Part 5

VIII

"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE"

Logic and defence of Philosophy--Utility of Philosophy and the Philosophy of the practical--Consolation of philosophy, as joy of thought and in the true. Impossibility of a pleasure arising from falsity and illusion--Critique of the concept of a sad truth --Examples: Philosophical criticism and the concepts of God and Immortality--Consolatory virtue, pertaining to all spiritual activities--Sorrow and elevation of sorrow.

FOURTH PART

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

HISTORY OF LOGIC AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Reality, Thought and Logic--Relation of these three terms--Inexistence of a general philosophy outside particular philosophic sciences; and, in consequence, of a general History of philosophy outside the histories of particular philosophic sciences--Histories of particular philosophies and literary value of such division--History of Logic in its particular sense--Works dealing with history of Logic.

THEORY OF THE CONCEPT

Question as to the "father of Logic"--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle --Enquiries as to the nature of the concept in Greece. Question of transcendency and immanence--Controversies in Plato concerning the various forms of the concept--Philosophic, empirical and abstract concepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics, mathematics--Universals of the "always" and those of "for the most part"--Logical controversies in the Middle Ages--Nominalism and realism--Nominalism, mysticism and coincidence of opposites--Renaissance and mysticism--Bacon--Ideal of exact science and Cartesian philosophy--Adversaries of Cartesianism --Vico--Empiristic logic and its dissolution. Locke, Berkeley and Hume--Exact science and Kant. Concept of the category--Limits of science, and Jacobi--Positive elements in Kantian scepticism--The synthesis a priori--Inward contradiction in Kant. Romantic principle and classic execution--Progress since Kant: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel--Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea--Identity of Hegelian Idea and Kantian synthesis a priori--The Idea and the antinomies. The dialectic--Lacunæ and errors in Hegelian Logic. Their consequences--Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher and others--Posterior positivism and psychologicism--Eclectics. Lotze--New gnoseology of the sciences. Economic theory of scientific concept. Avenarius, Mach--Rickert--Bergson and the new French philosophy--Le Roy, and others--Reattachment to romantic ideas, and progress upon them--Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action, etc.: and its insufficiency--The theory of values.

III

THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

Secular neglect of theory relating to history--Ideas upon history in Græco-Roman world--Theory of history in mediæval and modern philosophy--Writers on historical art in the sixteenth century--Writers on method--Theory of history and G. B. Vico--Anti-historicism of eighteenth century, and Kant--Hidden historical value of synthesis a priori--Theory of history in Hegel--W. von Humboldt--F. Brentano--Controversies as to the nature of history--Rickert; Xénopol. History as science of individual--History as art--Other controversies relating to history.

THEORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC

Relation between history of Logic and history of Philosophy of language--Logical formalism. Indian logic free of it--Aristotelian Logic and formalism--Later formalism--Rebellions against Aristotelian Logic--Opposition by humanists and its motives--Opposition of naturalism--Simplicatory elaboration in eighteenth century. Kant--Refutation of formal Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher--Its partial persistence, owing to insufficient ideas as to language--Formal Logic in Herbart, in Schopenhauer, in Hamilton--More recent theories--Mathematical Logic--Inexact idea of language among mathematicians and intuitionists.

CONCERNING THIS LOGIC

Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with Logic of philosophic concept--Its innovations--I. Exclusion of empirical and abstract concepts--II. Atheoretic character of second, and autonomy of empirical and mathematical sciences--III. Concept as unity of distinctions--IV. Identity of concept with individual judgment and of philosophy with history--V. Impossibility of defining thought by means of verbal forms, and refutation of formal Logic--Conclusion.

FIRST PART

THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT, AND THE A PRIORI LOGICAL SYNTHESIS

FIRST SECTION

THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT

Presupposed in the logical activity, which is the subject of this treatise, are representations or intuitions. If man had no representations, he would not think; were he not an imaginative spirit, he would not be a logical spirit. It is generally admitted that thought refers back to sensation, as its antecedent; and this doctrine we have no difficulty in making our own, provided it be given a double meaning. That is to say, in the first place, sensation must be conceived as something active and cognitive, or as a cognitive act; and not as something formless and passive, or active only with the activity of life, and not with that of contemplation. And, in the second place, sensation must be taken in its purity, without any logical reflection and elaboration; as simple sensation, that is to say, and not as perception, which (as will be seen in the proper place), so far from being implied, in itself implies logical activity. With this double explanation, sensation, active, cognitive and unreflective, becomes synonymous with representation and intuition; and certainly this is not the place to discuss the use of these synonyms, though there are excellent reasons of practical convenience pointing to the preference of the terms which we have adopted.

At all events, the important thing is to bear clearly in mind, that the logical activity, or thought, arises upon the many-coloured pageant of representations, intuitions, or sensations, whichever we may call them; and by means of these, at every moment the cognitive spirit absorbs within itself the course of reality, bestowing upon it theoretic form.

Another presupposition is often introduced by logicians: that of language; since it seems clear that, if man does not speak, he does not think. This presupposition also we accept, adding to it, however, a corollary, together with certain elucidations. The elucidations are: in the first place, that language must be taken in its genuine and complete reality; that is to say, it must not be arbitrarily restricted to certain of its manifestations, such as the vocal and articulate; nor be changed and falsified into a body of abstractions, such as the classes of Grammar or the words of the Vocabulary, conceived as these are in the fashion of a machine, which man sets in motion when he speaks. And, in the second place, by language is to be understood, not the whole body of discourses, taken all together and in confusion, into which (as will be seen in its place) logical elements enter; but only that determinate aspect of these discourses, in virtue of which they are properly called language. A deep-rooted error, which springs directly from the failure to make this distinction, is that of believing language to be constituted of logical elements; adducing as a proof of this that even in the smallest discourse are to be found the words this, that, to be, to do, and the like, that is, logical concepts. But these concepts are by no means really to be found in every expression; and, even where they are to be found, the possibility of extracting them is no proof that they exhaust language. So true is this that those who cherish this conviction are afterwards obliged to leave over as a residue of their analysis, elements which they consider to be illogical and which they call emphatic, complementary, colorative, or musical: a residue in which is concealed true language, which escapes that abstract analysis. Finally, the corollary is that if the concept of language is thus rectified, the presupposition made for Logic regarding language is not a new presupposition, but is identical with that already made, when representations or intuitions were discussed. In truth, language in the strict sense, as we understand it, is equivalent to expression; and expression is identical with representation, since it is inconceivable that there should be a representation, which should not be expressed in some way, or an expression which should represent nothing, or be meaningless. The one would fail to be representation, and the other would not even be expression; that is to say, both must be and are, one and the same.

What is a real presupposition of the logical activity, is, for that very reason, not a presupposition in Philosophy, which cannot admit presuppositions and must think and demonstrate all the concepts that it posits. But it may conveniently be allowed as a presupposition for that part of Philosophy, which we are now undertaking to treat, namely Logic; and the existence of the representative or intuitive form of knowledge be taken for granted. After all, scepticism could not formulate more than two objections to this position: either the negation of knowing in general; or the negation of that form of knowing which we presuppose. Now, the first would be an instance of absolute scepticism; and we may be allowed to dispense with exhibiting yet again the old, but ever effective argument against absolute scepticism which may be found in the mouths of all students at the university, even of the boys in the higher elementary classes (and this dispensation may more readily be granted, seeing that we shall unfortunately be obliged to record many obvious truths of Philosophy in the course of our exposition). But we do not mean by this declaration that we shall evade our obligation to show the genesis and the profound reasons for this same scepticism, when we are led to do so by the order of our exposition. The second objection implies the negation of the intuitive activity as original and autonomous, and its resolution into empirical, hedonistic, intellectualist, or other doctrines. But we have already, in the preceding volume, directed our efforts towards making the intuitive activity immune against such doctrines, that is to say, towards demonstrating the autonomy of fancy and establishing an Æsthetic. So that, in this way, the presupposition which we now allow to stand has here its pedagogic justification, since it resolves itself into a reference to things said elsewhere.

Facing, therefore, without more ado, the problem of Logic, the first obstacle to be removed will not be absolute scepticism nor scepticism concerning the intuitive form; but a new and more circumscribed scepticism, which does not question the two first theses, indeed relies upon them, and negates neither knowledge nor intuition, but logical knowledge itself. Logical knowledge is something beyond simple representation. The latter is individuality and multiplicity; the former the universality of individuality, the unity of multiplicity; the one is intuition, the other concept. To know logically is to know the universal or concept. The negation of logic is the affirmation that there is no other knowledge than representative (or sense knowledge, as it is called), and that universal or conceptual knowledge does not exist. Beyond simple representation, there is nothing knowable.

Were this so, the treatise which we are preparing to develop would have no subject-matter whatever, and would here cease, since it is impossible to seek out the nature of what does not exist, that is, of the concept, or how it operates in relation to the other forms of the Spirit. But that this is not so, and that the concept really exists and operates and gives rise to problems, undoubtedly results from the negation itself, pronounced by that form of scepticism which we will call logical, and which is, indeed, the only negation conceivable upon this point. Thus, we can speedily reassure ourselves as to the fate of our undertaking; or, if it be preferred, we must at once abandon the hope which we conjured up before ourselves, and resign ourselves to the labour of constructing a Logic; a labour which logical scepticism, by restricting us to the sole form of representation, had, as it seems, the good intention of sparing us.

Logical scepticism, in fact, can assume three forms. It may affirm simply that representative knowledge is the whole and that unity or universality, whose existence we have postulated, are words without meaning. Or it may affirm that the demand for unity is justified, but that it is satisfied only by the non-cognitive forms of the Spirit. Or, finally, it may affirm that the demand is certainly satisfied by these non-cognitive forms, but only in so far as they react upon the cognitive, that is to say, upon the one admitted form of the cognitive, namely, the representative. It is clear that there is no other possibility beyond these three, either that of being satisfied with representative knowledge; or of being satisfied with something non-cognitive; or of combining these two forms. In the first case, we have the theory of æstheticism (which could also be correctly called sensationalism, if this did not happen to be an inconvenient term, by reason of the misunderstanding which might easily spring from it); in the second, the theory of mysticism; in the third, that of empiricism or arbitrarism.