrender itself also, I will accept a suspension of hostilities.

"I will then communicate it to his highness Prince Blucher, to treat of the other articles.

(Signed) "ZIETHEN."

When Brennus, abusing his victory, offered an insult to the vanquished, the Romans ran to arms. We, less sensible, and less proud, heard, without shuddering, the insult offered to our eighty thousand brave soldiers, and accepted, without blushing, the disgrace thus inflicted upon them and us!

Our only revenge was to despatch MM. de Tromeling and Macirone, the former to Prince Blucher, the latter to Lord Wellington.