Appendix 2.)

TO M. DE VERGENNES.

Paris, Monday morning, August, 1779.

It is not, sir, to the king's minister that I am now writing, but my confidence in your kindness makes me hope that I am addressing a man whom I may safely call my friend, to whom I am merely giving an account of all that is most interesting to me. You may confer a great obligation upon me, (and render one perhaps to the public,) by employing in a less useless manner the few talents a soldier may possess, who has been hitherto rather fortunate in war, and who supplies his want of knowledge by the purest ardour in the cause.

I have seen the Comte de Maurepas, and I told him what I have the honour of communicating to you; he would not agree to the projects in question, and was doubtless right, although my own opinion remains unchanged; but he thinks that I, who was one of the first to speak of the expedition with fifteen hundred or two thousand men, must now command six hundred hussars, and that this change would be injurious to me. He, perhaps, imagined, as some others have done, from kindness towards me, that such a command would be beneath me. I ought not, besides, he added, to exchange a certainty for an uncertainty.

To this I answer, in the first place, that from the extreme kindness of the public towards me, nothing (I mean in relation to what passes in my own heart) can ever be injurious to me; that my setting out with only six hundred men would have been attributed to its real motive, and therefore pardoned. In the second place, to suspect me of entering into a calculation with my country, and of despising any means whatever of serving her, would either prove a want of discernment or of memory; and to the last objection, I reply, that the expedition of which I spoke to you yesterday, is quite as certain as my own.

If the troops had remained in a state of inactivity, it would have been very natural if my ardour had induced me to adopt the trade of a corsair; nay, it would have been natural if I had set out in an armed boat; but when an opportunity offers for employing on a grander scale the talents of a man who has never exercised a soldier's trade but on a wide field, it would be unfortunate for him to lose the power of distinguishing himself, and rendering, perhaps, some important services to his own country; and it would be injudicious in the government not to put to the test that reputation which has been gained in foreign service.

May I, sir, speak to you with frankness? What is most proper for me, would be an advance guard of grenadiers and chasseurs, and a detachment of the king's dragoons, making in all, from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, to raise me above the line, and give me the power of action. There are not many lieutenants-general, still fewer field-marshals, and no brigadiers, who have had such important commands confided to them as chance has given me. I also know the English, and they know me--two important considerations during a war. The command I wished for has even been given to a colonel.

It is said that M. de Maillebois, M. de Voyer, and M. de Melfort, will be employed; I know then first and last of these gentlemen; M. de Melfort is a field-marshal, and although I have exercised that trade myself, I should be well pleased to be under his orders. I wish to be chosen in the report of the army, not of the court; I do not belong to the court, still less am I a courtier; and I beg the king's ministers to look upon me as having belonged to a corps of the guards.

The Count de Maurepas only replied to me, perhaps, to divert my attention from some projects which are known unto me; I shall see him again on Wednesday morning, and my fate will then be decided. You would give me, sir, a great proof of friendship, by paying him a visit either to-night or to-morrow morning, and communicating to him the same sentiments you expressed to me yesterday. It is more important that you should see him at that time, because, if I hear from Lorient that the vessels are in readiness, I know not how to dissemble, and I must demand my farewell audience. The little expedition will then be given to some lieutenant-colonel, who may never have looked with the eye of a general, who may not possess great talents, but who, if he be brave and prudent, will lead the six hundred men as well as M. de Turenne could do if he were to return to life. The detachment of dragoons might then be kept back, the more so, as when reduced to fifty it would only become ridiculous; and the major, who takes charge of the detail, would likewise attend to the detail of my advance guard, in which I place great dependence.

I acknowledge to you, that I feel no dependence on M. de Montbarry, and I even wish, that my affairs could be arranged by you and M. de Maurepas. I know, sir, that I am asking for a proof of friendship which must give you some trouble, but I request it because I depend fully upon that friendship.

Pardon this scrawl, Sir; pardon my importunity; and pardon the liberty I take in assuring you so simply of my attachment and respect.

DR. FRANKLIN TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Passy, 24th August, 1779.

Sir,--The congress, sensible of your merit towards the United States, but unable adequately to reward it, determined to present you with a sword, as a small mark of their grateful acknowledgment: they directed it to be ornamented with suitable devices. Some of the principal actions of the war, in which you distinguished yourself by your bravery and conduct, are therefore represented upon it. These, with a few emblematic figures, all admirably well executed, make its principal value. By the help of the exquisite artists of France, I find it easy to express everything but the sense we have of your worth, and our obligations to you for this, figures, and even words, are found insufficient. I, therefore, only add that, with the most perfect esteem, I have the honour to be,

B. FRANKLIN.

P.S. My grandson goes to Havre with the sword, and will have the honour of presenting it to you.

TO DR. FRANKLIN.

(ORIGINAL.)

Havre, 29th August, 1779,

Sir,--Whatever expectations might have been raised from the sense of past favours, the goodness of the United States to me has ever been such, that on every occasion it far surpasses any idea I could have conceived. A new proof of that flattering truth I find in the noble present, which congress has been pleased to honour me with, and which is offered in such a manner by your excellency as will exceed everything, but the feelings of an unbounded gratitude.

In some of the devices I cannot help finding too honourable a reward for those slight services which, in concert with my fellow soldiers, and under the god-like American hero's orders, I had the good fortune to render. The sight of those actions, where I was a witness of American bravery and patriotic spirit, I shall ever enjoy with that pleasure which becomes a heart glowing with love for the nation, and the most ardent zeal for its glory and happiness. Assurances of gratitude, which I beg leave to present to your excellency, are much too inadequate to my feelings, and nothing but such sentiments can properly acknowledge your kindness towards me. The polite manner in which Mr. Franklin was pleased to deliver that inestimable sword, lays me under great obligations to him, and demands my particular thanks.

With the most perfect respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

West Point, 30th Sept., 1779.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,--A few days ago, I wrote a letter in much haste; since that, I have been honoured with the company of Chevalier de la Luzerne, and by him was favoured with your obliging letter of the 12th of June, which filled me with equal pleasure and surprise; the latter at hearing that you had not received one of the many letters I had written to you since you left the American shore. It gave me infinite pleasure to hear from your sovereign, and of the joy which your safe arrival in France had diffused among your friends. I had no doubt that this would be the case; to hear it from yourself adds pleasure to the account; and here, my dear friend, let me congratulate you on your new, honourable, and pleasing appointment in the army commanded by the Count de Vaux, which I shall accompany with an assurance that none can do it with more warmth of affection, or sincere joy, than myself. Your forward zeal in the cause of liberty; your singular attachment to this infant world; your ardent and persevering efforts, not only in America, but since your return to France, to serve the United States; your polite attention to Americans, and your strict and uniform friendship for me, have ripened the first impressions of esteem and attachment which I imbibed for you into such perfect love and gratitude, as neither time nor absence can impair. This will warrant my assuring you that, whether in the character of an officer at the head of a corps of gallant Frenchmen, if circumstances should require this; whether as a major-general, commanding a division of the American army; or whether, after our swords and spears have given place to the ploughshare and pruning-hook, I see you as a private gentleman, a friend and companion, I shall welcome you with all the warmth of friendship to Columbia's shores; and, in the latter case, to my rural cottage, where homely fare and a cordial reception shall be substituted for delicacies and costly living. This, from past experience, I know you can submit to; and if the lovely partner of your happiness will consent to participate with us in such rural entertainment and amusements, I can undertake, in behalf of Mrs. Washington, that she will do everything in her power to make Virginia agreeable to the Marchioness. My inclination and endeavours to do this cannot be doubted, when I assure you that I love everybody that is dear to you, and, consequently, participate in the pleasure you feel in the prospect of again becoming a parent; and do most sincerely congratulate you and your lady on this fresh pledge she is about to give you of her love.

I thank you for the trouble you have taken, and your polite attention, in favouring me with a copy of your letter to congress; and feel, as I am persuaded they must do, the force of such ardent zeal as you therein express for the interest of this country. The propriety of the hint you have given them must carry conviction, and, I trust, will have a salutary effect; though there is not, I believe, the same occasion for the admonition now that there was several months ago. Many late changes have taken place in that honourable body, which have removed, in a very great degree, if not wholly, the discordant spirit which, it is said, prevailed in the winter, and I hope measures will also be taken to remove those unhappy and improper differences which have extended themselves elsewhere, to the prejudice of our affairs in Europe.

I have a great pleasure in the visit which the Chevalier de la Luzerne and Monsieur Marbois did me the honour to make at this camp; concerning both of whom I have imbibed the most favourable impressions, and I thank you for the honourable mention you made of me to them. The chevalier, till he had announced himself to congress, did not choose to be received in his public character; if he had, except paying him military honours, it was not my intention to depart from that plain and simple manner of living which accords with the real interest and policy of men struggling under every difficulty for the attainment of the most inestimable blessing of life, liberty. The chevalier was polite enough to approve my principle, and condescended to appear pleased with our Spartan living. In a word, he made us all exceedingly happy by his affability and good humour, while he remained in camp.

You are pleased, my dear marquis, to express an earnest desire of seeing me in France, after the establishment of our independency, and do me the honour to add, that you are not singular in your request. Let me entreat you to be persuaded, that, to meet you anywhere, after the final accomplishment of so glorious an event, would contribute to my happiness; and that to visit a country to whose generous aid we stand so much indebted, would be an additional pleasure; but remember, my good friend, that I am unacquainted with your language, that I am too far advanced in years to acquire a knowledge of it, and that, to converse through the medium of an interpreter, upon common occasions, especially with the ladies, must appear so extremely awkward, insipid, and uncouth, that I can scarcely bear it in idea. I will, therefore, hold myself disengaged for the present; but when I see you in Virginia, we will talk of this matter, and fix our plans.

The declaration of Spain in favour of France has given universal joy to every Whig; while the poor Tory droops like a withering flower under a declining sun. We are anxiously expecting to hear of great and important events on your side of the Atlantic; at present, the imagination is left in the wide field of conjecture, our eyes one moment are turned to an invasion of England, then of Ireland, Minorea, Gibraltar; in a word, we hope everything, but know not what to expect, or where to fix. The glorious success of Count d'Estaing in the West Indies, at the same time that it adds dominion to France, and fresh lustre to her arms, is a source of new and unexpected misfortune to our tender and generous parent, and must serve to convince her of the folly of quitting the substance in pursuit of a shadow; and, as there is no experience equal to that which is bought, I trust she will have a superabundance of this kind of knowledge, and be convinced, as I hope all the world and every tyrant in it will be, that the best and only safe road to honour, glory, and true dignity, is justice.

We have such repeated advice of Count d'Estaing's being in these seas, that, though I have no official information of the event, I cannot help giving entire credit to the report, and looking for his arrival every moment, and I am preparing accordingly; the enemy at New York also expect it; and, to guard against the consequences, as much as it is in their power to do, are repairing and strengthening all the old fortifications, and adding new ones in the vicinity of the city. Their fears, however, do not retard an embarkation which was making, and generally believed to be for the West Indies or Charlsetown: it still goes forward; and, by my intelligence, it will consist of a pretty large detachment. About fourteen days ago, one British regiment (the forty-fourth completed) and three Hessian regiments were embarked, and are gone, as is supposed, to Halifax. The operations of the enemy this campaign have been confined to the establishment of works of defence, taking a post at King's Ferry, and burning the defenceless towns of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk, on the Sound, within reach of their shipping, where little else was, or could be, opposed to them, than the cries of distressed women and helpless children; but these were offered in vain. Since these notable exploits, they have never stepped out of their works or beyond their lines. How a conduct of this kind is to effect the conquest of America, the wisdom of a North, a Germain, or a Sandwich can best decide, it is too deep and refined for the comprehension of common understandings and the general run of politicians.

Mrs. Washington, who set out for Virginia when we took the field in June, has often, in her letters to me, inquired if I had heard from you, and will be much pleased at hearing that you are well and happy. In her name, as she is not here, I thank you for your polite attention to her, and shall speak her sense of the honour conferred on her by the Marchioness. When I look back to the length of this letter, I have not the courage to give it a careful reading for the purpose of correction: you must, therefore, receive it with all its imperfections, accompanied with this assurance, that, though there may be many inaccuracies in the letter, there is not a single defect in the friendship of, my dear Marquis, yours, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

Havre, 7th October, 1779.

My dear general--From those happy ties of friendship by which you were pleased to unite yourself with me, from the promises you so tenderly made me when we parted at Fishkill, gave me such expectations of hearing often from you, that complaints ought to be permitted to my affectionate heart. Not a line from you, my dear, general, has yet arrived into my hands, and though several ships from America, several despatches from congress or the French minister, are safely brought to France, my ardent hopes of getting at length a letter from General Washington have ever been unhappily disappointed: I cannot in any way account for that bad luck, and when I remember that in those little separations where I was but some days from you, the most friendly letters, the most minute account of your circumstances, were kindly written to me, I am convinced you have not neglected and almost forgotten me for so long a time. I have, therefore, to complain of fortune, of some mistake or neglect in acquainting you that there was an opportunity, of anything; indeed, but what could injure the sense I have of your affection for me. Let me beseech you, my dear general, by that mutual, tender, and experienced friendship in which, I have put an immense portion of my happiness, to be very exact in inquiring for occasions, and never to miss those which may convey to me letters that I shall be so much pleased to receive.

Inclosed I send to your excellency the copy of my letters to congress, which, in concert with Mr. Franklin's longer despatches, will give you a sketch of European intelligence. Contrary winds have much delayed an expedition which I think should have been undertaken much sooner: the kings of France and Spain seem desirous of carrying it on before the winter; it may be, however, deferred till next spring, and the siege of Gibraltar would be the only land expedition for the present campaign. In a few weeks time, when West India successes may be compared to those in Europe, my gazettes and predictions will have a greater degree of certainty, but one must not be a conjuror to see that England is in such a way that one may defy her to get up again, and that a happy peace, blessed with American independence, will, in this or the ensuing campaign, be the certain effect of the present war.

As my private circumstances are somewhat interesting to your friendship, I will tell you, my dear general, that since my last letter I have hardly quitted this place, where head-quarters had been fixed. I was to disembark with the grenadiers forming the vanguard, and am, therefore, one of the first who will land on the English shore. The king's own regiment of dragoons, which he gave me on my return, was to embark at Brest, and join us a few days after the landing. From Count d'Estaing's expedition on the American coasts, the nation raises great expectations, and very impatiently waits for intelligence. How unhappy I am to find myself so far from you on such an occasion you will easily conceive. The impression of sorrow such a thought gives me cannot be alleviated but by the sense I have that the general opinion of the turn warlike operations will take this campaign, the ties of my duty towards my own country, where my services had been employed for the expedition against England, and the hope I entertained of being here more useful to the United States, had not left me the choice of the part I should take for this campaign. I hope, my dear sir, you will agree in opinion with me.

Whatever may be Count d'Estaing's success in America, it will bring on new projects and operations. My ideas I laid before your excellency at Fishkill; but permit me to tell you again how earnestly I wish to join you. Nothing could make me so delighted as the happiness of finishing the war under your orders. That, I think, if asked by you, will be granted to congress and your excellency. But be certain, my dear general, that in any situation, in any case, let me act as a French or as an American officer, my first wish, my first pleasure, will be to serve again with you. However happy I am in France, however well treated by my country and king, I have taken such a habit of being with you, I am tied to you, to America, to my fellow soldiers by such an affection, that the moment when I shall sail for your country will be one of the most wished for and the happiest in my life.

From an American newspaper I find that a certain English intelligence had been propagated through the United States, that, at the head of fifteen hundred officers or non-commissioned officers, I was going to embark for America, and that, with soldiers of your army embodied under them, I wanted to teach military discipline throughout the American army. However remote I am from thinking of teaching my own masters, and however distant from such views was that command in France, whose end you very well know, I could not help taking it as a reflection on the American army. The English troops may remember that on some particular occasions I have not had to lament the want of discipline and spirit in the troops which I had the honour to command. Whilst we have but the same British army to fight with, we need not be looking out for any other improvement than the same qualities which have often enabled my fellow American soldiers to give, instead of receiving, pretty good lessons to an enemy, whose justly-reputed courage added a new reputation to American bravery and military conduct.

The above article, my dear general, I beg you will have printed in the several newspapers.

As there is but a little time to write before the sailing of the vessel, I cannot call to mind all the friends I have in the army, unless your excellency is pleased to make them a thousand compliments from one who heartily loves them, and whose first wish is to be again in their company.

I congratulate you, my dear general, on the spirited expedition of Stony Point,~ and am glad it has added, a new lustre to our arms.

Be so kind, my dear friend, as to present my best respects to your lady. Mine begs leave to be kindly remembered to you and to her. Thousand assurances of friendship wait from me on your family.

Oh! my dear general, how happy I should be to embrace you again!

With such affection as is above all expressions any language may furnish, I have the honour to be, very respectfully, &c.

Footnotes:

1. To this letter was joined a long letter to the president of congress, which contained nearly the same things, expressed in a different manner.

2. A brilliant exploit of General Wayne, who, on the 15th of July, took by assault the fort of Stony Point, and forced five hundred and fifty-four English to capitulate.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.

Versailles, February 2d, 1780.

You approved, sir, of my putting down in writing, before conversing with you upon the subject of the expedition, some of the measures necessary to be taken in either of the following cases: first, if I should command the French detachment; and secondly, if I should resume an American division.~

I must begin by observing that this commission is not only a military and political, but also a social affair: and from the circumstances under which I am now placed, I assure you, on my honour, that I believe the first measure would be most favourable to the public service, and the interest of France as regards her allies.

As I must immediately begin my preparations, I should wish to be informed of the decision in sufficient time to select some officers of proper age, experience, and talents, with whom I can become acquainted before I take charge of the corps; and on this account it is necessary to arrange matters immediately with the Prince de Montbarrey. Two old experienced lieutenant-colonels should command the infantry under me: in distant expeditions, it is necessary that officers should suit each other, and I am particularly fond of old officers.

In regard to myself, sir, I ask for nothing,--and as during the course of a war I may hope to acquire rank, you might either give me one of those commissions of M. de Sartine, which are only of use in America, or one that would not prevent my seniors from resuming afterwards their rank, or else letters of service, to enable me simply to command in the capacity of an American general officer.

There are three methods of concealing the real aim of the expedition: 1st, to set out together for Lorient, under pretence of taking an island, and operating in Carolina in the autumn;--2nd, to pretend to send troops to M. de Bouillé; there need be no commander, and I should have the title of maréchal-des-logis;--3d, for me to set out immediately with the grenadiers and dragoons for America, and that the four battalions, commanded by the two ancient officers, should join me at Rhode Island.

If I should have the command, you may act with perfect security, because the Americans know me too well to feel the slightest anxiety. I will bind myself, if it be desired, to ask for neither rank nor titles, and, to put the ministry quite at their ease, I will even promise to refuse them should they be offered me.

In the second case, sir, it would be necessary to prevent, beforehand, in America, the bad effects that the arrival of another commander would excite: that I am not to lead that detachment is the last idea that could ever occur in that country; I will say, therefore, that for myself I prefer having an American division.

I must be in the secret to prepare the various measures, and inform General Washington of the transaction. A secret with which I was not acquainted would appear very suspicious at Philadelphia.

Three merchant frigates and a transport ship would be procured at Lorient. We have, it is said, an American crew; the fifteen thousand suits of clothes, and fifteen thousand guns, &c. might be embarked; at the end of the month it would be necessary to set out for the continent.

On arriving at a port, I should endeavour to commence my operations with General Washington; I should take a division in the army, and, with M. de la Luzerne's aid, prepare everything for the arrival of the French. To increase the number of my division,--to serve as an example to them,--to change the ideas entertained respecting us,--and to shew in what perfect good intelligence French and Americans may live together,--I should request to take with me, at once, a battalion of six hundred grenadiers, three hundred dragoons, and one hundred hussars.

Two or three officers, whom I should bring back with me, must obtain the same rank in France which they had in America, and I should say that I have refused that rank myself from motives which are purely social. This attention is necessary to flatter the self-love of the Americans. We may stop at Bermuda on our way, and establish there the party for liberty.

I shall set out on Wednesday for Nantes, where the clothes are making; I shall also attend to the selection of the arms; I shall see the king's regiment at Angers, to form a detachment from it; I shall repair to Lorient to hasten the arrangement of the frigates, and to see the battalion of grenadiers; I shall only be here the 20th, and as my departure must be public, I shall take leave the 25th, in an American uniform, and if the wind be favourable, I shall sail the 1st of March.

As it is physically impossible that a detachment commanded by a foreigner should amalgamate together well, I believe it would be necessary to increase it by a battalion, which would raise the number to about three thousand six hundred, and the grenadiers would remain more particularly attached to me during the campaign.

If that little corps be given to an old field-marshal, we should certainly displease all the American chiefs. Gates, Sullivan, and Saint Clair, would not like to be under the orders of others, and their opinion in the council would be opposed to combined expeditions. I think it necessary, very necessary, to select a brigadier, and name him field-marshal, which he would look upon as a promotion. The corps must consider itself as a division of our army; its commander must abjure all pretensions, think himself an American major-general, and execute, in all respects, the orders of General Washington. The naval commander may have more power placed in his hands.

Conclusion. 1st, I think it would be best to give me the corps.--2d, If it be not given to me, I must instantly set out with the powers I demand. In either case, it is, unfortunately, necessary to reveal to me the secret, and set me immediately to work.

I shall have the honour, sir, of paying my respects to you during the procession.

Footnote:

1. This letter contains the basis of the plan which was finally adopted. We have been obliged to retrench several letters which relate to projects analogous to those presented at various periods by M. de Lafayette. It was at length determined to send an auxiliary corps even stronger than he had hoped to obtain. As to himself, he was to precede it to America, whither he repaired with political instructions from the French cabinet, and to resume a command in the army of the United States. His instructions are dated the 5th of March; his departure took place the 19th.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

At the entrance of Boston harbour, April 27, 1780.

Here I am, my dear general, and, in the midst of the joy I feel in finding myself again one of your loving soldiers, I take but the time to tell you that I came from France on board a frigate which the king gave me for my passage. I have affairs of the utmost importance which I should at first communicate to you alone. In case my letter finds you anywhere this side of Philadelphia, I beg you will wait for me, and do assure you a great public good may be derived from it.

To-morrow we go up to the town, and the day after I shall set off in my usual way to joined my beloved and respected friend and general.

Adieu, my dear general; you will easily know the hand of your young soldier.

My compliments to the family.

Footnote:

1. The second of the measures discussed in the preceding letter was the one preferred, and M. de Lafayette embarked alone at the island of Aix.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.

Waterburg, on the Boston road,

From the Camp, May 6th, 1780.

I have already had the honour of writing to you, sir, and of announcing to you the news of my arrival; but I place so much confidence in the kindness you express for me, that I do not hesitate to repeat the contents of my former letter. It was the 28th of April, after a voyage of thirty-eight days, and after having experienced both calms and contrary winds, that the Hermione entered the Boston harbour. I cannot sufficiently express my admiration of the frigate herself, and my gratitude to her commanding officers.

I can neither give you any certain information, sir, nor promise you any degree of accuracy respecting numbers and dates. General Washington can alone inform me of the truth; but this does appear to me certain;--

Our army is not numerous; the eastern states are occupied in recruiting it. Paper has been regulated by congress at forty for one: these are very high taxes, and they hope to be able to raise the finances a little, which are in a very low state; but, at present, I cannot give you any settled ideas upon this point.

The scarcity of horses, their price, and the want of provisions, have very much increased during my absence; but I assure you, sir, that, in a moral point of view, I continue to see a most favourable prospect for my American friends.

General Clinton has besieged Charlestown, and as he has eight or ten thousand men, and the report is spread that his vessels have crossed the bar, it is impossible not to fear for that place, unless Spanish or French vessels should come from the islands to its succour. Some troops from the army of General Washington have proceeded thither.

New York has only six or seven thousand garrisoned men; such is, at least, the public report, and I do not believe that the hostile forces are much more numerous at present. They say, at Boston, that there are only four thousand men; but I repeat, sir, that my gazettes cannot be at all accurate at present.

The English have but few vessels at Charlestown; at most they have only, I think, one or two at New York. It is said here, and every one seems to believe it, that if some French forces were to arrive at this moment, they might strike some decisive blows.

Be pleased, sir, to accept the assurance of the warm and respectful affection with which I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Some American officers, just come from New York, assure me that a frigate has, arrived with important despatches from the English government. Don Juan de Miralles, who has been long established at Philadelphia, and who knows M. d'Aranda, died at Morristown; he was buried with much honour.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Morristown, May, 1783.

My dear Marquis,--Your welcome favour of the 27th of April came to my hands yesterday. I received it with all the joy that the sincerest friendship would dictate, and with that impatience which an ardent desire to see you could not fail to inspire. I am sorry I do not know your route through the State of New York, that I might with certainty send a small party of horse, all I have at this place, to meet and escort you safely through the Tory settlements, between this place and the North River. At all events, Major Gibbs will go as far as Compton, where the roads unite, to meet you and will proceed from thence, as circumstances may direct, either towards King's Ferry or New Windsor. I most sincerely congratulate you on your safe arrival in America, and shall embrace you with all the warmth of an affectionate friend, when you come to head-quarters, where a bed is prepared for you. Adieu till we meet. Yours, &c.~

Footnote:

1. General Washington expressed, in several letters, the pleasure he felt at M. de Lafayette's return. (See his letters of the 13th and 14th of May.) The 16th of May, the congress declared, by a public resolution, that "they consider his return as a fresh proof of the disinterested zeal and persevering attachment which have justly recommended him to the public confidence and applause, and that they receive with pleasure a tender of the further services of so gallant and meritorious an officer."--(Journal of Congress, May 20th.)

It was afterwards resolved that the commander-in-chief, after having received the communications M. de Lafayette had to make to him, was to take the proper measures which were most likely to forward the success of the plan they had in view. The communications related to the expected arrival of a French squadron and land forces. The plan in contemplation was to make some attacks, especially on New York.

TO THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Philadelphia, 19th May, 1780.

Sir,--This letter will be handed to you by M. de Galvan, a French officer in the service of the United States, and you may receive with confidence the various accounts which he will have the honour to give you. I have appointed him to await your arrival at Cape Henry, and you will see that my instructions to this officer are in conformity with those which I have received from the Count de Vergennes.~

I reached Boston on the 26th of April. On the morning of the 10th of May, I was at head-quarters, and after passing four days with General Washington, I went to meet the Chevalier de la Luzerne. The military preparations and the political measures which it was necessary for us to attend to, have delayed M. de Galvan up to the present moment. I now hasten to despatch him to his destination, and shall keep him informed of whatever news may be interesting to you, continuing to add the ideas of the general, with regard to the best means of improving present circumstances.

Immediately upon my arrival, confidential persons were sent out to procure plans and details upon the different points which become interesting for the operations of this campaign. As to other matters, the Chevalier de la Luzerne has had the goodness to enable me, as far as possible, to fulfil my instructions, and he has taken the first measures requisite to procure a supply of food and other necessaries for the land and naval forces. Although the scarcity of all things is infinitely greater than when I left America, the precautions taken before-hand by the Chevalier de la Luzerne, and the measures we are now taking here, render it certain that the French will not be in want, either of flour or of fresh meat.

I will now give you a summary of the present situation of the enemy on the continent. I shall say nothing of Canada, or Halifax, or the Penobscot, from whence we are expecting news, and which, for the moment, are not of essential importance. Rhode Island is in our possession; you can enter it in full security; letters, signals, and pilots will await you there, agreeably to my instructions. Your magazines, your sick, and all your unnecessary baggage, can go up the Providence by water; I shall soon send to Rhode Island more particular information on this point.

The enemy have, at the present moment, seven thousand men of their best troops employed at the siege of Charlestown; they have also some ships of the line without the harbour; one vessel of fifty guns, two frigates of forty-four, and several smaller vessels. According to news from New York, Charlestown still held out on the 3rd of this month. On the Islands of New York, Long Island, and Staten Island, the forces of the enemy consisted of eight thousand regular troops, a few militia, upon which they place no dependence, and a small number of royalists, very contemptible in all respects. They have only one ship of seventy-four guns, and some frigates. The American army is in three divisions; one guards the fort of West Point and keeps open the North River; another is in South Carolina; and the third, which is the largest, is in the Jerseys, under the immediate command of General Washington. This last division, not very numerous at present, will be increased in a few days; and for that reason, I shall defer till another letter giving you a more exact account of its situation.

Your voyage is known at New York. Advices were immediately sent on to Charlestown, recalling either the troops, or at least the ships of war. They are erecting fortifications on the Island, and preparing vessels loaded with stones to obstruct the passage; in a word, if it be true that the present divided state of the English forces seems to insure their destruction, and to promise us the conquest of New York, it is equally true that, at the moment of your arrival, if by good fortune things remain in their present state, we shall have no time to lose in taking advantage of those favourable circumstances.

At the same time that I here execute the orders of my general, and communicate to you the sentiments of my friend, permit me to assure you of the strong desire of our army to do whatever may please you, and how much we shall all endeavour to merit the friendship and the esteem of troops, whose assistance at the present moment is so essential to us. You will find amongst us a great deal of good will, a great deal of sincerity, and above all, a great desire to be agreeable to you.

I send a duplicate of this letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, and I shall send the same to Point Judith and Seaconnet; so that in case you should make land at Rhode Island, you may at once sail for Sandy Hook. The next letter which I shall have the honour to write to you, will be dated at headquarters. The confidence of General Washington, which M. de Galvan has deserved, and the means which he has of fulfilling his instructions, all assure me that you will be satisfied with our choice. I have the honour to be, &c.

Footnote:

1. The instructions given to M. de Lafayette by the minister of foreign affairs, (5th March, 1780), were, that, to prevent any mistake or delay, he was to place, both on Rhode Island and on Cape Henry (the mouth of the Chesapeake), a French officer, to await the arrival of the French squadron, which was to land at one of those two points, and to give it all the information it might require on its arrival. This letter was consequently given to M. de Galvan, and he repaired to Cape Henry, but vainly expected those frigates: they landed at Rhode Island, they left Brest the 2nd of May, under the orders of the Chevalier de Ternay, and appeared before Newport the 10th of July. This letter was delivered afterwards to M. de Rochambeau, as well as several others, which want of space and interest do not allow us to insert.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp at Preakness, July 4th, 1780.

You know, my dear general, that I am very anxious to see the army well clothed for this campaign; the importance of such a measure is on every account obvious, and from the knowledge I have of the auxiliary troops that are coming, I can so well demonstrate its necessity that I shall for the present but attend to the means of executing it.

In the space of six months (we know from experience) the coats of our soldiers begin to be worn out, so that there is no great inconvenience in giving some new clothes to the draftsmen, and after they shall be discharged, the number of the remaining soldiers will not much exceed six or seven thousand men; as those very men will have been completely clothed by the middle of July, I think I make full allowance for them by keeping in store the seven thousand unmade suits that have been shipped by Mr. Ross.

If more are wanted in the course of next summer, I engage to go over to France and bring back ten thousand complete suits properly conveyed.

Excluding wagoners, servants, and all such people who do not want to be uniformly clothed, we may calculate the continental army to consist of fourteen thousand men in the field. There may be found in the army four thousand coats and waistcoats which are not absolutely bad, four thousand stocks or cravats, and one thousand pretty good hats.

We may get from the stores fifteen thousand overalls, ten thousand pairs of shoes, three thousand round hats, and some few shirts.

There are also six or seven hundred coats of every colour, to which may be added about three or four hundred of the same kind, and some indifferent hats found in the army, &c.

A small quantity of buff and red cloth to be bought for the facings of the Pennsylvanian and Jersey lines.

The four thousand good hats in the stores or in the army to be cut round, or cocked in the form of caps, but to be in an uniform manner.

All the articles now in the possession of the clothier-general, to be immediately ordered to North River, and, if necessary, wagons should be pressed for their speedy transportation.

I will write a letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, wherein I will desire him to send to the most convenient place the clothing which has been put under his convoy.

We shall then have ten thousand new coats and waistcoats, and four thousand old ones, the whole of an uniform ground, ten thousand new hats and stocks, and four thousand old ones, five and twenty thousand overalls, more than twenty thousand shirts, and thirty thousand pairs of shoes.

Each soldier enlisted for the war, let them even be ten thousand, shall have, if you choose, a new complete suit, one hat, one stock, two shirts, two pairs of overalls, and two pairs of shoes.

Each draftsman, if he has not the same, will at least receive a decent uniform coat, one stock, one hat, one pair of overalls, and two pairs of shoes; he will not certainly come out but well provided with shirts.

By the above mentioned arrangement, there remain about a thousand coats of every colour, a thousand hats, which are not absolutely bad, and two thousand pairs of shoes; these I propose to give to such men as will not appear under arms in the field, and, if necessary, some hunting-shirts may be added to the said clothing.

The dragoons are generally better clothed than the infantry, and we might very easily complete their coats or stable-jackets, as each different regiment could adopt a different colour.

As soon as the French clothing comes, I wish the whole army to be clothed at once, in observing to give the round hats to some particular brigades, for the sake of uniformity, and to turn up the facings according to the plan agreed.

There will be then no excuse for the officers who, out of neglect, should suffer their men to lose a single article, and the most strict orders may be given for that purpose.

The French arms that are coming might be put in the hands of soldiers enlisted for the war.

I wish that there was a distinction of one woollen epaulette for the corporal, and two for the serjeant.

As to the feathers, (become a distinction of ranks,) I wish such as have been pointed out might be forbidden to other officers, and for the light division I shall beg the leave of wearing a black and red feather, which I have imported for the purpose.

These ideas, my dear general, are not given to you as a great stroke of genius, but I heartily wish something of the kind may be thought proper.

TO MM. LE COMTE DE ROCHAMBEAU, AND LE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.~

Camp, before Dobb's Ferry, Aug. 9, 1780.

Gentlemen,--I arrived two days ago at head quarters, and in consequence of the mission I was charged with, my first care was to render an account of our conversations; but the most minute details of them are so important, and the fate of America, and the glory of France, depend so completely upon the result of our combinations here, that, in order to feel more certain of having perfectly understood your meaning, I will submit to you a summary of our conversations, and entreat you to write me word immediately whether I have rightly understood your meaning. Before quitting Rhode Island, gentlemen, I should have taken this precaution, if General Washington's march against New York had not obliged me to join my division, at the very moment when, from our further arrangements, you most required some information.

1st. I have described to you the actual situation of America, the exhausted state in which I found her, and the momentary efforts she had made, which could only have been produced by the hope of being delivered, by one decisive blow, from the tyranny of the English.

I told you those efforts were so enormous, when we consider the state of our finances, and the failure of all our resources, that I do not expect to see them renewed during another campaign. I added that on the 1st of November we should no longer have any militia, that the 1st of January one half of our continental army would be disbanded, and I took the liberty of saying, in my own name, that I thought it necessary, as a political measure, to enter into action this campaign; and this I had ascertained also to be the case, by sounding, on my journey, the wishes of the people.

2nd. I confirmed what I have already had the honour of writing to you respecting the continental troops, and the militia whom we are to have with us. I told you that by counting the enemies in New York at fourteen thousand men, of which ten thousand are regulars, and four thousand very bad militia, I thought their numbers were somewhat exaggerated, and that it was necessary to begin by deducting the sailors employed by Admiral Arbuthnot. As to the fortifications, I said that the American troops would take charge of New York, and that the fort of Brooklyn (upon which you might operate in concert with a division of our troops) is merely an earthen work of four bastions, with a ditch and a shed, containing from a thousand to fifteen hundred men, and having in front another smaller work, which cannot contain more than a hundred men. I added that nothing could prevent a regular approach upon Brooklyn, and that that post is the key of New York.

3rd. I explained to you General Washington's plan, and told you that the moment you began your march, he would repair to Morrisania, where, I again repeat, he would establish batteries that would close the passage of Hell's Gate, and secure the one from the continent to Long Island, so as to have nothing to fear from the enemy's ships. Whilst awaiting your arrival, gentlemen, our army would entrench itself at Morrisania, or, if possible, on the Island of New York, and would place itself in a situation to detach a corps of troops, as soon as you shall have approached us, either by coming by land to Westchester, and passing afterwards under favour of our batteries, or by repairing by sea to Wistown, or any other bay in that neighbourhood. General Washington would furnish a sufficient corps of Americans, and fifteen large cannon, to co-operate with your troops, and he believes that with these forces, and united with artillery, the point of Brooklyn might soon be taken, and consequently the town of New York.

4th. I represented to you that Long Island was a rich country, which, even alter the destruction effected by the English, still possesses some resources; that we might feel certain of being joined there by the militia of the island; and, in short, that with the assistance of our Morrisanian under-batteries, and still more with a battery on the Island of New York, we should assure the communication between Long Island and the continent. From these various circumstances, my own private opinion would decidedly be to commence our action, if the fleet could be placed in security, before we possessed any superiority of naval force.

5th. I strongly insisted upon the necessity of taking possession, as soon as possible, of the New York harbour. I requested M. de Ternay to examine that point with the pilots I gave him, and by the immense advantages of that measure I hoped that, either with the aid of land forces on the side of Sandy Hook, or merely by the superiority of his own naval force, he would be enabled to accomplish the object we had feared his attempting when we expected him with Admiral Graves.

6th. When proposing to you to send your magazines to Providence, I told you that Rhode Island was completely useless to the Americans, but very important for the succours arriving from France, in case, however, no army should be necessary to preserve it; that if the English were to commit the fault of taking it, a superior fleet, aided by forces from the continent, would always have the power of retaking it.

7th. I ended by having the honour of telling you, gentlemen, that in order to operate upon New York it would be necessary not to commence later than the first days of September; and, after this explanation, I said that General Washington, feeling the most perfect confidence in you, was very desirous of having your opinion upon the subject, and would only undertake what might appear to you most advantageous.

This, gentlemen, is what I had the honour of saying to you, and this is what you did me the honour to reply to:--

1st. That the succour sent to the United States was anything rather than trifling; that the second division was to set out a short time after you, and, that it might justly be expected every instant; that it would consist at least of two thousand five hundred, and, in all probability, of a still greater number of troops; that it was to be sent by three ships, but that, according to all appearances, a larger number of vessels would be granted; that the only reason which could prevent its arriving before the 1st of September, would be the impossibility of a junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and that, in the latter case, it would arrive, at farthest, by the end of autumn, and would then be a great deal stronger; that M. de Guichen has been apprised of our projects, and has received the order to facilitate them; that, consequently, the Chevalier de Ternay has written to him for the five promised vessels; and that, from all these circumstances, you hoped to be able to act before the end of the campaign, but did not doubt, at least, having the power of furnishing us with very superior forces for this winter, and for the next campaign.

2nd. The project of attacking Brooklyn was extremely agreeable to you, and appeared to you the most proper measure for the reduction of New York; but you think that we ought to have upon that Island a force at least equal to that which the enemy may offer us, and you added that by leaving a counterfeit at New York, they may fall on the corps of Long Island, with nearly their whole army, which contingency, you will perceive, had been already provided for by Washington's arrangements.

3rd. You appeared to me doubtful whether it would be possible to stop the enemy at the passage of Morrisania, but on this point I can give you no decisive information. The idea of repairing by land to Westchester appeared less agreeable to you than that of going by sea into a bay of Long Island. As to the landing, the Count de Rochambeau looks upon it as a very long operation, and, from his own experience on the subject, he believes that it would require nearly three weeks to land an army, with all its accoutrements, for a campaign and siege. You desired to have every possible information concerning Brooklyn, in order to be able to make calculations accordingly for the artillery and engineer service. You appeared to me to consider a naval superiority as necessary, even at the commencement of the campaign; but it is true that this idea may partly proceed from your doubts relating to the communication concerning Morrisania.

5th. The Chevalier de Ternay conceives it would be difficult to take possession of New York harbour, and hopes to accomplish the same object by the situation in which he has placed his cruisers. He does not think that his seventy-fours can enter, but from the difference of opinion which I ventured to express, as to the importance at least of occupying the harbour, he told me he would again attend to this project. As to his manner of protecting the disembarkation, it would be to cruise in the Sound, and his frigates, and one or two vessels, would enter into the bay at the place where the troops should land.

6th. Rhode Island appears to you a very important point to preserve; but if M. de Ternay should have the superiority, you think, as we do, that it would be unnecessary to leave a garrison there during the attack of New York. The Count de Rochambeau desired me to assure General Washington that, in every case, upon receiving an order, he would instantly repair to that spot which the commander-in-chief should appoint. I told him, also, that the French generals wished that it were possible to have an interview with him.

At the termination of our conversation, we decided upon the following measures, of which I consequently gave an account to General Washington.

1st. You have written to France to urge the speedy arrival and augmentation of the promised succours. You have already asked for the five vessels of M. de Guichen, and I have also taken charge of another letter, which repeats the same request, and which will pass through the hands of the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

2d. As soon as you receive news of the arrival either of the second division or of the ships from the West Indies, you will immediately despatch a messenger to General Washington; and, whilst our army is marching towards Westchester, and your own making preparation for embarkation, M. de Ternay will endeavour to effect his junction.

3d. If the French fleet should be equal to that of the enemy, it will immediately enter into a contest for superiority; if it should be superior, it will take the French troops instantly on board, and carry them towards the bay intended for their landing.

4th. A spot shall be chosen from whence the ships may protect the operation, and which will also afford to the troops first landed a position well sheltered by the fire from the ships, and behind which the remainder of the troops may join them; or by advancing with all the landed troops, the right and left wings may be so placed as to cover the last of the disembarkation. The spot selected shall be situated in such a manner that the corps of the American army intended for this particular expedition, may arrive and land at the very moment of the landing of the Count de Rochambeau, and that their general may be able to co-operate instantly with the French general.

5th. According to the number of French troops in a state to operate, General Washington will either conduct himself, or send to Long Island, a sufficient number of troops to obtain a force nearly equal to that of the enemy, and he will also have a corps of troops of nearly the same strength as the one opposed to him, either at Westchester or in the Island of New York.

6th. The Chevalier de Ternay will examine, attentively, the possibility of forcing the passage of Sandy Hook, and if it be deemed practicable, will attain that important end.

7th. As soon as the arms, clothes, and ammunition, belonging to the United States, shall arrive, the Chevalier de Ternay will have the goodness, without giving them time to enter the harbour, to send them with a convoy of frigates, or, if the batteries be not yet erected, by a ship of the line, to that point in the Sound which General Washington may judge proper to select.

8th. The French fleet will take charge of the boats we shall require, which will be delivered up to them at Providence; they will also land us all the powder that they can do without themselves; this does not amount, at present, to more than thirty thousand pounds.

9th. I shall send to the French generals all the correct information I may obtain respecting the passage of the Sound by Hell Gate; I shall communicate to them, likewise, all the details relating to Brooklyn, and they will send us the calculations which have been made in consequence by the artillery and engineers,--from thence we shall decide what must be sent with the American Long Island corps for these two companies. Some doubts are entertained by the French generals concerning the two points of this last article; I shall send them from home some information respecting that subject, of which I had before the honour of speaking to them.

10th. The invalids, magazines, &c., shall be sent to Providence, and the batteries of that river are to be placed by us in proper order. It is clearly specified that the instant the expected naval superiority of force arrives, the French are not to lose a single day in commencing their co-operative measures.

Such is, gentlemen, the abridgment of the account rendered to General Washington; and it will serve as the basis for his preparations, as well as a rule for the future elucidations you may receive. From the confidence with which he has honoured me, I was obliged to settle finally all that it was possible for me to arrange with you,--the fate of America, in short, appears to be dependent upon your activity or repose during the remainder of this summer. I attach the greatest importance to all your ideas being clearly rendered, and I entreat you to lose no time in writing a few words to say whether I have understood your meaning.

A short time after my departure, gentlemen, you must have learnt that General Clinton, fearing for New York; had been obliged, by a sudden movement of our army, to enclose himself in that island. The army is at present near Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right side of the North River, and our advance guard is nearly three miles before it.

If General Clinton, with a force and position equal to our own, should judge proper to fight, we shall give him a favourable opportunity of doing so, and he may take advantage of that kind of challenge to make the most impartial trial of the English and Hessian against the American troops.

I shall wait here, most impatiently, gentlemen, your answer to this letter. I shall have the honour of communicating to you the various advices General Washington may find it expedient to send you. The first intelligence of the arrival of the ships is very necessary to our peace of mind, and from an intimate knowledge of our situation, I assure you, gentlemen, in my own private name and person, that it is important to act during this campaign, that all the troops you may hope to obtain from France next year, as well as all the projects of which you may flatter yourselves, will never repair the fatal consequences of our present inactivity. Without resources in America, all foreign succours would prove of no avail; and although, in every case, you may rely wholly upon us, I think it important to take advantage of the moment when you may find here a co-operation, without which you will not be able to achieve anything for the American cause.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Such, gentlemen, is the long official letter which I have the honour of writing to you, but I cannot send it without thanking you for the kindness you expressed for me at Rhode Island, and presenting you the assurance of my sincere and respectful attachment.

Footnote:

1. General Heath, who commanded the militia in the state of Rhode Island, announced, on the 13th of July, the arrival of the French squadron to Washington, who was then stationed with his staff at Bergen. M. de Lafayette set out instantly, bearing instructions from the general-in-chief dated the 15th, to meet the French Generals and to concert with them. Washington had long formed a plan of offensive operations, for the reduction of the town and garrison of New York (letter to General Greene the 14th of July); this plan was to take effect on condition, first, that the French and American troops should form a junction; second, that the French should have a decided naval superiority over the united forces of Admiral Graves and Admiral Arbuthnot. In nine letters, written between the 20th of July and the 1st of August, which would not perhaps have offered much interest to the reader, M. de Lafayette rendered an account of his mission, of which a short analysis will give the principal details.

The first letters relate to the multiplied difficulties he encountered in the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island, in collecting provisions, clothing, arms, and, above all, powder, in sufficient quantities for the projected expedition. These difficulties were much increased by the insufficiency of every kind of munition brought by the French squadron, which but half realized the promises of the French cabinet. M. de Lafayette repaired to Newport the 25th, and found the army, which had been disembarked, encamped in Rhode Island, and M. de Rochambeau much occupied by the news of an important attack, and, in fact, four of the enemy's ships appeared on the 19th, and nine or ten more two days after, before Block Island. Sir Henry Clinton had on his side left New York. By a combination of his land and sea forces, he intended to surprise the French army. But he experienced some delay; his soldiers could only embark in the transports the 27th; there was a wrong understanding between him and Admiral Arbuthnot. He learnt that the French had fortified themselves at Newport, and that the neighbouring militia had joined them; and at length that General Washington was making a rapid movement upon New York. He hastened to pass over the Sound, and landed his troops on the 31st.

M. de Lafayette, who had always felt doubtful, himself, of Clinton's making the attack, had then the opportunity of discussing with the allies the project for an offensive operation. He was extremely anxious to put it into execution, and General Washington was desirous also of doing the same.

The thing was, however, difficult. Although the capture of New York had always been one of the objects of the French ministry, the instructions of M. de Rochambeau prescribed to him to attach great importance to the station of Rhode Island, and to endeavour to make it the basis for his other operations. He was therefore reluctant to quit it in order to march upon New York. M. de Ternay, at the same time, considered it as impossible to enter with his ships of war into the harbour of that town, and contented himself with promising a blockade; he did not, besides, possess that naval superiority which could only be obtained by the arrival of the second division, which was so vainly expected from France, or by the junction of the squadron of M. de Guichen, then in the West Indies, to whom M. de Lafayette had written to promote that object. M. de Rochambeau's own opinion was, however, in favour of offensive measures, and he promised to conform, according to his instructions, to the orders of the general-in-chief. Everything was discussed and regulated in two or three conferences, which took place from the end of July to the commencement of August, between MM. de Rochambeau, de Ternay, and de Lafayette. The result of these conferences is resumed in a letter, to which is annexed this note--

In the suppressed letters it is also seen that the French troops evinced the greatest ardour, and that the good intelligence that reigned between the two allies completely justified the expectations of M. de Lafayette, and the measures he had proposed. He wrote, in a letter of the 31st, to General Washington:--

"The French army hate the idea of staying here, and want to join you. They swear at those that speak of waiting the second division: they are enraged to be blockaded in this harbour. As to their dispositions towards the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the inhabitants and the militia for them, they are such as I may wish. You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our drafts that came on from Connanicut, without provisions and tents, and who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French soldier and officer took an American with him, and divided his bed and his supper in the most friendly manner. The patience and sobriety of our militia are so much admired by the French officers, that, two days ago, a French colonel called all his officers together, to take the good examples which were given to the French soldiers by the American troops. So far are they gone in their admiration, that they find a great deal to say in favour of General Varnum, and his escort of militia dragoons, who fill up all the streets of Newport. On the other band, the French discipline is such, that chickens and pigs walk between the tents without being disturbed, and that there is in the camp a corn-field, of which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories don't know what to say to it."--(ORIGINAL.)--(Letters of Washington from the 14th of July to the 5th of August, 1780, and Appendix, Nos. 1 and 8, VOL. vii.)

FROM THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU TO M. DE LAFAYETTE.

Newport, August 12th, 1780.

I received, my dear marquis, the letter you did me the honour of writing the 9th of August; permit me to send you, in reply, the one I had the honour of addressing to our general on the 10th of this month, to express to him the opinion you asked for by his desire. I am only now, therefore, waiting for his last orders, and I have earnestly requested him to grant me the favour of an interview, that the admiral and I may receive from his own lips the last plan he has decided upon; we should do more in a quarter of an hour's conversation than we could do by multiplied despatches. I am as thoroughly convinced as any person can be of the truth of what your letters mentioned, that it was his marching which had detained Clinton, who intended to come and attack us; but I must observe to you also, at the same time, that there was much reason to hope that he would have been well beaten here, and during that time our general would have taken New York. As to your observation, my dear marquis, that the position of the French at Rhode Island is of no use to the Americans, I reply:--

First, That I never heard it had been injurious to any one of them.

Second, That it would be well to reflect that the position of the French corps may have had something to do with Clinton's evacuation of the continent, when he has been obliged to confine himself to Long Island and New York; that, in short, while the French fleet is guarded here by an assembled and a superior naval force, your American shores are undisturbed, your privateers are making considerable prizes, and your maritime commerce enjoys perfect liberty. It appears to me, that, in so comfortable a situation, it is easy to wait patiently the naval and land forces that the king assured me should, be sent; that, in short, as I have received no letter from France since my departure; I can only flatter myself that the second division is already on the road, and is bringing me despatches, since, if it had been blockaded by superior forces, some sort of advice would have been sent me from the shores of France. I fear those savannahs and other events of the kind, of which I have seen so many during the course of my life. There exists a principle in war, as in geometry, vis unita fortior. I am, however, awaiting orders from our generalissimo, and I entreat him to grant the admiral and myself an interview. I will join the latter's despatch to this packet as soon as I receive it.

I beg you to accept, my dear marquis, the assurance of my sincerest affection.

TO MM. DE ROCHAMBEAU AND DE TERNAY.

Camp, August 18th, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,--As I wish to submit the same observations to you both, permit me to address this letter to you in common, and permit me also (without pretending to complain of the interpretation you have given to my last letter) to accuse myself of having explained my own meaning in a very awkward manner.

On my return here, gentlemen, General Washington asked me for an account of our conversations. You know that he had given me full powers to explain to you our situation, and to settle finally the plan of the campaign. When he knew that you wished to confer with him, he again wrote me word that I was to arrange everything in his name, as if he were himself present. It was natural that he should wish to know what I said to you, what you replied, and what we had finally decided upon. He thought that the best manner of collecting our ideas was to write them down; and I, fearing to say a single word that was not precisely according to your intentions, thought it more polite, more respectful towards you, to submit to your examination the written account which my general had requested. I may add, at this place, gentlemen, that the general, thinking that you were only acquainted with our position from what I had the honour of saying to you, did not consider the previous letters he had received as answers to what I had undertaken to explain to you. All that I said to you, gentlemen, concerning Rhode Island, the passage of Hell Gate, the harbour of New York, and the disembarkation, was from the reiterated orders of General Washington; and as to the political opinions, which I will dispense myself with expressing in future, because they must come from the Chevalier de la Luzerne, I, assure you that if, as your own countryman, it was more delicate for me to give them in my own name, they are not less conformable to the ideas of General Washington. The only time when I took the liberty of speaking for myself was, when, wearied by the questions that have been made to me by a thousand American individuals upon the second division, and the superiority of the English at this present period, I yielded to my ardent wish of entering at once on action, and to the hope of commencing our operations immediately. If I have been to blame, I think it can only be in this one instance.

I believe that the march towards New York has recalled Clinton from the bay of Huntington, but I believe that if he had been guilty of the folly of attacking you, he would have both lost at Rhode Island a portion of his army, owing to our French troops, and the Island of New York by our attack. This was my opinion, and the one I found most prevalent here, and I also think that it is very unfortunate for the common cause that General Clinton did not pursue his enterprise. Is it I who could imagine the contrary?--I who have always been laughed at for thinking it impossible that the French could ever be beaten!

When, after having received three letters from General Washington, and held twenty conversations with him on the subject, I thought it proper to tell you in what point of view we looked upon Rhode Island, I do not think it ever occurred to me to say you had injured any person by staying there, and as to the advantage America derives from having a French squadron and French troops, allow me to mention, gentlemen, that M. d'Estaing found me formerly well disposed to acknowledge this truth; that for more than eighteen months, and especially since the commencement of last summer, I held a regular correspondence with the French government, to represent to it the utility of such a measure; and, although the gratitude of the Americans does not by any means require being excited, few hours pass without my employing a part of my time in pointing out to them the advantages that you may procure for them even when inferior to the hostile forces, and in which I do not take the measures most proper to publish this truth from the extremity of Canada to that of Florida, as I may prove to you by the few copies of letters which I have preserved.

As to the political opinions with which I took the liberty of closing my letter, although I acknowledge having committed the fault of expressing them to you, I am certain beforehand that, from an intimate acquaintance with the American character and resources, the Chevalier de la Luzerne and General Washington are both of my opinion.

I will do all that depends upon me, gentlemen, to prevail upon the general to meet you half way; but, from his proximity to the enemy, and from the present situation of the army, which he has never quitted since the commencement of the war, I fear it will appear to him very difficult to absent himself. Whenever you have any orders to give me, look upon me as a man who, you must well know, idolizes his own country with a peculiar degree of enthusiasm, and who unites to that feeling (the strongest one of his heart) the respectful affection with which he has the honour of being, &c.

TO M. DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Camp, August 18th, 1780.

Having written, sir, one letter to you in common with the Chevalier de Ternay, permit me to address myself to you with the frankness authorised by the warm affection I have felt, and endeavoured to prove to you, from my earliest youth. Although your letter expresses your usual kindness for me, I observed a few sentences in it which, without being individually applied to me, prove to me that my last epistle displeased you. After having been engaged night and day for four months, in preparing the minds of the people to receive, respect, and love you; after all I have said to make them sensible of the advantages they derived from your residence at Rhode Island, and after having made use of my own popularity to propagate this truth; in short, sir, after all that my patriotism and affection for you have dictated to me, my feelings were unavoidably hurt by your giving such an unfavourable turn to my letter, and one which had never for a moment occurred to myself. If in that letter I have offended or displeased you; if, for example, you disapprove of that written account which General Washington asked for, and which I thought I ought to submit to you, I give you my word of honour that I thought I was doing a very simple thing; so simple, indeed, that I should have considered I was wronging you by not doing it.

If you had heard that second division spoken of, sir, as I have done; if you knew how strongly the English and the Tories endeavour to persuade the Americans that France only wishes to kindle, without extinguishing the flame, you would readily conceive that my desire of silencing those reports might have inspired me, perhaps, with too much warmth. I will confide to you that, thus placed in a foreign country, my self love is wounded by seeing the French blockaded at Rhode Island, and the pain I feel induces me to wish the operations to commence. As to what you write to me, sir, respecting Rhode Island, if I were to give you an account of all I have said, written, and inserted in the public papers; if you had heard me, frequently in the midst of a group of American peasants, relating the conduct of the French at Newport; if you were only to pass three days here with me, you would see the injustice of your reproach.

If I have offended you, I ask your pardon, for two reasons; first, because I am sincerely attached to you; and secondly, because it is my earnest wish to do everything I can to please you here. As a private individual, in all places your commands will ever be laws to me, and for the meanest Frenchmen here I would make every possible sacrifice rather than not contribute to their glory, comfort, and union with the Americans. Such, sir, are my feelings, and although you have imagined some which are very foreign to my heart, I forget that injustice to think only of my sincere attachment to you.

P.S. I am far from thinking, sir, that I am in any degree the cause of the sentiments that are experienced in this country for yourself and the officers of your army. I am not so vain as to have entertained such an idea; but I have had the advantage of knowing you, and I was, therefore, able to foresee what would occur on your arrival, and to circulate the opinions adopted by all those who have personally known you. I am convinced, and no one here can deny it, that but for your arrival, American affairs would have gone on badly this campaign; but, in our present situation, this alone is not sufficient, and it is important to gain advantages over the enemy. Believe, that when I wrote in my own name, that opinion did not belong to myself alone; my only fault was writing with warmth, in an official manner, that which you would have forgiven on account of my youth, if I had addressed it as a friend to yourself alone; but my intentions were so pure, that I was as much surprised as pained by your letter, and that is saying a great deal.

FROM M. DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Newport, August 27th, 1780.

Permit an aged father, my dear marquis, to reply to you as he would do to a son whom he tenderly loves and esteems. You know me well enough to feel convinced that I do not require being excited, that when I, at my age, form a resolution founded upon military and state reasons, and supported by circumstances, no possible instigation can induce me to change my mind without a positive order from my general. I am happy to say that his despatches, on the contrary, inform me that my ideas correspond substantially with his own, as to all those points which would allow us to turn this into an offensive operation, and that we only differ in relation to some small details, on which a slight explanation, or his commands, would suffice to remove all difficulties in an instant. As a Frenchman, you feel humiliated, my dear friend, at seeing an English squadron blockading in this country, with a decided superiority of frigates and ships, the Chevalier de Ternay's squadron; but console yourself, my dear marquis, the port of Brest has been blockaded for two months by an English fleet, and this is what prevents the second division from setting out under the escort of M. de Bougainville. If you had made the two last wars, you would have heard nothing spoken of but these same blockades; I hope that M. de Guichen, on one side, and M. de Gaston, on the other, will revenge us for these momentary mortifications.

It is always right, my dear marquis, to believe that Frenchmen are invincible; but I, after an experience of forty years, am going to confide a great secret to you: there are no men more easily beaten when they have lost confidence in their chiefs, and they lose it instantly when their lives have been compromised, owing to any private or personal ambition. If I have been so fortunate as to have retained their confidence until the present moment, I may declare, upon the most scrupulous examination of my own conscience, that I owe it entirely to this fact, that, of about fifteen thousand men who have been killed or wounded under my command, of various ranks, and in the most bloody actions, I have not to reproach myself with having caused the death of a single man for my own personal advantage.

You wrote to the Chevalier de Chastellux, my dear marquis, that the interview I requested of our general has embarrassed him, because it only becomes necessary after the arrival of the second division, when there will be quite time enough to act. But you must surely have forgotten that I have unceasingly requested that interview immediately, and that it is absolutely necessary that he, the admiral, and I, should concert together all our projects and details, that in case one of the three chances should occur and enable us to act offensively, our movements may be prompt and decisive. In one of these three cases, my dear marquis, you will find in your old prudent father some remnants of vigour and activity. Be ever convinced of my sincere affection, and that if I pointed out to you very gently what displeased me in your last despatch, I felt at the time convinced that the warmth of your heart had somewhat impaired the coolness of your judgment. Retain that latter quality in the council-room, and reserve all the former for the hour of action. It is always the aged father, Rochambeau, who is addressing his dear son Lafayette, whom he loves, and will ever love and esteem until his latest breath.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Robinson House, opposite W. Point, Sept. 26, 1780.

When I parted from you yesterday, sir, to come and breakfast here with General Arnold, we were far from foreseeing the event which I am now going to relate to you.~

You will shudder at the danger to which we have been exposed; you will admire the miraculous chain of unexpected events and singular chances that have saved us; but you will be still more astonished when you learn by what instruments this conspiracy has been formed. West Point was sold--and sold by Arnold: the same man who formerly acquired glory by rendering such immense services to his country. He had lately entered into a horrible compact with the enemy, and but for the accident that brought us here at a certain hour, but for the combination of chances that threw the adjutant-general of the English army in the hands of some peasants, beyond the limits of our stations, West Point and the North River, we should both at present, in all probability, be in possession of the enemy.

When we set out yesterday for Fishkill, we were preceded by one of my aides-de-camp, and one of General Knox's, who found General Arnold and his wife at breakfast, and sat down at table with them. Whilst they were together, two letters were given to Arnold, which apprised him of the arrestration of the spy. He ordered a horse to be saddled, went into his wife's room to tell her he was ruined, and desired his aide-de-camp to inform General Washington that he was going to West Point and would return in the course of an hour.

On our arrival here, we crossed the river and went to examine the works. You may conceive our astonishment when we learnt, on our return, that the arrested spy was Major André, adjutant-general of the English army; and when amongst his papers were discovered the copy of an important council of war, the state of the garrison and works, and observations upon various means of attack and defence, the whole in Arnold's own hand writing.

The adjutant-general wrote also to the general, avowing his name and situation. Orders were sent to arrest Arnold; but he escaped in a boat, got on board the English frigate the Vulture, and as no person suspected his flight, he was not stopped at any post. Colonel Hamilton, who had gone in pursuit of him, received soon after, by a flag of truce, a letter from Arnold to the general, in which he entered into no details to justify his treachery, and a letter from the English commander, Robertson, who, in a very insolent manner, demanded that the adjutant-general should be delivered up to them, as he had only acted with the permission of General Arnold.

The first care of the general has been to assemble, at West Point, the troops that, under various pretences, Arnold had dispersed. We remain here to watch over the safety of a fort, that the English may respect less as they become better acquainted with it. Continental troops have been summoned here, and as Arnold's advice may determine Clinton to make a sudden movement, the army has received orders to be prepared to march at a moment's warning.

Footnote:

1. The project of an expedition against New York had not been abandoned: it was still canvassed by letter. General Washington agreed with the French generals as to the necessity of waiting for a naval reinforcement. The latter insisted upon having a conference with the General and M. de Lafayette. (See especially Washington's Letter of the 21st August, vol. vii. p. 169.) That long deferred conference was at length granted, and it was fixed that it should take place at Hartford (Connecticut). Washington left his army the 18th of September. It will be recollected that it was his interview with Arnold at the passage of the Hudson, that induced the latter to take the steps which led to the discovery of the conspiracy. (See above.) Some days after, M. de Rochambeau wrote thus to M. de Lafayette:--

"Providence has declared itself for us, my dear marquis,--and that important interview, which I have so long wished for, and which has given me so much pleasure, has been crowned by a peculiar mark of the favour of Heaven. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has not yet arrived; I took the liberty of opening your letter to him, in which I found all the details of that horrible conspiracy, and I am penetrated with mingled feelings, of grief at the event itself, and joy at its discovery."

TO MADAME DE TESSÉ.

Camp, on the right side of the North River, near the Island of New York, October 4th, 1780.

A French frigate arriving from America,--the son of M. de Rochambeau on board! Good God, what a commotion all that will excite, and how much trouble inquisitive people will take to discover the secrets of the ministers. But I, my dear cousin, will confide to you our secret. The French army has arrived at Rhode Island, and has not quitted that spot. M. de Ternay's seven vessels have been blockaded the whole time, and the English have nineteen vessels here under that lucky commander, Rodney. We Americans, without money, without pay, and without provisions, by holding out fair promises, have succeeded in forming an army, which has been offering to fight a battle with the English for the last three months, but which cannot without vessels reach the island of New York. Gates, who was no favourite of mine, has become still less so since he has allowed himself to be beaten in the south. But all this is quite as monontonous as a European war, and catastrophes are necessary to excite and sustain the interest of men.

You must know, then, my cousin, that a certain General Arnold, of some reputation in the world, was our commander at West Point, a fort on the North River, whose importance the Duke d'Ayen will explain to you. General Washington and I, returning from Hartford, where we had held a conference with the French generals, discovered a conspiracy of the highest importance. We owe that discovery to an almost incredible combination of accidents. West Point was sold by Arnold, and we were consequently lost. The traitor has fled to join the enemy.

I received letters from you by the fleet, and by the Alliance, and I am impatiently expecting more recent ones. The nation will not be pleased with the state of tranquillity in which we remain. But as we have no ships, we can only wait for the enemy's blows, and General Clinton does not appear in any haste to attack us. As to ourselves, we republicans preach lectures to our sovereign master, the people, to induce him to recommence his exertions. In the mean while we practise so much frugality, and are in such a state of poverty and nudity, that I trust an account will be kept in the next world, whilst we remain in purgatory, of all we have suffered here.

Poircy~ is here, and although he does not find a St. Germain in this part of the world, he accustoms himself extremely well, I assure you, to a soldier's life. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all the news you gave me. Although they afforded me the greatest pleasure, I scarcely dare reply to them, from the fear that my answers may appear to come from another world. I saw in the paper that the King of Spain was dead: has God, then, punished him for having conferred the title of grandee upon M. de Montbarrey?

I need not tell you that I am in good health, for that is, you know, my usual custom. My situation here is as agreeable as possible. I am in high favour, I believe, with the French army: the American army shew me every possible kindness and attention. I have the command of a flying corps, composed of the elite of the troops. My friend General Washington continues to be everything to me that I before described to you.

Adieu, my dear cousin. When shall I again see you? I pray that God may grant us an honourable peace, and that I may embrace my friends, and I willingly, for my own part, will give up my share of the glory in the hope eventually to win.

Present my affectionate regards to M. de Tesse, M. de Mun, M. Tenai, and the baron;~ I was on the point of saying, embrace his daughter for me.

Footnotes:

1. Secretary. The Marshal de Noailles had a house at Saint Germain.

2. The Baron de Tott.

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.

Near Fort Lee, opposite Fort Washington, on the North River, Oct. 7th, 1780.

You must have already learnt, my dearest love, all that can interest you relating to myself, from my arrival at Boston until my voyage to Rhode Island, which place public affairs, and the desire of seeing my friends, induced me to visit soon after my landing. I have been since to Hartford in Connecticut, to be present at an interview between the French generals and General Washington: of all my young friends, Damas ~ was the only one who accompanied us. The viscount~ and I often write to each other, but we do not meet, and the poor man remains shut up in Rhode Island; the French squadron detains the army there, and is itself detained by nineteen ships of the line and sundry other ships of war, upon which M. Rodney proudly exhibits the British colours. So long as our naval inferiority lasts, you need feel no anxiety about the health of your friends in America.

I must speak to you, however, about my health; it continues excellent, and has not been interrupted for a single moment; a soldier's mode of living is extremely frugal, and the general officers of the rebel army fare very differently from the French army at Newport. You have probably heard that, on my arrival in America, I found the army of General Washington very weak in numbers, and still more so in resources. Our prospects were not brilliant, and the loss of Charleston was for us a most heavy blow, but the desire of co-operating with their allies gave new vigour to the states. General Washington's army increased more than half in number, and more than ten thousand militia were added to it, who would have come forward if we had acted offensively. Associations of merchants and patriotic banks were formed to supply the army with subsistence. The ladies made, and are still making, subscriptions, to afford succour to the soldiers. When that idea was first proposed, I made myself your ambassador to the ladies of Philadelphia, and you are inscribed on the list for a hundred guineas. General Gates had in the south an army quite sufficient for defence; but he has been completely beaten in Carolina. The fruit of all these labours has been, to prove to the French that the Americans desire nothing better than to second their views upon England, to prove to the English that the flame of liberty was not wholly extinguished in America, and to keep us, during the whole campaign, in daily expectation of a battle, which General Clinton, although equal to us in number, has never thought proper to accept. If we had only had ships, we should have been enabled to do a great deal more.

As I know that all that interests me deeply is also interesting to you, I will tell you that we are much occupied by an important system, which would secure to us a considerable army during the whole war, and would bring into action all the resources which America is capable of making. God grant that the nation may understand its true interests, and our affairs will go on without difficulty!

M. de Rochambeau and M. de Ternay, as well as all the other French officers, conduct themselves extremely well here. A little ebullition of frankness gave rise to a slight altercation between those generals and myself. As I perceived I could not convince them, and that it was important for the public good that we should remain friends; I declared, with due humility, that I had been mistaken, that I had committed an error, and, in short, in proper terms, I asked their pardon, which produced such an excellent effect that we are now on a more amicable footing than ever.

I command a flying corps, which always forms an advance guard, and is quite independent of the great army; this is far too grand for our pacific situation.

On the Hackensack River, Oct. 8th, 1780.

You will learn, my dearest love, an important event, which has exposed America to the greatest danger. A frightful conspiracy has been planned by the celebrated Arnold: he sold to the English the fort of West Point, which was under his command, and, consequently, the whole navigation of the river: the plot was within an ace of succeeding, and quite as many chances combined together to discover it as in that affair of the Alliance, which I have so often described to you.~ After our journey to Hartford, General Washington passed by West Point, which was not on his road; but he was desirous of shewing me the works that had been constructed since my departure for France. Detained by various accidents upon the road, we arrived at the traitor's house just as he received the letters which announced that he had been discovered. He had not time to intercept those proofs of infamy, and consequently he could only make his escape towards New York half an hour before our arrival.

The adjutant-general of the English army has been arrested under a feigned name and dress. He was an important person, the friend and confidant of General Clinton. He behaved with so much frankness, courage, and delicacy, that I could not help lamenting his unhappy fate.

I received, with great delight, the letters of my dear sisters; I shall write to them to-morrow; but I shall send this scrawl, as I fear the frigate may depart. I finish my letter in this place, having begun it rather more close to the enemy: we had approached them to protect a small enterprise, in which a detachment of my advance-guard has been engaged, and which only ended by capturing two officers, and fifteen men and horses. We are now marching towards a place you will find marked upon the map Sotawa, whither the grand army is also to repair. I shall write to Madame d'Ayen and to my sisters.

Sotawa Bridge, October 10th, 1780.

I am closing my letter, but before sealing it, I must again speak to you for a moment of my affection. General Washington was much pleased by the kind messages which I delivered from you; he desires me to present to you his tender regards; he is affectionately attached to George, and is much gratified by the name we have given him. We often speak of you and of the little family. Adieu, adieu.

Footnotes:

1. The Count Charles de Damas, died a peer of France under the restoration.

2. The Viscount de Noailles.

3. The conspiracy discovered on board the frigate which brought home M. de Lafayette, in September, 1779.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, October 30th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--In our conversations upon military operations you have often told me that, since the beginning of the campaign, your eyes were turned towards a project upon which I generally agree in opinion with you, and beg leave to offer some observations.

Far from lessening my desire of finishing the campaign by some brilliant stroke, the project of Staten Island, though it miscarried, has strengthened my opinions, as I have clearly seen, by the details of this operation, that we should, in all human probability, have succeeded, and that our men were fully equal to any enterprise of that kind.~

My reasons for wishing to undertake something are these:--1st. Any enterprise will please the people of this country, and shew them that when we have men we do not lie still; and even a defeat (provided it was not fatal) would have its good consequences. 2ndly. The French court have often complained to me of the inactivity of the American army, who, before the alliance, had distinguished themselves by their spirit of enterprise. They have often told me, your friends leave us now to fight their battles, and do no more risk themselves: it is, moreover, of the greatest political importance to let them know, that, on our side, we were ready to co-operate. Be sure, my dear general, that many people's interest will be to let it be believed that we were not ready, and if anything may engage the ministry to give us the asked for support, it will be our proving to the nation that, on our side, we had been ready. So far was the Chevalier de la Luzerne convinced of this (and on this point the minister's interest is the same as ours) that he was made happy by my mentioning to him the Staten Island affair. I well know the court of Versailles, and were I to go to it, I should think it very impolitic to go there unless we had done something. 3rdly. It is more than probable that mediators will interfere this winter by a negotiation. Then England will say, how can we give up people whom we consider as half conquered; their best city has been taken by an army not much superior to the people that were to defend it; their southern army was routed almost as soon as looked at by the British troops New York is so much ours, that they dare not approach it, and General Washington's army does not exceed five thousand men. What shall France answer? Principally now that from the letters I have received I find the Charleston affair has brought our arms into contempt. But what difference, if France might say, the American army has taken, sword in hand, your best works; they have offered to you the battle upon your own island, and, perhaps they may add (for news increases in travelling), they are now in possession of New York.

Upon these considerations, my dear general, what I want is this, to find an expedition which may wear a brilliant aspect, and afford probable advantages, also an immense, though very remote one, which, if unsuccessful, may not turn fatal to us, for the loss of two or three hundred men, half of them being enlisted for two months, I do not consider as a ruinous adventure.

The basis of the plan will be, that Fort Washington, being in our possession, may, with the Fort Lee batteries, protect our crossing North River, and be a security for our retreat, principally if some works are added on the point of embarkation. The taking of Fort Washington we may demonstrate to be very probable, and upon that point you are of my opinion.

The enemy have, on the upper part of the Island from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, who would immediately occupy all the other upper posts. Their army on Long Island would repair to New York, and there would also retire the troops posted at Harlem.

As soon as Fort Washington should be ours, the army would cross over to the island, and those of West Point arrive in the same time (which calculation may be easily done) so that we should effectually possess all the upper posts, or cut them off from their main army. Some militia would come to our assistance, and as these posts are not well furnished with provisions we should take them, at least, by famine.

The enemy's army consists of nine thousand men: they must certainly leave one thousand men in their several posts; fifteen hundred of them, at least, will be either killed at Fort Washington or blocked up at Laurel Hill, and they will then have between six and seven thousand men to attack ten. The two thousand militia (in supposing that they durst take them out) I do not mention, because we may have four thousand militia for them: under such circumstances it is, probable that Sir Henry Clinton will venture a battle. If he does, and by chance beat us, we retire under Fort Washington; but, if we beat him, his works will be at such a distance, that he will be ruined in the retreat. If, on the contrary, he knows that the French army is coming, and if we spread the report of a second division, or of Count de Guichen being upon the coasts, he will keep in his works, and we will, some way or other, carry the upper posts. When we are upon the spot we may reconnoitre New York, and see if something is to be done. If Clinton was making a forage into the Jerseys, I should be clear for pushing to the city.

If we undertake, the circumstances of the weather make it necessary that we undertake immediately. I would move the army, as soon as possible, to our position near the new bridge. This movement may invite Clinton in the Jerseys, and bring us nearer to the point of execution.

Though my private glory and yours, my dear general, both of which are very dear to my heart, are greatly interested, not so much for the opinions of America, as for those of Europe, in our doing something this campaign, I hope you know me too well to think I should insist upon steps of this nature unless I knew that they were politically necessary, and had a sufficient military probability.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The six hundred men of Luzerne's legion might be got in twelve days. If our movements had no other effect but to make a diversion in favour of the south, it would, on that footing, meet with the approbation of the world, and perhaps impeach the operations of General Leslie.

Footnote:

1. M. de Lafayette had taken, since the 7th of August, command of the corps of light infantry, consisting of six companies of men, selected in different lines of the army. Those battalions were divided into two brigades; one under the command of General Hand, the other of General Poor. The inactivity of the army was very opposite to the character and policy of M. de Lafayette; he endeavoured incessantly to find means of putting an end to it, at least as far as regarded himself. The 14th of August he had written to General Washington to ask his permission to attempt a nocturnal surprise on the two camps of Hessians established at New York Island. At the beginning of October, he attempted an expedition on Italian Island, which could not be accomplished, owing to a mistake made by the administration of the materality of the army. This letter, and the letters of the 13th of November, allude to this circumstance. We have been obliged to retrench ten letters, which relate solely to the unimportant incidents of a war of observation.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Head-quarters, 30th October, 1780.

It is impossible, my dear marquis, to desire more ardently than I do, to terminate the campaign by some happy stroke; but we must consult our means rather than our wishes, and not endeavour to better our affairs by attempting things which, for want of success, may make them worse. We are to lament that there has been a misapprehension of our circumstances in Europe; but to endeavour to recover our reputation, we should take care that we do not injure it more. Ever since it became evident that the allied arms could not co-operate this campaign, I have had an eye to the point you mention, determined, if a favourable opening should offer, to embrace it; but, so far as my information goes, the enterprise would not be warranted; it would, in my opinion, be imprudent to throw an army of ten thousand men upon an island against nine thousand, exclusive of seamen and militia. This, from the accounts we have, appears to be the enemy's force. All we can do at present, therefore, is to endeavour to gain a more certain knowledge of their situation, and act accordingly. This I have been some time employed in doing, but hitherto with little success. I shall thank you for any aids you can afford. Arnold's flight seems to have frightened all my intelligencers out of their senses. I am sincerely and affectionately yours.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, November 13th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--In revolving in my mind the chances of discovery by moonlight, and, on the other hand, the inconveniences of staying longer than you wish under our tents, I have thought if there was any position which might enable us to take advantage of the first hours of the night. How far the sending of the Pennsylvanians towards Aquakanac, and going ourselves to the Hukinsac~ position, may awaken the enemy, I cannot pretend to say. The most difficult affair in this would be the article of the boats. Colonel Smith will go tomorrow morning to West Point, unless any intelligence received at head-quarters had made it useful that the enterprise be attempted soon, in which case he would go and reconnoitre the place. Suppose he was to bring from West Point Colonel Gouvion, who has often examined the place with the eye of an engineer. These ideas, my dear general, have rather started into any mind, than become fixed, and I thought I would communicate them.

Most affectionately and respectfully yours,

LAFAYETTE.

The Marquis de Laval Montmorency, one of the most illustrious families in France, is on his way to the camp. The Chevalier de Chastellux, a relation and friend of mine, major-general in the French army, is also coming. I every day expect my brother-in-law, and his friend, Count de Charlus, only son to the Marquis de Castries, who enjoys a great consideration in France, and has won the battle of Closter Camp. The Duke of Lauzun has also written to me that he would come soon.~ These five gentlemen may, by their existence at home, be considered as the first people in the French army. This little history I give you before their arrival, in consequence of what you have desired from me at the beginning.

I write some letters to the commanding officers at Fishkill, West Point, and King's Ferry, so that the gentlemen may be directed to come by the best road to my quarters, from which I will present them to you. I think the letters ought to be sent as soon as possible.

P.S. As General Heath commands in all these parts, I think, upon recollection, that I had better write to him alone. You might also send him a line on the subject.

Footnotes:

1. The general-in-chief projected an attack on the posts of the northern part of New York. While General Heath was to attract, by a feint, the attention of the enemy, Washington was to march in advance, and M. de Lafayette to attack Fort Washington. This expedition, for which great preparations had been made, terminated in a few reconnoitring parties. The campaign closed without an engagement.

2. The Marquis de Laval, is the Duke de Laval, who died under the restoration. The Chevalier de Chastellux is well known by his works. The Count de Charlus is at present the Duke de Castries, member of the chamber of peers. M. de Lauzun has been general in the service of the French republic.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON

(ORIGINAL.)

Paramus, November the 28th, 1780.

My dear General,--We arrived last night at this place, and were much favoured by the weather in our recognising of the Island, where, I confess, my feelings were different from what I had experienced when looking at these forts with a hopeful eye. I saw the fatal sentry alluded to, Colonel Gouvion, on an upper battery of Jeffery's Hook. I also saw a small vessel playing off this Hook, but quite a trifling thing, without guns, and but two men on board. Nothing else on the river but the usual guards of spiting devil.

As you have been pleased to consult me on the choice of an adjutant-general, I will repeat here, my dear general, that though I have a claim upon General Hand, in every other point of view, his zeal, obedience, and love of discipline, have given me a very good opinion of him.

Colonel Smith has been by me wholly employed in that line, and I can assure you that he will perfectly answer your purpose.

Unless, however, you were to cast your eye on a man who, I think, would suit better than any other in the world. Hamilton is, I confess, the officer whom I should like to see in that station. With equal advantages, his services deserve from you the preference to any other. His knowledge of your opinions and intentions on military arrangements, his love of discipline, the superiority he would have over all the others, principally when both armies shall operate together, and his uncommon abilities, are calculated to render him perfectly agreeable to you. His utility would be increased by this preferment; and on other points he could render important services. An adjutant-general ought always to be with the commander-in-chief. Hamilton should, therefore, remain in your family, and his great industry in business would render him perfectly serviceable in all circumstances. On every public or private account, my dear general, I would advise you to take him.

I shall, on my arrival at Philadelphia, write you how those matters are going, upon which I build my private schemes. But I heartily wish that some account or other from Europe may enable you to act this winter on maritime operations. I hate the idea of being from you for so long a time; but I think I ought not to stay idle. At all events, I must return when your army takes the field.

I flatter myself with the hope of meeting Mrs. Washington on the road. Adieu, my dear general, most affectionately and respectfully yours.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December 5th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--By my letter of yesterday I have mentioned to you that a Spanish expedition was intended against St. Augustine. They mean to set out at the end of December, which will certainly delay them till the middle of January. It consists of twelve ships of the line, some frigates, bomb ketches, and a large number of troops. I have advised the minister to communicate officially to you this intelligence, and also to Count de Rochambeau, that proper means, if convenient, may be taken to improve it.

For my part, my dear general, I have conducted myself agreeably to what you said to me in our last conversations, that if, in the course of the winter, a naval superiority was obtained, our business should be to push for the southward, and that you would take for that purpose four thousand French and two thousand Americans. Nothing against New York can be undertaken before the end of May. Anything, therefore, that could employ us during February, March, and April, is worthy of our attention.

The confederacy was going to sail for some clothing which we have in the West Indies. No time was left to wait for an answer from you. I knew perfectly your sense of this affair. I therefore, with the advice of Chevalier de la Luzerne, wrote him a letter dated from Camp, wherein I explained to him that something might be done in conjunction for the public good. My opinion is strengthened by your sentiments on this matter, without, however, bringing myself, and still less yourself, to make any formal application to the Spanish generals.

Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter, the first part of which mentions that if, after having landed their troops in Florida, they would send their ships of the line for us, we might, at three weeks notice before the departure of the squadron, have in readiness six thousand men for a powerful diversion in Carolina. Their own interest is the only thing I seem to consider in this business, and I endeavour to invite Spanish caution in this measure; but, unless a more particular application is made, I do not believe that this part of my letter will have any effect.

The second part will, I hope, be productive of some good for America. I urge the necessity immediately to open a correspondence with General Greene that he may, by his manoeuvres, facilitate the operation of Spain. I tell them, that unless they land a corps of troops on the boundaries of Georgia, with a view at least to threaten Augusta and Savannah, their expedition will run a great risk. I advise the measure of cruizing off Charleston Harbour, the whole under the idea of their own interest.

I have also written to the naval French commander in the West Indies, advising him to succour Chevalier de Ternay, which I know he will not do. But I take this opportunity of condemning their foolish neglect, in not appearing on our coasts when they return to Europe; and I do also advise that, in their cruizes from St. Domingo, they may sometimes appear off Savannah and Charlestown Harbour. Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter.

Though I always speak of the beginning of February, it is, however, certain, that any time in February would be convenient to go to the southward. March and April are more than sufficient for the taking of Charlestown; and in all cases, I know, from our last conversations, that you wish for a naval superiority this winter, in order to succour the southern states.

I had this morning, my dear general, a long conversation with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, relating to a southern operation. He is, as well as myself, clearly of opinion, that unless a formal application and a plan of campaign be proposed to them, they will not send their ships to us. In this last case their coming ought still to be questioned. But if you thought it better to try, you might propose to the French generals to send a frigate there, and see, with them, what might be done in conjunction. Suppose they were to take four thousand men, leaving some, and the militia, at Rhode Island. We could on our part muster two thousand Americans. However, the Spaniards are so positive and strict in following literally their instructions that I do not believe anything will engage them to come. But my letter, which I look upon as a mere cipher on the first proposition, will, I hope, engage, them to impart their projects to General Greene, and of course this diversion will become useful to us.

Suppose Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay were to send to Havanna a copy of your letter, I think they ought to intrust it to Viscount de Noailles, who will soon return to Rhode Island, and whose name is highly respected by the court of Spain for many particular reasons, too long to be mentioned here.

I have seen Mr. Ross, and find that very little clothing is to be for the present expected. They have some arms on board the Alliance, and, I think, a hundred bales of cloth on board a vessel under Jones's convoy. The remainder will come with the Serapis. Unless the storm has forced Jones to put in some French harbour, he may be expected every minute.

The assembly of Pennsylvania have before them the affair of the recruits; but proper arrangements are not properly supported. They are fond of voluntary enlistments. I have an appointment for to-morrow with General Mifflin, where I will debate this matter with him.

To-morrow, my dear general, I will go to Brandywine with Chevalier de Chastellux, and also to Red Bank, Fort Mifflin, &c. On my return I hope to find news from France, and I will write you my determination about my going to the southward.

Inclosed you will find a newspaper, wherein congress have printed a letter from General Gates, relating to a new success of Sumpter.

Congress have lately received letters from Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, but nothing very particular. They have more fully written by other opportunities that are expected. Portugal has entered into the convention of neutrality, and with such conditions as to shew their partiality to our side of the question.

Adieu, my dear general, most respectfully and affectionately.

Footnote:

1. The winter, according to custom, causing the dispersion of the army, M. de Lafayette repaired to Philadelphia to be nearer arrivals and intelligence from Europe. It was there he first conceived the project of going to serve in the south under General Greene, who was to make a winter campaign. As regards the project of making a division in Florida, with the co-operation of the Spaniards, he seconded it with ardour, and to General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and the Spanish commanders, he wrote long letters on the subject, which have but little interest, owing to the project not having been attended with any important result: those letters have been omitted.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, 14th December, 1780.

My dear Marquis,--Soon after despatching my last letter to you, your favour dated at Paramus was put into my hands by Colonel Gouvion. The Chevalier de la Luzerne's despatches came in time for the post, which is the only means left me for the conveyance of letters; there not being so much money in the hands of the quartermaster-general (I believe I might go further, and say in those of the whole army,) as would bear the expense of an express to Rhode Island. I could not get one the other day to ride so far as Compton.

I am now writing to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, on the subject of your several letters. When their answer arrives, I will communicate the contents to you. You must be convinced, from what passed at the interview at Hartford, that my command of the French troops at Rhode Island stands upon a very limited scale, and that it would be impolitic and fruitless in me to propose any measures of co-operation to a third power, without their concurrence; consequently an application from you, antecedently to an official proposition from the minister of France, the gentlemen at the head of the French armament at Rhode Island, congress, or myself, could only be considered as coming from a private gentleman; it is, therefore, my advice to you to postpone your correspondence with the Spanish generals, and let your influence come in hereafter, as auxiliary to something more formal and official. I do not hesitate to give it clearly as my opinion to you, (but this opinion and this business should be concealed behind a curtain,) that the favourable moment of the Spanish operations in the Floridas ought to be improved to the utmost extent of our means, provided the Spaniards, by a junction of their maritime force with that of his most Christian Majesty, under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay, will give us a secure convoy, and engage not to leave us until the operations shall be at an end, or it can be done by consent of parties.

I am very thankful to the minister for permitting, and to you for communicating to General Greene, intelligence of the Spanish movement towards the Floridas. It may have a happy influence on his measures, and it may be equally advantageous to the Spaniards. Your expressions of personal attachment and affection to me are flattering and pleasing, and fill me with gratitude. It is unnecessary, I trust, on my part, to give you assurances of mutual regard, because I hope you are convinced in your own choice to go to the southern army or to stay with this, circumstances and inclination alone must govern you. It would add to my pleasure if I could encourage your hope of Colonel Nevill's exchange. I refused to interest myself in the exchange of my own aide. General Lincoln's were exchanged with himself, and upon that occasion, for I know of no other, congress passed a resolution, prohibiting exchanges out of the order of captivity.

Under one general head, I shall express my concern for your disappointment of letters, our disappointment of clothes, and disappointment in the mode of raising men; but I shall congratulate you on the late change of the administration of France,~ as it seems to be consonant to your wishes, and to encourage hope. I am much pleased at the friendly disposition of Portugal. Much good, I hope, will result from the combination of the maritime powers. I am in very confined quarters; little better than those at Valley Forge, but such as they are I shall welcome into them your friends on their return to Rhode Island. I am, &c.

Footnote:

1. Footnote 1: The Marquis de Castries had succeeded, as minister of the navy, to M. de Sartine. This change gave rise to the hope that France would send the promised succours, and that expectation induced M. de Lafayette to renounce his journey to the south.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.~

New Windsor, on the North River, Jan. 30th, 1781.

The letters which I had the honour of writing to you, sir, and which were dated the 20th May, 19th July, 4th and 16th December, have, I hope, reached you safely. Since the arrival of the squadron, your despatch of the 3rd of June is the only one I have received. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has only received one letter of the same month, and none have yet reached the officers of the army and squadron.

The first copy of this letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, who is charged by congress with a private mission. Permit me to recommend to you this officer as a man who, by his integrity, frankness, and patriotism, must be extremely acceptable to government.

According to the instructions of congress, he will place before you the actual state of our affairs, which demand, I think more than ever, the most serious attention. As to the opinions which I may allow myself to express, sir, they entirely correspond with those I have hitherto expressed, and the very slight alterations observable in them have been occasioned by a change of time, prejudices, and circumstances.

With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating. The English are conscious of this truth, and all their movements prove how much they desire to retain the empire of the sea. The harbours, the country, and all the resources it offers, appear to invite us to send thither a naval force. If we had possessed but a maritime superiority this spring, much might have been achieved with the army that M. de Rochambeau brought with him, and it would not have been necessary to have awaited the division he announced to us. If M. de Guichen had stopped at Rhode Island, on his way to France, Arbuthnot would have been ruined, and not all Rodney's efforts could have prevented our gaining victories. Since the hour of the arrival of the French, their inferiority has never for one moment ceased, and the English and the Tories have dared to say that France wished to kindle, without extinguishing the flame. This calumny becomes more dangerous at a period when the English detachments are wasting the south; when, under the protection of some frigates, corps of fifteen hundred men are repairing to Virginia, without our being able to get to them. On the whole continent, with the exception of the Islands of Newport, it is physically impossible that we should carry on an offensive war without ships, and even on those Islands the difficulty of transportation, the scarcity of provisions, and many other inconveniences, render all attempts too precarious to enable us to form any settled plan of campaign.

The result, sir, of all this is, that the advantage of the United States being the object of the war, and the progress of the enemy on that continent being the true means of prolonging it, and of rendering it, perhaps, even injurious to us, it becomes, in a political and military point of view, necessary to give us, both by vessels sent from France, and by a great movement in the fleet in the Islands, a decided naval superiority for the next campaign; and also, sir, to give us money enough to place the American forces in a state of activity; fifteen thousand of the regular army, and ten thousand, or, if we choose it, a still greater number of militia in this part of the country; a southern army, of which I cannot tell precisely the extent, but which will be formed by the five southern states, with all means of supporting in this country such a considerable force. Such, sir, are the resources that you may employ against the common enemy; immense sums of money could not transport resources of equal value from Europe to America, but these, without a succour of money, although established on the very theatre of war, will become useless; and that succour, which was always very important, is now absolutely necessary.

The last campaign took place without a shilling having been spent; all that credit, persuasion, and force could achieve, has been done,--but that can hold out no longer: that miracle, of which I believe no similar example can be found, cannot be renewed, and our exertions having been made to obtain an army for the war, we must depend on you to enable us to make use of it.

From my peculiar situation, sir, and from what it has enabled me to know and see, I think it is my duty to call your attention to the American soldiers and on the part they must take in the operations of the next campaign. The continental troops have as much courage and real discipline as those that are opposed to them. They are more inured to privation, more patient than Europeans, who, on these two points, cannot be compared to them. They have several officers of great merit, without mentioning those who have served during the last wars, and from their own talents have acquired knowledge intuitively; they have been formed by the daily experience of several campaigns, in which, the armies being small, and the country a rugged one, all the battalions of the line were obliged to serve as advance-guards and light troops. The recruits whom we are expecting, and who only bear, in truth, the name of recruits, have frequently fought battles in the same regiments which they are now re-entering, and have seen more gun-shots than three-fourths of the European soldiers. As to the militia, they are only armed peasants, who have occasionally fought, and who are not deficient in ardour and discipline, but whose services would be most useful in the labours of a siege. This, sir, is the faithful picture that I think myself obliged to send you, and which it is not my interest to paint in glowing colours, because it would be more glorious to succeed with slighter means. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, having himself seen our soldiers, will give you a detailed and disinterested account of them, will doubtless tell you, as I do, that you may depend upon our regular troops. The result of this digression, sir, is, to insist still more earnestly on the necessity of sending money to put the American troops in movement, and to repeat that well-known truth, that a pecuniary succour and a naval superiority must be the two principal objects of the next campaign.

It would take us too long to examine the faults that have been committed, and the efforts that the states may still endeavour to make: we must return to the former point, that, under present circumstances, money is requisite to derive any advantage from the American resources; that the means which have been substituted for funds are almost completely worn out; that those to which we are at present reduced, do not fulfil the proposed end, and are opposed to the ideas which induced the nation to commence the revolution; that, consequently, we require money to restore to the army that degree of activity without which it cannot operate in an efficacious manner. Clothes, arms, ammunition, are comprised in the same article, and Colonel Laurens carries with him a copy of the former list, from which some deductions have been made. I will content myself with saying, that nothing of any importance has been sent us, that it is necessary to clothe the American army, that it requires arms, and, to be enabled to besiege places, a great augmentation of powder. As these expenses relate to the pecuniary succours, and are those which will strike most forcibly individuals, both of the army and nation, I think it important that the government should prepare them with promptness, and send them in a secure manner.

If it should appear strange, sir, to call that completion of the army a great effort, I would beg to observe, that hunger, cold, nudity, and labour, the certainty of receiving no pay, clothes, or necessary food, being the prospects held out to the American soldier, they must be but little inviting to citizens who are, generally speaking, accustomed to live at home with some degree of comfort; and the English having had sufficient time to think of all the naval points, the attacks of next year will be anything rather than surprises, and our forces must increase in proportion to their precautions. I could have wished that there had been some French troops, and my confidence in the decrease of prejudice has been even greater than that of congress, General Washington, or your minister at that time. The advance-guard of the Count de Rochambeau, although inactive itself from want of ships, by its presence alone has rendered an essential service to America: if it had not arrived, the campaign would have been a ruinous one. When I consider the present state of feeling, my opinion, as I have had the honour of telling you before, would be to send hither, for the expedition of New York, a division of about ten thousand Frenchmen.

In our conference at Hartford, sir, the calculations were of course made, not according to the fortifications actually existing, but according to those they might intend erecting. The answers General Washington thought proper to make to the questions put by the Count de Rochambeau, have been long since carried to you by the Amazon. A proposal to ask for a corps of fifteen thousand Frenchmen could only be acceptable to the commander-in-chief. But if that surplus were to lessen the sum of money by means with which fifteen thousand regular troops, ten thousand militia, and a southern army should be put into motion; if it were to lessen the number of ships that would enable us to act in all places, and with a decided superiority;--I must again repeat, that pecuniary succours and a naval superiority are the two most essential points; that the same quantity of money would, put into action here, double that number of American soldiers; and that, without ships, a few thousand men more would be but of little use to us.

The admirable discipline of the French corps, in addition to the honour it confers on M. de Rochambeau and the soldiers under his command, fulfils a still more important aim, by impressing on the minds of the Americans the highest idea of our nation.

The wisdom of the government, in placing that corps under the orders of General Washington, allows me only to repeat how essential it is that his authority should be complete, and without any sort of restriction. The talents, prudence, delicacy, and knowledge of country, which are all united in him in the greatest degree of perfection, are qualities of which one only would suffice to ensure the rigid observance of the instructions which I bear; and the longer I remain here, the more frilly am I convinced that each of them is equally necessary to the harmony and success of the whole affair.

We have had, lately, sir, an important mutiny, of which Colonel Laurens will give you the details.~ A corps of Pennsylvanian troops, almost wholly composed of strangers, and stationed at Morristown (Jersey), unanimously rose against their officers, and, under the direction of one of their sergeants, marched on to Princetown. The civil authorities repaired thither, to afford them the justice they demanded. To be in want of food and clothes, to serve for more than a year without pay, some of them, indeed, having been forced to serve a whole year beyond their engagement, are evils to which no army would submit. It is singular enough that those mutineers should have hung up the envoys of General Clinton. The greatest part of the soldiers are disbanded, but they are to re-enter the service, and to join the recruits in different regiments of the state. I am not less positive as to the number of men we shall have in our continental army. Some troops belonging to the Jerseys, seduced by example, and being those next to the Pennsylvanians, which were composed of the greatest number of foreigners, wished to take the same method of obtaining justice; but General Washington, having taken the management of this affair in his own hands, sent forward a detachment; the mutineers submitted, and their chiefs were punished. It is impossible to pass too high encomiums upon the New England troops, almost all national ones, whose cause was at bottom the same, and who, in spite of their nudity, crossed heavy snows to march against the mutineers. This proves, sir, that human patience may have some limits, but that soldier citizens will endure far more than strangers. These events furnish another argument for the necessity of obtaining money.

I flatter myself, sir, that the government, conscious that the ensuing campaign may be a decisive one, will occupy itself seriously of rendering it favourable to us. The taking of New York would destroy the power of the English on this continent, and a short continuation of naval superiority would secure to us the easy conquest of all the other parts of the United States. As to the taking of New York, which it would be rash to consider easy, but absurd to respect the town as if it were a fortified one, it is, I believe, well authenticated, and General Washington has no doubt upon the subject, that with the means proposed in my letter, we should obtain possession of it in the course of the summer.

It is, I believe, important to turn, as far as possible, the enemy's attention towards Canada.

When General Washington gave Colonel Laurens his opinion respecting military affairs and the operations of the campaign, he also put down in writing some ideas on our present situation, and communicated to me that letter, which contains the substance of several of his conversations with me. I take the liberty of requesting the king's minister, to ask to see that letter. Our situation is not painted in flattering colours; but the general speaks from the sad experience of our embarrassments, and I agree with him, sir, that it is indispensable for us to obtain some pecuniary succours, and a decided naval superiority.

You must certainly have learnt, sir, that the defeat of Ferguson, and some other successes of ours, having disarranged the plans of Lord Cornwallis, General Leslie re-embarked to form the junction by water, and that he has since arrived at Charlestown. Arnold, became an English general, and honoured by the confidence of that nation, is at this moment at the head of a British detachment. Having landed in Virginia, he took possession of Richmond for some hours, and destroyed some public and private property: he must now have retired into a safe harbour, or has, perhaps, joined some other expedition. At the very moment when the English fancied that we were in the most awkward situation from the mutiny of some troops, General Washington sent a detachment on the left side of the Hudson, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, supported by General Parsons, which surprised, at Westchester, a corps of three hundred men under Colonel Delancey, wounded several, killed thirty, took sixty prisoners, burnt all the barracks and provisions, and retired, after having destroyed a bridge of communication with the Island of New York.

The general is soon to pass some days with the French troops at Rhode Island, and I shall accompany him on that journey.

I have the honour to be, sir, with equal affection and respect, &c. &c:

New Windsor, February 4th, 1781.

By a letter from M. de Rochambeau, sir, we learn that the English squadron in Gardiner's Bay has suffered severely from a gale of wind. A seventy-four, it is said, has run on shore; the London, of ninety guns, is dismasted, and M. Destouches~ was preparing to take advantage of this event. But you will receive more circumstantial, and perhaps more certain details, by letters from Rhode Island, and we are also ourselves expecting some, to fix more positively our own ideas and hopes. General Knox, commander of our artillery, a man of great merit and extreme probity, has just reported to the general the result of a mission which had been given him in the New England States. The spirit of patriotism and the zeal he found,--the exertions they are making to levy troops, either for the whole duration of the war, or for (what amounts, I trust, to the same thing) the period of three years, surpass our most sanguine hopes; and as they have twenty regiments in the continental service, I can only urge, in a still more positive manner, what I have already had the honour in writing to you.

Footnotes:

1. This letter was written in ciphers. It is inserted here exactly as it was first deciphered at the archives of foreign affairs. To avoid repetitions, we have not inserted the answers of the minister; these were written in a tone of confidence and friendship, and accord almost on every point with the ideas of M. de Lafayette, which were, in a measure, adopted by the cabinet of Versailles for the approaching campaign.

2. The revolt of the Pennsylvanian line is of the 2nd of January. It was appeased ten days afterwards, and imitated, the 20th of the same month, by the New Jersey troops.--(See the Letters of Washington at that period, and the Appendix, No. x. vol. vii.)

3. M. Destouches had replaced in the command of the frigates M. de Ternay, deceased the 15th December, after a short illness.

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.

New Windsor, in the North River, February 2nd, 1781.

The person who will deliver this to you, my dearest love, is a man I am much attached to, and whom I wish you to become intimate with. He is the son of president Laurens, who has been lately established in the Tower of London;~ he is lieutenant-colonel in our service, and aide-de-camp to General Washington; he has been sent by congress on a private mission to the court of France. I knew him well during the two first campaigns, and his probity, frankness, and patriotism, have attached me extremely to him. General Washington is very fond of him; and of all the Americans whom you have hitherto seen, he is the one I most particularly wish you to receive with kindness. If I were in France, he should live entirely at my house, and I would introduce him to all my friends (I have even introduced him to some by letter); and give him every opportunity in my power of making acquaintance, and of passing his time agreeably at Versailles; and in my absence, I entreat you to replace me. Introduce him to Madame d'Ayen, the Marshal de Mouchy, the Marshal de Noailles, and treat him in every respect as a friend of the family: he will tell you all that has occurred during our campaign, the situation in which we are at present placed, and give you all details relating to myself.

Since my arrival here, my health has not for a moment failed. The air of this country agrees with me extremely well, and exercise is very beneficial to me. My exertions during the last campaign did not lead me into much danger, and in that respect we have not, in truth, much to boast. The French squadron has remained constantly blockaded in Rhode Island, and I imagine that the Chevalier Ternay died of grief in consequence of this event. However this may be, he is positively dead. He was a very rough and obstinate man, but firm, and clear in all his views, and, taking all things into consideration, we have sustained a great loss. The French army has remained at Newport, and although its presence has been very useful to us, although it has disconcerted some plans of the enemy which would have been very injurious to us, it might have done still more good if it had, not been thus blockaded.

Several Frenchmen have passed by head quarters. They have all been delighted with General Washington, and I perceive with pleasure that he will be much beloved by the auxiliary troops. Laval and Custine disputed together during the whole journey, and at each station would have done much better than the American and English generals, but never both in the same manner. The viscount and Damas have taken a long journey on the continent; we have also had the Count des Deux-Ponts, whom I like very much; M. de Charlus is at present in Philadelphia. I intend setting out about the 15th, for Rhode Island, and I shall accompany General Washington during his visit to the French army. When you recollect how those poor rebels were looked upon in France, when I came to be hung with them, and when you reflect upon my warm affection for General Washington, you will conceive how delightful it will be for me to witness his reception there as generalissimo of the combined armies of the two nations.

The Americans continue to testify for me the greatest kindness: there is no proof of affection and confidence which I do not receive each day from the army and nation. I am serving here in the most agreeable manner possible. At every campaign I command a separate flying corps, composed of chosen troops; I experience for the American officers and soldiers that friendship which arises from having shared with them, for a length of time, dangers, sufferings, and both good and evil fortune. We began by struggling together; our affairs have often been at the lowest possible ebb. It is gratifying to me to crown this work with them, by giving the European troops a high idea of the soldiers who have been formed with us. To all these various motives of interest for the cause and army, are joined my sentiments of regard for General Washington: amongst his aides-de-camp there is one man I like very much, and of whom I have often spoken to you; this is Colonel Hamilton.

I depend on Colonel Laurens to give you the details of our campaign. We remained sufficiently near the English to merit the accusation of boldness; but they would not take advantage of any of the opportunities we offered them. We are all in winter quarters in this part of the country. There is some activity in the south, and I was preparing to go there; but the wishes of General Washington, and the hope of being useful to my countrymen, have detained me here. The corps I command having returned to the regiments, I have established myself at head-quarters. America made great efforts last summer, and has renewed them this winter, but in a more durable manner, by only making engagements for the war, and I trust that none will have cause to be dissatisfied with us.

Arnold, who has now become an English general, landed in Virginia, with a corps, which appears well pleased to serve under his orders. There is no accounting for taste; but I do not feel sorry, I own, to see our enemies rather degrade themselves, by employing one of our generals, whose talents, even before we knew his treachery, we held in light estimation: abilities must, in truth, be rare in New York. But whilst speaking of baseness, Colonel Laurens will tell you of the fine embassy sent by General Clinton to some mutinous soldiers. He will describe to you also the details of that mutiny; the means employed to arrest it with the Pennsylvanians, and also those we employed with the Jersey troops. This only proves, however, that human patience has its limits, as no European army would endure the tenth part of such sufferings, that citizens alone can support nudity, hunger, cold, labour, and the absolute want of that pay which is necessary to soldiers, who are more hardy and more patient, I believe, than any others in existence.

Embrace our children a thousand and a thousand times for me; their father, although a wanderer, is not less tender, not less constantly occupied with them, and not less happy at receiving news from them. My heart dwells with peculiar delight on the moment when those dear children will be presented to me by you, and when we may embrace and caress them together. Do you think that Anastasia will recollect me? Embrace tenderly for me my dear and amiable viscountess, Madame du Roure, my two sisters, de Noailles and d'Ayen, &c. &c.

Footnote:

1. He was detained both as a prisoner of war and a rebel. The 18th of October, Madame de Lafayette had herself written in his favour to M. de Vergennes, a letter which is still preserved, in the archives of foreign affairs.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL)

Elk, March the 8th, 1781.

My dear general,--Your letter of the 1st inst. did not come to hand until last evening, and I hasted to answer to its contents, though I should, in a few hours, be better able to inform you of my movements.~

From what I hear of the difficulties to convoy us down the bay, I very much apprehend that the winds will not permit any frigate to come up. Count de Rochambeau thinks his troops equal to the business, and wishes that they alone may display their zeal and shed their blood for an expedition which all America has so much at heart. The measures he is taking may be influenced by laudable motives, but I suspect they are not entirely free from selfish considerations. God grant this may not be productive of bad consequences. Baron de Viomenil will also want to do every thing alone. As to the French troops, their zeal is laudable, and I wish their chiefs would reserve it for the time when we may co-operate with an assurance of success.

I heartily feel, my dear general, for the honour of our arms, and think it would be derogatory to them had not this detachment some share in the enterprise. This consideration induces me to embark immediately, and our soldiers will gladly put up with the inconveniences that attend the scarcity of vessels. We shall have those armed ones (though the largest has only twelve guns) and with this every body assures us that we may go without any danger to Annapolis. For my part I am not yet determined what to do; but if I see no danger to our small fleet in going to Annapolis, and if I can get Commodore Nicholson to take the command of it, I shall perhaps proceed in a small boat to Hampton, where my presence can alone enable me to procure a frigate, and where I will try to cool the impetuosity or correct the political mistakes of both barons.~

Whichever determination I take, a great deal must be personally risked, but I hope to manage things so as to commit no imprudence with the excellent detachment whose glory is as dear, and whose safety is much dearer, to me than my own. I have written to General Greene, and will write to the governors, either to get intelligence or to prepare means to operate; but (General Greene excepted) I do not give them any hint of our intentions further than the expedition against Portsmouth.

When a man has delicate games to play, and when chance may influence so much his success or miscarriage, he must submit to blame in case of misfortune. But your esteem, my dear general, and your affection, will not depend upon events. With the highest respect and most tender friendship, &c.

Footnotes:

1. An instruction of the 20th of February, enjoined to General Lafayette to take the command of a detachment assembled at Peekskill, to act in conjunction with the militia, and some vessels of M. Destouches. He was to proceed by a rapid march to Hampton, on the Chesapeak bay, to surprise Arnold at Portsmouth: he had orders to return back immediately if he learnt that the latter had quitted Virginia, or that the French commander had lost his naval superiority. M. de Lafayette reached Pompton the 23rd, (from whence he wrote to the general-in-chief,) Philadelphia the 2nd, and Head-of-Elk the 3rd of March. Washington, however, had himself repaired to Newport to urge the departure of M. Destouches, which event he announced in a letter of the 11th. The result of his encounter on the 16th with Admiral Arbuthnot was to oblige the squadron to return to Newport, and M. de Lafayette to begin his retreat on the 24th. He spoke himself in the following terms of the expedition of which this letter treats:--

"Dr. Ramsay and Mr. Marshall speak of the expedition attempted against Arnold, and the circumstances which caused its failure. Lafayette's detachment was composed of twelve hundred of those soldiers of light infantry which had formed, the preceding year, the advance guard of the army: these were drawn from regiments of the four states of New England and Jersey. Gordon has truly related that, after conducting them by water from Head-of-Elk to Annapolis, he went himself in an open canoe to Elizabethtown to accelerate the preparations. The expedition having failed, he was obliged to return to Annapolis, where his continental troops had remained, vainly expecting that the French frigates would come to escort them. It was a bold and skilful stroke in him to take advantage of a favourable moment to convoy the American flotilla from Annapolis to Head-of-Elk, and the detachment had scarcely arrived when General Washington, announcing to him that General Phillips, with more than two thousand chosen men, had gone to reinforce Arnold, and take the command in Virginia, which was to become the centre of active operations, desired him to defend the state as well and as long as the weakness of his means allowed."--(Manuscript, No. 2.)

2. Viomenil and Steuben.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

On board the Dolphin, March 9th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Here I am at the mouth of Elk River, and the fleet under my command will proceed to Annapolis, where I am assured they can go without danger. They are protected by the Nesbitt, of twelve guns, some field-pieces on board the vessel that carries Colonel Stevens, and we are going to meet an eight-gun and a six-gun-vessel from Baltimore. With this escort, we may go as far as Annapolis. No vessel of the enemy ever ventured so far up, and if by chance they should, our force is superior to any cruizer they have in the bay. At Annapolis we shall meet Commodore Nicholson, whom I have requested, by a letter, to take the general command of our fleet, and if there was the least danger, to proceed farther down. They are to remain at Annapolis until I send them new orders.

As to myself, my dear general, I have taken a small boat armed with swivels, and on board of which I have put thirty soldiers. I will precede the fleet to Annapolis, where I am to be met by intelligence, and conformable to the state of things below, will determine my personal movements and those of the fleet.

With a full conviction that (unless you arrived in time at Rhode Island) no frigate will be sent to us I think it my duty to the troops I command, and the country I serve, to overlook some little personal danger, that I may ask for a frigate myself; and in order to add weight to my application, I have clapped on board my boat the only son of the minister of the French Navy, whom I shall take out to speak if circumstances require it.

Our men were much crowded at first, but I unload the vessels as we go along, and take possession of every boat that comes in my way.

These are, my dear general, the measures I thought proper to take. The detachment is, I hope, free from danger, and my caution on this point has been so far as to be called timidity by every seaman I have consulted. Captain Martin, of the Nesbitt, who has been recommended by General Gist, makes himself answerable for the safe arrival of the fleet at Annapolis before to-morrow evening.

I have the honour to be, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Williamsburg, March the 23rd 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--By former letters your excellency has been acquainted with my motions, from my arrival at the head of Elk to the time of my landing at this place. The march of the detachment to Elk had been very rapid and performed in the best order. Owing to the activity of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, a train of artillery had been provided at Philadelphia, and notwithstanding some disappointments, namely, that relating to the want of vessels, no delay should have been imputed to us in this co-operation. Having received your excellency's letter, by which the sailing of the French fleet became a matter of certainty, I determined to transport the detachment to Annapolis, and did it for many essential reasons. The navigation of the bay is such that the going in and the going out of Elk River requires a different wind from those which are fair to go up and down the bay. Our stopping at Annapolis, and making some preparations on the road to Carolina, might be of use to deceive the enemy. But above all, I thought, with your excellency, that it was important, both to the success of the operation and the honour of our arms, that the detachment should be brought to cooperate, and from the time when the French were to sail and the winds that blew for some days, I had no doubt but that our allies were in the Chesapeak, before we could arrive at Annapolis.

Owing to the good disposition of Commodore Nicholson, whom I requested to take charge of our small fleet, the detachment was safely lodged in the harbour of Annapolis; and in the conviction that my presence here was necessary, not so much for preparations which Baron de Steuben provided, as for settling our plans with the French, and obtaining an immediate convoy for the detachment, I thought it better to run some risk than to neglect anything that could forward the success of the operation, and the glory of the troops under my command.

On my arrival at this place, I was surprised to hear that no French fleet had appeared, but attributed it to delays and chances so frequent in naval matters. My first object was to request that nothing be taken for this expedition which could have been intended for, or useful to, the southern army, whose welfare appeared to me more interesting than our success. My second object has been to examine what had been prepared, to gather and forward every requisite for a vigorous co-operation, besides a number of militia amounting to five thousand; I can assure your excellency that nothing has been wanting to ensure a complete success.

As the position of the enemy had not yet been reconnoitred, I went to General Muhlenberg's camp, near Suffolk, and after he had taken a position nearer to Portsmouth, we marched down with some troops to view the enemy's works. This brought on a trifling skirmish; during which we were able to see something; but the insufficiency of ammunition, which had been for many days expected, prevented my engaging far enough to push the enemy's outposts, and our reconnoitring was postponed to the 21st,--when, on the 20th, Major MacPherson, an officer for whom I have the highest confidence and esteem, sent me word from Hampton, where he was stationed, that a fleet had come to anchor within the Capes. So far it was probable that this fleet was that of M. Destouches, that Arnold himself appeared to be in great confusion, and his vessels, notwithstanding many signals, durst not, for a long time, venture down. An officer of the French navy bore down upon them from York, and nothing could equal my surprise in hearing from Major MacPherson, that the fleet announced by a former letter certainly belonged to the enemy.

Upon this intelligence, the militia were removed to their former position, and I requested Baron de Steuben (from whom, out of delicacy, I would not take the command until the co-operation was begun, or the continental troops arrived) to take such measures as would put out of the enemy's reach the several articles that had been prepared. On my return to this place, I could not hear more particular accounts of the fleet. Some people think they are coming from Europe; but I believe them to be the fleet from Gardiner's Bay. They are said to be twelve sail in all, frigates included. I have sent spies on board and shall forward their report to head-quarters.

Having certain accounts that the French had sailed on the 8th, with a favourable wind, I must think that they are coming to this place, or were beaten in an engagement, or are gone somewhere else. In these three cases, I think it my duty to stay here until I hear something more, which must be in a little time. But as your excellency will certainly recal a detachment composed of the flower of each regiment, whose loss would be immense to the army under your immediate command, and as my instructions are to march them back as soon as we lose the naval superiority in this quarter, I have sent them orders to move at the first notice which I will send to-morrow or the day after, or upon a letter from your excellency, which my aide-de-camp is empowered to open.

Had I not been here upon the spot, I am sure that I should have waited an immense time before I knew what to think of this fleet, and my presence at this place was the speediest means of forwarding the detachment either to Hampton or your excellency's immediate army. By private letters, we hear that General Greene had, on the 19th, an engagement with Lord Cornwallis. The honour of keeping the field was not on our side. The enemy lost more men than we did. General Greene displayed his usual prudence and abilities, both in making his dispositions and posting his troops at ten miles from the first field of battle, where they bid defiance to the enemy, and are in a situation to check his progress.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, 6th April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,--Since my letter to you of yesterday,~ I have attentively considered of what vast importance it will be to reinforce General Greene as speedily as possible; more especially as there can be little doubt that the detachment under General Phillips, if not part of that now under the command of General Arnold, will ultimately join, or in some degree co-operate with Lord Cornwallis. I have communicated to the general officers at present with the army my sentiments on the subject; and they are unanimously of opinion that the detachment under your command should proceed and join the southern army. Your being already three hundred miles advanced, which is nearly half way, is the reason that operates against any which can be offered in favour of marching that detachment back. You will therefore, immediately at the receipt of this, turn the detachment to the southward. Inform General Greene that you are upon your march to join him, and take his directions as to your route, when you begin to approach him. Previously to that, you will be guided by your own judgment, and by the roads on which you will be most likely to find subsistence for the troops and horses. It will be well to advise Governor Jefferson of your intended march through the state of Virginia, or, perhaps, it will answer a good purpose were you to go forward to Richmond yourself, after putting the troops in motion, and having made some necessary arrangement for their progress.

You will take with you the light artillery and smallest mortars, with their stores and the musket cartridges. But let these follow, under a proper escort, rather than impede the march of the detachment, which ought to move as expeditiously as possible without injury to them. The heavy artillery and stores you will leave at some proper and safe place, if it cannot be conveniently transported to Christiana River, from whence it will be easily got to Philadelphia. You may leave to the option of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens to proceed or not, as he may think proper; his family is in peculiar circumstances, and he left it with the expectation of being absent for a short time. Should there be other officers under similar circumstances, you may make them the same offers, and they shall be relieved.

I am, my dear marquis, yours, &c.

Footnote:

1. This related merely to the expedition which had lately failed. Washington deplored its result, which had been occasioned by maritime events, but he approved and eulogised the conduct of M. de Lafayette.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Elk, April 8th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your excellency's letters of the 5th and 6th instant are just come to hand, and before I answer their contents, I beg leave to give you a summary account of the measures I have lately taken. As to the part of my conduct you have been acquainted with, I am happy, my dear general, to find it has met with your approbation.

When the return of the British fleet put it out of doubt that nothing could be undertaken for the present against Portsmouth, I sent pressing orders to Annapolis, in order to have everything in readiness, and even to move the troops by land to the Head-of-Elk. I myself hastened back to Maryland, but confess I could not resist the ardent desire I had of seeing your relations, and, above all, your mother, at Fredericksburg. For that purpose I went some miles out of my way, and, in order to conciliate my private happiness to duties of a public nature, I recovered by riding in the night those few hours which I had consecrated to my satisfaction. I had also the pleasure of seeing Mount Vernon, and was very unhappy that my duty and my anxiety for the execution of your orders prevented my paying a visit to Mr. Curtis.~

On my arrival at Annapolis, I found that our preparations were far from promising a speedy departure. The difficulty of getting wagons and horses is immense. No boats sufficient to cross over the ferries. The state is very desirous of keeping us as long as possible, as they were scared by the apparition of the Hope, twenty guns, and the Monk, eighteen guns, who blockaded the harbour, and who (as appeared by intercepted letters) were determined to oppose our movements.

In these circumstances, I thought it better to continue my preparations for a journey by land, which, I am told, would have lasted ten days, on account of ferries, and, in the meanwhile, had two eighteen-pounders put on board a small sloop, which appeared ridiculous to some, but proved to be of great service. In the morning of the 6th, Commodore Nicholson went out with the sloop and another vessel, full of men. Whether the sound of eighteen pounders, or the fear of being boarded, operated upon the enemy, I am not able to say; but, after some manoeuvres, they retreated so far as to render it prudent for us to sail to this place. Every vessel with troops and stores was sent in the night by the commodore, to whom I am vastly obliged; and having brought the rear with the sloop and other vessels, I arrived this morning at Elk. It is reported that the ships have returned to their stations; if so, they must have been reinforced; their commander had already applied for an augmentation of force.

Before I left Annapolis, hearing that General Greene was in want of ammunition, I took the liberty of leaving for the southern army four six-pounders, with three hundred rounds each, nearly a hundred thousand cartridges, and some small matters, which I left to the care of the governor and General Smallwood, requesting them to have wagons and horses impressed, to send them to a place of safety, where they must be by this time. I also wrote to the governor of Virginia, to General Greene, and the baron. These stores will set off in a few days, under the care of a detachment, for the Maryland line, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

In consequence of previous orders, everything was in readiness for our movement. The troops were ordered to march the next morning, and I expect a sufficiency of vessels is now at Wilmington or Christiana Creek; so that I am in hopes to join your excellency in a very few days. Your letter of the 6th, ordering me to the southward, is just come to hand. Had I been still at Annapolis, or upon the road by land, and of course with the same means to return that I had to advance, your commands should have been immediately obeyed; but necessity keeps us here for some days, and as your letters arrived in two days, your answer to this must be here before we are in a situation to move.

When your excellency wrote to me, I was supposed to be at Annapolis, or very near that place, with the means of returning, which makes a great difference. Another circumstance, still more material, is, that, instead of joining either Arnold or Phillips (if Phillips be there), Lord Cornwallis is so disabled as to be forced to a retreat, as appears from General Greene's letter.

To these considerations I have added this one, which is decisive: that being fitted only to march twelve miles, part of it in the State of Delaware, and a part of our provisions being asked for from Philadelphia, it is impossible to have the necessary apparatus to march and subsist, or to cross ferries on our way to the southern army, so as to leave this place under four or five days. As to a transportation through the bay, we cannot expect the same good luck of frightening an enemy, who must know how despicable our preparations are; and we must, at least, wait for the return of look-out boats which, if sent immediately, will not possibly return under five or six days.

In these circumstances, my dear general, I am going to make every preparation to march to Virginia, so as to be ready as soon as possible. I shall keep here the vessels, and will also keep those which have been ordered to Christiana Creek. This state of suspense will distract the enemy's conjectures, and put me in a situation to execute your excellency's orders, which will be here before I can be able to move with any degree of advantage towards the southward.

Had it been possible to obey to-morrow morning, I would have done it immediately; but since I am obliged to make preparations, I beg leave to make these observations, which I should have been allowed to present, had I been at the meeting of general officers.

The troops I have with me being taken from every northern regiment, have often (though without mentioning it) been very uneasy at the idea of joining the southern army. They want clothes; shoes particularly; they expect to receive clothes and money from their states. This would be a great disappointment for both officers and men. Both thought at first they were sent out for a few days, and provided themselves accordingly; both came cheerfully to this expedition, but both have had already their fears at the idea of going to the southward. They will certainly obey, but they will be unhappy, and some will desert.

Had this corps considered themselves as light infantry, destined for the campaign, to be separated from their regiments, it would be attended with less inconveniences; and such a corps, in the course of the campaign, might be brought there without difficulty, particularly by water, as they would be prepared accordingly.

Supposing the Jersey line were to join the detachment of their troops at this place, it would hardly make any difference, as we have been but five days coming from Morristown to the Head-of-Elk.

These considerations, my dear general, I beg you to be convinced, are not influenced by personal motives. I should most certainly prefer to be in a situation to attack New York, nor should I like, in an operation against New York, to see you deprived of the New England light infantry; but I think with you, that these motives are not to influence our determination, if this be the best way to help General Greene.

By the letters I have received from my two friends, Marquis de Castries and Count de Vergennes, I am assured that we shall soon get an answer to our propositions against New York, and am strongly led to hope that, having a naval superiority, the army under your immediate command will not remain inactive.

At all events, my dear general, I will use my best endeavours to be ready to move either way as soon as possible; and have the honour to be, with the highest respect and affection, &c.

Footnote:

1. Son of Mrs. Washington by a former marriage.

TO COLONEL HAMILTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Susquehannah Ferry, 18th April, 1781.

Dear Hamilton,~--You are so sensible a fellow, that you can certainly explain to me what is the matter that New York should be given up; that our letters to France go for nothing; that when the French are coming, I am going. This last matter gives great uneasiness to the minister of France. All this is not comprehensible to me, who, having been long from head-quarters, have lost the course of intelligence.

Have you left the family, my dear sir? I suppose so. But from love to the general, for whom you know my affection, I ardently wish it was not the case. Many, many reasons conspire to this desire of mine; but if you do leave it, and if I go to exile, come and partake it with me. Yours, &c.

Footnote:

1. The 11th of April, Washington renewed, with more detail, his instructions upon the movement to the south, and General Greene, desiring to carry the theatre of war into South Carolina, urged General Lafayette to march upon the capital of Virginia. The latter made his preparations accordingly, and with great activity, in spite of the regret he experienced, and the difficulties he encountered. He deplored, in truth, that long-promised expedition on New York being abandoned; and he had to combat the repugnance of the troops, who threatened to become weakened by desertion. This was the subject of several long letters we have thought proper to suppress. He wrote, also, frequently, to Colonel Hamilton, and we may see some of those letters in the life of the latter. We have only inserted this one letter, which expresses all he felt. Hamilton, at that period, having had a coolness with Washington, wished to quit his staff; and it was in reality as an officer of the line that he took part in the siege of Yorktown.--(See his Life, vol. i., chap. xiii.)

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Baltimore, April 18th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Every one of my letters were written in so lamentable a tone, that I am happy to give you a pleasanter prospect. The anxiety I feel to relieve your mind from a small part of those many solicitudes and cares which our circumstances conspire to gather upon you, is the reason of my sending this letter by the chain of communication, and with a particular recommendation. When I left Susquehannah Ferry, it was the general opinion that we could not have six hundred men by the time we should arrive at our destination. This, and the shocking situation of the men offered the more gloomy prospects, as the board of war have confessed their total inability to afford us relief. Under these circumstances, I have employed every personal exertion, and have the pleasure to inform you that desertion has, I hope, been put to an end.

On my arrival on this side of the Susquehannah, I made an order for the troops, wherein I endeavoured to throw a kind of infamy upon desertion, and to improve every particular affection of theirs. Since then, desertion has been lessened. Two deserters have been taken up; one of whom has been hanged to-day, and the other (being an excellent soldier) will be forgiven, but dismissed from the corps, as well as another soldier who behaved amiss. To these measures, I have added one which my feelings for the sufferings of the soldiers, and the peculiarity of their circumstances, have prompted me to adopt.

The merchants of Baltimore lent me a sum of about 2,000l., which will procure some shirts, linen, overalls, shoes, and a few hats. The ladies will make up the shirts, and the overalls will be made by the detachment, so that our soldiers have a chance of being a little more comfortable. The money is lent upon my credit, and I become security for the payment of it in two years' time, when, by the French laws, I may better dispose of my estate. But before that time, I shall use my influence with the French court, in order to have this sum of money added to any loan congress may have been able to obtain from them.

In case you are told, my dear general, that my whole baggage has been taken in the bay, I am sorry I cannot discountenance the report. But when the mention of papers and maps is made, do not apprehend anything bad for the papers or maps you have put in my possession. Nothing has been lost but writing paper and printed maps. The fact is this: when at York, I had some continental soldiers and my baggage to send up in a safe barge and an unsafe boat. I, of course, gave the barge to the soldiers, who easily went to Annapolis. The baggage was put into the boat, and has not been since heard of. But being aware of the danger; I took by land with me every article that was, on public accounts, in the least valuable. By a letter from Baron de Steuben, dated Chesterfield Court House the 10th of April, I find that General Phillips has at Portsmouth 1500 or 2000 men added to the force under Arnold. Proper allowance being made for exaggerations, I apprehend that his whole army amounts to 2800 men, which obliges me to hasten my march to Fredericksburg and Richmond, where I expect to receive orders from General Greene.

The importance of celerity, the desire of lengthening the way home, and immense delays that would stop me for an age, have determined me to leave our tents, artillery, &c., under a guard, and with orders to follow as fast as possible, while the rest of the detachment, by forced marches, and with impressed wagons and horses, will hasten to Fredericksburg or Richmond, and by this derange the calculations of the enemy. We set off to-morrow, and this rapid mode of travelling, added to my other precautions, will, I hope, keep up our spirits and good humour.~

I am, my dear general, &c.

P. S. The word lessened does not convey a sufficient idea of what experience has proved to be true, to the honour of our excellent soldiers. It had been announced in general orders, that the detachment was intended to fight an enemy far superior in number, under difficulties of every sort. That the general was, for his part, determined to encounter them, but that such of the soldiers as had an inclination to abandon him, might dispense with the danger and crime of desertion, as every one of them who should apply to head-quarters for a pass to join their corps in the north might be sure to obtain it immediately.

Footnote:

1. This letter announces the real commencement of the Virginian campaign. M. de Lafayette marched upon Richmond, and thus wrote on the 4th of May:--

"The leaving of my artillery appears a strange whim, but had I waited for it, Richmond had been lost. It is not without trouble I have made this rapid march. General Phillips has expressed to a flag officer the astonishment he felt at our celerity; and when on the 30th, as he was going to give the signal to attack, he reconnoitred our position, Mr. Osburn, who was with him, says, that he flew into a violent passion, and swore vengeance against me and the corps I had brought with me."

The subsequent operations are given in detail, both in the Memoirs, and in a relation of the campaign; it was, therefore, thought proper to suppress the greatest part of the letters in which M. de Lafayette gave an account of them to General Washington. To each of those letters is usually annexed a copy of his official reports to General Greene.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Alexandria, April 23rd, 1781.

My Dear General,--Great happiness is derived from friendship, and I experience it particularly in the attachment which unites me to you. But friendship has its duties, and the man who likes you best, will be the first to let you know everything in which you may be concerned.

When the enemy came to your house, many negroes deserted to them. This piece of news did not affect me much, as I little value these matters. But you cannot conceive how unhappy I have been to hear that Mr. Lund Washington went on board the enemy's vessels, and consented to give them provisions.

This being done by the gentleman who, in some measure, represents you at your house, will certainly have a bad effect, and contrasts with spirited answers from some neighbours that have had their houses burnt accordingly.

You will do what you think proper about it, my dear general; but, as your friend, it was my duty confidentially to mention the circumstances.

With the help of some wagons and horses, we got, in two days, from the camp, near Baltimore, to this place. We halted yesterday, and having made a small bargain for a few pair of shoes, are now marching to Fredericksburg. No official account from Phillips, but I am told they are removing stores from Richmond and Petersburg. I am surprised nobody writes to me, and hope soon to receive intelligence.

Our men are in high spirits. Their honour having been interested in this affair, they have made a point to come with us; and murmurs, as well as desertion, are entirely out of fashion. Requesting my best respects to Mrs. Washington, and my compliments to the family, I have the honour to be, with those sentiments which you know, &c.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, May 4, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,--The freedom of your communications is an evidence to me of the sincerity of your attachment, and every fresh instance of this gives pleasure and adds strength to the bond which unites us in friendship. In this light I view the intimation respecting the conduct of Mr. Lund Washington. Some days previous to the receipt of your letter, which only came to my hands yesterday, I received an account of this transaction from that gentleman himself, and immediately wrote and forwarded the answer, of which the enclosed is a copy. This letter, which was written in the moment of my obtaining the first intimation of the matter, may be considered as a testimony of my disapprobation of his conduct, and the transmission of it to you, as a proof of my friendship; because I wish you to be assured, that no man can condemn the measure more sincerely than I do.

A false idea, arising from the consideration of his being my steward, and in that character more the trustee and guardian of my property than the representative of my honour, has misled his judgment and plunged him into error, upon the appearance of desertion among my negroes, and danger to my buildings; for sure I am, that no man is more firmly opposed to the enemy than he is. From a thorough conviction of this, and of his integrity, I entrusted every species of my property to his care, without reservation or fear of his abusing it. The last paragraph of my letter to him was occasioned by an expression of his fear, that all the estates convenient to the river would be stripped of their negroes and moveable property.

I am very happy to find that desertion has ceased, and content has taken place, in the detachment you command. Before this letter can reach you, you must have taken your ultimate resolution upon the proposal contained in my letters of the 21st and 22nd ultimo, and have made the consequent arrangements. I shall be silent, therefore, on the subject of them, and only beg, in case you should not return to this army, and the papers were not lost with your other baggage (on which event give me leave to express my concern) that you would permit M. Capitaine to furnish me with copies of the drafts, and the remarks of the pilots (taken at Colonel Day's) on the entrance of the harbour of New York. It is possible they may be wanted, and I am not able to furnish them without your assistance.

Mrs. Washington and the rest of my small family, which, at present, consists only of Tilghman and Humphreys, join me in cordial salutations, and, with sentiments of the purest esteem and most affectionate regard, I remain, my dear marquis, &c.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO LUND WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, April 30, 1781.

Dear Lund,--I am very sorry to hear of your loss; I am a little sorry to hear of my own; but that which gives me most concern is, that you should go on board the enemy's vessels, and furnish them with refreshments. It would have been a less painful circumstance to me to have heard that, in consequence of your non-compliance with their request, they had burnt my house and laid the plantation in ruins. You ought to have considered yourself as my representative, and should have reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer of refreshments to them, with a view to prevent a conflagration.

It was not in your power, I acknowledge, to prevent them from sending a flag on shore, and you did right to meet it; but you should, in the same instant that the business of it was unfolded, have declared explicitly, that it was improper for you to yield to the request; after which, if they had proceeded to help themselves by force, you could but have submitted, and, being unprovided for defence, this was to be preferred to a feeble opposition, which only serves as a pretext to burn and destroy.

I am thoroughly persuaded that you acted from your best judgment, and believe that your desire to preserve my property, and rescue the buildings from impending danger, was your governing motive; but to go on board their vessels, carry them refreshments, commune with a parcel of plundering scoundrels, and request a favour by asking a surrender of my negroes, was exceedingly ill judged, and, it is to be feared, will be unhappy in its consequences, as it will be a precedent for others, and, may be, become a subject of animadversion.

I have no doubt of the enemy's intention to prosecute the plundering plan they have begun; and, unless a stop can be put to it by the arrival of a superior naval force, I have as little doubt of its ending in the loss of all my negroes, and in the destruction of my houses. But I am prepared for the event, under the prospect of which, if you could deposit in a place of safety the most valuable and less bulky articles, it might be consistent with policy and prudence, and a means of preserving them hereafter. Such and so many things as are necessary for common and present use must be retained, and must run their chance through the fiery trial of this summer. I am sincerely, yours.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp Wilton, on James River, May 17, 1781.

Dear General,--My correspondence with one of the British generals, and my refusal of a correspondence with the other, may be, perhaps, misrepresented, I shall therefore give an account of what has passed, and I hope your excellency and General Greene will approve of my conduct. On the arrival of our detachment at Richmond, three letters were brought by a flag, which I have the honour to inclose, and which, as commander of the troops in this state, it became my duty to answer. The enclosed letters were successively sent in pursuit of General Phillips, who received them both with a degree of politeness that seemed to apologize for his unbecoming style. General Phillips being dead of a fever, an officer was sent with a passport and letters from General Arnold. I requested the gentleman to come to my quarters, and having asked if General Phillips was dead,~ to which he answered in the negative, I made it a pretence not to receive a letter from General Arnold, which, being dated head-quarters, and directed to the commanding officer of the American troops, ought to come from the British general chief in command. I did, however, observe, should any officers have written to me I should have been happy to receive their letters. The next day the officer returned with the same passport and letter, and informed me that he were now at liberty to declare that Phillips was dead, and Arnold was commander-in-chief of the British army in Virginia. The high station of General Arnold having obliged me to an explanation, the enclosed note was sent to the officer of the flag, and the American officer verbally assured him that were I requested to put in writing a minute account of my motives, my regard for the British army was such that I would cheerfully comply with the demand.

Last evening, a flag of ours returned from Petersburg, who had been sent by the commander of the advanced corps, and happened to be on his way while the British officer was at our picquets. Inclosed is the note written by General Arnold, in which he announces his determination of sending our officers and men to the West Indies.

The British general cannot but perfectly know that I am not to treat of partial exchanges, and that the fate of the continental prisoners must be regulated by a superior authority to that with which I am invested.

With the highest respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

Footnote:

1. Gordon places the death of General Phillips on the 13th of May: he was very ill in his bed, when a cannon ball traversed his bed-room. General Phillips commanded at Minden the battery whose cannon killed the father of M. de Lafayette.

FROM GENERAL PHILLIPS TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

British Camp, at Osborn, April 28, 1781.

SIR,--It is a principle of the British army engaged in the present war, which they esteem as an unfortunate one, to conduct it with every attention to humanity and the laws of war; and in the necessary destruction of public stores of every kind, to prevent, as far as possible, that of private property. I call upon the inhabitants of Yorktown, Williamsburg, Petersburg, and Chesterfield, for a proof of the mild treatment they have received from the king's troops; in particular at Petersburg, when the town was saved by the labour of the soldiers, which otherwise must have perished by the wilful inactivity of its inhabitants.

I have now a charge of the deepest nature to make against the American arms: that of having fired upon the king's troops by a flag of truce vessel; and, to render the conduct as discordant to the laws of arms, the flag was flying the whole time at the mast head, seeming to sport in the violation of the most sacred laws of war.

You are sensible, sir, that I am authorized to inflict the severest punishment in return for this bad conduct, and that towns and villages lay at the mercy of the king's troops, and it is to that mercy alone you can justly appeal for their not being reduced to ashes. The compassion, and benevolence of disposition, which has marked the British character in the present contest, still govern the conduct of the king's officers, and I shall willingly remit the infliction of any redress we have a right to claim, provided the persons who fired from the flag of truce vessel are delivered into my possession, and a public disavowal made by you of their conduct. Should you, sir, refuse this, I hereby make you answerable for any desolation which may follow in consequence.

Your ships of war, and all other vessels, not actually in our possession in James River, are, however, driven beyond a possibility of escaping, and are in the predicament and condition of a town blockaded by land, where it is contrary to the rules of war that any public stores should be destroyed. I shall therefore demand from you, sir, a full account of whatever may be destroyed on board vessels or otherwise, and need not mention to you what the rules of war are in these cases.

I am, sir, your most humble servant,

W. PHILLIPS.

FROM GENERAL PHILLIPS TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp at Osborn, April 29th, 1781.

Sir,--When I was at Williamsburg, and at Petersburg, I gave several inhabitants and country people protections for their persons and properties. I did this without asking, or even considering, whether these people were either friends or foes, actuated by no other motive than that of pure humanity. I understand, from almost undoubted authority, that several of these persons have been taken up by their malicious neighbours, and sent to your quarters, where preparations are making for their being ill treated; a report which I sincerely hope may be without foundation. I repeat to you, sir, that my protections were given generally from a wish that, in the destruction of public stores, as little damage as possible might be done to private property, and to the persons of individuals; but at any rate, I shall insist upon my signs manual being held sacred, and I am obliged to declare to you, sir, that if any persons, under the description I have given, receive ill treatment, I shall be under the necessity of sending to Petersburg, and giving that chastisement to the illiberal persecutors of innocent people, which their conduct shall deserve. And I further declare to you, sir, should any person be put to death, under the pretence of their being spies of, or friends to, the British government, I will make the shores of James River an example of terror to the rest of Virginia. It is from the violent measures, resolutions of the present house of delegates, council, and governor of Virginia, that I am impelled to use this language, which the common temper of my disposition is hurt at. I shall hope that you, sir, whom I have understood to be a gentleman of liberal principles, will not countenance, still less permit to be carried into execution, the barbarous spirit which seems to prevail in the council of the present civil power of this colony.

I do assure you, sir, I am extremely inclined to carry on this unfortunate contest with every degree of humanity, and I will believe you intend doing the same.

I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

W. PHILLIPS.

TO MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS.

(ORIGINAL.)

American camp, April 30th, 1781.

Sir,--Your letters of the 26th, 28th, and 29th, came yesterday to hand. The duplicate dated at Petersburg being rather of a private nature, it has been delivered to Major-General Baron de Steuben. I am sorry the mode of your request has delayed the civility that had been immediately intended.

From the beginning of this war, which you observe is an unfortunate one to Great Britain, the proceedings of the British troops have been hitherto so far from evincing benevolence of disposition, that your long absence~ from the scene of action is the only way I have to account for your panegyrics. I give you my honour, sir, that the charge against a flag vessel shall be strictly inquired into, and in case the report made to you is better grounded than the contrary one I have received, you shall obtain every redress in my power, that you have any right to expect. This complaint I beg leave to consider as the only part in your letter that requires an answer. Such articles as the requiring that the persons of spies be held sacred, cannot certainly be serious.

The style of your letters, sir, obliges me to tell you, that should your future favours be wanting in that regard due to the civil and military authority in the United States, which cannot but be construed into a want of respect to the American nation, I shall not think it consistent with the dignity of an American officer to continue the correspondence.

I have the honour to be, your most obedient servant,

LAFAYETTE.

Footnote:

1. General Phillips had been made prisoner at Saratoga.

TO MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS.

(ORIGINAL.)

May 3rd, 1781.

Sir,--Your assertion relating to the flag vessel was so positive, that it becomes necessary for me to set you right in this matter. Inclosed I have the honour to send you some depositions, by which it is clearly proved that there has been on our side no violation of flags.

I have the honour to be, sir, your humble servant,

LAFAYETTE

NOTE FOR CAPTAIN EMYNE.

May 15th, 1781.

The Major-General Marquis de Lafayette has the honour to present his compliments to Captain Emyne, and begs him to recollect that, on the supposition of the death of General Phillips, he said, "that he should know in that case what to do." From regard to the English army, he had made use of the most polite pretence for declining all correspondence with the English general who is at this moment commander-in-chief. But he now finds himself obliged to give a positive denial. In case any other English officer should honour him with a letter, he would always be happy to give the officers every testimony of his esteem.

NOTE FROM GENERAL ARNOLD TO CAPTAIN RAGEDALE.

Brigadier-General Arnold presents his compliments to Captain Ragedale, and takes the liberty of informing him, that the flag of truce having been sent by Brigadier-General Nelson, who is not commander-in-chief of the American army, is an inadmissible act. The letters are accordingly sent back unopened. If Captain Ragedale thinks proper to leave them with the servants, a receipt must be given for them.

Brigadier-General Arnold has given orders that the officers lately taken in that place should be sent to New York; their baggage will follow soon after them, and all the officers and soldiers of the American army that shall be taken prisoners in future, shall be sent to the West Indies, unless a cartel be immediately granted for the exchange of prisoners, as General Arnold has repeatedly demanded.

Head-quarters, at Petersburg, 17th May, 1781.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Richmond, May 24th, 1781,

MY DEAR GENERAL,--My official letter, a copy of which I send to congress, will let you know the situation of affairs in this quarter. I ardently wish my conduct may meet with your approbation. Had I followed the first impulsion of my temper, I should have risked something more; but I have been guarding against my own warmth; and this consideration, that a general defeat, which, with such a proportion of militia, must be expected, would involve this state and our affairs in ruin, has rendered me extremely cautious in my movements. Indeed, I am more embarrassed to move, more crippled in my projects, than we have been in the northern states. As I am for the present fixed in the command of the troops in this state, I beg it as a great favour that you will send me Colonel Gouvion. Should a junction be made with General Greene, he will act as my aide-de-camp. Had the Pennsylvanians arrived before Lord Cornwallis, I was determined to attack the enemy, and have no doubt but what we should have been successful. Their unaccountable delay cannot be too much lamented, and will make an immense difference to the fate of this campaign. Should they have arrived time enough to support me in the reception of Lord Cornwallis's first stroke, I should still have thought it well enough; but from an answer of General Wayne, received this day, and dated the 19th, I am afraid that at this moment they have hardly left Yorktown.

Public stores and private property being removed from Richmond, this place is a less important object.

I don't believe it would be prudent to expose the troops for the sake of a few houses, most of which are empty; but I am wavering between two inconveniences. Were I to fight a battle, I should be cut to pieces, the militia dispersed, and the arms lost. Were I to decline fighting, the country would think itself given up. I am therefore determined to skirmish, but not to engage too far, and particularly to take care against their immense and excellent body of horse, whom the militia fear as they would so many wild beasts.

A letter from General Greene to General Sumner is dated 5th May, seven miles below Camden. The baron is going to him with some recruits, and will get more in North Carolina. When the Pennsylvanians come, I am only to keep them a few days, which I will improve as well as I can. Cavalry is very necessary to us. I wish Lauzun's legion could come. I am sure he will like to serve with me, and as General Greene gave me command of the troops in this state, Lauzun might remain with me in Virginia. If not, Shelden's dragoons might be sent. As to Moylan, I do not believe he will be ready for a long time.

Were I anyways equal to the enemy, I should be extremely happy in my present command, but I am not strong enough even to get beaten. Government in this state has no energy, and laws have no force. But I hope this assembly will put matters upon a better footing. I had a great deal of trouble to put the departments in a tolerable train; our expenses were enormous, and yet we can get nothing. Arrangements for the present seem to put on a better face, but for this superiority of the enemy, which will chase us wherever they please. They can overrun the country, and, until the Pennsylvanians arrive, we are next to nothing in point of opposition to so large a force. This country begins to be as familiar to me as Tappan and Bergen. Our soldiers are hitherto very healthy: I have turned doctor, and regulate their diet. Adieu, my dear general. Let me hear sometimes from you; your letters are a great happiness to your affectionate friend, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp, 28th June, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Inclosed, I have the honour to send you a copy of my letter to General Greene. The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us.~

Twice I gave them a chance of fighting (taking care not to engage farther than I pleased), but they continued their retrograde motions. Our numbers are, I think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the opinion.

I thought, at first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low down as possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. But it appears that he does not as yet come out, and our position will admit of a partial affair. His lordship had (exclusive of the reinforcement from Portsmouth, said to be six hundred) four thousand men, eight hundred of whom were dragoons, or mounted infantry. Our force is about equal to his, but only one thousand five hundred regulars and fifty dragoons. Our little action more particularly marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place whence he first began to retire to Williamsburg is upwards of one hundred miles. The old arms at the Point of Fork have been taken out of the water. The cannon was thrown into the river, undamaged, when they marched back to Richmond; so that his lordship did us no harm of any consequence, but lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did not make any in this state. General Greene only demanded of me to hold my ground in Virginia. But the movements of Lord Cornwallis may answer better purposes than that in the political line. Adieu, my dear general; I don't know but what we shall, in our turn, become the pursuing enemy; and in the meanwhile, have the honour to be, &c.

Footnote:

1. It was the 20th of May that Lord Cornwallis effected his junction with the troops of Arnold, whose unexpected opposition re-established the affairs of the English in Virginia. The war became from that moment extremely active, and the movements of the two armies very complicated. M. de Lafayette maintained his position, and experienced no other check than the loss of some magazines, at the forks of James River, which had been confided to the care of Baron Steuben. His position was, however, rather a defensive one, until the period at which that letter was written, when the English abandoned Richmond. Cornwallis obtained, and usually by the aid of negroes, the best horses of Virginia. He had mounted an advance-guard of Tarleton on race-hores, who, like birds of prey, seized all they met with, so that they had taken many couriers who were bearers of letters. Cornwallis stopped once during his retrograde march on Williamsburg; the Americans being close to him, it was thought an affair would take place, but he continued on his road. It was before he reached Williamsburg that his rear-guard was attacked by the advance corps of Lafayette under Colonel Butler. He evacuated Williamsburg the 4th; Lafayette had done all he could to convince him that his own forces were more considerable than they really were. Either the night of, or two nights before, the evacuation of Williamsburg, a double spy had taken a false order of the day to Lord Cornwallis,--found, he said, in the camp,--which ordered General Morgan's division to take a certain position in the line. The fact was, that General Morgan had arrived in person, but unaccompanied by troops: Dr. Gordon justly observes, that Lord Cornwallis, from Charlestown to Williamsburg, had made more than eleven hundred miles, without counting deviations, which amounts, reckoning those deviations, to five hundred leagues. The whole march through North Carolina and Virginia, and the campaign against Lafayette, were effected without tents or equipages, which confers honour on the activity of Lord Cornwallis, and justifies the reputation he had acquired, of being the best British general employed in that war.--(Extract of Manuscript, No. 2.)

EXTRACTS OF SEVERAL LETTERS TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

Ambler's Plantation, July 8th, 1781.

The inclosed copy, my dear general, will give you an account of our affairs in this quarter. Agreeably to your orders I have avoided a general action, and when Lord Cornwallis's movements indicated that it was against his interest to fight, I ventured partial engagements. His lordship seems to have given up the conquest of Virginia. It has been a great secret that our army was not superior, and was most generally inferior, to the enemy's numbers. Our returns were swelled up, as militia returns generally are; but we had very few under arms, particularly lately, and to conceal the lessening of our numbers, I was obliged to push on as one who had heartily wished a general engagement. Our regulars did not exceed one thousand five hundred, the enemy had four thousand regulars, eight hundred of whom were mounted: they thought we had eight thousand men. I never encamped in a line, and there was greater difficulty to come at our numbers.

Malvan Hill, July 20th.

When I went to the southward, you know I had some private objections; but I became sensible of the necessity there was for the detachment to go, and I knew that had I returned there was nobody that could lead them on against their inclination. My entering this state was happily marked by a service to the capital. Virginia became the grand object of the enemy, as it was the point to which the ministry tended. I had the honour to command an army and oppose Lord Cornwallis. When incomparably inferior to him, fortune was pleased to preserve us; when equal in numbers, though not in quality of troops, we have also been pretty lucky. Cornwallis had the disgrace of a retreat, and this state being recovered, government is properly re-established: The enemy are under the protection of their works at Portsmouth. It appears an embarkation is taking place, probably destined to New York. The war in this state would then become a plundering one, and great manoeuvres be out of the question. A prudent officer would do our business here, and the baron is prudent to the utmost. Would it be possible, my dear general, in case a part of the British troops go to New York, I may be allowed to join the combined armies?

Malvan Hill, July 20th.

No accounts from the northward, no letter from head quarters. I am entirely a stranger to every thing that passes out of Virginia; and Virginian operations being for the present in a state of languor, I have more time to think of my solitude; in a word, my dear general, I am home sick, and if I cannot go to head quarters, wish at least to hear from thence. I am anxious to know your opinion concerning the Virginian campaign. That the subjugation of this state was the great object of the ministry is an indisputable fact. I think your diversion has been of more use to the state than my manoeuvres; but the latter have been much directed by political views. So long as my lord wished for an action, not one gun has been fired; the moment he declined it, we have been skirmishing; but I took care never to commit the army. His naval superiority, his superiority of horse, of regulars, his thousand advantages over us, so that I am lucky to have come off safe. I had an eye upon European negotiations, and made it a point to give his lordship the disgrace of a retreat.

From every account it appears that a part of the army will embark. The light infantry, the guards, the 80th regiment, and the Queen's rangers, are, it is said, destined to New York. Lord Cornwallis, I am told, is much disappointed in his hopes of command. I cannot find out what he does with himself. Should he go to England, we are, I think, to rejoice for it; he is a cold and active man, two dangerous qualities in this southern war.

The clothing you have long ago sent to the light infantry is not yet arrived. I have been obliged to send for it, and expect it in a few days. These three battalions are the best troops that ever took the field; my confidence in them is unbounded; they are far superior to any British troops, and none will ever venture to meet them in equal numbers. What a pity these men are not employed along with the French grenadiers; they would do eternal honour to our arms. But their presence here, I must confess, has saved this state, and, indeed, the southern part of the continent.

Malvan Hill, July 26th.

I had some days ago the honour to write to your excellency, and informed you that a detachment from the British army would probably embark at Portsmouth. The battalions of light infantry and the Queen's rangers were certainly, and the guards, with one or two British regiments, were likely to be, ordered upon that service. My conjectures have proved true, and forty-nine sail have fallen down in Hampton-road, the departure of which I expect to hear every minute. A British officer, a prisoner, lately mentioned that Lord Cornwallis himself was going.

It appears the enemy have some cavalry on board. The conquest of Virginia, and the establishment of the British power in this state, not having succeeded to the expectation of the British court, a lesser number might be sufficient for the present purpose, and two thousand men easily spared. So that I do not believe the present embarkation is under that number; so far as a land force can oppose naval operations and naval superiority, I think the position now occupied by the main body of our small army affords the best chance to support the several parts of Virginia.

Malvan Hill, July 30th.

Some expressions in your last favour will, if possible, augment my vigilance in keeping you well apprised of the enemy's movements.~ There are in Hampton-road thirty transport ships full of troops, most of them red coats. There are eight or ten brigs which have cavalry on board, they had excellent winds and yet they are not gone. Some say they have received advices from New York in a row boat: the escort, as I mentioned before, is the Charon, and several frigates, the last account says seven. I cannot be positive, and do not even think Lord Cornwallis has been fully determined.

I have sent, by a safe hand, to call out some militia, mount some cannon at the passes, and take out of the way every boat which might serve the enemy to go to North Carolina. You know, my dear general, that, with a very trifling transportation, they may go by water from Portsmouth to Wilmington. The only way to shut up that passage is, to have an army before Portsmouth, and possess the heads of these rivers, a movement which, unless I was certain of a naval superiority, might prove ruinous. But should a fleet come in Hampton-road, and should I get some days' notice, our situation would be very agreeable.

Malvan Hill, July 31.

A correspondent of mine, servant to Lord Cornwallis, writes on the 26th of July, at Portsmouth, and says his master, Tarleton, and Simcoe, are still in town, but expect to move. The greatest part of the army is embarked. My lord's baggage is yet in town. His lordship is so shy of his papers that my honest friend says he cannot get at them. There is a large quantity of negroes, but, it seems, no vessels to take them off. What garrison they leave I do not know: I shall take care at least to keep them within bounds. . . . Should a French fleet now come in Hampton Road, the British army would, I think, be ours.

Camp on Pamunkey, August 6.

The embarkation which I thought, and do still think, to have been destined for New York, was reported to have sailed up the bay, and to be bound for Baltimore; in consequence of which I wrote to your excellency, and as I had not indulged myself too near Portsmouth, I was able to cut across towards Fredericksburg. But, instead of continuing his voyage up the bay, my lord entered York River, and landed at York and Gloucester. To the former vessels were added a number of flat-bottomed boats.

Our movements have not been precipitate. We were in time to take our course down Pamunkey River, and shall move to some position where the several parts of the army will unite. I have some militia in Gloucester county, some about York. We shall act agreeably to circumstances, but avoid drawing ourselves into a false movement, which, if cavalry had command of the rivers, would give the enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, that no blunder can be hoped from him to recover a bad step of ours.

York is surrounded by the river and a morass; the entrance is but narrow. There is, however, a commanding hill, (at least, I am so informed,) which, if occupied by the enemy, would much extend their works. Gloucester is a neck of land projected into the river, and opposite to York. Their vessels, the biggest of whom is a forty-four, are between the two towns. Should a fleet come in at this moment, our affairs would take a very happy turn.

New Kent Mountain, August 11.

Be sure, my dear general, that the pleasure of being with you will make me happy in any command you may think proper to give me; but for the present I am of opinion, with you, I had better remain in Virginia, the more so, as Lord Cornwallis does not choose to leave us, and circumstances may happen that will furnish me agreeable opportunities in the command of the Virginian army. I have pretty well understood you, my dear general, but would be happy in a more minute detail, which, I am sensible, cannot be entrusted to letters. Would not Gouvion be a proper ambassador? indeed, at all events, I should be happy to have him with me; but I think he would perfectly well answer your purpose; a gentleman in your family could with difficulty be spared. Should something be ascertained, Count Damas might come, under pretence to serve with me; it is known he is very much my friend. But, to return to operations in Virginia, I will tell you, my dear general, that Lord Cornwallis is entrenching at York and at Gloucester. The sooner we disturb him, the better; but unless our maritime friends give us help, we cannot much venture below.

Forks of York River, August 21.

The greater part of the enemy are at York, which they do not as yet fortify, but are very busy upon Gloucester neck, where they have a pretty large corps under Colonel Dundas. They have at York a forty-four gun ship; frigates and vessels are scattered lower down. There is still a small garrison at Portsmouth. Should they intend to evacuate, they at least are proceeding with amazing slowness. From the enemy's preparations, I should infer that they are working for the protection of one fleet, and for a defence against another; that in case they hold Portsmouth, the main body would be at York, and a detached corps upon Gloucester neck to protect the water battery. Their fortifications are much contracted. From the enemy's caution and partial movements, I should conclude their intelligence is not very good, and that they wish to come at an explanation of my intentions and prospects.

We have hitherto occupied the forks of York River, thereby looking both ways. Some militia have prevented the enemy's parties from remaining any time at or near Williamsburg, and false accounts have given them some alarms. Another body of militia, under Colonel Ennis, has kept them pretty close in Gloucester Town, and foraged in their vicinity. Upon the receipt of your orders, I wrote to the governor, that intelligence of some plans of the enemy rendered it proper to have some six hundred militia collected upon Blackwater. I wrote to General Gregory, near Portsmouth, that I had an account that the enemy intended to push a detachment to Carolina, which would greatly defeat a scheme we had there. I have requested General Wayne to move towards the southward, to be ready to cross James River at Westover. A battalion of light infantry, and our only hundred dragoons, being in Gloucester county, I call them my vanguard, and will take my quarters there for one or two days, while the troops are filing off towards James River. Our little army will consequently assemble again upon the waters of the Chickahonimy; and should Jamestown Island thought to be a good place to junction, we will be in a situation to form it, while we render it more difficult for the enemy to render a journey to Carolina.~

In the present state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you will come yourself to Virginia, and that, if the French army moves this way, I will have, at least, the satisfaction of beholding you myself at the head of the combined armies. In two days I will write again to your excellency, and keep you particularly and constantly informed, unless something is done the very moment (and it will probably be difficult). Lord Cornwallis must be attacked with pretty great apparatus. But when a French fleet takes possession of the bay and rivers, and we form a land force superior to his, that army must, sooner or later, be forced to surrender, as we may get what reinforcements we please.

Adieu, my dear general; I heartily thank you for having ordered me to remain in Virginia; it is to your goodness that I am indebted for the most beautiful prospect which I may ever behold.

Footnotes:

1. From Williamsburg, the English retreated towards Portsmouth, near the mouth of James River, and consequently not far from Chesapeak Bay. The sea was open to them, and those repeated retrograde movements seemed to indicate the project of evacuating Virginia. M. de Lafayette, therefore, when he learnt that they were embarking on board their ships, never doubted but that their intention was to leave that part of the country, to repair, in all probability, to New York. But it became evident, at the same time, that if those naval forces appeared upon the coast, they would be blockaded without any means of escape. This is what occasioned their inexplicable and unhoped for retreat upon Yorktown and Gloucester.

2. The 13th, Washington, who was then at Dobb's Ferry, while congratulating M. de Lafayette on his success, announced to him the junction of his army with that of Rochambeau, and that very important information would be carried to him by a confidential officer. He recommended to him to concentrate his forces, and obtain means of corresponding with him. The 15th, he apprised him that the Count de Grasse intended quitting St. Domingo on the 3rd, with his fleet, to proceed to the Chesapeak, and prescribed to him to shut out from Lord Cornwallis all retreat on North Carolina. He added, "You shall hear further from me." The 30th, he no longer concealed his intention of marching to the south. But he only announced on the 21st of August that his troops were actually on their march. While recurring to the necessity of inclosing the enemy on every side, he ended by saying, "The particular mode I shall not at this distance attempt to dictate; your own knowledge of the country, from your long continuance in it, and the various and extended movements you have made, have given you great opportunities for observation; of which I am persuaded your military genius and judgment will lead you to make the best improvement."--(Letters of Washington, vol. viii.)

3. After the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at York, General Lafayette asked Colonel Barber for a faithful and intelligent soldier, whom he could send as a spy into the English camp. Morgan, of the New Jersey line, was pointed out to him. The general sent for him and proposed to him the difficult task of going over to the enemy as a deserter and enrolling in their army. Morgan answered that he was ready to everything for his country and his general, but to act the part of a spy was repugnant to all his feelings; he did not fear for his life but for his name which might be blotted with an eternal stain. He ended, however, by yielding but on condition, that in case of any misfortune, the general would make the truth known, and publish all the particulars of the case in the New Jersey papers. M. de Lafayette promised this should be done. Morgan then proceeded to the English camp. His mission was to give advice of the movements of the enemy, and deceive them as to the projects and resources of the Americans. He had not been long with the English, when Cornwallis sent for him, and questioned him, in the presence of Tarleton, upon the means General Lafayette might have of crossing south of James River. Morgan replied, according to his private instructions, that he had a sufficient number of boats, on the first signal, to cross the river, with his whole army. "In that case," said Cornwallis to Tarleton, "what I said to you cannot be done;" alluding, in all probability, to an intended march upon North Carolina. After the arrival of the French fleet, M. de Lafayette, on his return from a reconnoitring party, found in his quarters six men dressed in the English uniform, and a Hessian dressed in green: Morgan was amongst them, bringing back five deserters and a prisoner: he no longer thought his services as a spy could be of any use to his country. The next day, the general offered him, as a recompence, the rank of sergeant. Morgan thanked him, but declined the offer, saying that he thought himself a good soldier, but was not certain of being a good sergeant. Other offers were also refused. "What can I then do for you?" inquired the general. "I have only one favour to ask," replied Morgan. "During my absence, my gun has been taken from me; I value it very much, and I should like to have it back again." Orders were given that the gun should be found and restored to him: this was the only thing he could be prevailed on to receive. Mr. Sparks, who published this anecdote, "says he heard it related, fifty years after it had occurred, by General Lafayette, who still expressed great admiration for that soldier's noble feelings and disinterested conduct."--(Washington's Writings, vol. viii., p. 152.)

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.

Camp, between the branches of York River, August 24, 1781.

The residence of Virginia is anything but favourable to my correspondence. I do not accuse public affairs of this evil; and as I find so much time to think of my affection for you, I could doubtless find some, also, to assure you of it; but there are no opportunities here of sending letters, and we are obliged to despatch them to Philadelphia and expose them to many hazards; these dangers, in addition to those of the sea, and the increased delay they occasion, must necessarily render the arrival of letters far more difficult. If you receive a greater number from the French than from the Virginian army, it would be unjust to imagine that I have been to blame.

Your self-love has, perhaps, been gratified by the part I have been obliged to act: you may have hoped that I could not be equally awkward on every theatre; but I should accuse you of an egregious degree of vanity (for all things being in common between us, there is vanity in rating me too highly) if you have not trembled for the perils to which I have been exposed. I am not speaking of cannon balls, but of the more dangerous master-strokes with which I was threatened by Lord Cornwallis. It was not prudent in the general to confide to me such a command. If I had been unfortunate, the public would have called that partiality an error in his judgment.

To begin, even from the deluge, I must speak to you of that miserable Portsmouth expedition. General Rochambeau had intended sending a thousand Frenchmen there, under the Baron de Viomenil. You must have heard that the French squadron gained a great deal of glory, whilst the English attained their desired end. Admiral Arbuthnot will since have informed you that I was blockaded; but, although we were not sailors, that blockade did not detain us four hours. You will have learnt, afterwards, that General Phillips having made some preparations at Portsmouth, we marched in all haste to Richmond, where we arrived nearly at the same time; but I arrived first. They then came from New York and Carolina to unite with the Virginian troops; the whole was commanded by the formidable Lord Cornwallis, who abandoned his first conquests to fulfil the ministerial plan by the conquest of Virginia. It was not without some difficulty that we avoided the battle he wished for; but, after many marches, we became stronger than we were at the commencement, and we pretended to be stronger than we were; we regained what we had lost without risking a battle, and, after two trifling affairs, the hostile army proceeded to Portsmouth, which it has since evacuated, and whose fortifications we have destroyed. That army is now in York River, whither they repaired by water. If the naval superiority which we are so fully expecting should arrive, I shall rejoice at the campaign closing by the English army's assuming that position.

The French and American troops before New York are under the orders of the generalissimo. My friend Greene has had great success in Carolina, and that campaign has taken a far better turn than we had any reason to expect or hope. It may perhaps end in a very favourable manner. It is said that the British ministry are sending here the Governor of Virginia; I fancy they have founded rather too many hopes upon the success of their army. The Pennsylvanians, who were to have joined them, are at present here with us. But for the virtue, zeal, and courage of the regular troops who were with me, it would have been impossible for me to have saved myself. I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to those with whom I have undertaken this fatiguing campaign. The militia have done all they could. I have been well pleased, with our little army, and only hope it may have been also pleased with me.

I must speak of my health, which is a monotonous subject,--for I need only repeat favourable accounts of my own constitution: the sun of Virginia has a very bad character, and I had received many alarming predictions; many persons, in truth, have had fevers; but this climate agrees with me as well as any other, and the only effect fatigue has upon me is to increase my appetite.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.

Camp, between the branches of York River, August 24th, 1781.

When a person, sir, has Lord Cornwallis in front and is flying through the sands of Virginia, he must depend upon others to give circumstantial news of America. Ever since the guidance of this army has been entrusted to me, I have found myself five hundred miles from any other troops, and all accounts of the war, of General Washington, and of congress, are an immense time in reaching me; but you have the Chevalier de la Luzerne, and you could not have a better informer. There is only one point on which I cannot depend on any person to speak for me,--and that is when I am assuring you of the affectionate and devoted attachment I shall feel for you during the remainder of my life.

To execute the gigantic project which his court has planned, Lord Cornwallis was obliged to leave exposed both the Carolinas. General Greene took ample advantage of this circumstance. It is true that the hostile army bore on every point upon us, and all depended upon our having the good luck to avoid a battle: fortune served us well, and after a few junctions, our little army regained all the ground whose conquest had occasioned so many sacrifices. In the other states we manoeuvred rather than fought. Lord Cornwallis has left us Portsmouth, from whence he communicated with Carolina, and finds himself at present at York, which would be a very advantageous station for us, if we possessed a naval superiority: if that should by chance arrive, our little army would enjoy successes which would amply compensate for this long and fatiguing campaign: I should not, in that case, regret our last movements having placed us in our present situation.

I can only speak to you of myself, sir, or of the English army, for all other accounts will reach you at Versailles almost as soon as they do me in this remote corner of Virginia. It is reported that you are going to make peace, but I am not very credulous on this point, and I fancy that they will at least await the end of this campaign.

This is a large packet, sir, but I do not fear taking advantage of your kindness, as I well know the full extent; I flatter myself I merit it as much as it is possible for any person to do so, by the feelings of confidence and respectful affection with which I remain, &c.

I beg you to present my kind compliments to the Countess de Vergennes, and to your sons.

TO M. DE MAUREPAS.

Camp, between the branches of the York River, August 24th, 1781.

Whilst I am thus, sir, more than ever separated from the rest of the world, I am not less occupied with the persons I love, and who honour me with their kindness and attention. I owe you so much gratitude, and feel so much attached to you, that I wish to recal sometimes to your recollection the rebel commander of the little Virginian army. Interested for me, sir, as I know you are, you would have been alarmed by the important part my youth has been called upon to act: five hundred miles from any other corps, and without any resources whatever, I was placed to oppose the projects of the court of St. James's and the good fortune of Lord Cornwallis. Until the present moment, we have not met with any disasters; but, in a time of war, no person can tell what events may occur on the following day. Lord Cornwallis pursued us without succeeding in taking us, and after a variety of movements, he is now in the good York harbour; who knows whether his manoeuvres may not end by making us prisoners of war?

As I do not know what vessel may bear this despatch, I will neither dwell upon our projects nor our hopes; the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who knows every opportunity for France, will inform you of all that passes here; for my part, I am lost in the sands of Virginia, living only by my wits, and corresponding with Lord Cornwallis only. This letter, sir, is merely intended to recal me to your remembrance, and to offer you the assurance of my respectful and affectionate regard.

Will you permit me, sir, to present my respects to the Countess de Maurepas and Madame de Flamarens?

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

Holt's Forge, 1st Sept., 1781.

My dear General,--From the bottom of my heart I congratulate you upon the arrival of the French fleet. Some rumours had been spread, and spy accounts sent out, but no certainty until the admiral's despatches came to hand. Inclosed I send you his letter, and that of M. de St. Simon, both of whom I request you will have translated by Tilghman or Gouvion alone, as there are parts of them personal, which I do not choose to shew to others. Thanks to you, my dear general, I am in a very charming situation, and find myself at the head of a beautiful body of troops; but am not so hasty as the Count de Grasse, and think that, having so sure a game to play, it would be madness, by the risk of an attack, to give anything to chance.

It appears Count de Grasse is in a great hurry to return; he makes it a point to put upon my expressions such constructions as may favour his plan. They have been pleased to adopt my ideas, as to the sending of vessels into James River, and forming a junction at Jamestown. I wish they may also force the passage at York, because then his lordship has no possibility of escape.

The delay of Count de Grasse's arrival, the movement of the grand army, and the alarm there was at York, have forced me, for greater security, to send a part of the troops to the south side, of James River. To-morrow and the day after will be employed in making dispositions for covering a landing, which will be done with continentals discumbered of baggage; and on the 5th, agreeable to the count's desire, a junction will be made of our troops. I shall then propose to the French general the taking of a safe position, within ten or twelve miles of York; such a one as cannot be forced without a much greater loss than we could suffer.

And, unless matters are very different from what I think they are, my opinion is, that we ought to be contented with preventing the enemy's forages, and fatiguing them by alarming their picquets with militia, without committing our regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis de St. Simon has been pleased to express to Colonel Gimat, respecting his being under me, I shall do nothing without paying that deference which is due to age, talents, and experience; but would rather incline to the cautious line of conduct I have of late adopted. General Portail must be now with Count de Grasse. He knows your intentions, and our course will be consulted in our movements.

Lord Cornwallis has still one way to escape; he may land at West Point, and cross James River, some miles below Point of Fork; but I thought this part was the most important, as the other route is big with obstacles. However, to prevent even a possibility, I would wish some ships were above York.

The governor~ was with me when the letters came; he jumped upon a horse, and posted off to his council. I gave him a memorandum, demanding provisions of every kind for the fleet and the combined army. We may depend upon a quantity of cattle, but flour ought to be sent from Maryland and Pennsylvania. Chevalier d'Annemours, the French consul, is here, and will take a method to have his countrymen supplied without starving us.

Upon a particular inquiry of the country, and our circumstances, I hope you will find we have taken the best precautions to lessen his lordship's chances to escape; he has a few left, but so very precarious, that I hardly believe he will make the attempt; if he does, he must give up ships, artillery, baggage, part of the horses, all the negroes; he must be certain to lose the third of his army, and run the greatest risk to lose the whole, without gaining that glory which he may derive from a brilliant defence.

Adieu, my dear general, the agreeable situation I am in is owing to your friendship, and is, for that reason, the dearer to your respectful servant and friend.

Footnotes:

1. Washington having finally adopted the project of uniting the land and sea forces against the army of Cornwallis, which had so fortunately stationed itself in the position most favourable to a naval attack, it was still important and difficult to prevent him from reaching Carolina, and thus ruining the campaign of the allied powers. It was to attain this end, that Lafayette had despatched troops to the south of James River, under pretence of dislodging the English from Portsmouth; this movement had also the good effect of uniting to the corps of the army the troops and artillery who could escape by Albemarle Sound on the arrival of the Count de Grasse. With the same view, he detained troops on the south of James River, on pretence of sending General Wayne and his Pennsylvanians to the southern army to reinforce General Greene. No person was in the secret, and the enemy could not, therefore, be undeceived. It was at that period that he sent them the pretended deserter, Morgan. In short, after having manoeuvred for several months to lead his opponent into the spot that would best allow him to take advantage of a naval co-operation, he manoeuvred at last so as to prevent his enemy from withdrawing when he became conscious of his danger. His precautions in this respect were more necessary from Lord Cornwallis knowing that a large French fleet was expected in North America. The moment the Count de Grasse arrived, Lafayette marched on rapidly to Williamsburg, and effected a junction with a corps of three thousand men belonging to the Marquis de St. Simon. As soon as he landed at Jamestown, he crossed the river, united Wayne's corps to his own, and assembled, on the other side of York River, opposite to Gloucester, a corps of militia. The English army thus found itself enclosed on every side, and no possible means of safety were left to Lord Cornwallis but by his undertaking a very perilous enterprise. He reconnoitred, however, the position of Williamsburg, with the intention of attacking it. It was a well chosen station: two creeks; or small rivers, throwing themselves, one into James, the other into York River, almost enclosed the peninsula on that point; it was necessary to force two well defended passages; two houses and two public buildings of Williamsburg, both of stone, were well placed to defend the front. There were five thousand French and American troops, a large corps of militia, and a well served campaign artillery. Lord Cornwallis thought he ought not to hazard an attack. He might have crossed over to Gloucester, or have ascended York River, the Count de Grasse having neglected to place vessels above that point, but he must have abandoned, in that case, his artillery, magazines, and invalids, and measures had been taken to cut off his road in several places; he determined, therefore, to await the attack. He might have had, in truth, the chance of a combat, if Lafayette had yielded to some tempting solicitations. The Count de Grasse was in a hurry to return; the idea of waiting for the northern troops and generals was intolerable to him; he entreated Lafayette to attack the English army; with the American and French troops that were under his command, offering, for that purpose, not only the detachments which formed the garrisons of the ships, but also as many sailors as he should demand. The Marquis de St. Simon, who although subordinate to Lafayette from the date of his commission, was much his senior in point of age and service, joined earnestly in the admiral's request. He represented that Lord Cornwallis's works were not yet completed, and that an attack of superior forces would soon, in all probability, take Yorktown, and afterwards Gloucester. The temptation was great for the young general of the combined army, who was scarcely four-and-twenty years of age; he had an unanswerable pretence for taking such a step in the declaration made by M. de Grasse, that he could not wait for the northern generals and forces; but this attack, which, if successful, would have been so brilliant, must necessarily have cost a great deal of blood. Lafayette would not sacrifice to his personal ambition the soldiers who had been confided to him; and, refusing the request of the Count de Grasse, he only endeavoured to persuade him to await the arrival of General Washington, accompanied by the Generals Rochambeau and Lincoln, seniors of Lafayette; by this means the reduction of the army of Cornwallis became a secure and by no means costly operation. (Note extracted from Manuscript, No. 2.)

2. The governor of Virginia, Nelson.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Williamsburg, September 8, 1781.

My dear General,--I had the honour to write you lately, giving an account of everything that came within my knowledge. I was every hour expecting I might be more particular; but if you knew how slowly things go on in this country; still I have done the best in my power; I have written and received twenty letters a day from government and from every department. The governor does what he can: the wheels of his government are so very rusty that no governor whatever will be able to set them free again. Time will prove that Jefferson has been too severely charged. The French troops, my dear general, have landed with amazing celerity; they have already been wanting flour, meat and salt, not so much, however, as to be one day without. I have been night and day the quarter-master collector, and have drawn myself into a violent head-ache and fever, which will go off with three hours' sleep, the want of which has occasioned it. This, my dear general, will apologize to you for not writing with my own hand. The French army is composed of the most excellent regiments: they have with them a corps of hussars, which may be of immediate use. The general and all the officers have cheerfully lived in the same way as our poorly provided American detachment. I think a letter from you on the subject will have a very good effect. Last night by leaving our own baggage, and accepting of our officers' horses, we have been able to move to a position near Williamsburg: it is covered along the front with ravines; the right flank is covered by a mill-pond, on the road to Jamestown; the left by Queen's Creek, small rivulets, and marshes. We have militia still in front of our right and left, and a good look out on the river. Our provisions may come to the capital landing. Williamsburg and its strong buildings are in our front. I have upon the lines General Muhlenberg with one thousand men, four hundred of whom are Virginian regulars, and one hundred dragoons. In borrowing White's unequipped horses we may add one hundred hussars. There is a line of armed ships along James River, and a small reserve of militia, which may increase every day: there are in Gloucester county eight hundred militia driving off stock. I had recommended, with proper delicacy, to Count de Grasse to send some naval forces up York River; the French armed vessels in Pamunkey are come down to West Point. No movement of Count de Grasse has as yet taken place, except some ships below York. Your excellency's letter to him has been duly forwarded; we are under infinite obligations to the officers and the men for their zeal.

I entered into these particular accounts, my dear general, in order to show you that propriety, and not the desire to advance, has dictated our measures. We will try, if not dangerous, upon a large scale, to form a good idea of the works; but, unless I am greatly deceived, there will be madness in attacking them now with our force. Marquis de St. Simon, Count de Grasse, and General du Portail, agree with me in opinion; but, should Lord Cornwallis come out against, such a position, as we have, everybody thinks that he cannot but repent of it; and should he beat us, he must soon prepare for another battle.

Now, my dear general, I am going to speak to you of the fortifications at York. Lord Cornwallis is working day and night, and will soon work himself into a respectable situation: he has taken ashore the greater part of his sailors; he is picking up whatever provisions he can get. I am told he has ordered the inhabitants in the vicinity of the town to come in, and should think they may do him much good. Our present position will render him cautious, and I think it a great point. No news as yet in this camp of the fleet of M. le Comte de Barras.~

I will now answer you that part of your letter respecting provisions for the troops under your immediate command.

With respect to a proper place for the debarkation of your troops, it is the opinion of the Marquis de St. Simon, and mine, that it must be in James River, but we have not had an opportunity yet of fixing on the best spot: it appears, however, that it must be at or near Williamsburg or Jamestown.

With the most affectionate regard and esteem, I am; dear general, &c.

Footnote:

1. Marshall speaks of the departure of the Count de Barras for the Chesapeak, and of his arrival with the artillery of the siege; that the admiral had received a letter from the minister of the marine, the Marshal de Castries, who, informing him of the orders given to M. de Grasse to proceed to the coasts of the United States, left him free to make a cruise on the banks of Newfoundland, not wishing to oblige him to serve under his junior, to whom the minister had entrusted the command. But M. de Barras nobly determined to convey himself and the artillery to Rhode Island, and to range himself, with all his vessels, under the command of an admiral less ancient than himself.--Manuscript, No. 2.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp before York, October 16, 1781.

My dear General,--Your excellency having personally seen our dispositions, I shall only give an account of what passed in the execution.

Colonel Gimat's battalion led the van, and was followed by that of Colonel Hamilton's, who commanded the whole advanced corps; at the same time, a party of eighty men, under Colonel Laurens, turned the redoubt. I beg leave to refer your excellency to the report I have received from Colonel Hamilton, whose well known talents and gallantry were on this occasion most conspicuous and serviceable. Our obligations to him, to Colonel Gimat, to Colonel Laurens, and to each and all the officers and men, are above expression. Not one gun was fired, and the ardour of the troops did not give time for the sappers to derange them, and, owing to the conduct of the commanders and the bravery of the men, the redoubt was stormed with uncommon rapidity.

Colonel Barber's battalion, which was the first in the supporting column, being detached to the aid of the advance, arrived at the moment they were getting over the works, and executed their orders with the utmost alacrity. The colonel was slightly wounded: the rest of the column under General Muhlenberg and Hazen advanced with admirable firmness and discipline. Colonel Vose's battalion displayed to the left, a part of the division successively dressing by him, whilst a second line was forming columns in the rear. It adds greatly to the character of the troops that, under the fire of the enemy, they displayed and took their rank with perfect silence and order. Give me leave particularly to mention Major Barber, division inspector, who distinguished himself, and received a wound by a cannon ball.

In making arrangements for the support of the works we had reduced, I was happy to find General Wayne and the Pennsylvanians so situated as to have given us, in case of need, the most effectual support.

I have the honour to be, with the most perfect respect, &c.

Footnote:

1. It was the 13th of September that General Washington had operated his junction with General Lafayette, and the 28th the place of York was invaded. The assault was given on the 15th of October.

TO M. DE MAUREPAS.

Camp, near York, October 20th, 1781.

The play, sir, is over--and the fifth act has just been closed; I was in a somewhat awkward situation during the first acts; my heart experienced great delight at the final one--and I do not feel less pleasure in congratulating you, at this moment, upon the fortunate issue of our campaign. I need not describe the particulars of it, sir, because Lauzun will give them to you in person; and I only wish him the same degree of good luck in crossing the ocean that he had in passing through a corps of Tarleton's legion.

M. de Rochambeau will give you a full account of the army he commands; but if the honour of having commanded for some time the division of M. de St. Simon gives me any right to speak of my obligations to that general and his troops, that right would be much valued by me.

Will you have the kindness, sir, to present my respectful compliments to the Countess de Maurepas, and Madame de Flamarens, and to accept, yourself, the sincere assurance of my affection, gratitude, and respect.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.

Camp, near York, October 20th, 1781.

Allow me, sir, to offer you my congratulations upon the good leaf that has been turned over in our political tablets. M. Laurens will give all particulars; I rejoice that your Virginian campaign should close so well, and my respect for the talents of Lord Cornwallis renders his capture still more valuable to me. After this commencing stroke, what English general will ever think of conquering America? Their southern manoeuvres have not ended more fortunately than their northern ones, and the affair of General Burgoyne has been again renewed.

Adieu, Sir; I have so short a time for writing, that I can only add at present the assurance of the respect and sincere attachment of, &c.

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.

On board La Ville de Paris, in Chesapeak Bay, Oct. 22, 1781.

This is the last moment, my dearest love, allowed me for writing to you; M. de Lauzun is going to join the frigate and return to Europe; some business I had to settle with the admiral affords me the pleasure of thus giving you some news of me two days later; what relates to public affairs will be detailed to you by M. de Lauzun. The close of this campaign is truly brilliant for the allied troops; our movements have been all remarkably well combined, and I must, indeed, be difficult to please, if I were not completely satisfied with the close of my Virginian campaign. You must have learnt all the trouble that Lord Cornwallis's talents and superior forces gave me,--the good luck we had in regaining the ground we had lost,--and, finally, our drawing Lord Cornwallis into the very position that was necessary to enable us to capture him: at that precise moment all the troops rushed upon him. I count as amongst the happiest epochs of my life, that in which the division of M. de St. Simon remained united to my army, and that in which I alternately commanded the three field-marshals, with the troops under their orders. I pity Lord Cornwallis, for whom I have the highest respect; he is kind enough to express some esteem for me, and after having allowed myself the pleasure, in the capitulation, of repaying the incivilities of Charlestown, I do not intend to carry my vengeance any farther. My health is extremely good, and I met with no accident during our encounter.

Present my most affectionate respects to Madame d'Ayen, and the Marshal de Noailles; a thousand kind regards to all my sisters, the Abbé Fayon, and M. de Margelay. I embrace ten thousand times our beloved children. Adieu, adieu.

THE MARQUIS DE SEGUR TO M. DE LAFAYETTE.

December 5th, 1781.

The king, sir, having been informed of the military talents of which you have given such multiplied proofs whilst commanding the different corps of the army that has been confided to you in the United States; of the wisdom and prudence that have guided you in the various decisions you were called upon to take respecting the interests of the United States; and of the great confidence with which you have inspired General Washington; his Majesty has desired me to tell you, that the praises you have so justly merited on such various occasions have fixed his attention, and that your conduct and successes have made him, sir, conceive the most favourable opinion of you; such a one as you might yourself desire, and from which you may depend on his future kindness. His Majesty, in order to give you a very flattering and peculiar mark of this intention, renews to you the rank of field-marshal in his armies, which you are to enjoy as soon as the American war shall be terminated, at which period you will quit the service of the United States to re-enter that of his Majesty. In virtue of this decision, sir, you may be considered as field-marshal from the date of the signature of the capitulation, after the siege of Yorktown, by General Cornwallis, the 19th October, of this year, on account of your fulfilling at that time the functions belonging to that rank in the troops of the United States of America.

His Majesty is disposing at this moment of his regiment of dragoons, of which he had kept for you the command until the present time.

I beg you to be convinced of the pleasure I experience in this act of his Majesty's justice, and of the wish, I feel to prove to you, on every occasion, the sincere attachment with which I have the honour of being, &c.

SÉGUR.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Alliance, off Boston, December 21st, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I am sorry to think we are not yet gone, and there still remain some doubts of our going to-morrow. This delay I lament not so much on private accounts as I do on the account of our next campaign, in the planning of which your opinion, as I shall deliver it, must be of the greatest use to the common cause. As to the department of foreign affairs, I shall be happy to justify the confidence of the congress, by giving my opinion to the best of my power, whenever it is asked for; but the affair of finances will, I fear, be a difficult point for the American minister, in which, however, I shall be happy to help him with my utmost exertions. The moment I arrive in France, I will write to you minutely how things stand, and give you the best accounts in my power.

I have received every mark of affection in Boston, and am much attached to this town, to which I owe so many obligations; but, from public considerations, I have been impatient to leave it and go on board the frigate, where I receive all possible civilities, but where I had rather be under sail than at anchor.

I beg your pardon, my dear general, for giving you so much trouble in reading my scrawls; but we are going to sail, and my last adieu, I must dedicate to my beloved general. Adieu, my dear general: I know your heart so well, that I am sure that no distance can alter your attachment to me. With the same candour, I assure you that my love, my respect, my gratitude for you, are above expression; that, at the moment of leaving you, I felt more than ever the strength of those friendly ties that for ever bind me to you, and that I anticipate the pleasure, the most wished for pleasure, to be again with you, and, by my zeal and services, to gratify the feelings of my respect and affection. Will you be pleased to present my compliments and respects to Mrs. Washington, and to remember me to General Knox and General Lincoln.

Adieu, my dear general, your respectful and tender friend, &c.

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENCE.

INSERTED ONLY IN THE

AMERICAN EDITION.

* * * * *

TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

At Robins's Tavern, halfpast four, 26 June, 1778.

DEAR GENERAL,--I have received your excellency's favor~ notifying your arrival at Cramberry, and am glad to have anticipated your orders in not going too far. I have felt the unhappy effects of the want of provisions, for I dare say if we had not been stopped by it, as we were already within three miles of the enemy's rear, we would very easily have overtaken them and fought with advantage.

I have consulted the general officers of the detachment, and the general opinion seems to be that I should march in the night near them, so as to attack the rear guard when on the march. We have also spoken of a night attack. The latter seems dangerous. The former will perhaps give them time of escaping, as it is impossible I would move quite close by them, at least nearer than three miles.--Col. Morgan is towards the right flank, Gen. Dickinson is a little upon the left, Gens. Scott and Maxwel have insisted upon going further down than we are now; for Wayne's and Jackson's corps they have not had provisions at all but will be able to march in the night. I beg you would let me know your intention and your opinion of the matter, my motions depend much upon what the army will do for countenancing them. I beg you would be very particular upon what you think proper to be done and what your excellency will do. I wish indeed you would anticipate the different cases which may happen according to the place where the enemy lays.--Gen. Wayne, Col. Hamilton and several officers have gone to reconnoitre it, I fancy they will lay about seven or eight miles from here. Your excellency knows that by the direct road you are only three miles further from Monmouth than we are in this place.

The enemy is said to march since this morning with a great confusion and fright. Some prisoners have been made, and deserters come amazingly fast. I believe an happy blow would have the happiest effect, and I always regret the time we have lost by want of provisions.

I beg you would answer to me immediately, and with the highest respect I have the honor to be, &c.

Footnote:

1. The letter referred to does not appear in Sparks' "Writings of Washington;" but there is a letter of instructions in vol. 5, p. 417 of that work addressed to Gen. Lafayette by Gen. Washington, dated the 25th June 1770, in relation to the service upon which the former had been detached; some account of which is to be found in the preceding "Memoirs," ante p.p.51, 52. See also, the letters of Gen. Washington to Gens. Lee and Lafayette, in Sparks' "Writings &c." p.p. 410, 419.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL.)

At Cranbarry, 5 o'clock, June, 1778,

Dear General,--I have received your orders for marching as just as I could and I have marched without waiting for the provisions tho' we want them extremely. Gen. Forman and Col. Hamilton sat out last night to meet the other troops and we shall be together at Hidestown or somewhat lower. Gen. Forman is firmly of opinion that we may overtake the enemy,--for my part I am not so quiet upon the subject as he is, but his sentiment is of great weight on account of his knowledge of the country. It is highly pleasant to me to be followed and countenanced by the army that if we stop the enemy and meet with some advantage they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt but if we overtake them we possess a very happy chance. However, I would not have the army quite so near as not to be quite master of its motions, but a very little distance may do it.--I have heard nothing of the enemy this morning. An officer of militia says, that after they had pitched their tents yesterday night, they struck them again. But I am inclined to believe they did not go farther, and that the man who brought the intelligence was mistaken. I expect some at Hidestown which I will immediately forward to you. I beg when your excellency will write to me, that you could let me know the place you have reached, that I might govern myself accordingly.

With the highest respect I have the honor to be, &c.

Footnote:

1. In answer to the letter of instructions mentioned in the preceding note.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL)

Half past ten, 28th June, 1778.

Dear General,--Your orders have reached me so late and found me in such a situation that it will be impossible to follow them as soon as I could wish. It is not on account of any other motive than the impossibility of moving the troops and making such a march immediately, for in receiving your letter I have given up the project of attacking the enemy, and I only wish to join Gen. Lee.--I was even going to set out, but all the Brigadiers, Officers, &c. have represented that there was a material impossibility of moving troops in the situation where ours find themselves--I do not believe Gen. Lee is to make any attack to morrow, for then I would have been directed to fall immediately upon them, without making 11 miles entirely out of the way. I am here as near as I will be at English Town. To-morrow at two o'clock I will set off for that place.

I do not know if Morgan's corps, the militia, &c., must be brought along with the other part of the detachment. Gen. Forman who don't approve much of that motion, says, that our right flank must be secured, unless to incur the most fatal consequences for the whole army.

I beg your pardon sir, if my letter is so badly written, but I want to send it soon and to rest one or two hours.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Be so good as to send a speedy answer of what you think proper to order me.

Footnote:

1. In answer probably to Gen. Washington's letter of the 26th June. Sparks' Washington, vol. 5, p. 419.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Cranbarry, half past nine o'clock, 29 June, 1778.

Dear General,--Inclosed I have the honor to send you a letter which Colonel Hamilton was going to send me from this place when I arrived with the detachment, and which may give you an idea of the position of the enemy. I will try to meet and collect as soon as possible our forces, tho' I am sorry to find the enemy so far down that way. We will be obliged to march pretty fast, if we want to attack them. It is for that I am particularly concerned about provisions. I send back immediately for the purpose, and beg you would give orders to have them forwarded as speedily as possible, and directed to march fast, for I believe we must set out early to-morrow morning. The detachment is in a wood, covered by Cranberry Creek, and I believe extremely safe. We want to be very well furnished with spirits as a long and quick march may be found necessary, and if Gen. Scot's detachment is not provided, it should be furnished also with liquor; but the provisions of this detachment are the most necessary to be sent as soon as possible, as we expect them to march.

If any thing new comes to my knowledge, I will immediately write to your excellency, and I will send an express in the morning.

I have the honor to be, &c.

I wish also we could get some axes, but it should not stop the so important affairs of provisions.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

St. Jean d'Angely, June, 1779.

Sir,--I learnt before I left Paris, that a loan, negotiating in Holland for England, and which was to have been completed the coming autumn, would be stopped, because the lenders had demanded one per cent more interest. This loan was undertaken by a banker of English origin, who has apportioned it among a great many persons, and had become lender-general to the English government. I am told that some profits over and above the commission might help America to this sum, amounting to above forty millions. I communicated this information to the Chevalier de la Luzerne to be imparted to you; but having discharged that duty towards the Americans, I feared lest M. Necker would not share in my earnestness. I have already appropriated twenty millions to bank stock, ten to an expedition, and ten to pay the interest until the final reimbursement.

I received at the moment I was coming away a letter from America, dated in the month of January, in which the President informed me in behalf of Congress, that they had changed their determination respecting the joint expedition to Canada. The reasons assigned are, the slight probability of Rhode Island and New York being evacuated next winter, the uncertainty of the enemy's movements next spring, and therefore the impossibility of promising their quota of the troops, fixed in the plan that I was intrusted with. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Havre, 9 July, 1779

Sir, If my letter from America had contained any interesting information, I should not have delayed a moment to acquaint you with it; but it is only a confirmation of what you heard, and we have some later news by the way of England. It will be injurious to commerce for the British to have the command of James River, and while they can coast along those shores with impunity, their transient descents will almost always succeed. If they should establish themselves in their new profession, to drive them out would be the more accordant to the plan I spoke to you about; as, in Virginia, November and even December are good campaigning months. The arrival of M. Gerard will certainly supply you with many details of American affairs, the Swedish ambassador has sent me, in the name of his king, the most flattering assurances, and well suited to awaken my gratitude, but the vessels are not forthcoming, and if we go to America, we must go under the Spanish or French flag. I think if our Southern allies should engage alone in a similar expedition, they would do more harm than good by it.

I wish I could send news that the English fleet was beaten in good earnest; and whilst I wait that event with as much interest, as if I was at the head of the fleet, the army and the whole ministry, I do not forget that your time is precious, and so I shall content myself with presenting to you the homage of my respect and my attachment.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Havre, 7th October, 1779.

Sir,--As from their minister in France, any European intelligence will be properly conveyed to congress, I beg only the leave of paying them a due tribute of my respect and heartfelt assurance of my unbounded zeal, love and gratitude: so sensible I am of their goodness towards me, that I flatter myself they will kindly receive this letter from one who will ever boast in the name of an American soldier, and whose delight has been long ago, in sharing the same fortune as the American people, never to be considered but as a countryman of theirs.

...land has been obliged to make, the terror that has been spread along her own shores, while her naval forces were flying in the channel before our fleet, and suffering themselves to be insulted by our van guard frigates, and at length the obligation our fleet was under, to repair into the harbour of Brest for getting provisions and water, are events which will be more accurately reported by Mr. Franklin's dispatches. The Ardent, man-of-war of sixty-four guns has been taken by two French frigates. Captain Jones's small American squadron had the good luck of taking lately a fleet from the Baltic, and displaying Continental colours along the coasts of Scotland.

Since I had the honor to write to your excellency, I have ever been with Count de Vaux's army, which was divided in two corps at St. Malo and the Havre, and consisted of thirty thousand men. Another body has been stationed in Flanders, and two thousand dragoons are to embark at Brest.--The project of invading England was at first retarded by a difficult meeting of the French and Spanish fleets on account of contrary winds, by useless efforts to bring out the enemy to an engagement, and the necessity of repairing into the harbour of Brest. How it will be possible to bring out the expedition in the autumn is yet undetermined, but it will be perhaps delayed until next spring, though the ministry seem very anxious of acting in this campaign.

Suppose the taking of Gibraltar, which they are going to attack with the greater vigor, was the only European conquest for this year, the large expenses France has made will yet be of a great use to the common cause, as it has exhausted England and detained at home forces which would have done mischief in the other part of the world.

The loss which the enemy have sustained in the East Indies has been very severly felt by them, and from their negociations in Europe they cannot procure themselves any allies.

Count d'Estaing's arrival on the American coasts will, I hope, have produced such an effect as we earnestly desire. How truly concerned, how truly unhappy I am in being confined to mere wishes, Congress, from the knowledge they have of my sentiments will better feel for me than I might myself express. The furlough they were pleased to give me was unlimited, no one could imagine the campaign would take such a turn, and till the month of June I was in hopes of rendering myself, in this part of the world, of a more immediate use to the United States. The expedition against England had been afterwards fixed upon, and my services were thought useful to my country and the common cause: So that I hope Congress will approve of my conduct.

Whatever may be the success of the campaign in America, it will certainly bring on new projects for the ensuing year. The sense I have of the favors conferred on me by congress, and the marks of confidence which I have obtained in many occasions, give me the freedom of reminding them that the moments where I may find myself under American colours, among my fellow soldiers, and take orders from our great and heroic General will ever be considered as the happiest ones in my life.

If there is any thing in France where not only as a soldier, but as a politician, or in whatever possible light, I may employ my exertions to the advantage of the United States, I hope it is useless to tell that I will seize the happy opportunity and bless the fortunate hour which shall render me useful to those whom I love with all the ardor and frankness of my heart.

The inestimable sword which Congress have generously added to their so many favors, I have received from their minister with such honorable services as by far exceed any merit I may ever boast of. This present has been also graced by Mr. Franklin's politeness in offering it, and I could not help repeating again to Congress some assurances of those sentiments which for ever will animate my grateful heart.

With the warm feelings of one whose first ambition and delight is to be known in this and to be called in ages to come a lover of America, who is bound to his representatives by the most respectful and tender attachment and gratitude, and with the highest regard for your excellency.

I have the honor to be your's &c.

Paris, 9th January, 1780.

SIR,--You were too busy yesterday for me to communicate to you the answer of M. de Montbarrey to the request for powder and guns which I had taken it upon me to make. I spoke in my own name, and the advice which I took the liberty of giving was not ill received. M. de Montbarrey told me that he would speak to you about it. He promised me an early answer; and as you favor my request, I hope that we shall soon obtain the powder and the fifteen thousand complete sets of accoutrements, which we would add to the clothes bought with the king's money. You are conferring a great obligation upon America, and affording her great additional means of contributing to the advancement of the grand common cause. Every citizen must be strongly interested in the fate of our islands, and must fear the effects, which would follow if an expedition should go out from New York. It is enough to know that country, whose independence is so important to the honor and safety of France, to desire that it may be not forgotten in the plan of the campaign, and to regret the loss of the time which might be employed in giving it assistance. But the extensive operations are beyond my sphere, I shall merely ask for my guns, and assure you of the strong affection and respect with which I have the honor to be, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.~

(ORIGINAL)

Peekskill, July the 20th, 1780.

DEAR GENERAL,--Having heard of an express from Rhode Island being going through the Continental village, I sent for him as it would not delay him more than an hour. Inclosed I have the honor to send you the letter from Gen. Heath, which I have opened, and also two letters from the French generals to me. It seems, my dear General, that they have anticipated the desire you expressed yourself of our plans in a private conversation. That way indeed will do better than a hundred letters. In case (what however I don't believe) they would wish to speak to yourself, I shall immediately send an express to inform you of it; but I dare say they will be satisfied with my coming.

I am glad to hear they are hunting after the Cork fleet, and those frigates being out will also apprise them of the enemy's naval motions.

Adieu, my dear General. With a heart full of hopes, and I think of well grounded expectations, I have the honor to be very tenderly and respectfully, &c.

P.S. It is much to be lamented that Paul Jones did not come in the first envoy. In case there is nothing to fear from the enemy, I will send the clothing to New London. Be certain, my dear General, that though by serious reflexions and calculations which I can prove to be right, I have great hopes of success, I shall however look upon and speak of all the difficulties that may present themselves. I have on public and private accounts many reasons to feel the consequence of the plan in question, and to take the greatest care in considering by myself and explaining to others our circumstances. The delay of the small arms I don't consider as equally hurtful to our affairs as will be the deficiency of Powder. But as (even at the so much overrated calculations) we have enough of it for one month, I will try to get a supply from the fleet, and then it will come to the same point. You will hear from me as soon as possible after my arrival.

Footnote:

1. This letter was written by General Lafayette, while on his journey to Newport R.I., whither he has been sent with full instructions to conduct measures of co-operation with the French Generals De Rochambeau and De Ternay. A copy of these instructions is given in Sparks' History of Washington, Vol. 7, App. III. See also the answer of Washington to La Layette, ib. p. 117.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Danbury, July the 21st, 1780.

As I find an express going from Hartford to General Greene, I send this letter to him that you might hear something further about the recruits of Connecticut.

From the Colonel who under Gen. Parsons is intrusted with the care of forwarding them, I hear that by the first of August two thousand of them will be at West Point; but I had put in my head that they were to bring arms with them, and I find it is not the case.

Gen. Parsons and myself will meet at Newtown, where, in mentioning again to him the necessity of hurrying the recruits to West Point, I will apprise him that you have been disappointed in the expectation of some powder, and desire him to write to you how far, in case of an emergency, you might be provided for with that article from his state.

In case Gen. Parsons thought that my waiting on the governor and council might answer any purpose, I would go three or four miles out of my way to preach to them some of my old sermons.

With the help of French horses whom I make free with on the road, I hope I will arrive very soon at Rhode Island. Nothing about Graves' fleet; but I am happy to think that they will find our people ready to receive them at Newport.

When I wrote you, my dear General, that my heart was full of flattering expectations, it is understood that I suppose a sufficiency of arms and ammunition, which I thought so far useless to explain, as I hope you believe I have some common sense. But I had an idea that the recruits would be armed, and I yet think (though I had no reason to be particular on that head) that you have many small arms in your stores. For what relates to the powder, I hope that what you will get from the states, and what I flatter myself to borrow from the French fleet, wilt put you in a situation to wait for the alliance. You may remember that the second division is to come before, or very little after, the beginning of our operations.

I however confess it is impossible not to be very angry at captain Jones's delays, and much disappointed in our expectations. The only thing I want to know, is if you depend on a sufficiency of arms and ammunition for the first thirty days. Be certain that before settling any thing, my great basis will be, when and how does the second division come, and how far may we depend on the arms and ammunition coming with them.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Hartford, July the 22d, 1780.~

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I hasten to inform you that the missing transport is safely arrived, on the 19th, at Boston. She is said to be a two-decker, and to have on board a vast deal of powder, with pieces of ordnance, and also the baggage of the officers of Bourbonnsis.--The intelligence came this instant by an officer of our army who saw the men encamped on the commons, from where they were to march to Providence. Two American frigates were, I am told, ordered to convoy the ship around the Rhode Island; but as their orders were to sail by to-morrow, they will have time to receive contrary directions from the French Admiral. The inclosed newspaper will acquaint you of Graves's cruising off Block Island, and on their first appearance, Chev. de Ternay will certainly dispatch an express to Boston.

In a conversation which I had yesterday with General Parsons, he told me that he thought the number of your arms in stores, amounted to ten thousand, exclusive of those which are now in the hands of the men. He seems to be of opinion, and so is Col. Wadsworth, that there is no inconvenience in their State's furnishing their drafts with arms, and giving even a larger proportion if thought necessary. They say those arms may be by the 5th of August at King's Ferry. I was so particular as to make myself certain that this demand will not in the least impeach any other measure, and as it would be too distressing to fall short on that article, I will take on myself, though in a private capacity, to persuade the Governor and Council in the measure of arming every one of the men whom they send out, and forwarding the arms to King's Ferry, or West Point, as you may direct.

As to the matter of ammunition Gen. Parsons thinks that (as far as he may guess,) near fifty tons of powder might be collected. Col. Wadsworth says he can't ascertain the quantity. They have three mills, and from what I can collect, I am certain that if you attack New York, this State will do all in their power. I will foretell the Governor, that he will have a large demand of ammunition, and let you know how much we are to depend upon, as far as I may guess from his answer. Massachusetts have, say they, a vast deal of powder.

I intend to breakfast at Newport the day after to-morrow, and as soon as I can make out any thing worth the while, from my conversation with them, I will let you know every matter that may be interesting.

With the highest respect and most tender friendship, I have the honor to be, dear General, &c.

I am told that the French are in a great want of vegetables. I think it will be agreeable to them to forward their waggons and horses as much as possible.~

Footnotes:

1. It appears from Spark's Hist. of Washington, p. 125. n. that in his progress to New Port, General Lafayette called on Governor Trumbull, General Parsons, Mr. Jeremiah Wadsworth, the Commissary-General, and other persons in Connecticut, to procure and hasten forward the quota of troops, and such supplies of arms and ammunition as could be spared from that State, to co-operate with the French troops upon their landing.

2. The answer to the above letter appears in Spark's Writ. of Washington, Vol. 7, p 125, See also ib. p.127, note.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Lebanon, July the 23d, 1780.~

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I had this morning the honor to wait on His Excellency, the governor, and took the liberty, though in a private capacity, to inform him of our circumstances. The result of our conversation I will therein transmit to you, and to be more certain of conveying the governor's ideas, I am writing at his own house, and will show him my letter before I fold it up.

To begin by the article of powder which is so much wanted, and which, from unforeseen circumstances may, by its deficiency, ruin all our expectations, I am, by the Governor, desired to tell you that you may depend upon: 1stly. Fifty four tons for the present. 2dly, Fifteen tons to be made up in the course of August, by the three Connecticut Mills. 3dly, Twenty tons, which in case of an absolute necessity, will be found out in this State; the whole amounting to eighty-five tons, which he would try to encrease, if possible, to ninety. How far that may fulfil your expectations, I don't know, but his Excellency will wait for a letter from you on this subject.

As to the balls, shells, &c., the Governor cannot as yet ascertain the quantity to be expected, but thinks this State may go a great length.

His resources for arms have been, it seems, overrated by General Parsons, and other gentlemen, whose opinions I had communicated to your Excellency. The Governor thinks that it would be difficult to arm the whole of the recruits. He will, however, if requested by you, do any thing in his power, and might have a good prospect of succeeding for the half part of them.

Tho' I had no orders for this interview with Governor Trumbull, and from the knowledge of our circumstances, took upon myself the freedom of disclosing them to him, I heard your Excellency's sentiments on one point so often, so strongly, and so repeatedly expressed, that I could with all certainty assure him, that you would not ask from the State more than is necessary to answer our great purposes, and in delivering the country from the danger of ruin and the disgrace of a shameful inability, to turn this decisive crisis to the honor and safety of America.

I took also the liberty of mentioning something about clothing the officers, and assured the Governor that you thought the measure to be highly necessary. He entirely agrees in opinion with me, and does not doubt but that at the first meeting of the Council a sufficient sum in hard money will be delivered for that purpose. The knowledge I have of Colonel Wadsworth's zeal and activity makes me desirous that he be intrusted with that business.

As to the clothing from the fleet, it seems the Governor wishes it to be sent into Connecticut river, and I will engage the French Admiral into that measure; for I am very warm in this opinion, my dear General, and so I know you are, that as less trouble as possible must be given to the people whose exertions should be entirely thrown in such channels, as are of absolute necessity; but if we can't send the clothing around without an eminent danger of its being taken, then his Excellency the Governor will send it with all possible dispatch and by pressed waggons from the boundaries of Rhode Island to any place on the North River, which is mentioned in Mr. Olney's instructions.

I have the honour to be, dear General, &c.

Your's, &c.

P. S.--I have read my letter to the Governor and he agrees with the contents. He will immediately give orders about the Mills, and collect four hundred french arms he had in stocks.~

Footnotes:

1. This is one of the letters referred to in Gen. Washington's letter of 20th July. Spark's Writ. of Wash. v, 7, p.128.

2. For the answer to the above, see Spark's Writ. Of Wash. v. 7, p.124.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Newport, July 26th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Every private intelligence from Long-Island, and also the letters from General Howe, and the officer on the lines do agree with the note I have received from Colonel Hamilton, and are all positive upon it that General Clinton, with a great part of his army, is coming to attack the French troops.

In consequence of this Count de Rochambeau is fortifying both Islands, and making preparations of defence. He has requested our calling immediately a body of militia, which demand has been complied with by General Heath.

After many intelligences had been received, I did yet persist in disbelieving the report, but they now come from so many quarters, that I am obliged to yield to the general idea, and expect them in a little time.

I have no doubt but that in the course of the day we will receive some orders, and some intelligences from head-quarters. The French Generals have asked me if your army was in a situation to make a diversion, or if a part of it would not be marched immediately to our relief. My answer was, that if you was able to do one or the other, you would certainly not lose a minute, but that I could not tell them any thing positive; that however, I thought you would come nearer to New-York than you was when at Preakaness.

All the last day has been employed or in viewing the camp with Count de Rochambeau, or in helping General Heath in his arrangements. This morning the Count is gone to reconnoitre the grounds on the Island. We dine together at the Admiral's, and I will, if possible, begin our conversation, our affairs exclusive of what we are now expecting from the enemy.

In case you was to send some troops this way, I wish I might get notice in such a time as to have some clothing kept on the road, but in all cases we should take some well looking and well dressed men; that, I only mention as a mere supposition.

If the enemy mean regular approaches the French Generals say that they would give time for a succour to come. In all suppositions I don't think the French will be able to form a junction before some time, as they can't leave the Island before the fifteenth of next month, (in supposing that they are not attacked.) They have many sick, but I will soon be able to tell you more about it, and had not those intelligences been so pressing, I might have by this time fully spoken on our affairs with the French Generals.

For my part, my dear General, till orders from you fix any thing I am to do, I will stay here under General Heath's orders, and help him to the best of my skill. As soon as any thing important comes to us I will send you an express.

From private inquires I hope the fleet will furnish us with some powder. As to the militia who are called by General Heath, the French army will spare to them such provisions as may be wanted.

I have the honor to be with the most perfect respect and tender affection, Yours, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Newport, July the 26th, at Seven o'clock, P. M.~

My Dear General,--I had this morning the honor of writing to you by Genl. Heath's express, and informed you that we had from every official and private quarter minuted accounts of the enemy's coming in great force to attack this island. For my part I have been a long time a disbeliever of the intelligence; but so many letters came to hand that at length I was forced to take the general opinion about their intended expedition. But, tho' I wrote you in the morning, I know you are anxious of hearing often from this quarter, and will therefore desire General Heath to send an other express.

Nothing as yet (the ships of war excepted) has come in sight; but the French Generals who have not the smallest doubt about their coming, are hurrying their preparations of defence.

General Heath and myself were invited to a meeting of the French General Officers, wherein, to my great satisfaction, the idea of holding both Connecticut and Rhode Island was abandoned, as it is assured that from the first one the enemy cannot annoy our shipping, if in a certain position. Count de Rochambeau, Chevalier de Chattelux, and myself, went afterwards to dine with the Admiral, and the two French Commanders have agreed to the following plan:

The transports to be put in the harbour of Newport; the shipping to anchor along the shore from Brenton's Point, going Northward, where they are protected by batteries, a frigate and a cutter to be stationed in Sekonnet Passage; the army to encamp at its usual place, but upon the appearance of the enemy, to be in readiness to attack them at any point where they may disembark, and, if unsuccessful, to retire to the position which was once occupied by the enemy. There they want also to place some militia. Count de Rochambeau cannot hear of the idea of evacuating the island, and says he will defend this post to the last man. I could not help advising him very strongly and very often to erect works, and keep a communication open with the Continent by Howland's Ferry or Bristol Point, that matter will, I hope, be attended to in the course of the next day.

General Heath will inform you of the measures he has taken, in which, as the second officer, I am only to help him to the best of my power. The Count's urging request, made it, I think, necessary to call for Militia.

The number of sick is such that by the return given before me to Count de Rochambeau, it appears they will have but three thousand six hundred men fit for duty if they are attacked within a few days. The fleet has a great proportion of sick men and the ships are therefore poorly manned for the present.

Count de Rochambeau asked me so often if you would not send a body of Continental troops to their relief; if, in the course of twelve days from this they could not be arrived, or that I knew he wanted me to write to you about it, and at length he told me he did not want it. But this must be between us. The Count says he will stand a storm; but if the enemy wanted to make a long work of it that a corps of Continental troops in their rear would have the best effects. That in this case the enemy would be much exposed on the Island, and that the circumstances which would follow their re-embarking, would be so fatal to them as to facilitate our operations for the campaign. All this, my dear General, I was in a private manner desired to hint to you.

We could not speak of our grand operations, and they are wholly taken in their expectations of the enemy. But what might be an inducement to send a corps this way is, that in any case the French will not be able to march before the 15th of August.

A return of the clothing has been promised to me for this evening, but tho' I am sorry to be the news-bearer of so many disappointments, I must tell you that from what they said to me nothing but a small part of the clothing has been intrusted to them, and that not only nothing new has been done, but what I had settled has been undone by those arrangements of the alliance which I can't conceive. In case you was to send troops this way, I think their route to Providence should be known, so that they might meet the clothing on the way. What you will do, my dear General, I don't know, but it seems Count de Rochambeau is determined to defend Newport, at all events.

With the most perfect respect and tender sentiments, I have the honor to be, Yours, &c.

Footnote:

1. For the answer to this letter, See Spark's Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p.128.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Newport, July the 29th, 1780.

My Dear General,--Your letter of the 22d~ came to hand last evening, and I hasten to answer at least to a part of its contents. I shall begin by the disagreeable disappointment I met with on account of our clothing. Inclosed, my dear General, you will find the return of what has been put on board of the fleet, which I have sent by a vessel to Providence, and which will be forwarded to head-quarters. I can't tell you how much I feel for that shoking arrangement of clothing, but as it is not quite so essential to arms and powder, if we have no clothing. I shall be the forwardest to advise our acting without it. I am apt to blush for neglecting improvements that are within my reach, but I readily do without those which are not in our power.

As to the affair of arms I spoke this morning to the Count, and am sorry to find that he has but the most necessary articles of exchange which are to answer to the daily broken arms, &c., his superfluous armament is coming in the second division, and for the present there is nothing to expect from that quarter. The only way, my dear General, will be to request the States to pick up arms for their recruits. Governor Trumbull, (as you may have seen by my letter from Lebanon,) thinks there is a great deal of difficulty in this matter; but many other Gentlemen from the State assure that it can be done. I will desire Colonel Wadsworth to manage that affair with the Governor, and I will also write a private letter to Mr. Bowdoin and Governor Greene.

As to the powder, my dear General, I hope the Navy will give us some, not however a great deal. You cannot conceive how difficult it is for the present to speak with them on offensive plans. They expect Clinton at every minute, and say his success will decide our operations, I had however this morning a conversation with the Land General, and was to see in the evening the Admiral, who, I am told, cannot come, so that I must delay it to be done to-morrow.

Connecticut will, I think, furnish you with a much greater quantity than you expected. How far it will fulfil your purpose I hope to hear from you; but I cannot flatter you to get so much from the fleet as two hundred, even as hundred tons.

I have fully considered, my dear General, the idea of those French Generals, and made myself acquainted with every thing that has past since my departure from France. A great mismanagement in the affair of transports, has prevented the whole coming here at once; but as the French and Spaniards have a superiority, there is no doubt but that if they join together as was intended, the second division will be here in less than three of four weeks. The fleet on this Continent will, I hope, be commanded by Mr. Duchoffaut, and will be very superior to that of the enemy. If by an unlucky chance the junction was prevented, the second division would yet certainly come in the autumn, and be in a situation to act during the winter; but I have all reasons to believe that they will be here in three weeks, and you may depend upon it that they will at all events be here for the winter. From what I have been intrusted with I have a pretty certain ground to hope that my letter will produce upon Count de Guichen, the desired effect, and after an expedition which I can't trust to paper, will be concluded, you may, I think, depend upon his coming this way with a good part of his fleet.

In a word, the French Ministry are determined to keep here during the war a land and naval force which will act on the Continent till a peace is concluded, and to support it with all their power. They look upon Rhode Island as a point to be kept for receiving their fleets and their reinforcements of troops, and want the defence of it to be such an object as will insure the basis of our operations.

Before settling any thing the French Generals want to hear from their second division. Don't fear by any means their acting rashly, and be assured that you may very far depend on their caution; but our wants of arms and ammunition have made me also very cautious. If the States furnish us with a sufficiency of the first article, and almost a sufficiency of the second, which we will make up with the fleet, then I am most strongly of opinion that waiting for the second division is all together wrong and unwarrantable.

I have, however, brought Count de Rochambeau to this, viz.:--That if the second division comes we must attack. That in all cases, if we are masters of the water, we may attack; and that we may do it if the Admiral thinks that we can secure the passage by batteries, and if each part is equal to the whole of the enemy.

We must now see what the Admiral has to say. What he wrote about the harbour of New York don't please me. If Duchoffaut comes, I answer for anything you wish. To-morrow I will speak with the two Gentlemen, so at least I hope, and will let you know their answers.

If the second division comes in time we shall certainly act and succeed. Then we will have our arms, powder, clothing, &c.

I never thought, my dear General, that Clinton would come this way; nor do I think it now, but every body says he is coming. Governor Clinton has it as a certainty, and upon his letter received this morning they have altered the arrangement; I had settled to dismiss the extraordinary militia. I hate troubling all these people, and taking them away from their harvest. Gen. Heath is of my opinion, but the intelligences are so particular, so authentic, that he dares not to neglect to gather as many men as possible. Before you receive this you will certainly know the truth of those reports.

If you think, my dear General, that Clinton is coming, and if he disembarks upon Rhode Island, I am clearly of opinion that three or four thousand Continental troops and the militia landing on his rear, while the Count would sally from Newport, would ruin the British army, and that the taking of New York would be but a trifle after such a stroke.

In case you adopt the measure, I think that the communication with the main is very important. I went yesterday to the North end of the Island, and had the works repaired in such a way (at least they will be soon so) as to keep up a communication by Howland's Ferry for eight or ten days after the enemy will possess the Island. I have also desired Colonel Greene, in case they appear, to run up the boats to Slave Ferry. Signals have been established from Watch Point to Connanicut; all those arrangements I have made with the approbation and by the orders of General Heath.

You will by this express receive a letter from Genl. Heath, who applies for, and most ardently wishes a leave of repairing to his command in the grand army. For my part, my dear General, I will, I think, wait your answer to this, and want to know if by the situation of your arms and ammunition, there is a possibility of your acting before the second division comes. If from the answers of the States you think such a proportion of powder from the fleet will be sufficient; then I will be more positive. If, however, after my conversations, I was to see that the second division must be waited for at all events, then I need not be waiting for your answer to this. I will, therefore, my dear General,

1st, Or arrange with them a beginning of operations before the second division comes, and then wait for your answer about arms and ammunition, or the prospects I may have by myself to fix it entirely.

2d, Or fix our plans for the moment the second division comes, and then I will, as soon as possible, repair to head-quarters.

They seem rather doubtful of the possibility of landing safely, and having a sufficiency of boats to carry them under the protection of our Westchester batteries, and I beg you will give me such a note about it as I might show to them.

With the highest respect and most tender friendship, I have the honor to be, dear General,

Yours, &c.

All the officers and soldiers of the army have a great desire to join the grand army, and hate the idea of staying at Rhode Island.

Footnote:

1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 117.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL)

Newport, July the 31st, 1780,

My Dear General,--In consequence of a note from me the Admiral came to last evening, and defensive ideas gave way to offensive plans. Our conversation was long, and it is not yet ended, but I hasten to write you a summary report of what past between the Count, the Chevalier, and myself.

I first began, in my own name, to give them a pretty exact account of the situation we were in three months ago, of the supernatural efforts which the country had made for the purpose of an immediate co-operation. I told them that by the 1st of January our army would be dismissed; that the Militia was only to serve for three months. I added, that for the defensive they were useless to us, nay, they were hurtful, and that I thought it necessary to take New-York before the winter. All that, my dear General, was said in my own name, and therefore in a less delicate way than when I am your interpreter.

I then told them that I was going to speak of you, and after many compliments, assurances of confidence, &c., I went on with your plan, beginning with the importance of possessing the harbour, and going on about the three ways which you have directed me to point out as to be hereafter regulated by circumstances.

As to the possessing of the harbour the Chevalier told that he did not believe his ships might go in; but that if superior at sea, he would answer by cruising off to protect the landing, the transportation, and prevent an evacuation; indeed to blockade the harbour.

The French General, with the advice of the Naval commander did not hesitate to prefer the going in transports to the point you know of. Both were of opinion that nothing could be undertaken unless we had a naval superiority, and as I know it is your opinion also, (tho' it is not mine,) I durst not insist on that article.

There was another reason which made me wait for the reinforcement. I knew we had neither arms nor powder. I know we would be at least a long time to get them; but as they did not think of making me the objection I put my assent to the others on the account of my private confidence in their superior abilities; told them that you also thought we should have a naval superiority, and added, in my own name, that however we must, any how, act before the winter, and get rid of a shameful defensive.

The summary of the arrangement will, I presume, be this: That as soon as we hear of a naval reinforcement we go where you know, and establish what you intend to fix; that, if possible, we get where I want you to be; that immediately the French will embark and go where you wish them to be, or thereabout; that a number equal to the enemy's whole force be stationed in that part; that they don't want there more than ten pieces of our heavy cannon; that after every thing will be disembarked, three weeks, in their opinion, will do the business on their side; that proper means will be taken by sea to keep up the communication and prevent an evacuation; that we must not give up that plan if we may begin in August or September; that fascines and other apparatus must be ready on the opposite shore; that they will take for us all the boats belonging to the Continent which will be at Providence; that as soon as our clothing, &c., arrive, it will without entering any harbour be sent to W.C. or thereabout.

Their superiority at sea, will, I think, take place in the course of this month; they have two ways to depend upon it:--1st, Unless of an absolute impossibility the second division, consisting of four other regiments and the remaining part of Lauzun's, with the Alliance and all other stores, and with a strong convoy of ships of the line, will be here very soon. When they will be heard of on the coast, Chevalier de Tergay will, at all events, go out and meet them. 2dly, the Gentleman I wrote to on my arrival has full liberty to send here reinforcements, the Admiral has already applied to him, but I am going to make him write other letters in my way, and will send them to-morrow or the day after to Chevalier de la Luzerne, whom I beg you will immediately desire to secure three fast sailing vessels for the West Indies.

I am going this evening to fix plans with Pilots, and also to speak of the entrance of the harbour. Dobs and Shaw are here, and I will have a full conversation with them and the Admiral, both for the entrance of the harbour and the navigation of the Sound. To-morrow I call, with as much secrecy as possible, a number of Pilots for the harbour of Halifax and River St. Laurence.

Inclosed, you will find a letter from Count de Rochambeau. He requests you will have the goodness of letting the Minister know what the French army is about, as he had no time of writing to him; it is, I believe, very important. 1st, To send every where to meet the reinforcement, and give them proper directions. 2dly, To have some vessels ready for the West Indies.

The French set more value upon Rhode Island than it is worth. I however got them to promise that in case of an operation they will not leave here a Garrison, and that their Magazines would be sent to Providence.

You know, my dear General, I did not expect Clinton, and tho' I could not stand alone in my opinion, I ever lamented the calling out of the Militia. I am happy to inform you that they have been dismissed. Nothing can equal the spirit with which they turned out, and I did not neglect letting the French know that they have done more for their allies than they would have done for the security of their own continental troops on a similar occasion.

As to the three month men, the French General wants them to establish the communication with the main; but I will soon request him to let them go to the grand army, and will, in the same time, get from this State as many arms and powder as possible. I have written to Massachusetts for the same purpose.

After I will have sent the Pilots, and made calculations with the Commander of the Artillery and the first Engineer whom the Count will consult, I shall draw a plan which I will get their answer to, and repair with it to head-quarters. In the meantime I will receive answers from Boston and from Governor Greene.

The Admiral cannot send to us more than thirty thousand of powder. But you see that their demands as to heavy pieces are small; they indeed say they do not want any on the Island, and that their twenty-ones will be sufficient. All that, my dear General, I will be more positive upon after the Commanders of Artillery and Engineers will have made with us their calculations.

I hope, my dear General, that by the 5th or 6th of August, I will have nothing more to do in this place. The French army hate the idea of staying here, and want to join you; they swear at those that speak of waiting for the second division; they are enraged to be blockaded in this harbour. As to the dispositions of the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the inhabitants and the Militia for them, they are such as I may wish. You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our drafts that came on Connecticut without provisions or tents, and who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French soldier and officer took an American with him and divided their bed and their supper in the most friendly manner.

The patience and sobriety of our Militia is so much admired by the French Officers, that two days ago a French Colonel called all his officers together to desire them to take the good examples which were given to the French soldiers by the American troops. So far are they gone in their admirations that they find a great deal to say in favor of General Varnum, and his escort of Militia Dragoons, who fill up all the streets of Newport. On the other hand, the French discipline is such, that chiken and pigs walk between the tents without being disturbed, and that there is in the camp a cornfield, from which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories don't know what to say to it.

Adieu, my dear General. To-morrow, I hope having the pleasure of writing you another letter, and am with the most tender friendship, dear General,

Your most obedient humble servant, &c.

I beg, my dear General, you will present my compliments to the family. ~

Footnote:

1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 117. The answer to this letter appears in Spark's Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 135.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Newport, August the 1st, 1750.

My Dear General,--Your letter to Count de Rochambeau~ mentioning the enemy's embarkation, and your future movements against New-York, a positive letter from Governor Trumbull, and a positive one from General Parsons, have once more altered the dispositions, and such of the Militia as had been dismissed have been again sent for.

In consequence of these expectations my offensive arrangements have been entirely cut short, they are wholly taken in their preparations. My letter of yesterday has been detained with the hope that some intelligence might be added to it; but I will send it this morning, and if it is possible to obtain from the Admiral some hour's conversation with Captains Dobs and Shaw I shall to-morrow morning dispatch another express.

The dispositions of defence are, I believe, these; the French to occupy the English lines; General Heath to command a corps of militia on the Tivertown side; I to have his van-guard on the Island, and to watch the enemy's motions almost all around the Island, which is not a small affair.

If the enemy land I will try to oppose it, and the French will come in columns to attack them with fixed bayonets. If this attack do not succeed they will retire behind the lines, and take with them fifteen hundred Militia, when with the few ones that may stay, I will retire to Butt's Hill, and secure the communication with General Heath.

As you did not write to me, my dear General, I could not know what you want me to do. If you think seriously of entering on the Island of New-York, I am extremely sorry to stay here. If on the contrary you send troops this way, (which, if the enemy land, would be fatal to them,) I will not be to lament my being away from the army. I shall feel very unhappy to be with some Militia while the Light Infantry is acting under you, and had I been sent for, I would have joined you very fast; but if you can take New-York I will heartily forget that I could have been there, and feel nothing but joy; if, however, there was time enough, I'd beg you will send for me. If you send troops this way I believe they may strike a great blow.

The wind is against them, so that they won't be here before the day after to-morrow. Adieu, my dear General, with the highest respect I have the honor to be,

Your's, &c.~

Footnotes:

1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 126.

2. For the answer to the above, approving the measures of Lafayette, See Spark's Writ. of Wash. v.7, p.147.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Elizabeth Town, October the 27th, 1780.

My Dear General.--From what you have heard from Dr. Hagen about the boats when on your way to head-quarters, I don't believe that you may have kept any hope for our success. The boats have been, it seems, reduced to five, and from the time when they were yet at the Little Falls you may see that they could not be here at the appointed hour.

I will not permit myself to reflect on this moment upon the many blunders committed on that affair by the Quarter-General's department. I was too certain of some brilliant success, and military glory is too much idolized by me; not to be rather severe on the occasion. I will content myself to say that from the report and common agreement of all the spies and guides collected together by Major Lee, from the negligence of the enemy, the circumstances of the tide and a thick foggy weather, not one of those whom I led into the matter had the least doubt upon your success.

The only advantage I have got from it has been to convince myself that our troops are particularly fit for such an expedition, on account of their patience and silence; and that if the other business could be supported upon a large scale, I would answer to carry it. I have written upon both roads to the commanding officer of the brigade of the line that our expedition was relinquished, and that I would advise him not to give to his men the trouble of going farther. I have also requested him to speak of this movement as if it had taken place on account of some intelligence that the enemy meant to come out into the Jersey's to attack us.

I have taken my position between Elizabethtown and Connecticut Farms. General Clinton has not the time of making any disposition against us. To-morrow at nine or ten I will march to our position of Crane's Town, and the day after to-morrow to Cotawa, unless I receive contrary orders.

Newark Mountain was rather too far to march it this night, and too near for to-morrow, because our men being in want of blankets will like better to join their tents again.

If your Excellency approves of this arrangement, I beg, you will order our baggage to wait for us on our position of Crane's Town; if you dislike the disposition your orders may reach us on the road.

I beg, my dear General, you will please to communicate our ill success and disgraceful disappointment to the Minister, who said he would not leave Morris Town until he hears from me.

Had I any thing to reproach to myself on the occasion, I would be inconsolable. I undertook the business because I thought myself equal to it; I wish the people in the Quarter Master's Department had done the same for their plans.

I am, my dear General, your's, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, October 27th, 1780.

My Dear General,--I am sorry to hear from Major Gibbs that my letter of last night did not reach you before your departure from head quarters. It had been written at one o'clock, as soon as I took my position for the night, and intrusted to Colonel Ogden, who promised to send it by an officer acquainted with the roads.

Depending upon your communication of the sad intelligence to Chevalier de la Luzerne, I did not send to Morristown where he was to wait for the news of the success.

Among the many blunders which have been committed, I shall extract from that complete assortment some instances (not for this glorious occasion that is forever lost) but on any future one.

You may remember that after a long time Colonel Pickering assured to you that the boats were in complete readiness whilst they had no oars,--he afterwards positively told that he had only three boats with him at Camp when two hours before I had seen five of them with my own eyes. The sending of those five boats two hours after that which you had appointed, you have been early apprized of, but you don't perhaps know that instead of being at Dod's the night before last the boats from Suffrans arrived there last evening about sunset, to this report the man who received them eight miles this side of Suffrans adds that they wanted their double trees and spread chains, so that he was obliged to lose about two hours in taking those things from Continental wagons and the inhabitants; when our affairs will be thus managed your best projects cannot fail of being defeated.

Had Mr. Pickering followed the example of General Knox, every thing would have been here in proper time and proper order, as was the artillery from the Park.--I confess, my dear General, that I cannot reconcile my feelings to the idea that by this neglect I have lost a most happy opportunity, blessed with all the little circumstances which may insure success. Our expedition has taken the most foolish turn in the eyes of any one who is unacquainted with this circumstance of the boats.

When I was in hopes of seeing in time at least five of them, I gave up the watering place to think only of Richmond; but when I saw that we could not be there before the break of the day, I did not hesitate to relinquish an expedition which on that footing would have occasioned a great profusion of blood for little or no purpose, but you will easily guess what I have felt on the occasion. I never have been so deeply wounded by any disappointment.

By Mercereau and Colonel Ogden, I hear that the enemy are collecting boats and intend a forage into the Jerseys. I would be very happy to know if you have got the like intelligence. Suppose they were to come out in force and at a distance from us, would not this be an opportunity to execute your grand plan?

I beg you will let me know this evening if I am to march to-morrow to our old ground to Cotawa; if the enemy were likely to come out, or if you thought of a certain plan, I would advise to keep Major Lee for some days, as in both cases he will be a capital man,--he is a most charming officer.

Arnold has issued a second proclamation wherein he invites the officers and soldiers of our army to join him, promising to them equal ranks to those they hold in the American service.

I am told expresses were sent to me to acquaint me of the delay of the boats; but excepting Doctor Pagen I have not seen one of them,--the boats have been sent to the two bridges by Major Gibbs, I had brought them up with me, and in passing by them both conductors and wagoners have received the curses of every officer and soldier in the division. The men marched last night very fast with such silence, good order and desire of fighting as would have highly pleased you. The activity and resources of Major Lee have been on that occasion displayed in such a way as entitles him to my eternal esteem and gratitude. I felt not only for me but for all the officers and men who had promised themselves so much glory on the occasion.

With the most tender affection and high respect I have the honor to be, my clear general, yours, &e,

Colonel Ogden has remained behind to get inteligences; so that being uncertain if my first letter has reached you, I would be happy to know in the course of the night if I am to march to-morrow morning to the old ground.~

Footnote:

1. The two preceding letters relate to a descent upon Staten Island, which was projected, and was to be executed by Lafayette, who was now in command of a Light Corps, consisting of battallions, stationed in advance of the main army, and was anxious to effect some important enterprise before the campaign should be brought to a close; but this expedition, as well as an attack proposed in his letter of the 30th October, ante upon the upper part of New York Island, was rendered impracticable by the want of boats and other necessary preparations. See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 280, and App. No. 9.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December 4, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I will for this time write a very short letter to you and cannot be more particular either on public or private business, until some few days stay in this city have enabled me to get further information.

I have been greatly disappointed in my not meeting Mrs. Washington. I have been very angry with my bad fate which led me into another road at the only moment when I could miss her--this has been the more the case, as I knew you was uneasy about her, and I wanted both to send you an express and to advise her to the best way of meeting you as soon as possible.

The southern news are expected this evening. Leslie has re-embarked and will probably go to Charleston; the southern members are pleased to like my going towards their country. However I cannot for the present be determined, as I don't yet know if the campaign will be active, and if succours are to be expected from France.

By a vessel from there who left Lorient before the middle of October, we hear that nothing material had happened except the taking of the merchant fleet. Both naval armies were in port. There was an expedition of, I think, ten ships of the line and five thousand men ready to sail--this vessel came in company with Jones, who is daily expected; but a very little part of our clothing will be on board, some will come on board the Serapis, Jones, who mounts the Ariel had dispatches from the French Court, for as he however might have been detained by a storm off the French coast which separated the little convoy. In the vessel arrived was a Mr. Ross, who, I hope will give me some account of the clothing, and Baron d'Arent, who got rid of his rupture, has a star with a cross and a ribbon, and is upon very good terms with the King of Prussia.

Congress have debated a motion about your being desired to go to the southward, but have determined that you would better know than they do if it was more useful to go or to stay. I am more than ever of this last opinion.

On my arrival I found one of the salt meat vessels sold and the other to be sold to day. I have spoken on the subject to almost every member of Congress, who promised that they would take the best measures in their power to get these provisions.

Chevalier de la Luzerne has communicated to me in the most confidential way a Spanish plan against St. Augustine, upon which I am building a letter for the Generals of this nation, and using the best arguments in my power to engage them either to send twelve ships of the line to take us and conduct us to Charleston, as to render their operations as useful as possible to General Greene. To-morrow I will write you about it. If I have time before the departure of the confederacy who is going to the West Indies, I will send you the original, if not a copy of my letter. This is entirely confidential, as I have not the Chevelier's permission to mention it. Adieu, my dear General, your's, most respectfully.

A letter dated Cadiz, September 23d, mentions that Count d'Estaing commands the combined fleet, and is gone to sea. In this case his going with sixteen ships could not be true. I will endeavour to ascertain this matter.~

Mr. Carmichael writes that Spain has sent a hundred and thirty thousand dollas. It is not a great deal, the dispositions of that court are very satisfactory. Portugal does every thing we want, letters are just arrived from St. Domingo but not desciphered.

Footnote:

1. The Light Infantry corps which Lafayette had commanded was broken up when the army went into winter quarters, and he now entertained the desire of transferring his services to the southern army under General Greene, and had applied to Washington for his advice. See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. Vol. 7, p. 316.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

December the 5th, in the Evening, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--However acquainted I may be with your intentions, I thought, upon the whole, that I should better wait for your approbation before I present any opinion of yours to the Spanish and French Generals in the West Indies. I will, I know, lose the opportunity of the confederacy, but many vessels are going that way, and if my letters meet with your approbation I shall send them by triplicates. I Impatiently wait for your answer.

I will write to General Greene to let him know of this intended expedition, which, tho' uncertain as all human events are, may be, however, in a great measure depended upon.

I confess that I don't hope to prevail upon the Spaniards to come here; but if you will, you, Count de Rochambeau, and Chevalier de Ternay, may try. In that case I wish you would write to both of them. My letter will, at all events, give some remote chance of their doing what I wish, and insure their communicating with General Greene. For political reasons I also wish to draw them into this correspondence.

Chevalier de la Luzerne wishes his packet to Count de Rochambeau to be forward as soon as possible. Adieu, my dear General, yours most respectfully and affectionately.~

Footnote:

1. For the answer to this letter, See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 322.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December the 16th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your favor of the 8th instant never came to hand before last night. My former letters will have explained to you my sentiments relating to a journey southward. I must heartily thank you, my dear General, for the kind and friendly letters you have been pleased to send me. I am so happy in your friendship that every mark of your affection, for me gives me a degree of pleasure which far surpasses all expressions.

As I have written to you before, my dear General, there is an intelligence of some ships and troops having been put in readiness at Brest; there is a possibility of a Spanish officer waiting on you for the sake of a co-operation. We are also to expect news from my friend the new Minister of the French Navy, and before they arrive you would not like my departure.

Two other reasons have weight with me; the first that if the enemy make this detachment, without which nothing material will happen in the Southward, and if the intelligence is true about the fast recruiting of six month men, there is (not a probability) but a possibility of some thing to be done in this quarter. The second is, that for reasons I will explain to you when we meet, a visit from you to the French army is to be much wished, and in this case you will be glad that I may accompany you.

Under these circumstances, to which is added a natural reluctance to part from you and this army, and some idea that upon the whole my staying will be more agreeable to you, I think, my dear General, that unless new intelligence comes I will soon return.

Colonel Laurens persists in refusing to go, and hopes Hamilton may be sent, whom he thinks better calculated for the purpose; but I don't believe now that this plan may be effected, and in that case I should advise Laurens to accept of the commission, provided he is merely a messenger and not an envoy, that would supersede the old Doctor.

The Assembly of Pennsylvania have passed a bill for their officers which seems satisfactory to them. Before I go I will still intrigue for the affair of filling up the battalions. Mifflin behaves perfectly well.

Adieu, my dear General, most affectionately and respectfully, Yours, &c.~

Footnote:

1. For the letter referred to in the commencement of this, See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 316, and see also the letter of Washington to Lafayette, ibid, p.322 & 339.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, March the 2nd, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your letters of the 25th and 26th~ both came yesterday to hand, which shows that the expresses have not made great dispatch. I would have done myself the honour of writing to your Excellency had I not every minute waited for intelligence from the Southward.

Your Excellency remembers that our shortest calculation on the arrival of the troops at the head of Elk was for the 6th of March; I am happy to inform you that they will be there this day or to-morrow early, and notwithstanding the depth of the mud, and the extreme badness of the roads, this march, which I can call rapid, (as for example, they came in two days from Morris Town to Princeton,) has been performed with such order and alacrity, that agreeable to the report two men only have been left behind; and yet these two men have embarked at Trenton with some remains of baggage. At every place where the detachment have halted, they have found covering and wood ready for them, and there has not been the least complaint made to me from any inhabitant. Every third day they have drawn their provisions; the clothing has also been distributed, and having embarked yesterday at Trenton they passed the city about two o'clock with a wind which was extremely favorable. Congress have given to their troops the advance of one month's pay which will be distributed at the head of Elk in new emission.

The Artillery, consisting of one 24, six 18, two brass 12, one 8 inch howitzer, two 8 inch mortars, in all, 12 heavy pieces; four 6 pounders, and two small howitzers, with a sufficient quantity of ammunition, will be at the head of the Elk this day and to-morrow, so that by the 4th I hope we shall be ready to sail. A quantity of medicines and instruments, and fifteen hundred pairs of shoes will be at the head of Elk before we embark. Vessels will be in readiness to receive us with thirty days provision on board. I am also assured that we will have a sufficient quantity of boats to land the detachment, and two heavy ones will be added for the Artillery, the public, and some of the private armed vessels in the Bay have been ordered to the head of Elk; two dispatch boats are there, and four more have been asked for. As a farther security to our subsistence, I have got the Minister's permission to dispose of the French flour and salt meat along the Bay in case of necessity.

On my arrival at this place I heard that M. de Tilly, the French Commander, had conferred with the Virginians, but upon seeing that nothing could be done immediately, he was undetermined whether to stay or to return to Rhode Island. Fearing that our letters might miscarry, and wishing to hurry the preparations of the Militia, I complied with the earnest solicitations of the Minister of France to send on Colonel Gouvion, and directed him to go either by land or water (as the state of the Bay would permit) on board the French squadron, and afterwards to Baron de Steuben's Camp, where he may apprise these Gentlemen of our force, our intentions, and the time of our arrival. This minuted account I give to your Excellency to show you that nothing on our part has been wanting for the success of the expedition. Our preparations have in every article fulfilled, and in the most important one, time, have exceeded what had been expected.

Your letter was sent by express to General St. Clair, who immediately came to town; but nothing having been done for the settling of the accounts, none of the promises having been complied with, and the men being much scattered, it has, (after much consideration,) been thought impossible to embark any number with us, and General St. Clair promises to make every exertion for the sending of two or three hundred in a few days whom however I am not to depend upon.

I am myself going to the head of Elk and shall arrive there this evening. It has not been possible for me to leave sooner the City, as the three days I have remained here have been fully employed in making and forwarding preparations.

Before I go I will wait on the Board of War Navy and propose the sending of the frigates; but the Trumbull having not her compliment of men, and those of the Ariel having mutinied at sea, I am afraid we will find difficulties. The preparations made at New York; the return of the Amarila; the remasting of the Bedfort; the impossibility Mr. Destouches is under to give us any further assistance; the uncertainty of what Mr. de Tilly may have determined before he had received your letter. Such are, my dear General, the many reasons which from a pretty certain expedition have lately made a precarious one. Under these circumstances, indeed, there must always be more or less danger in going down the Bay, and venturing the low country about Portsmouth. Being unacquainted with the answer you have received from Count de Rochambeau and Mr. Destouches, I am not able to judge how far I may depend upon the same ship being ordered again to Chesapeake (in case before the reception of your letter) she had thought proper to sail. Her coming was not in consequence of your proposition; her going was relative to the difficulties of an expedition very different from ours, and I wish I might know if (tho' Mr. Destouches cannot give further assistance,) this assistance at least may be depended upon, so as to hope for the return of the ship should M. de Tilly have left the bay. The bottom of the Bedfort is said to be damaged; the Amarila was said to have been dismasted. Suppose those circumstances were true, they would be in our favour. If a detachment was to go from New York to Portsmouth, Westpoint would be less in danger. If Cornwallis continues advancing on, perhaps our being in the neighbourhood of Arnold may be of service; I will, however, confine myself literally to my instructions, and if Colonel Gouvion writes me with certainty that M. de Tilly is gone; if I am not led to suppose he will return, I will march back the detachment; for the present I am going on because upon the increasing of the enemy's force at Gardner's Bay, you recommended dispatch to me; I hope, however, that I will hear from your Excellency. Now that the chain is established, Colonel Dickering says, that in six days I may receive your answer at the head of Elk. The hope of seeing the French ship again, or some other reason, may detain me; but your answer will determine my movements, and I can receive it by the 8th, which is about the time when it was thought we would arrive at the head of Elk.

My expectations are not great, and I think we have but few chances for us. I shall make all possible dispatch, and listen particularly to the voice of prudence; however, some hazard might be ran, if we undertake under these circumstances.

General Duportail having not left this place, I am led to hope that if we don't go I may return in time for the journey to Rhode Island. I most earnestly beg, my dear General, that you will favor me with an immediate answer.

With the highest respect and most tender affection, I have the honor to be, your's, &c.

P.S.--One of our transports from Trenton had got aground, but the troops of her will still be in time for her at the head of Elk. Some new difficulties have been made for the collecting of shoes, but I will try to get over them. From the extraordinary motions of Lord Cornwallis, whom we have not heard of these many days, and from the movements in New-York, I am led to hope that I will hear from you respecting my future conduct, and that I may be at head-quarters before you think it prudent to leave New Windsor.~

Footnotes:

1. For these, See Sparks' Writ. Wash. p. 430 & 439 The date of the letter is there given as the 27th.

2. See the letters of Washington is Sparks' Writ. of Wash. Vol. 7, p. 444 & 447.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Head of Elk, March the 7th, 1781.

My dear general,--Contrary winds, heavy rains, disappointments of vessels, and every inconvenience to which we had no remedy, have been, from the day of my arrival, combined against our embarkation. I hope, however, we will be on board to-morrow morning, and as nothing certain has been heard from the French ships, no time will be lost on our part for the celerity of the expedition.

The troops will embark five miles below this place, and three miles higher up than the Point where General Howe landed. There will be more room for the arrangements of our vessels, and the shallowness of the water insures us against the enterprise of any vessel of force. In this situation we may wait for intelligence from our friends. The State of Maryland have made to me every offer in their power. I will improve this opportunity of making up some deficiencies in the Quarter-Master and Engineer's Department, of insuring to us a good stock of provisions, and upon the intelligence received that Baron de Steubens was gone with a large detachment to the Southward, I had hinted the possibility of getting some Militia from the lower countries, and repairing some cannon at Baltimore; but having read the inclosed from the Baron, I will write again to Governor Lee, (as my letter has been gone but two days,) and save the State from any expence of that kind. To the obtaining of vessels has been joined the difficulty of getting them up the river, as they were taking every opportunity to slip them off. All the vessels, three excepted, are only bay craft, and our Admiral's ship mounts twelve guns. I have prepared some kind of orders for that fleet, but hope to be relieved from my Naval command by the arrival of a French frigate, and have, at all events, sent for Commodore Nicholson of Baltimore. Mr. McHenry has been very active in accelerating the measures of his State.

By a letter from Colonel Gouvion, dated Yucomico River, I find that after many adventures, he had landed there on the 4th, and was proceeding by land to his destination. The wind is fair enough to come up the Bay, and hope soon to hear from our friends.

The enclosed letter from the Baron having first come into my hand, and being on public service, as it was waited upon to be forwarded with dispatch, I took the liberty to open it, but was very sorry to have done it after a letter of the same date had came also to hand; both say the same thing (at least in every material point,) and I am happy to find that the Baron's preparations are going on rapidly.

Whatever may be the Baron's opinion upon the facility of taking, sword in hand, the fortifications of Portsmouth, I will not hazard any thing before I have considered the matter with my own eyes. Arnold had so much time to prepare, and plays so deep a game; nature has made the position so respectable, and some of the troops under his orders have been in so many actions that I don't flatter myself to succeed so easily as it may be thought. The prospect of preserving Naval superiority must, I think, decide if we are to save bloodshed by regular approaches, or to risk our men into the dangers of an assault; but I would like to destroy the works in some measure before we attempt to storm them. A conversation with the Baron, with Colonel Gouvion, and some other officers, joined to what I can see myself, will better fix my mind on the matter than it can be at present. When I left Philadelphia General Wayne was not far from hoping he could soon collect a thousand men; but I am not so sanguine in my expectations; I am, however, trying to prepare matters for this number of men, but I think that a sufficiency of vessels, (unless ours are sent back,) will not be obtained in a few days. Let General Wayne arrive in time or not, when he comes under my directions I wish to know if in case we succeed, he must be sent to Genl. Greene. Supposing he is to go there, would your Excellency think of selecting some riflemen for the grand army? It seems to me that I heard you once mentioning this matter. The State of Virginia, I am told, finds difficulties in the keeping of prisoners. Suppose something of the kind was stated to me, am I to alter any thing in what you said to me on the subject?

I am in a great hurry to go, my dear General; but let us succeed or fall in the object we have in view, I shan't be less hurried to return with the detachment to head-quarters, where I hope to be again as soon as you may possibly expect. I beg you will present my respects to Mrs. Washington, and Mrs. Hamilton, and compliments to the family. I have received Mr. Washington's answer, he is waiting for me at the Baron's quarters.

With the highest respect and most tender affection I have the honor to be, your's, &c.~

Footnote:

1. See Washington's letter in Sparks' Writ. in Wash, vol. 8, p. 449.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Off Turkey Point, March the 9th.

My dear general,--Commodore Nicholson has joined us sooner than I expected; he answers to conduct the detachment to Annapolis without the least danger, there he will wait for intelligence from me, but says that if the French fleet are below be might go with safety (if not for the vessels at least for the troops) to the point of our destination. Nicholson will be very useful to the French fleet as he knows well the bay.

I will be at Hampton to-morrow night or the day after, and three days after my arrival, if the French (whose arrival has not been heard of) consent to send a Frigate, the detachment may come in two days from Annapolis.

Most respectfully, my dear General, your's &c.

P.S.--I have written to the State of Maryland to tell them we don't want any of their Militia. I have left to the Navy Board to judge of the propriety to send out the Ariel adding that it was no more essential.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

York, March 15th, 1781.

My Dear General,--The number of small frigates and privateers that are in the bay, made it impossible for me to carry the detachment farther down than Annapolis, and I have requested the Governor of Maryland as well as the principal officers of the detachment, to give out that we are going to join General Greene; but the object of the expedition is so perfectly well known every where, that our sole dependence to keep Arnold must be upon the apprehension he has of a French fleet being cruizing off the capes.

For my part, I came in a barge from Annapolis, and very luckily escaped the dangers that were in the way. Colonel Harrison will have given to your Excellency a minute detail of the reasons which have prompted me to this measure. I have taken his advice on the matter, and have no doubt but that your Excellency (considering the probability that no frigate would have been sent) will approve of the step I have taken to forward as much as possible both the advantage of the expedition and the honor of the American arms.

On my arrival, (yesterday afternoon) I have found that Baron de Stuben had been very active in making preparations, and agreeable to what he tells me, we shall have five thousand militia ready to operate. This, with the Continental detachment, is equal to the business, and we might very well do without any land force from Newport.

By papers found in the baggage of a British officer, (taken in a boat) it seems that General Gregory had a correspondence with the enemy. The Baron has suspended him, but he is still with the troops.

Arnold is so well acquainted with the coming of the detachment, and his object is so well known, that, as I said before, our only chance to keep him must be the idea of a French fleet being off the capes; he is fortifying at Portsmouth, and trying to get provisions. There has been some trifling skirmishes with the militia.

To my great disappointment the French fleet have not yet appeared. If the project has not been given up they must be expected every minute; they had double the time which they wanted, and such winds as ought have brought them in four days.

I wanted to hold up the idea of my going to the Southward; but the Baron says that if the detachment is not announced, the militia will desert. He wanted me to take the command immediately, but I thought it more polite not to do it until the detachment arrives or operations are begun.

In your first letter to the Baron, I wish my dear General, you will write to him that I have been much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please him, and harmony shall be my first object. As in all cases, (even this of my going to the Southward and coming here to make arrangements with the Baron) I would reconnoitre the enemies; I will take an opportunity of doing it as soon as possible. They have not as yet been reconnoitred by the Baron, and I think it therefore more necessary for me to see with my own eyes.

As I have just arrived, my dear General, I cannot give you a very exact account of matters.

This letter I send by duplicate, and have the honor to be with the highest respect and most tender affection, yours, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Elk, April the 10th, 1751.

Dear general,--By my letter of the 8th your Excellency will have known of my arrival at this place, and the preparations I was making to proceed Southward. I took at the same time the liberty to inform you that the great want of money, baggage, clothing, under which both officers and men are suffering, and the hope they had of being furnished with a part of these articles from their States, would render it very inconvenient for the troops to proceed immediately by land; they begin to be sensible of the reason which detains them here, and are uneasy about it, as they are so unprovided for the journey. I have, however, hurried on preparations, and will be able to set off to-morrow morning. The circumstances of my being ready sooner than I expected, and a letter from the Governor of Maryland telling that six ships, whom I take to be plundering vessels, were coming up the Potomac, induces me not to wait for your Excellency's answer. Not that I pretend to defend the towns of Alexandria, Baltimore and Annapolis, at a time, or to stop the depredations of the enemy's parties in a country where their naval superiority renders it impossible; but because I don't think any consideration must delay the execution of superior orders, and because, if the corps was not sent to Southward they would with alacrity march back thirty or forty miles more to rejoin the grand army.

Having received no particulars of your Excellency's journey to Rhode Island, but by the paper, a letter from you to Mr. Lund Washington, and private letters from some friends, I cannot know what change has taken place in your plans, and am not able to account for the inactivity which you foresee for the grand army. Letters from Ministers, letters from my friends, intelligences from other quarters, every thing was combined to flatter me with the hope that our grand and decisive object would be in contemplation. I then was not displeased with the dispositions of the enemy that weakened that place. It is probable that your Excellency's plans have changed, and you intend to prosecute the war to the Southward.

I had yesterday the pleasure of dining on board the Hermione, and left her under sail to go to Rhode Island, where she will probably be the day after to-morrow. Mr. Delatouche, uncle to captain Latouche, will, it is said, command the squadron of the second division. I was conversing with his nephew, on whom he has an entire confidence on the expedition against New York, and he assured me that his Uncle's plan would certainly be to take possession of the harbour, and send a force up the North River, which you know is entirely the thing that you wanted M. de Vernay to do.

Mr. Delatouche having confidentially told me that he had a great influence over Mr. Destouches, I observed to him how important it was for the common cause that the French fleet might have the greatest possible activity. We were also conversing of the difficulties we laboured under for transportation, and he told me that the next day after his arrival at Rhode Island, unless such obstacles occurred as he could not foresee; Mr. Destouches would make you an offer of the ship l'Eveillé, and the four frigates to carry twelve hundred men to any part of` continent you might think proper. Those ships are too strong to be afraid of frigates, and too fast sailers to be in the least concerned by the fear of a squadron. Thinking that (particularly as Lord Cornwallis has retreated) our march would take us forty days, where desertion and sickness, occasioned by want of shoes and every other necessary, as well as by the heat of the season, would much reduce our numbers, and that these ships, with the addition of the two frigates at Philadelphia, armed en flute, would in sailing on the 4th or 5th of May, carry 1500 men to Wilmington, Georgetown, or any place in the rear of Lord Cornwallis or the neighborhood of General Greene, I thought it my duty to encourage this idea, which would bring us to the point of operations sooner than we could arrive by land. It would also give you the time of forming at Morristown or Trenton, a detachment well provided, agreeably to the project you had in contemplation after the return of this corps. The appointment of officers could be made without affecting the delicacy of the regimental officers, nor the honor of those already employed. While we would be operating, Mr. Destouches might keep cruizers off Charleston. These ideas, my dear General, are only thrown out in consequence of the freedom you have often ordered me to take. What Mr. Destouches may do is uncertain, and I did not think myself authorised to express to him the least wish on that head. It was my duty to relate our difficulties to you, and the chances I foresaw to see them relieved in some measure; but unless the bad weather, of which there is now a prospect, makes it impossible, I will be to-morrow at the ferry at the Susquehannah.

You may have known from Mr. de La Luzerne, that two millions and a half had been given to Mr. Franklin, and that Marquis de Castries and Count de Vergennes, were trying to obtain a sum more adequate to our wants. This, however, the Minister of France has requested me not to mention, as it was as yet an uncertainty, and would perhaps give ill-grounded hopes, destructive of the internal efforts we ought to make. I am told that just before the departure of Mr. Dela Peyrouse, some dispatches were sent to Brest; but do not think they contain any thing relating to our operations, as Marquis de Castries writes me that the determination of the Council upon our letters will be sent by the ships who is to convoy the expected vessels.

I am very sorry I have not seen the Aid de Camp who had a verbal message from General Greene. Inclosed I send to your Excellency the letter I have received on the occasion. Perhaps, did he mean to propose an expedition towards Cape-fear or Georgetown, which might be made with the light squadron above mentioned. An additional circumstance is, that l'Eveillé will now be commanded by Mr. de Lombard, captain Latouche's uncle, who is entirely under that Gentleman's influence.

I write to the board of war to get some shoes and other parts of clothing. I will this morning speak to the commanding officers of battalions on our intended journey; but have not yet said any thing to Colonel Gimat and Major Galvan, because it is possible that new circumstances may engage you to change your dispositions. Going by water, if possible, would level most all difficulties; but if I don't hear from you, I will always proceed on. I have the honor to be, yours &c.~

Footnote:

1. See Washington's Letters of 21st of March and 5th and 6th of April. Sparks' Writ. of Wash. volume 7. pp. 449 and 468, 8469. See also--Sparks' Writ. of Wash. vol. 8. Appendix No. 1.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Susquehannah ferry April 13th, 1751.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I received your Excellency's letter relating to Colonel Gouvion. It would have been very agreeable to me to keep this officer, your orders have been sent to Philadelphia where he is for the present. However distant I may be from the scene, I am happy to find that your Excellency hopes to undertake the grand object we have had in contemplation.

By a letter just received from the board of War, it seems that representations of wants have been made which they have mistaken for objections from me to our journey southward. I have said to some officers that our proximity to the southern states was the reason which had induced your Excellency to send this detachment, but I hope I need not assure you that I never thought of intimating the least idea of alteration to your Excellency's projects, but such as you would think of making yourself after your own ideas and intelligences. Perhaps my letter to the board of War may appear disrespectful or impolite, but nothing could stop me in an instance where it might be suspected I objected to your plans, or even differed in opinion. You know me too perfectly not to think an explanation useless.

It is confidently reported that the second division is arrived in the capes of Delaware, consisting of nine sail of the line, this was the number mentioned to me by the Marquis de Castries to be in harbour, your Excellency would in that case have a brilliant Campaign to the northward.

With the highest and most affectionate respect Yours &c.~

Footnote:

1. See Letters of Wash. of the 11th April. Sparks' Writ. of Wash. vol. 8, p. 11.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Susquehannah ferry April 13th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Had your Excellency's answer to my letter of the 8th, been forwarded with an equal celerity that your favor of the 6th, I would have received it before this time, but whatever change my new situation could make in your Excellency's dispositions, I thought it my duty in the mean while to obey the positive orders I had received, the Troops are now crossing the ferry and will with all possible speed proceed to Richmond.

By a letter received from General Green I find that he is, strongly of opinion that I must go to the southward, his intention is to carry the seat of war into South Carolina, there by preventing a junction between Arnold and Cornwallis, he gives me many excellent reasons to justify the movement and requests me to make to Richmond, and they will, if possible, increase my zeal to execute your Excellency's orders.

General Green's opinion is that Lord Cornwallis will fall down towards Wilmington, his own project is to carry the war into South Carolina. Under these circumstances a corps of Light Infantry embarked at Philadelphia on board a light squadron might have been upon the seat of war in a very short passage.

I cannot help fearing, my dear General, that our campaign will take a defensive turn which is far from answering our first plans and expectations. Major McPherson is with me as a volunteer, that officer has most zealously employed himself and has been most dangerously exposed in the discovery of a plot made to furnish the enemy with provisions, he has managed this matter with infinite address, being for two days and one night with six soldiers who, as well as himself, put on the air of British, and, in company with a spy who thought them to be enemy and by a most violent gale of wind, crossed the bay in a small boat, by which means he was made sensible that a trade of flour is carried with the enemy from the western shore of Maryland, and saved a magazine of 800 barrels of continental flour which would otherwise have fallen into the hands of the enemy. In case we proceed southerly perhaps will it be possible for General Green to give Mayor McPherson a command in some detachment; I would be happy if he was recommended to him by your Excellency. My determination being to go on with rapidity, unless I am recalled, your Excellency may easily judge of my movements from the answer I will probably receive in a few hours. Was I to assure your Excellency that this journey is perfectly agreeable to the Troops, I would not use that candor which you have so much right to expect, but their zeal and discipline insure their readiness to obey. I shall do my utmost to prevent desertion, and unless I was recalled, I shall proceed with celerity. But I beg your Excellency to remember that experience has often taught us how much reduced has ever been the number of our troops from the time of their departure to that of their arrival at the Southern army.

With the highest and most affectionate respect,

Yours &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Susquehannah ferry April 14th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL--Your Excellency's letter of the 11th, has overtaken me at this place, and having given to you an account of every measure I thought proper to take, I will only add that I am still at the ferry where the troops have crossed the river; but the wind blows so high that it has been impossible to take the waggons over, and I am obliged to have others impressed on the southern side of the Susquehannah. Your Excellency mentions the propriety of remaining at the head off Elk until shoes can be collected, but the prospect I have from the board of war are not flattering enough to encourage this measure. On the other side General Green is pressing in his advices, and will soon be so in his orders to me. I cannot obtain any good account of Phillip's motions, nor oppose the schemes he may have formed, until I am much farther advanced; and dissatisfaction and desertion being two greater evils than any other we have to fear; I am anxious to have rivers, other countries, and every kind of barrier to stop the inclination of the men to return home. Many men have already deserted, many more will I am afraid take the same course, whatever sense of duties, ties of affection, and severity of discipline may operate, shall be employed by me, and I wish we might come near the enemy, which is the only means to put a stop to the spirit of desertion.

Many articles, and indeed every one which compose the apparatus of a soldier, will be wanting for this detachment. But shoes, linen, overalls, hunting shirts, shirts, and ammunition will be the necessary supplies for which I request your Excellency's most pressing orders to people concerned, and most warm entreaties to the board of war. I wish it was possible to have the men equiped at once, and this would be a great saving of expense.

While I am writing to your Excellency the wind rises more and more, which will much impede our passage for such stores as were to cross over with the waggons, and the guard appointed to stay with them. At such a distance from the enemy, I cannot give your Excellency any account of their movements, but by the last intelligence General Phillips was still at Portsmouth.

Should the French get a naval superiority, an expedition against Portsmouth is very practible. These companies, filled up to their proper number, and some other troops to increase the corps to two thousand, would with a detachment of artillery from Philladelphia, be equal to the attack of that post. 3000 militia can with the greatest ease be collected. In case Duke de Lauzurn's legion arrives, that corps could come in the fleet; but should the French become superior at sea the British fleet in Chesapeak would be in danger, and in every case, if your Excellency thinks of sending any reinforcement this way, (let it be the Jersey troops or recruits) their coming by water to James or York river may save an immense trouble and expense.

My heart and every faculty of my mind, have been these last years so much concerned in the plan of an expedition against * * * that I am very desirous to hear, by the very first safe opportunity what reasons can have overthrown the project.

Some disputes that have at first happened between the Jersey and New-England troops, make me think that these last must be as much as possible separated from the Pensylvanians.

While I was writing these accounts have been brought to me, that, a great desertion had taken place last night: nine of the Rhode Island company, and the best men they had, who have made many campaigns, and never were suspected, these men say they like better a hundred lashes than a journey to the south-ward. As long as they had an expedition in view they were very well satisfied, but the idea of remaining in the southern states appear to them intolerable, and they are amazingly averse to the people and climate. I shall do my best, but if this disposition lasts I am afraid we will be reduced lower than I dare express. With the highest and most affectionate respect, yours &,c.~

Footnote:

1. See Letters of Washington, of the 21st and 22d April--Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 8., pp. 19, 22.

TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Hanover Court House, April 28th, 1781.

Sir,--Having received intelligence that General Phillips' army were preparing at Portsmouth, for offensive operations. I left at Baltimore every thing that could impede our march, to follow us under a proper escort, and with about a thousand men, officers included; hastened towards Richmond which I apprehended would be a principal object with the enemy.

Being on our way, I have received successive accounts of their movements. On the 21st, the British troops, commanded by their Generals, Philips and Arnold, landed at City Point on the south side of James River. A thousand militia under Maj. General Caroude Stuben and General Muhlenberg, were posted at Blandford to oppose them, and on the 25th they had an engagement with the enemy; the militia behaved very gallantly, and our loss, it is said, is about twenty killed and wounded. The same day, the enemy whose force it is reported to be near 2500 regular troops, marched into Petersburg. Yesterday they moved to Osburn's, about thirteen miles from Richmond, and after a skirmish with a corps of militia, destroyed some vessels that had been collected there, but have not yet attempted to cross the river. Baron de Stuben, is at the same side, and has removed to Falling Creek Church.

The Continental detachment will in a few hours arrive at this place, 20 miles from Richmond. The enemy are more than double our force in regular troops and their command of the waters gives them great advantages.

With the highest respect, I have the honor to be yours, &c.

TO GENERAL GREENE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp on Pamunkey River, May 3d, 1781.

Sir,--I had lately the honor to inform you of the enemy's movements towards Richmond, and the forced marches I was making to its defence. The detachment arrived on the 29th; the British army was thirteen miles distant on the other side of the river. Petersburg, Chesterfield Court House, and part of our vessels had fallen into their hands. Our regular force consisted of 900 men, rank and file; that of the enemy, of 2,300, at the lowest estimate.

The command of the water, and such a superiority of regular troops, gave them possession of our shore. There was no crossing for us, but under a circuit of fifteen miles, and from the number and size of their boats, their passage over the river was six times quicker than ours.

Richmond being their main object. I determined to defend this capital, where a quantity of public stores and tobacco was contained. General Nelson was there, with a corps of militia, and Generals Stuben and Muhlenberg, higher up on the other side. The same evening, we were by summons from General Philips, made accountable for the public stores on board vessels near the town, (which he declared) should certainly fall into his hands. Next morning the enemy moved to Manchester, opposite Richmond, where they burnt the ware-houses. Six hundred men ventured on this side, but were timely recalled, and being charged by a few dragoons of Major Nelson, flew into their boats with precipitation.

Knowing General Phillip's intention against Richmond, (orders for attack had been already given) I directed Baron de Stuben to join us, and collected our force to receive the enemy, but the same night they retreated to Osburn's, from thence to the neck of land formed by James River and Appamatox, where they have re-embarked. Col. Pleasant's and Good's battallions of militia, were sent on each side of the river and gave annoyance to their troops and boats. The enemy have lost some men killed, prisoners and deserters. Since the British army landed at City Point, (some flour excepted at the Court-house) no public property has been destroyed. Yours &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp near Bottom's Creek, May 4th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I request you will receive my affectionate acknowledgements for your kind letters. Every mark of friendship I receive from you adds to my happiness, as I love you with all the sincerity and warmth of my heart, and the sentiment I feel for you goes to the very extent of my affections.

Inclosed I send you, my dear General, two copies of letters to General Greene, which I also sent to Congress for their information. You will also find copies of the strange letters I have received from General Phillips, and the answers which, if he does not behave better, will break off our correspondence.

The leaving of my artillery appears a strange whim, but had I waited for it Richmond was lost, and Major Galvan, who has exerted himself to the utmost, cannot be with us under two days, as he never could obtain or seize horses for the artillery and ammunition waggons. It is not without trouble I have made this rapid march. General Phillips has expressed to an officer on flag, the astonishment he felt at our celerity, and when on the 30th, as he was going to give the signal to attack, he reconnoitred our position, Mr. Osburn, who was with him, says that he flew into a violent passion and swore vengeance against me and the corps I had brought with me.

I am, however, uneasy, my dear General, and do not know what the public will think of our conduct. I cannot say in any official letter that no boats, no waggons, no intelligence, not one spy could be obtained; that if once I had been manoeuvring with Phillips he had every advantage over me; that a defeat would have scattered the militia, lost the few arms we have, and knocked down this handful of Continental troops. Great deal of mischief had been already done. I did not know but what the enemy meant to establish a post. Under these circumstances I thought it better to fight on none but my own grounds and to defeat the main and most valuable object of the enemy. Had I gone on the other side, the enemy would have given me the slip and taken Richmond, leaving nothing to me, but the reputation of a rash unexperienced young man. Our stores could not be removed.

No orders from General Greene have as yet come to me. I cannot conceive the reason of his delay in answering my letters. In the meanwhile, Phillips is my object, and if with a thousand men I can be opposed to three thousand in this State, I think I am useful to General Greene. In a former letter he tells me that his object is to divide the enemy, and having no orders I must be regulated by his opinion.

The enemy are gone down the river. I have detached some militia to Hoods where I mean to make a fort. Colonel Hennis, with another corps of militia, is gone towards Williamsburg. His orders are in case the enemy land there, to annoy them, and in case they mean to establish a post, he is to disturb them until I arrive. This position is 16 miles from Richmond, 42 from Williamsburg, 60 from Fredericksburg. I have sent an officer at Point Comfort, and established a chain of expresses to know if they appear to turn towards Potomac. Should it be the case, Fredericksburg will have my attention, having missed Mr. Hunter's works at Fredericksburg must be their next object as they are the only support to our operations in the southward. Your first letters, my dear General, will perhaps tell me something more about your coming this way. How happy I should be to see you, I hope I need not express. As you are pleased to give me the choice, I shall frankly tell my wishes. If you co-operate with the French against the place, you know I wish to be at head quarters. If something is co-operated in Virginia, I will find myself very happily situated for the present. In case my detachment remains in this State I wish not to leave it, as I have a separate and active command, though it does not promise great glory; but as you gave me leave to do it, I shall in a few days write to you more particularly on my private concerns. It is not only on account of my own situation that I wish the French fleet may come into the bay. Should they come even without troops, it is ten to one that they will block up Phillips in some rivers, and then I answer he is ruined. Had I but ships, my situation would be the most agreeable in the world. Adieu my dear General, you will make me happy to write me sometimes. With the highest respect and most tender affection, I have the honor to be, yours, &c.~

Footnote:

1. See Letters of Wash. of 31 May.--See Sparks' Writ., v. 8., p. 60.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Richmond, May the 8th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--There is no fighting here unless you have a naval superiority, or an army mounted upon race-horses. Phillips' plan against Richmond has been defeated; he was going towards Portsmouth, and I thought it should be enough for me to oppose him at some principal points in this State. But now it appears I will have business to transact with two armies, and this is rather too much.

By letters from North Carolina, I find that Lord Cornwallis, who I had been assured had sailed from Charleston, is advancing towards Hallifax. In consequence of letters from the same quarter, General Phillip's has altered his plans, and returned to a place called Brandon on the south side of James river, where he landed the night before last. Our detachment is under march towards the Hallifax road, his command of the water, enabled him to land where I could not reach him. The brigade at Petersburg is destroyed, and unless he acts with an uncommon degree of folly, he will be at Hallifax before me. Each of these armies is more than the double superior to me. We have no boats, few militia, and less arms. I will try to do for the best, and hope to deserve your approbation.

Nothing can attract my sight from the supplies and reinforcements destined to General Green's army. While I am going to get beaten by both armies or each of them seperately, the Baron remains at Richmond where he hurries the collection of recruits, and every other requisite. I have forbidden every department to give me any thing that maybe thought useful to General Greene, and should a battle be expected (an event which I will try to keep off,) no consideration will prevent our sending to Carolina 800 recruits who, I hope, may be equiped in a fortnight. When General Green becomes equal to offensive operations, this quarter will be relieved. I have written to Wayne, to hasten his march, but unless I am very hard pushed, shall request him to proceed south-ward. The militia have been ordered out, but are slow, unarmed, and not yet used to this business. General Green, from whom I had as yet no letters, was on the 26th, before Camden, but did not think himself equal to the storming of the works. My respects, if you please, to Mr. Washington, and compliments to the family. Most respectfully and affectionately.

Yours &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Welton, north side of James River, May 18th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL.--Having been directed by General Greene to take command of the troops in Virginia. I have also received orders from him, that every account from this quarter, be immediately transmitted to Congress, and to your Excellency; in obedience to which I shall have the honor to relate our movements, and those of the combined armies of the enemy. When General Phillips retreated from Richmond, his project was to stop at Williamsburg, there to collect contributions which he had imposed, this induced me to take a position between Pamunkey, and Chikahomany rivers, which equally covered Richmond, and some other interesting parts of the State, and from where I detached General Nelson with some militia towards Williamsburg.

Having got as low down as that place, General Phillips seemed to discover an intention to make a landing, but upon advices received by a vessel from Portsmouth, the enemy weighed anchor, and with all the sail they could crowd, hastened up the river, this intelligence made me apprehensive that the enemy intended to manoeuvre me out of Richmond where I returned immediately, and again collected our small force, intelligence was the same day received that Lord Cornwallis (who I had been assured, to have embarked at Wilmington) was marching through North Carolina, (this was confirmed by the landing of General Phillips at Brandon south side of James River.) Apprehending that both armies would move to meet at a central point, I march towards Petersburg and intended to have established a communication over Appamatox and James river, but on the 9th, General Phillips took possession of Petersburgh; a place where his right flank being covered by James River, his front by Appamatox, on which the bridges had been destroyed in the first part of the invasion, and his left not being attackable but by a long circuit through fords that at this season are very uncertain, I could not (even with an equal force) have got any chance of fighting him, unless I had given up this side of James River, and the country from which reinforcements are expected. It being at the enemy's choice to force us to an action, which their own position insured them against our enterprizes, I thought it proper to shift this situation, and marched the greater part of our troops to this place about ten miles below Richmond. Letters from General Nash, General Sumner, and General Jones are positive as to the arrival of Colonel Tarleton, and announce that of Lord Cornwallis at Halifax. Having received a request from North Carolina for ammunition, I made a detachment of 500 men under General Muhlenberg to escort 20,000 cartridges over Appamatox, and to divert the enemy's attention, Colonel Gimat, with his battalion, and 4 field pieces cannonaded their position from this side of the River. I hope our ammunition will arrive safe, as before General Muhlenberg returned he put it in a safe road with proper directions. On the 13th, General Phillips died and the command devolved on General Arnold. General Wayne's detachment has not yet been heard of, before he arrives, it becomes very dangerous to risk any engagement where (as the British armies being vastly superior to us) we shall certainly be beaten, and by the loss of arms, the dispersion of militia, and the difficulty of a junction with General Wayne, we may lose a less dangerous chance of resistance.

These considerations have induced me to think that with our so very great inferiority, and with the advantage the enemy have by their cavalry and naval superiority, there would be much rashness in fighting them on any but our grounds, and this side of the river, and that an engagement which I fear will be soon necessary; ought, if possible to be deferred till the Pensylvanians arrive, whom I have by several letters requested to hasten to our assistance.

No report has lately come from near Hallifax, though a very active officer has been sent for that purpose; but every intelligence confirms that Lord Cornwallis is hourly expected at Petersburg, it is true there never was such difficulty in getting tolerable intelligence, as there is in this country, and the immense superiority of the enemy's horses, render it very precarious to hazard our small parties.

Arnold has received a small reinforcement from Portsmouth.

I am dear General, your most obedient humble servant, Yours &c.

P.S. Injustice to Major Mitchell and Captain Muir, who were taken at Petersburg, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that they had been sent to that place on public service. I have requested General Lawson to collect and take command of the militia south of Appamatox, local impediments was thrown in the road from Hallifax to Petersburg, and precautions taken to remove the horses from the enemy's reach. Should it be possible to get arms, some militia might be brought into the field, but General Greene and myself labour under the same disadvantage, the few militia we can with great pains collect arrive unarmed, and we have not a sufficiency of weapons to put into their hands.~

Footnote:

1. See Washington's Letter of the 31st May.--Sparks' Writ. of Wash., v. 8., p. 60.

TO COLONEL HAMILTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Richmond, May 23, 1781.

MY DEAR HAMILON,--I have been long complaining that I had nothing to do, and want of employment was an objection I had to my going to the southward; but for the present, my dear friend, my complaint is quite of an opposite nature, and I have so many arrangements to make, so many difficulties to combat, so many enemies to deal with, that I am much of a General as will make me a historian of misfortunes, and nail my curse upon the ruins of what good soldiers are pleased to call the army in Virginia. There is an age past since I heard from you. I acknowledge that on my part, I have not written so often as I ought to have done, but you will excuse this silence in favor of my very embarrassing circumstances, however remote you may be from your former post of aid-de-camp, to the Commander-in-chief, I am sure you are nevertheless acquainted with every transaction at head quarters. My letters have served to report information, and I shall consequently abstain from repetitions.

Our forced march saved Richmond. Phillips was going down, and thus far I am very happy. Phillips' return, his landing at Brandon, south side of James and Appamatox rivers. Had Phillips marched to Hallifax I was determined to follow him, and should have risked every thing rather to omit making a diversion in favor of Greene; but that army took possession of Petersburg, and obliged me to stick to the side of the river whence reinforcements are expected. Both armies have formed their junction of between four and five thousand men. We have no Continentals; their infantry is near five to one; their cavalry ten to one. Our militia are not numerous, without arms, and not used to war. Government wants energy, and there is nothing to enforce the laws. General Greene has directed me to take command in this State, and I must tell you by the way, his letter is very polite and affectionate; it then became my duty to arrange the departments, which I found in the greatest confusion and relaxation; nothing can be obtained, and yet expenses are enormous. The Baron and the few new levies we could collect, are ordered to South Carolina. Is it not strange that General Wayne's detachment cannot be heard of? They are to go to Carolina; but should I have them for a few days, I am at liberty to keep them. This permission I will improve so far as to receive one blow, that being beat, I may at least be beat with some decency. There are accounts that Lord Cornwallis is very strong; others make him very weak. In this country there is no getting good intelligence. I request you will write me if you approve of my conduct. The command of the waters, the superiority in cavalry, and the great disproportion of forces, gave the enemy such advantages that I durst not venture out, and listen to my fondness for enterprise; to speak truth, I was afraid of myself as much as of the enemy. Independence has rendered me the more cautious, as I know my own warmth; but if the Pennsylvanians come, Lord Cornwallis shall pay something for his victory.

I wish a reinforcement of light infantry to recruit the battallions, or a detachment under General Huntington, was sent to me. I wish Lawson or Sheldon were immediately dispatched with some horses. Come here, my dear friend, and command our artillery in Virginia. I want your advices and your exertions. If you grant my request, you will vastly oblige your friend. Yours, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Richmond, May the 24th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL.--The junction of Lord Cornwallis with the other army at Petersburg was an event that, from local circumstances, and from their so great superiority, it was impossible to prevent, it took place on the 20th, and having lost every hope to operate, a timely stroke in conjunction with the Pensylvanians, my ideas were confined to defensive measures. I therefore moved up to Richmond, where precautions were taken to remove every valuable property, either public or private.

By an officer that was in Halifax after Lord Cornwallis, I hear he has not left any post at that place, it appears, his sick and wounded remained at Wilmington, and were reimplaced by that garison. Reports concerning the numbers are so different, that I cannot trust anything but my eyes, until such an opportunity offers, this is the order of march, in which it is said his Lordship crossed Roanoke. Col. Tarlton's legion, Col. Hamilton's corps, 23d, 71st, 33d, British regiments, 200 tories, an Hessian regiment, the light infantry and guards with six field pieces. I am told General Leslie and Genl. O'Hara are with him, I have received successive and repeated accounts, that a British fleet of transports was arrived at Hampton, they were said to consist of 11 large vessels, and 16 smaller ones, under convoy of three large frigates. Mr. Day D.Q.M. at Williamsburg, writes that on the 22nd, 12 sail of large ship; a sloop, and schooner got underway opposite James Town; those ships full of men, and some horses on board the sloop. We have no accounts of any fleet having sailed from New-York.

Yesterday afternoon, we had a heavy rain, which Colonel Tarlton improved in surprising some militia in Chesterfield County, thirty of whom fell into his hands.

This morning at 9 o'clock the enemy moved from Peteraburg towards City Point, and destroyed the bridge they had lately constructed over Appamatoc. I have just received accounts, that a body of them has landed at Westover. These are said to be the men who came up the river from Hampton, previous to which General Arnold had received a small reinforcement from Portsmouth.

To my great mortification, I have heard this morning, that the Pensylvanians are not so near as I had been, by every account positively assured. General Wayne writes me he will hasten to my support, and I am confident he will not lose time at this critical moment, but before he arrives, it is impossible that 900 continentals and 40 horses, with a body of militia by no means so considerable as they are reported to be, and whom it is so difficult to arm, be with any advantage opposed to such a superiority of forces, such a number of cavalry, to which may be added, their very prejudicial command of the writers.

Our handful of men being the point to which militia may be collected, and the only check, however small it is, that the enemy may have in this state, it ought, I think, to be managed with a great deal of prudence as its preservation is so very important to the fate of operations in Virginia.

With the highest respect. I have the honor to be Yours &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp between Rappahannock and North Anna, June 3rd, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Inclosed you will find the copy of a letter to General Green. He at first had requested that I would directly write to you, since which his orders have been different, but he directed me to forward you copies of my official accounts. So many letters are lost in their way that I do not care to avoid repetitions.--I heartily wish, my dear general, my conduct may be approved of, particularly by you. My circumstances have been peculiar, and in this state I have sometimes experienced strange disappointments. Two of them, the stores at Charlottesville, and the delay of the Pennsylvania detachment, have given me much uneasiness and may be attended with bad consequences. Your presence, my dear general, would do a great deal, Should these detachments be increased to three or four thousand, and the French army come this way, leaving one of our generals at Rhode Island and two or three about New York and in the Jerseys, you might be very offensive in this quarter, and there could be, a southern army in Carolina. Your presence would do immense good, but I would wish you to have a large force. General Washington, before he personally appears, must be strong enough to hope success. Adieu, my dear general, with the highest respect and most tender affection I have the honor to be, Yours,~

P.S. If you persist in the idea to come this way. you may depend upon about 3000 militia in the field, relieved every two months. Your presence will induce them to turn out with great spirit.

Footnote:

1. This letter, and the succeeding one to Gen. Greene, was written while Lafayette was retreating before Lord Cornwallis, and as he was about to cross the Rapidan to form a junction with Wayne. See the answers in Sparks's Writ. of Wash. v. 3. p. 86.

TO GENERAL GREENE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp between Rappahannock and North Anna, June 3rd, 1781,

SIR,--I have done myself the honor to write you many letters, but least some of them should have miscarried, which I much apprehend to have been the case, I shall repeat an account of the late transactions in this state.

The junction of the enemy being made, which for the reasons I have mentioned it was impossible to prevent, I retired towards Richmond and waited for Lord Cornwallis's movements, his regular force being so vastly superior to mine.--Reinforcements from below having still increased it, and his cavalry being ten to one, I could not think to bring into action a small body of eight or nine hundred men, that preserved the shadow of an army and an inconsiderable number of militia whose defeat was certain and would be attended with a fatal loss of arms.--

Lord Cornwallis had at first a project to cross above Richmond, but desisted from it and landed at Westover, he then proposed to turn our left flank, but before it was executed we moved by the left to the forks of Chickahomony,--the enemy advanced twelve miles and we retreated in the same proportion; they crossed Chickahomony and advanced on the road to Fredericksburg. We marched in a parallel with them, keeping the upper part of the country. Our position at Mattapony church would have much exposed the enemy's flank on their way to Fredericksburg, but they stopped at Cook's ford on the North Anna river, where they are for the present.--General Wayne having announced to me his departure on the 23d, I expected before this time to have made a junction. We have moved back some distance and are cautious not to indulge Lord Cornwallis with an action with our present force.--

The intentions of the enemy are not as yet well explained. Fredericksburg appears to be their object, the more so as a greater number of troops are said to be gone down than is necessary for the garrison of Portsmouth.--The public stores have been as well as possible removed, and every part of Hunter's works that could be taken out of the way.--It is possible they mean to make a stroke towards Charlotteville; this I would not be uneasy for, had my repeated directions been executed, but instead of removing stores from there to Albemarle old Court House, where Baron de Steuben has collected six hundred regulars, and where I ordered the militia south of James River to rendezvous--It appears from a letter I received this evening that state stores have been contrary to my directions collected there, least they should mix with the Continentals, but my former letters were so positive, and my late precautions are so multiplied that. I hope the precious part of the stores will have been removed to a safer place. I had also some stores removed from Orange Court House. Dispatches from the Governor to me have fallen into the enemies' hands; of which I gave him and the Baron immediate notice.

The report of an insurrection in Hampshire county, and the hurry of Lord Cornwallis to communicate the copy of a Cartel with you where it is settled the prisoners will be sent by such a time to Jamestown, are motives that gave me some suspicions of a project towards the Convention troops. The number of the rebels is said to be 700--Gen. Morgan has marched against them; I think the account is pretty well authenticated tho' it is not official.--Having luckily opened a letter from the Board of War, to the Governor whereby the Convention troops are ordered to New England, I sent a copy of it to Col. Wood and requested an immediate execution of the order. This motive and the apprehension that I might be interrupted in a junction with Gen. Wayne have induced me particularly to attend to our re-union, an event that was indispensable to give us a possibility to protect some part or other of this state. I was until lately ignorant of your orders, that the new Continentals and militia under Baron de Steuben be united with this part of your army, and the Baron intended shortly to march to the southward.--When united to Gen. Wayne 1 shall be better able to command my own movements and those of the other troops in this state.--Had this expected junction taken place sooner, matters would have been very different.

The enemy must have five hundred men mounted and their Cavalry increases daily. It is impossible in this country to take horses out of their way, and the neglect of the inhabitants, dispersion of houses, and robberies of negroes, (should even the most vigorous measures have been taken by the Civil authority) would have yet put many horses into their hands. Under this cloud of light troops it is difficult to reconnoitre as well as counteract any rapid movements they choose to make. I have the honor to be with great respect, &c.

TO GENERAL GREENE,

(ORIGINAL.)

Allen's Creek, 22 miles from Richmond, Jane 18th, 1781.

SIR,--The enemy's position at Cooke's ford enabled them either to return to James River or to gain our northern communication. The arms and other precious stores arriving from Philadelphia, the importance of a junction with Gen. Wayne, and other strong reasons mentioned in my last, made it my first object to check the further progress of Lord Cornwallis. Some stores at the forks of James River were under the care of the major general, the Baron de Steuben, who had five hundred regulars of the Virginia new levies, and some militia.

Col. Tarlton's legion having pressed for Charlottesville, where the Assembly were sitting, was disappointed in his purpose by proper information being given them. One hundred and fifty arms, however, and a small quantity of powder fell into the enemy's hands.

A detachment under Col. Simcoe said to be four hundred dragoons and mounted infantry, proceeded to the point of Fork, of which the Baron de Steuben received notice. Both his men and stores were transported to the south branch when the Baron marched to Etaunton River. Simcoe threw over a few men which destroyed what stores had been left. He hazarded a great deal, but our loss was inconsiderable.

In the meantime the British army was moving to the point of Fork, with intention to strike our magazines at Albermarle old Court House. Our force was not equal to their defence, and a delay of our junction would have answered the views of the enemy. But on the arrival of the Pennsylvanians we made forced marches towards James River, and on our gaining the South Anna we found Lord Cornwallis encamped some miles below the point of Fork. A stolen march through a difficult road gave us a position upon Michunk Creek, between the enemy and our magazines, where, agreeable to appointment, we were joined by a body of riflemen. The next day Lord Cornwallis retired towards Richmond (where he now is) and was followed by our small army.

I have directed General Steuben to return this way and a junction will be formed as soon as his distance permits.

With the highest regard, &c., &c.

P. S. The following is an extract of a letter just now received from James Barron, Commodore, dated Warwick, 9 miles from Hampton, June 17th, 1781,

"At five o'clock this afternoon anchored in the road from sea, 35 sail of the enemies' vessels; viz: 24 ships, 10 brigs and one schooner, which I take to be the fleet that sailed from hence 13 days ago. Only 4 appear to have troops on board."

TO GENERAL GREENE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Mr. Tyter's plantation, 20 miles from Williamsburg, 27th June, 1781.

SIR,--My letter of the 18th, informed you of the enemy's retrograde movement to Richmond, where they had made a stop. Our loss at the point of Fork chiefly consisted of old arms out of repair and some cannon, most of which have been since recovered.

On the 18th the British Army moved towards us with design as I apprehend to strike at a detached corps commanded by Gen. Muhlenberg, upon this the light Infantry and Pennsylvanians marched under Gen. Wayne when the enemy retired into town. The day following I was joined by Gen. Steuben's troops, and on the night of the 20th Richmond was evacuated. Having followed the enemy our light parties fell in with them near New Kent Court House, the army was still at a distance and Lord Cornwallis continued his route towards Williamsburg; his rear and right flank were covered by a large corps commanded by Col. Simcoe. I pushed forward a detachment under Col. Butler, but notwithstanding a fatiguing march the colonel reports that he could not have overtaken them, had not Major McPherson mounted 50 light infantry behind an equal number of dragoons, which coming up with the enemy charged them within six miles of Williamsburg; such of the advance corps as could arrive to their support, composed of riflemen under Major Call and Major Willis began a smart action. Inclosed is the return of our loss. That of the enemy is about 60 killed and 100 wounded, including several officers, a disproportion which the skill of our riflemen easily explains. I am under great obligations to Col. Butler and the officers and men of the detachment for their ardor in the pursuit and their conduct in the action. Gen. Wayne who had marched to the support of Butler, sent down some troops under Major Hamilton. The whole British army came out to save Simcoe, and on the arrival of our army upon this ground returned to Winsburg. The post they occupy at present is strong and under protection of their shipping, but upwards of one hundred miles from the point of Fork.

I had the honor to communicate these movements to the executive of the state that the seat of government might be again re-established in the capital. Lord Cornwallis has received a reinforcement from Portsmouth.

With the greatest respect I have the honor to be.

TO GENERAL GREENE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Ambler's Plantation, opposite Jamestown, 8 July, 1781.

SIR,--On the 4th inst. the enemy evacuated Williamsburg where some stores fell into our hands, and retired to this place under the cannon of their shipping. Next morning we advanced to Bird's tavern, and a part of the army took post at Norrel's mill about nine miles from the British camp.

The 6th I detached an advanced corps under Gen. Wayne with a view of reconnoitering the enemy's situation. Their light parties being drawn in the pickets which lay close to their encampment were gallantly attacked by some riflemen whose skill was employed to great effect.

Having ascertained that Lord Cornwallis had sent off his baggage under a proper escort and posted his army in an opened field fortified by the shipping, I returned to the detachment which I found more generally engaged. A piece of cannon had been attempted by the van guard under Major Galvan whose conduct deserves high applause.--Upon this the whole British army came out and advanced to the thin wood occupied by General Wayne.--His corps chiefly composed of Pennsylvanians and some light infantry did not exceed eight hundred men with three field pieces. But notwithstanding their numbers, at sight of the British the troops ran to the rencontre. A short skirmish ensued with a close, warm, and well directed firing, but as the enemy's right and left of course greatly outflanked ours, I sent General Wayne orders to retire half a mile to where Col. Vose's and Col. Barber's light infantry battalions had arrived by a rapid move, and where I directed them to form. In this position they remained till some hours in the night. The militia under Gen. Lawson had been advanced, and the continentals were at Norrel's mill when the enemy retreated during the night to James Island, which they also evacuated, crossing over to the south side of the river. Their ground at this place and the island were successively occupied by General Muhlenberg. Many valuable horses were left on their retreat.

From every account the enemy's loss has been very great and much pains taken to conceal it. Their light infantry, the brigade of guards and two British regiments formed the first line, the remainder of the army the second; the cavalry were drawn up but did not charge.

By the inclosed return you will see what part of Gen. Wayne's detachment suffered most. The services rendered by the officers make me happy to think that altho' many were wounded we lost none. Most of the field officers had their horses killed, and the same accident to every horse of two field pieces made it impossible to move them, unless men had been sacrificed. But it is enough for the glory of Gen. Wayne and the officers and men he commanded to have attacked the whole British army with a reconnoitering party only, close to their encampment, and by this severe skirmish hastened their retreat over the river.--

Col. Bowyer of the riflemen is a prisoner.--

I have the honor to be, &e,

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Mrs. Ruffin's, August 20th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL--Independent of the answer to your letter of the 15th, I have been very particular in a second letter intrusted to Col. Moriss. But at this moment wish to send you minuted and repeated accounts of every thing that passes in this quarter.

The enemy have evacuated their forts at Troy, Kemp's Landing, Great Bridge, and Portsmouth. Their vessels with troops and baggage went round to York. Some cannon have been left spiked up at Portsmouth; but I have not yet received proper returns.

I have got some intelligences by the way of this servant I have once mentioned. A very sensible fellow was with him, and from him as well as deserters, I hear that they begin fortifying at York. They are even working by a windmill at which place I understand they will make a fort and a battery for the defence of the river. I have no doubt but that something will be done on the land side. The works at Gloster are finished; they consist of some redoubts across Gloster creek and a battery of 18 pieces beating the river.

The enemy have 60 sails of vessels into York river, the largest a 50 gun ship and two 36 frigates.--About seven other armed vessels, the remainder are transports, some of them still loaded and a part of them very small vessels. It appears they have in that number merchantmen, some of whom are Dutch prizes. The men of war are very thinly manned. On board the other vessels there are almost no sailors.

The British army had been sickly at Portsmouth, the air of York begins to refit them. The whole cavalry have crossed on the Gloster side yesterday evening, a movement of which I gave repeated accounts to the militia there; but the light infantry and main body of the militia are at this place, Gen. Wayne on the road to Westover, and we may form our junction in one day. I keep parties upon the enemy's lines. The works at Portsmouth are levelling. The moment I can get returns and plans l will send them to your Excellency. The evacuation of a post fortified with much care and great expense will convince the people abroad that the enemy cannot hold two places at once.--The Maryland troops were to have set out on Monday last. There is in this quarter an immense want of clothing of every sort, arms, ammunition, hospital stores, and horse accoutrements. Should a maritime superiority be expected, I would propose to have all those matters carried from Philadelphia to the head of Elk.

The numbers of the British army fit for duty I at least would estimate at 4500, rank and file. Their sailors I cannot judge but by intelligences of the number of vessels. In a word this part affords the greatest number of regulars and the only active army to attack, which having had no place of defence must be less calculated for it than any garrison either at New York or in Carolina.

With the highest respect and most sincere affection, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Holt's Forge, September the 1st, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL.--I am happy to inform your Excellency that Count de Grasse's fleet is safely arrived in this bay; it consists of 28 ships of the line with several frigates and convoys a considerable body of troops under Marquis de St. Simon.--Previous to their arrival such positions had been taken by our army as to prevent the enemy's retreating towards Carolina.

In consequence of your Excellency's orders I had the honor to open a correspondence with the French Generals, and measures have been taken for a junction of our troops.--

Lord Cornwallis is still on York river and is fortifying himself in a strong position.--

With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~

Footnote:

1. See answer of Washington, Sparks's Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 156.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp Williamsburg, Sept. 8th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL.--Your letter of the 2d September is just come to hand. Mine of yesterday mentioned that the ships in York river had gone down. Inclosed is the account of an engagement off the capes. What disposition has been made for the internal protection of the bay, I do not know. James river is still guarded, but we have not as yet received any letter from Count de Grasse relative to his last movements. I hasten to communicate them as your Excellency will probably think it safer to keep the troops at the Head of Elks until Count de Grasse returns. Indeed, unless the greatest part of your force is brought here, a small addition can do but little more than we do effect. Lord Cornwallis will in a little time render himself very respectable.

I ardently wish your whole army may be soon brought down to operate.

We will make it our business to reconnoitre the enemy's works and give you on your arrival the best description of it that is in our power. I expect the governor this evening and will again urge the necessity of providing what you have recommended.

By a deserter from York I hear that two British frigates followed the French fleet and returned after they had seen them out of the capes. A spy says that two schooners supposed to be French have been seen coming up York river, but we have nothing so certain as to insure your voyage, tho' it is probable Count de Grasse will soon return.

I beg leave to request, my dear General, in your answer to the Marquis de St. Simon you will express your admiration at this celerity of their landing and your sense of their cheerfulness in submitting to the difficulties of the first moments. Indeed I would be happy something might also be said to Congress on the subject.

Your approbation of my conduct emboldens me to request that Gen. Lincoln will of course take command of the American part of your army; the division I will have under him may be composed of the troops which have gone through the fatigues and dangers of the Virginia campaign; this will be the greatest reward of the services I may have rendered, as I confess I have the strongest attachment to these troops.

With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~

Footnote:

1. See Letter of Washington, Sparks's Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 157. A plan of operations in Virginia at p. 158.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Williamsburg, 10 Sept. 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Gourion is just arrived, he says you may be on your way. We hasten to send to the commanding naval officer in the bay. Hitherto I had no way to write to you by water, but Count de Grasse being at sea we request the officer he has left to have every precaution taken for the safety of navigation. It is probable they are taken, but I would have been too uneasy had I not added this measure to those that have been probably adopted.

I wrote several letters to you; the surprising speedy landing of the French troops under the Marquis de St. Simon; our junction at Williamsburg; the unremitted ardor of the enemy in fortifying at York; the sailing of Count de Grasse in pursuit of 16 sail of the line, of the British fleet, were the most principal objects. I added we were short of flour, might provide cattle enough. I took the liberty to advise James River as the best to land in, the particular spot referred to a more particular examination, the result of which we shall send tomorrow.

Excuse the haste that I am in, but the idea of your being in a cutter leaves me only the time to add that I am, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Camp before York, September 30th, 1781.

My Dear General--You have been so often pleased to ask I would give my opinion on any subject that may occur, that I will this day take the liberty to mention a few articles.

I am far from laughing at the idea of the enemy's making a retreat. It is not very probable, but it is not impossible, indeed they have no other way to escape; and since we cannot get ships at York I would be still more afraid of a retreat by West Point than any thing else. The French hussars remaining here, our dragoons and some infantry might be stationed somewhere near West Point, rather on the north side. I see the service is much done by details, and to use your permission would take the liberty to observe that when the siege is once begun it might be more agreeable to the officers and men to serve as much as possible by whole battalions. Col. Scamel is taken: his absence I had accounted for by his being officer of the day. I am very sorry we lose a valuable officer, but tho' Col. Scamel's being officer of the day has been a reason for his going in front, I think it would be well to prevent the officers under the rank of generals or field officers reconnoitering for the safety of their commands from advancing so near the enemy's lines.

There is a great disproportion between Huntington's and Hamilton's battalions. Now that Scamel is taken we might have them made equal and put the eldest of the two Lieutenant Colonels upon the right of the brigade.

I have these past days wished for an opportunity to speak with your Excellency on Count de Grasse's demand relative to Mr. de Barrass's fleet. This business being soon done, we may think of Charleston, at least of the harbor or of Savannah. I have long and seriously thought of this matter but would not be in a hurry to mention it until we knew how long this will last. However it might be possible to give Count de Grasse an early hint of it in case you agree with him upon the winterly departure of the whole fleet for the West Indies. One of my reasons to wish troops (tho' not in great number) to be sent to Glocester county by way of West Point is that for the first days it will embarrass any movement of the enemy up the river or up the country on either side, and when it is in Glocester county it may be thought advantageous by a respectable regular force to prevent the enemy's increasing their works there and giving us the trouble of a second operation, and in the same time it will keep from York a part of the British forces.

With the highest respect and most sincere affection I have the honor to be, &c.~

Footnote:

1. For a "Plan of the Siege of Yorktown," see Spark's Writ. of Wash. v.8. p. 186.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

November 29th, 1781

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Inclosed you will find some numbers, a copy of which I have kept, and which contains some names that may probably occur in our correspondence. I need not tell you, my dear General, that I will be happy in giving you every intelligence in my power and reminding you of the most affectionate friend you can ever have.

The goodness you had to take upon yourself the communicating to the Virginia army the approbation of Congress appears much better to me than my writing to the scattered part of the body I had the honor to command. Give me leave, my dear General, to recall to your memory the peculiar situation of the troops who being already in Virginia were deprived of the month's pay given to the others. Should it be possible to do something for them it would give me great satisfaction.

I will have the honor to write to you from Boston, my dear General, and would be very sorry to think this is my last letter. Accept however once more the homage of the respect and of the affection that render me for ever--

LAFAYETTE.