Part 6

But illumination may fail because the incubation is defective. “We can often get more result in the same time,” says Wallas, “by beginning several problems in succession, and voluntarily leaving them unfinished while we turn to others, than by finishing our work on each problem at one sitting.” The associations come up, as it seems, of themselves, although voluntary effort fails. If waiting is necessary, perhaps another difficulty may meanwhile be attacked.

Or some exercise, like walking, which involves no exceedingly complex mental demands of its own, may arouse the fugitive ideas. Idleness as well has its uses in the incubation of thought. There is such a state as that of being too busy to think. But performing some simple task all day, for instance, operating a sewing machine, need not prevent constructive thinking. The ordinary workingman of today, doing over and over again the same piece of work, is in this respect better off than the medieval laborer who made the whole pair of shoes or the whole cart by himself. If it is in him to think, his thoughts can incubate during his working hours. Moreover, he has a great deal of leisure in which to verify his conclusions or to gather material for thought.

He can read books and magazines and newspapers after he is through with his work. Yet the man who reads much does not necessarily think efficiently. He must leave time for his thoughts to develop and he must acquire the art of reading critically: else his reading probably does him more harm than good.

SOME COMMON FORMS OF STUPIDITY

There is, says H. G. Wells, an “empty gulf in quality between the superb and richly fruitful scientific investigations that are going on, and the general thought of other educated sections of the community.” Graham Wallas points specifically to the lack of perfection in politics, jurisprudence, and economics, as well as to deficiencies in the coördination of biology, physics, politics, and sociology.

That which is truly scientific is precise. Some of the attempts to make the social sciences exact have failed because of undue simplifications. Human behavior is a very complex matter, and it cannot accurately be set forth with any short formula--or with any long formula that is at present available.

The science of psychology, although it is now worthy of the name, is yet loosely established. We must remember that all the sciences are subject to revision. Einstein appears pretty much to have upset the laws of Newton, which have been looked upon with almost religious reverence for tens of decades. When we wish to find the truth, we do not hesitate to attack the errors to which the names of old authorities are attached. Moreover, the man who has the scientific spirit in him recognizes that the truth he discovers is very likely relative, that it may be overturned by another truth-seeker.

Darwin was a great man. Yet the scientists of today, who accept his theory of organic evolution, do not hesitate to criticize his account of the machinery bringing about evolution--that is, natural selection. So it happens that the ignorant can declare Darwinism discredited, with the implication that organic evolution is denied.

Truth which is relative, which is constantly in a state of flux, is hard for the lazy-minded to accept. But scientific truth (which is, of course, erroneous to an indeterminable extent, which probably will never be entirely accurate) is yet infinitely more truthful than any fixed dogmas like those of the theologians. So long as scientific method remains in use and there are eager workers in the field, we can be certain that the truth of the scientists will approach closer and closer to absolute truth.

The warfare of science with theology is not yet ended. Where once the battleground was in the fields of physics and astronomy, now it is in the fields of biology and psychology. When the soul finally goes, what will be left for the ministers? Probably a thin residue of ethical teachings.

At present the clergy are all more or less afraid of the new biological and psychological doctrines. Either they deny them or they attempt to adjust their opinions to them, but they cannot help suspecting attacks upon their vested interests. Worse still, perhaps, would be the uncovering of their own ignorance--an ignorance of great profundity, in some instances.

A great many agnostics dislike to see Christianity attacked because they believe that religion keeps the masses out of mischief. No matter how thoroughly the doctrine of “Whatever is, is right” has been spread, however, there have always been criminals and rebels. There is no evidence available showing that unbelievers are more ready than Christians or Jews or Mohammedans to murder and rob and forge checks.

To set up two standards of truth--one for the “upper” or the more intelligent classes, one for those who are regarded as inferior--is stupid and dangerous. Absolute truth is supposed to be important according to the religious teachings as well as the principles of science. When the members of a congregation suspect the minister’s agnosticism, their own faith is likely to be troubled. When there is a slave morality as well as a separate morality for masters, it must be based upon something more tangible than rewards and punishments after death. It has usually been maintained with the whip.

But in our civilized communities it seems to be necessary to maintain masters and servants without too frequently bloodying backs. I do not wish to set forth the Marxian doctrine that there is a great gulf between the capitalists and the proletarians. Yet it is obvious that some people have power and unlimited luxuries while others go hungry on occasion. It is not mere perversity or stupid ignorance, then--as James Harvey Robinson and others of his school sometimes appear to imply--which causes all sorts of obstacles to be laid in the way of the frank teaching of the social sciences. It is the fear that valuable privileges will be lost.

It does not seem to me that there is any likelihood in the near future of a Bolshevistic revolution in the United States. Those who possess intelligence and the qualities of leadership feel that they cannot be the gainers by any such overthrow. But a feeling that something is being suppressed, that a censorship of ideas exists, if it once gains ground, may cause certain individuals to join the revolutionary movement.

The present capitalistic system, although it is in many ways palpably defective, yet has the merit of working. It is certain that the sudden change to a socialistic, syndicalistic, or anarchistic state would, at least for several generations, bring about famine and a general breakdown in various complex organizations which we consider essential for our civilization and culture. Perhaps we may gradually pass into socialism. A number of paternalistic tendencies (which I, personally, regret) suggest that we are on the way. The importance or lack of importance of the Socialistic Party makes no difference. Just now, when the Unitarian Church is diminishing in importance, all the old doctrines of the Unitarians are being taken over by the religious leaders who call themselves modernists.

But if we are in a transition stage, it is well that we should know what we are doing. Our fears for vested interests and special privileges must not hold us back. All attempts (conscious or unconscious) to make ignorance into a Chinese wall are bound to be futile. That sort of wall is undermined with dynamite before it is erected.

At present, indeed, the free study of sociology seems to mean no more than the liberty to exhibit that reason which justifies the actions brought about by passion. That is, very little intelligence has been brought to bear on the problem of the relations between men. Those who argue have opinions which seem to arise out of their own temperaments, not out of any objective study of the problem. Thus they would justify Hume’s view of reason.

James Harvey Robinson (The Mind in the Making) says: “I mean by social science our feeble efforts to study man, his natural equipment and impulses, and his relations to his fellows in the light of his origin and the history of the race.... Human affairs are in themselves far more intricate and perplexing than molecules and the chromosomes. But this is only the more reason for bringing to bear on human affairs that critical type of thought and calculation for which the remunerative thought about molecules and chromosomes has prepared the way.” He goes on to say in the next paragraph that exact scientific results, like those formulated in mechanics, are “of course” out of the question.

But we have seen that there is no absoluteness about the laws of mechanics. The accepted doctrines of chemistry have been and still are being overthrown to a considerable extent. It may be that two or three centuries from now the laws of sociology will be as exact as those of physics. That is to say, they will be respected until further investigation makes it plain that they must be revised.

Precisely as psychology must be founded upon physiology and biochemistry, sociology must depend upon psychology. Just at present the study of human behavior is in an interesting but somewhat uncertain state. The psychoanalysts, Freud especially, have brought in about as much new matter as was previously contained in the science. Much of it is immediately useful, some of it is worthless or even harmful, a great deal will be found useful when it is digested. In a somewhat different direction, the experimental behaviorists (not all of whom have called themselves by this name) have contributed much to psychology. They, too, have made some assumptions which at present seem to be unwarranted, but they appear to be working in the right direction. The new contributions came just when psychology seemed to be in a hopeless state. The teachers had nothing to offer but definitions, and originality meant either the invention of new words or the use of the old ones in new senses.

Right now we perhaps stand too close to the recent developments to understand their full purport. Yet we are justified in feeling a certain amount of optimism about the future of psychology and consequently about the formation of a genuine science of sociology. Only we must take an open-minded attitude, we must not try to draw conclusions which will justify our prejudices. That amounts to the stupid destruction of unborn knowledge, perhaps also of unborn wisdom. Intellectual abortion is never justified and--at least one would like to suppose so--never permanently successful. It is healthier to think freely, to pursue truth without fear.

After all, we need make no special effort to woo stupidity. It will be only too much with us, despite our best efforts to be intelligent. Those four “idols” or types of error of which Bacon wrote long ago in the Novum Organum still beset the human mind.

The “idols of the tribe” arise out of sensory deficiencies common to all men and women. “The human mind,” according to Bacon, “resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted and distort and disfigure them.”

We may notice in passing that Bacon here takes up definitely the scientific point of view. According to some philosophers, objects have no existence except as the senses bring them to the minds of men. If we were to agree with them, we might not speak of “uneven mirrors” except in the case of those individuals who have sensory deficiencies peculiar to themselves.

These are, to use Bacon’s fanciful term, “idols of the den.” More particularly he applies the term of predilections and prejudices caused by the special trend of an individual’s education or by the emotions under whose sway he at the moment stands. These warping influences are such that we may with Bacon approve the thought of Heraclitus: “that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.”

The “idols of the market” are the errors arising in social intercourse, largely through failure to use words in the same precise sense. Even in spite of the careful definitions set up by men of science, this condition exists. Sometimes, in fact, the scientific definitions aggravate the idols of the market; as in those cases where a word used in ordinary language is also employed for a somewhat different meaning in a field of science.

The “idols of the theater” depend upon the peculiarities of various systems of philosophy. It seems to me that these are largely “idols of the market,” although the errors described by Bacon under the first two heads are also among them.