Part 4

The cultivator of those branches of natural science which constitute practical and experimental philosophy;—equally with the teacher of religion and morals,—extends the beneficial effects of his researches and knowledge beyond the bounds of his particular country. Truth is every where the same; and the promulgation of it tends, at all times and in all places, to elevate to its proper station the dignity of man. The more extensively, then, true science can be diffused, the greater will be the means—the fairer will be the rational prospect, of enlarging the sphere of human happiness. The philosopher may, pre-eminently, be considered as a citizen of the world; yet without detracting in any degree from that spirit of patriotism, which ever stimulates a good man to contribute his primary and most important services to his own country. There are, indeed, some species of aids, which are exclusively due to a community, by all its citizens; and, consequently, such as they are bound to withhold from other national communities, in certain contingencies and under peculiar circumstances. But a knowledge of those truths which lead to the acquisition of wisdom and practice of virtue, serves to meliorate the condition of mankind generally, at all times, and under all circumstances;—inasmuch as they greatly assist in banishing error, with its frequent concomitant, vice, not only from the more civilized portions of the world, but also by their inherent influence, from among nations less cultivated and refined.

The truths promulgated by means of a natural and sublime philosophy—corresponding, as this does, with the dignity of an enlightened spirit—must ever emanate from a virtuous heart as well as an expanded intellect. Hence, the real philosopher,—he whose principles are unpolluted by the sophisticated tenets of some modern pretenders to the appellation,—can scarcely fail to be a good man. Such was the immortal Newton; such were a Boyle, a Hale and a Barrow,—a Boerhaave, a Stephen Hales and a Bradley; with many worthies equally illustrious,—whose glories will, for ever, retain their primitive splendour.

Even the most celebrated sages of antiquity, extremely imperfect as we know the philosophy of the early ages to have been, elucidated, by the purity of their lives and the morality of their doctrines, the truth of the position,—that the cultivation of natural wisdom, unaided as it then was by the lights of revelation, encreased every propensity to moral virtue. Such were Socrates, Plato his disciple, and Anaxagoras; who flourished between four and five centuries before the Christian era.

The life of Socrates, who is styled by Cicero the Father of Philosophers, afforded a laudable example of moderation, patience, and other virtues; and his doctrines abound with wisdom. Anaxagoras and Plato united with some of the nobler branches of natural science, very rational conceptions of moral truth. Both of them had much higher claims to the title of philosophers, than Aristotle, who appeared about a century afterwards. This philosopher, however,—for, as such, he continued for many ages to be distinguished in the schools,—was, like Socrates, more a metaphysician than an observer of the natural world. His morality is the most estimable part of his works; though his conceptions of moral truths were much less just than those of Anaxagoras and Plato: for his physics are replete with notions and terms alike vague, unmeaning and obscure. The intimate connexion that subsists between the physical and moral fitness of things, in relation to their respective objects, was more evidently known to Anaxagoras and Plato, than to either Socrates or Aristotle: and the reason is obvious;—both of the former cultivated the sublime science of Astronomy.

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Footnote 5:

Aristotle is supposed, by some, to have imbibed the best and most rational of his notions from his master Plato; to whom, notwithstanding, he seems to have been greatly inferior as a moral philosopher.

His opinions respecting government, abound in good sense. As a general outline of his sentiments on this subject, it may serve to mention, that he distinguished civil government into two kinds; one, in which the general welfare is the great object; the other, in which this is not at all considered. In the first class, he places the limited monarchy—the aristocratical form of government—and the republic, properly so called. In the second, he comprehends tyranny—oligarchy—and democracy; considering these as corruptions of the three first. Limited monarchy, he alleges, degenerates into despotism, when the sovereign assumes to himself the exercise of the entire authority of the state, refusing to submit his power to any controul; the aristocracy sinks into an oligarchy, when the supreme power is no longer possessed by a reasonable proportion of virtuous men,—but by a small number of rulers, whose wealth alone constitutes their claim to authority; and the republican government is debased into a democracy, when the poorest class of the people have too great an influence in the public deliberations.

In Physics, Aristotle scarcely deserves the name of a Philosopher.—As to his metaphysical opinions, in the common acceptation of the term,—it is impossible to ascertain, with certainty, what they really were. It was not until eighteen centuries after his death, that his philosophy—such as it was then promulgated, anew—began to be generally known and studied. After the sacking of Constantinople by the Turks, in the year 1453, some fugitive Greeks, who had escaped the fury of the Ottoman arms, brought from that city into the west of Europe many of the writings of the Stagyritish philosopher: But, although some of his treatises were previously known, they were such as had passed through the hands of the Arabs, in translations into their tongue; done by men who, it may be fairly presumed, very imperfectly understood the author’s language; consequently not capable, even if they were disposed, to do justice to the sense of the original. Subsequent translations of those writings, from the Arabic, probably occasioned, in the same way, further departures from the meaning of the original Greek. Thus varying, as may be supposed, from the opinions taught by Aristotle himself,—the philosophy of the schoolmen, engrafted upon his systems, was neither entirely that of the Stagyrite, nor altogether different. His writings, nevertheless, gave birth to what is termed the Scholastic Philosophy,—“that motley offspring of error and ingenuity,” as it is called by Mr. Mallet. “To trace at length,” says this writer, “the rise, progress, and variations of this philosophy, would be an undertaking not only curious, but instructive; as it would unfold to us all the mazes in which the force, the subtlety, the extravagance of human wit, can lose themselves: till not only profane learning, but Divinity itself, was at last, by the refined frenzy of those who taught both, subtilized into mere notion and air.”

Footnote 5a:

Aristot. de Rep.—lib, 3. cap. 6.

Footnote 5b:

Id. Rhet.—lib. 1. cap. 8.

Footnote 5c:

Id. de Rep.—lib. 3. cap. 7.

Footnote 5d:

In his Life of Lord Chancellor Bacon.

Footnote 5e:

Ibid.

Footnote 6:

Baron Bielfeld (in his Elements of Universal Erudition) observes, that the fondness for Aristotle’s reveries began about the twelfth century. It was then, that the scholastic philosophy was formed. This was partly borrowed from the writings of the Arabs, who were always attached to the theories of Aristotle: they were initiated into a subtile, ambiguous, abstract and capricious mode of reasoning; by which they never hit the truth, but constantly went on the one side, or beyond the truth. Toward the end of the fourteenth century, continues the learned Baron, this absurd system arrived to a great height. It became a mere jargon, a confused heap of unintelligible ideas.

The celebrated Mr. Boyle, the great successor of Lord Verulam (St. Albans) in experimental philosophy, is said to have declared against the Philosophy of Aristotle, as having in it more of words than things; promising much and performing little; and giving the Inventions of Men for indubitable proofs, instead of building upon observation and experiment. He was so zealous for, and so scrupulous about, this true method of learning by experiment, that, though the Cartesian philosophy then made a great noise in the world, yet he would never be persuaded to read the works of Descartes; for fear he should be amused, and led away, by plausible accounts of things founded on conjecture, and merely hypothetical. (See Art. Boyle, in the New and General Biography.)—This great and excellent man was born the same year in which Bacon, Viscount St. Albans, died.

Epicurus, the disciple of Democritus, and follower of the Philosophy of Aristotle, was engaged, although unsuccessfully enough, in the labyrinth of Metaphysics, as well as in Physics. He adopted the system of Atoms, which Democritus first propagated; and hence appears to be derived Descartes’s equally preposterous doctrine of the Plenum and of Vortices.

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To this cause, then, may be fairly attributed the half-enlightened notions of the Deity, and of a future state, entertained by these pagan searchers after truth. To the same cause may be traced the sentiment that dictated the reply made by Anaxagoras,—when, in consequence of his incessant contemplation of the stars, he was asked, “if he had no concern for his country?”—“I incessantly regard my country,” said he, pointing to Heaven.

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Footnote 7:

“Nulla gens tam fera, quæ non sciat Deum habendum esse, quamvis ignoret qualem habere deceat.”