CHAPTER XVII.. Loose Statements With Regard to the Loss of Life At Sea, and

Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and other matters—“Coffin ships”—Great improvement of our ships and officers in recent years—Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks—Return of lives lost and saved between 1855 and 1873, note—Wreck chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently examined—Danger of too much Government interference—Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat—Causes of loss—More details required—Improvement in lighthouses, buoys, and beacons—Harbours of Refuge—Extraordinary scene in the House of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill, 1875—Another Bill introduced by Government—Its conditions—Unusual personal power granted to Surveyors—Propriety or not, of further legislation considered—Compulsory load-line—Mr. J. W. A. Harper’s evidence—Mr. W. J. Lamport and others—Opinion of the Commissioners—Voluntary load-line—Its value questionable—All ships should be certified as seaworthy—How can this be accomplished?—Opinion of Mr. Charles McIver, note—Registration Associations—Lloyd’s Register, its great importance—Improvement of seamen by better education—Evil effects of advance notes, confirmed by the opinion of the Commissioners—Over-insurance—Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Evidence of other witnesses—Opinion of the Commissioners—Too much legislation already—The necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code, and more prompt punishment in criminal cases—Concluding remarks on the extraordinary progress of British shipping, and the dangers of over-legislation.

Although one or two of the more important questions with which the Commissioners had to deal, cannot be materially advanced without an arrangement with other nations, there are others entirely within our own power. To retrace our steps, therefore, with regard to some of these is as worthy of consideration as to devise any new enactments. But these subjects can only be properly dealt with in a calm and impartial spirit. So many exaggerated statements have been recently made, in and out of Parliament, with reference to the extent of the loss of life caused by men being sent to sea in “coffin ships,” as if such occurrences had no existence except in our own time, and were the creation of a prevailing eagerness to be rich too soon, that it is, above all things, necessary to adhere strictly to facts, in considering further legislation, should such be necessary, and to regulate any measures to be enforced on this subject by such facts alone. Nothing can be more dangerous than legislation founded on sentimental or sensational reports.

But if “coffin ships” still exist, and I fear they do, this cannot arise from lack of legislative enactments. Indeed, the wisdom of Parliament has, for the last quarter of a century, been seriously directed every Session to the improvement of our ships and of their crews. Nor have individual efforts of the most effective and laudable description been wanting to prevent the construction of vessels of an unseaworthy character: while it is not the case, as has been alleged, that, either our ships or the officers by whom they are navigated have deteriorated. On the contrary, they have, within the last quarter of a century, vastly improved in almost every respect. If any of my readers have any doubts on this question, let them refer to the answers to Mr. Murray’s circular of 1843, and to those sent by our consuls abroad to Mr. J. G. Shaw Lefevre’s circular of 1872. It may be that our seamen do not “hand, reef, and steer,” with the same alacrity as they did in the days of our forefathers, simply because such duties are less required now than they were then; but our masters and mates are infinitely superior to what they were a short time since, and in our regular lines of steamers and packet-ships, there are to be found a class of seamen much more sober and steady than could be found in any merchant service twenty-five years ago. Men now exist, who are quite as competent for the duties required of them, as any seamen of the days of Duncan or Nelson, and far more to be depended on for the performance of their duties on board of merchant ships than was the case in my own boyhood, although there are, still, far too many who are inefficient, drunken, and worthless. There are likewise still many ships lost which ought not to be lost, but the assertions which have been made with regard to an increase in the amount of loss during recent years have been greatly exaggerated, as I shall now endeavour to show.

Among the multifarious duties imposed on the Board of Trade, not the least important is that connected with wrecks, casualties, and collisions of ships at home and abroad. For many years, a sort of record had been kept of those casualties, but it is not until 1855, when the duty devolved on the Board of Trade, that we have any reliable statistics.

Of course the number of wrecks, casualties, and collisions reported for any one year, increases or diminishes according to the prevalence or absence of gales of remarkable violence and duration. These sometimes tell in an appalling manner, in the greatly increased loss of life which occurs in one year over another. A Table, copied from the wreck returns of the Board of Trade of 1874, classifies the reports so far as regards the loss of life, showing how far one year has been more disastrous than another; for instance, in 1859-60, the number of lives lost was five times greater than in the previous year, and three times more than in the year following, arising, in a great measure, from the disastrous gale in October 1859 in which 343 lives were lost in the Royal Charter, wrecked on the Anglesea Coast. Again, in 1867-68, nearly double the number of lives were lost than during any year either before or since: in fact, no less than 326 vessels were lost or damaged, and 319 lives sacrificed by tempest, between the 1st and 3rd December inclusive of the former year.

But, though between 1855 and 1873, 13,466 lives were lost on the coasts of the United Kingdom, more than 71,000 lives were saved, during the same period, from the shipwrecked vessels; and, though the duty of a seafaring man is proverbially a dangerous one, and the navigation of our coasts is attended with greater perils than those in any other parts of the world, it is astonishing how small is the percentage of loss either of life or property, when compared with the amount of shipping frequenting our shores.

In the frontispiece to this volume will be found a wreck chart of the British Islands, prepared from the last Board of Trade Returns for the year 1873-4. A red dot signifies a case of total loss; a blue dot signifies a case of partial damage. The first glance of this chart is very appalling; but it becomes less so when we consider the enormous number of vessels annually frequenting our coasts. Many hundreds of vessels at times leave the northern coal ports, alone, in one day; and I estimate that, in the year to which this chart refers, no less than 500,000 vessels of 90,000,000 tons! including their repeated voyages, frequented the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

But, however startling these figures as a measure of the immense number of vessels frequenting our coasts, they affect the mind much less than a glance at the actual facts, the fleets themselves. Until I made a course from the Thames to the Tyne, and saw the sea covered with ships, steamers, and fishing boats, of all kinds and sizes, and saw what an industry even the fishing alone employed, I never had clearly in my own mind a notion of what our mercantile marine really was. Let anyone survey from the fort of Tynemouth and ancient churchyard adjoining—a favourite walk of mine when I represented that borough in Parliament—and see from 200 to 300 ships going out at one tide, or watch the passing ships from Flamborough Head or from the cliffs of Dover, or let him steam through the endless crowd of herring boats off the Scotch coast, and he will have a stronger impression of the magnitude of the mercantile marine of Great Britain than can be derived from the most careful study of all our Blue Books on the subject.

In dealing with this question, it becomes our duty to consider carefully such realities as these. We should not be led astray by a mere glance at the wrecks and casualties which appear on the face of the chart—a chart which has too frequently been used as a picture to alarm the public mind, and induce people, who will not take the trouble to inquire for themselves, to believe that the question of the loss of life and property at sea has not received that consideration from Government or Parliament which its great importance demands.

I have frequently remarked, in the course of this work, that, however great our exertions have been to save human life, more might still be done, but, without all the facts, further legislation, based on general impressions, and still more so on popular clamour (valuable in itself, though but too often deplorable in its results), will prove of the most mischievous character. We must, also, remember that every act fettering free navigation, renders our Shipowners less able to compete with those of other countries, and, if it does not forward the main object in view—the safety of life—must be a clear national loss, because it renders us less able to make our ships a source of profit, a result which, if not carefully watched, might easily be carried to such an extent as to discourage investments in British shipping.

Now if we take the total disasters on our coasts, including trivial accidents, it does not amount to anything like one-half per cent. per annum, and to not three out of every thousand of the vessels frequenting these shores; indeed, when we consider the dangerous character of these shores, the rocks and shoals with which they are surrounded, the storms with which we are visited, the frequency and uncertainty of these storms, and the dense fogs which often prevail, we may, so far from being startled by the sight of the wreck chart, be surprised that the casualties are not far greater. But, to arrive at the true bearing of the case, it is desirable to analyse the disasters. Besides the red and blue dots on the chart, indicative of total loss or partial damage to vessels, I have indicated by similar dots, with a cross above, the number of disasters in the course of the year, which were attended with loss of life. When my readers examine these, they will be still more agreeably surprised. From the Frith of Forth to Spurnhead, a distance of somewhere about 150 miles of the most rugged, unprotected, and dangerous coast in the world, where numerous fleets of vessels are constantly wending their way, and in every description of weather, there were only seven vessels wrecked with loss of life during 1873-4, and two of these were partial losses. In calling attention to this fact, I must remind my readers that, on the part of our coast in question, the most inferior description of vessels, and the most deeply laden, carry on their hazardous trade. If we next cast our eye over the line of coast extending from London to the Lizard Point, and embracing the whole coast of the English Channel, a distance of somewhere about 400 miles, we will see that during the whole of the same year there were only fifteen wrecks with loss of life, and seven of these were partial. Nor is the proportion greater on any other portion of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

But we should do well to inquire still further, and not merely compare the present number of disasters with those of former years, but likewise their extent and character; and, as far as is practicable, the different causes of loss, so as to endeavour to apply, to the best advantage, any further remedies that may be necessary. I have shown that the average loss of life during the three years ending 1835 was 894 per annum, when we owned 2,780,000 tons of shipping; but the loss of life for the year 1873-4, when our Merchant Shipping had increased to 7,294,230 tons, of which no less than 1,825,738 tons consisted of steamers, in which the risk of navigating our coasts is greatly increased, amounted only to 506, of whom 103 were lost in foreign vessels. Many of the remaining 403 were lost on fishing boats, and other vessels not registered under the Merchant Shipping Act. Very material progress towards the saving of life on our coasts has, therefore, been made during the last forty years—a progress which will appear the more striking when I direct attention to the fact, that, while the entrances and clearances of British ships engaged in the foreign trade were, in 1835, not much more than 4,000,000 tons, they had increased to more than 26,000,000 tons in 1873-4. Of the 506 lives lost, 61 were lost in vessels that foundered; 76 through vessels in collision; 200 in vessels that stranded or were cast ashore derelict; and 101 in missing vessels. The remaining 68 lives were lost from various causes, such as by being washed overboard and by other accidents on board. The whole of the above lives were lost in 130 vessels, 87 of which were laden, and 40 in ballast. It is not known whether the remaining three were laden or light.

If we take the last five years from 1869 to 1873-4 inclusive, we find the total number of wrecks and casualties of vessels of every kind, arising from all causes and including collisions, amounted to 8952, giving an annual average of 1791; the average loss of life in these vessels during the five and a half years, including the disastrous half-year 1873, being 755 per annum. Although no return is kept in minute detail of the approximate cause of these disasters, we learn from the wreck register, that in the year 1873-4, 381 were from collisions, and 1422 from wrecks and casualties other than collisions; 346 were wrecks, &c., resulting in total loss; and 1076 partial damage more or less serious. Of the total losses, 128 happened when the wind was at “force 9 or upwards” (a strong gale), and they are classed as having been caused by stress of weather; 93 from inattention, carelessness, or neglect; 30 from defects in the ship or equipments (and of these thirty, 19 appear to have foundered from unseaworthiness); the remainder seem to have arisen from various other causes. Of the 1070 casualties, 525 arose from stress of weather; 180 from carelessness; and 91 from defects in equipments; and the remainder from various other causes. In 1873-4, there were, on or near the coasts of the United Kingdom, 165 wrecks and casualties to smacks and other fishing vessels, which are included in the above returns, and in these, 76 lives were lost, while 195 lives were lost in vessels of the collier class.

These returns are, no doubt, very valuable as far as they go, and have become more so since they were extended to the loss of all British ships, and, where practicable, to the cause of the loss. But the class of the vessel, whether built of wood or iron, and the draught of water when she left her last port, might be added to advantage. Nor should we omit the familiar S.S. to distinguish steam from sailing ships. However, they amply show that no charge can be justly made against either the Government or the Legislature of any dereliction of duty in their endeavours to save the life of all persons who “go down to the sea in ships.” Nor can we charge the people of this country with any callousness or want of sympathy for the seafaring portion of the population. The number of Acts of Parliament passed in recent years, and the grants of public money voted for the purpose of saving life, are an answer to all such charges; while noble private institutions, like the Shipwrecked Mariners’ Society, the Lifeboat Establishments, the Royal Alfred Asylum, besides various other charitable associations for the benefit of seamen, testify in this respect to the liberality of the public.

Nor have the lights, beacons, and buoys on our coast, all tending materially, as they do, to save life, been neglected. On the contrary, while we have greatly reduced the charges, we have increased the number and highly improved the quality of our lights. By the Act passed in 1836, a number of lighthouses, which formed part of the hereditary estate of the Crown and had been allowed to get into the hands of private persons, were transferred to the Trinity House, provision being made for reducing the exorbitant tolls previously levied. By an Act of 1853, the expenditure of the Trinity House on lighthouses, and that of the Scotch and Irish lighthouse boards, was subjected to the control of the Board of Trade, and, since then, the reduction on the charges for lights, buoys, beacons, &c., has been fully 75 per cent. Nor has the question of Harbours of Refuge been overlooked; for, besides the construction of various national harbours, large sums of public money have been advanced at a low rate of interest for the improvement of local harbours, expressly for the benefit of merchant ships and seamen, and these, while facilitating commerce, have, in no small degree, tended to the safety of life and property.

Indeed, so anxious has Government been to rectify any shortcomings in legislation, which might tend to the loss of life, or inflict a hardship on seamen, that the Bill of Mr. Fortescue (now Lord Carlingford), passed in 1873, contained not merely clauses about “load-lines” and “clear sides,” but a provision giving seamen a claim for compensation when, having been detained on a charge of desertion, the ship, upon survey, was shown to be unseaworthy. This Act further contains a provision, strengthening the power of the Board of Trade to detain unseaworthy ships, whereby that “Board are enabled to act of their own accord, and without complaint from without,” the result of which has been that, up to the last return, out of the 474 vessels detained and surveyed by the Board of Trade under this Act, 435 have been on the report of their own officers, and 39 only on complaints made ab extra. To these facts I may add, as having a very important bearing on the opinions I have hitherto ventured to express, that only 24 out of the 474 vessels were detained because they were overladen; and that, out of these, not a single vessel detained was alleged to be overladen on information given by the crews, notwithstanding the encouragement they had to become informers against their employers. This power to detain is extended to cases of overloading and improper stowage or imperfect loading, and the conditional orders of release are of a very elaborate character, while the provisions concerning payment of expenses, and the mode of appeal, are made far more full and explicit.

This Act further gives power to vary the requirements contained in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 with regard to boats—requirements, I may add, which it had been found practically impossible to comply with. It likewise contains a clause, which ought to have been the law long since, making it criminal (though the dictates of humanity, it had been thought, were in themselves sufficient), in a master, after collision with another vessel, not to stand by and render assistance. In the same statute, a code of signals of distress has been adopted and very properly enforced, as well as a general code of pilot signals.

Many losses having occurred from spontaneous combustion of coal on board ship, Government, in 1874, appointed, on the recommendation of Lloyd’s Committee, a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Childers, to inquire into this subject, but this Commission has not yet concluded its labours.

Early in the Session of 1875, the Government introduced another Merchant Shipping Bill, containing various amendments of the then existing law, and among them a special clause which had for its object the abolition of all advance notes. This Bill met with very considerable opposition (partly of a frivolous character), rendering its progress through the House so slow, that Government found it desirable to withdraw it, more especially as the Bill had been materially altered and curtailed in the course of various divisions, especially in the clauses referring to the advance notes and other matters of importance.

When Government intimated its intention of withdrawing the Bill of which they could no longer approve, and which they had not time to pass, a scene arose happily of rare occurrence in the debates of the British Parliament. It was closed, however, with great dignity by the Prime Minister and leader of the Commons. He had introduced such a measure as he no doubt, after grave consultation with his Cabinet, considered necessary and sufficient. The House, and more especially those members of it who were more immediately interested in maritime affairs, and who either approved or opposed the views of Mr. Plimsoll had so mutilated the Government measure, that Mr. Disraeli would no longer be responsible for it. To use his own words, he “declined to deal with the subject in that fragmentary manner,” and no man of prudence or common sense can blame him for the course he adopted under these circumstances.

Unfortunately, however, the popular outcry was so great against the course he had adopted, aroused as this had been for the moment by the well-meaning but rhapsodical protests of Mr. Plimsoll, backed, as they no doubt were, by many really benevolent men, that Mr. Disraeli, in the end, considered it expedient to introduce another Bill, embodying a portion of his own views together with those of the philanthropists. Although this Act contains some necessary and useful provisions, it is not a wise measure, nor can the Government have considered it perfect, as it was hurriedly passed so late in the Session as the 6th of September, and is only to remain in force until the 1st of October 1876.

This Act confirms the powers previously given to persons, specially appointed by the Board of Trade, to detain what they consider unseaworthy ships, without previous orders from the Board, an addition which, however necessary, ought not to have been conceded to any individuals without much further consideration and discussion than it received. This addition opens the door to corruption in its most pernicious and dangerous forms, by giving, as it does, to each one of a great number of subordinate officers, personal authority to detain “unseaworthy vessels,” thus transferring to a single person a power the Board of Trade alone possessed under the Act of 1873, and laying down a principle contrary to all good government, while relieving that Board of its administrative responsibility. Otherwise the Bill contains some useful provisions, and none more so than where it prohibits the carriage of a cargo of which more than one-third consists of grain, &c., unless the grain is secured from shifting by suitable boards or otherwise. But, while this clause may be necessary or right in itself, its meaning may be misconstrued, and it may lead to further and more detailed legislation, making its vague language specific, and calling on Government officers in Foreign ports to enforce its provisions.

The Act also amends the clause in the Act of 1871, which makes the sending an unseaworthy ship to sea a misdemeanour, by providing—

(a.) That criminal liability shall attach to any one who attempts, or is party to an attempt, to send such a ship to sea, and to a master who knowingly takes such a ship to sea.

(b.) That every ship shall have a registered managing owner, and that if she is sent to sea from any port in the United Kingdom in an unseaworthy state he shall be liable, unless he proves that he has done all he can to prevent it.

The Act further provides that every British ship shall be marked permanently with lines on her sides showing the position of her decks.

It also provides that the owner of every foreign-going British ship shall, before clearance outwards from any port in the United Kingdom, mark upon her sides a maximum load-line, and shall insert the distance between this and the deck marks in the entry outwards at the Custom House and in the agreement with the crew.

The Act further stipulates that every contract with a seaman shall imply an obligation on the part of the owner and his agents to use all reasonable efforts to make and keep the ship seaworthy. The effect of this clause is to give the seaman or his family a remedy against the owner. But it does not extend to damage or loss of life caused by the act of a fellow seaman other than the master.

Happily it is not necessary, in reviewing the recent changes in our Mercantile Marine Laws, to notice those personal matters which have unfortunately been raised in the course of their discussion, except to express regret that Mr. Plimsoll in dealing with a subject of such great public importance should have made grave assertions and charges alike against Government and private individuals, too many of which he has not merely entirely failed to prove, but has neglected to withdraw.

Had Government been persistently neglectful of its duty in its endeavours to mitigate the loss of life and property at sea, there might have been an excuse for some of these charges, especially if it had neglected necessary legislative enactments. But such has not been the case. On the contrary, Parliament of late years, while producing some excellent measures, has interfered far too much with the details of the affairs of individuals connected with Merchant Shipping: and, though yielding for the moment to a popular cry, Mr. Disraeli may well have had reasonable doubts whether further legislation might not, so far from lessening, tend to increase those dangers and disasters which must ever attend the navigation of the ocean.

Having, however, officially announced his intention to review the whole subject, and to consider it in all its bearings, I venture to invite the attention of my readers to the more important points now pending. They are: a compulsory load-line, and the production of an official certificate of seaworthiness by all ships before they are cleared at the Custom House.

So far as regards the proposed compulsory load-line, a very competent and intelligent witness who gave his evidence before the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, says, “I think nothing could be more serviceable and nothing more excellent than to obtain and, if it were possible, enforce a load-line; but I also think there is nothing more impossible. A load-line, do what you may, is the opinion of an expert. How can you, by authority, enforce the opinion of an expert? I have had before me,” he continues, “a great many proposals for ascertaining load-lines for ships. Some of them are very ingenious. By the best of them you may get, with considerable accuracy, the cubical displacement of the empty ship, the displacement of the cargo, and so you may arrive at the cubical space left in the ship available for floating. And getting that you get a valuable and useful fact for some objects. But the supreme difficulty remains untouched, viz., What ought the floating capacity to be? I cannot imagine it possible to enforce by any Government intervention a rule which must depend in every individual case upon the opinion of an expert.”

Such, also, was the purport of the evidence of the great majority, if not of all the witnesses examined before the Commission; but I quote that of Mr. Harper, because he is not merely thoroughly competent to offer an opinion on the subject, but is altogether disinterested. Indeed, from the appointment he holds, it would be to his interest to recommend a compulsory load-line, and he would no doubt have done so, had he not thought that any such legislative measure would be likely to aggravate the evils sought to be remedied. In fact, the whole tenor of the evidence is that a fixed load-line would do more harm than good. And such was the opinion of the Commissioners, who state, “that any rule of freeboard founded on surplus buoyancy gives to a vessel of light scantling an advantage over a stronger vessel. Thus the inferior ship would by law be allowed to carry the heavier cargo. Such an enactment would not contribute to the safety of life at sea. From all the evidence we have collected on this subject, we are of opinion that an Act of Parliament enforcing any scale of freeboard would be mischievous.”... “A law presenting such a rule would therefore enhance the perils of a seafaring life.”

Nor can impartial persons who have studied this question arrive at any other conclusion, for as the Commissioners justly add, “There is no general agreement as to a rule by which the requisite amount of reserve buoyancy could be determined, and it appears that, except under definite circumstances, it is not a determinable problem. The proper load-line in each particular case depends not only upon the principal dimensions of the ship, but also upon her form and structural strength, the nature of her cargo, the voyage, and the season of the year.”

The Commissioners, consequently, limited their recommendation so far as regards freeboard to the extent that “every merchant ship should have marked upon each of her sides amidships, a vertical scale of feet downwards from the edge of her main-deck,” and that a note of her draught of water “should be entered in the log after the vessel has received her full load, immediately before the time of her starting on her voyage, which should, wherever practicable, be left with the officer of Customs or with the British Consul, by whom it should be recorded.”

This recommendation was proposed to be carried out in the Government Bill which was withdrawn, but, in the Act now temporarily in force, the provisions are somewhat different. The advantages of either system are problematical. Shipowners will continue, as they have hitherto done, to load their vessels to such draught as they consider prudent, and if one of their vessels is lost, and other persons remark that she was too heavily laden, the answer will either be that the draught was as usual, or that safety in proportion to depth is a matter of opinion depending on many varying circumstances. The mere fact of publicly recording the draught of water would, it is to be feared, have little effect on unprincipled or avaricious Shipowners, against whom alone the law is aimed. Practically, I think the system of marking now in force will be of little or no avail, and that the result will not be as the framers of the law intended. A Shipowner being now required by law to mark upon the sides of the vessel amidships a circular disc 12 inches in diameter, to be so placed that “the centre of the disc shall indicate the maximum load-line in salt water to which the owner intends to load the ship for that voyage,” will perceive that to place the disc only slightly above the usual line of load draught would, on the one hand, fetter him to some extent; while, on the other hand, he would incur no disadvantage by placing it so much higher as to ensure its being well clear of the water under any circumstances of loading. A maximum load-line will, therefore, in practice mean the line down to which the ship will certainly not be loaded. Indeed, from the information I have gained on the subject, the practice with some Shipowners seems already to be that the discs are placed one, two, and in some cases, three and even four feet above the water-line. The mere marking it would, therefore, appear in a great measure worthless, as surveyors will still require to wait until a ship has her cargo on board and is ready for sea, before they can form any opinion as to her safety. Whether it is wise, on the part of Shipowners, to place the disc so far above the vessel’s ordinary water-line as to make it meaningless has been doubted by many, but the fact remains that it is so placed in very many instances. It would, certainly, have been better to have omitted from the clause of the Act I have just quoted the word “maximum,” as few Shipowners would have placed their discs too high if, by doing so, this indicated an intention on their part to overload their vessels.

However, if it can be shown that this new mode of marking the sides of a ship tends in any degree towards the greater safety of life and property at sea, the shipping community, generally, will not complain of the expense and trouble. In all good governments there is a pervading principle to which all classes submit, that the interests of the few must be made subservient to the good of the many, and that, especially where life is at stake, no reasonable trouble or expense should be spared to preserve it. But if, on the other hand, it is found that this system of marking or registering the draught of water is useless, or even injurious, Shipowners will have great cause of complaint against Government for an unnecessary interference with their business, provided they can show that they have made an earnest endeavour to apply the provisions of the Act fairly and in the spirit in which they were framed.

The other important point on which Mr. Plimsoll insisted is of a different character. But to carry it out in the way suggested, or as it was argued in the House of Commons and before the Royal Commission, would be impracticable, and even if practicable, it would be most mischievous: the Commissioners in their Report state the question as follows:—“With the view of providing for the greater safety of life at sea, it has been suggested that the Board of Trade shall superintend the construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the loading of all British Merchant Ships.” Considering the extent of our mercantile marine and the mode in which business must, necessarily, be conducted if we desire to maintain our present high position as a maritime nation, any such suggestion is simply absurd and, if carried into effect, would be most ruinous. That we have already too much legislation in matters of detail the Commissioners themselves admit. Referring to the pernicious effects of inquiry into such matters by Government surveyors on Emigrant ships, they say, and from the evidence before them they would have been justified in expressing their opinion in still stronger terms, “We consider it to be a question worthy of serious consideration, whether, in the case of passenger ships, the certificate of the Board of Trade, so far as regards specific approval, should not be expressly confined to the number of passengers to be allowed, and to the accommodation for their health, comfort, and general security; all questions of unseaworthiness of hull, machinery, and equipment being left to the owners, subject only to a general power of interference in case of danger, sufficiently apparent to justify special intervention.”

I have been unable to ascertain who made the extraordinary proposal, that every ship from the time her keel was laid until she was loaded and ready for sea should be under the superintendence of officers appointed by the Board of Trade. In justice to Mr. Plimsoll I must state that, though I have read his book, and nearly all his speeches, I cannot trace any recommendation that the merchant ships of this country should be placed, either as regards construction, inspection, or repair, altogether, under the control of the Board of Trade or of any other Government department. What Mr. Plimsoll mentions seems to me, to be a matter to which I have often referred in the course of this work, that we do not utilise to anything like the extent we might the vast private resources within ourselves, and that we might do so to advantage, so far as regards the survey of our merchant ships, not one of which he suggests should be allowed to go to sea unless she is seaworthy. Now this is a suggestion which few men would be bold enough to decline to consider, and Mr. Plimsoll points out how this may be secured by means already at our disposal. Perhaps in the way he puts it, the difficulties with which it is surrounded could not be overcome; but the maxim cannot be ignored, as it is sound in principle.

To leave the survey of our ships to any one private institution, not on a sufficiently broad basis, such as Lloyd’s Register, might create as many evils as a general Government survey, and, besides creating jealousy on the part of other somewhat similar institutions or associations, might be considered contrary to the rules of sound government. But these institutions could be enrolled and licensed, as various other associations now are, and empowered to grant certificates of seaworthiness, which every ship above a certain tonnage would require to produce before she was cleared at the Custom House. Or they might be welded into one great national institution directly controlled by all the various branches of the shipping community in harmony with their sentiments, and alive to the wants and necessities always arising through the growth and development of trade and commerce.

Individuals may do wrong, and, though it may be for their interests to have a good sound ship, there is no denying the fact that ships are sent to sea which are not seaworthy; but corporations and associations cannot do wrong with the same impunity. If they did, they would be deprived of their licence, and there would be a check, one against the other, which is not the case with individuals. Or, on the other hand, a great representative institution would be efficiently checked and influenced by public opinion, and the voice of those immediately concerned. Were Government to require these associations to classify ships, then I agree with the Commissioners, that it is not its province “to ascertain whether a ship is fit for the conveyance of dry and perishable goods,” but, from the debates in Parliament, and numerous articles in the public press, it is clear that many persons are of opinion, that it is the duty of Government to be reasonably satisfied that a ship is seaworthy before she proceeds to sea. We exercise this duty in the case of railways, mines, and manufactures of various kinds, and events have shown, however much we may have already done to save life and property at sea, that the exercise of a similar duty, if practicable, is at least worthy of consideration in the case of ships.

As the great bulk of the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom are already classed, the certificate of classification they now hold would suffice as a certificate of seaworthiness. Those which are not now classed in Lloyd’s Register, or in any other association, but which belong to the great steam companies, or to very large shipowners, are so well known for their good qualities as not to require classification, and for this reason classification, or, at least, survey for seaworthiness, even if compulsory, could not be a serious hardship to them.

Practically the number of vessels now unclassed is confined to the very good or to the very bad ships. With the owners of the former I should think there would be no difficulty in dealing; they do not class their ships either because they do not care to incur the expense (underwriters being ready to insure them at the lowest current premiums), or because they think they can construct ships, in their own way, superior to those which are built to rules for classification. But such men, while they might protest, and justly so, against being interfered with in a business they more thoroughly understand than any government or private surveyor, and in which they take a laudable pride (for such men are the pillars of our maritime greatness), would, I doubt not, have no objection to an authorised surveyor inspecting their ships, and would readily pay the moderate fee required to cover the cost of a certificate of seaworthiness.

For the information of the general public I may state that there is a very great difference between the highest grades of vessels and those which any surveyor who knew anything about his business would pronounce to be unseaworthy. In the case of classed ships, the certificate of classification would suffice; but, from the owners of ships who do not class, many intelligent persons are of opinion that a certificate of seaworthiness should be required. They argue, and with great force, that those persons who do not class their ships, because they will not bear inspection, have no right to imperil the lives of others for their own gain. Life is not a thing of price; if it were, the rich would live, and the poor would die. And when a Shipowner declines to bear the expense of making his vessel seaworthy, he places in jeopardy the life of the sailor to benefit himself.

There are very easy means of ascertaining the seaworthiness of a ship, when first sent afloat, already at our disposal, as those of my readers, who are not conversant with this subject, will find by referring to the Appendix, where a history of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping will be found. That association has a well-organised and extensive staff of surveyors, through whom, at a very small cost, this fact could be ascertained. My readers will also there see the immense advantage that association has afforded in the improvement of our ships and the power it possesses of rendering still greater public service. But while rivalry amongst associations for classification is unquestionably injurious, it may not be considered advisable that Lloyd’s Register alone should issue certificates of seaworthiness. There are other similar associations whose certificates would answer the object in view equally well, and it is for Government to decide (should an attempt be made to carry this principle into practice) what associations shall be empowered to issue the requisite certificates.

But while I cannot ignore the principle that no unseaworthy vessel should be allowed to leave our ports, I cannot hide from myself the fact that there would be numerous difficulties (but far from insurmountable) in the way of carrying it fully into practice. It might be argued that if the Board of Trade enrolled the associations named, and, more especially, if it took them under its immediate control, they would in a few years, instead of being private Institutions, be mere servants of the Board, and, through the Board, of a sensational House of Commons. But that argument may be met by the Shipowners saying to the Board of Trade, “We do not wish to be under your immediate control at all. Why should we not be allowed to manage our own affairs, as all other branches of the community now do,—subject, in our case, as in that of all others, to such enactments only as may be necessary for the public safety? We ought to know our own business a great deal better than any of your surveyors can teach us; and, if we think proper to form ourselves into an association, or associations, to manage our own affairs, and if we do what the country requires, why should we be interfered with by the Government as to the manner in which we think proper to build, equip, and navigate our ships, any more than other traders in the management of their affairs? Enrol us, if we think proper to associate, as you do joint-stock concerns or other associations; let us form a board with members elected by the persons interested, such, for instance, as the Metropolitan Board of Works, to manage our own concerns, with specific rules for the protection of the public, which, if we violate, you will punish us as you would do any other class of the community.”

Now, arguments such as these are really unanswerable. Statesmen and others, who have to encounter the harassing difficulties of official life, and who know that all executive power must be exercised by a minister, or by individuals responsible to him, and, through him, to the public, might say, “How are we, unless all ships are under our immediate control, to meet questions put to us in the House of Commons, such as, ‘Whether such and such a society licensed by Government had the folly and audacity to allow of spring safety-valves, or of boats not fitted with Clifford’s Patent?’ or how could we justify a licence granted to an association which showed such flagrant disregard of modern inventions and of seamen’s lives?” But the reply to all this is that it is not the province of Government to legislate on such details as these, any more than it would be to dictate by Act of Parliament, how the details of any other branch of trade or manufacture are to be carried out. The duties of Government have long since been defined, and it is because Government, of recent years, has gone far beyond its duties in the case of Shipowners, that Shipowners complain, and justly complain, against Government for a “meddling and muddling” in matters alike beyond its province and its knowledge.

Reverting to the principle which so many persons now say should be enforced by legislative enactment, the seaworthiness of every ship, there would be great difficulty in carrying that out by Government, as seaworthiness is not definable. That is to say, though a vessel may be seaworthy, when launched, (even then it would depend upon the trade in which she was to be employed), she might not be so at the end of her first voyage, or she might be so for one trade in summer, but not in winter, or with one description of cargo, but not with another; or, in fact, with the same cargo if properly stowed, but not otherwise, and so forth. The details are so numerous that it would be impossible to enter upon them within my limits, and for the same reasons, if the principle is to be carried out, it can only be by the association of competent individuals with the necessary staff under their control, possessing that knowledge which long experience alone can give. I mention these points in case the Legislature consider it necessary to enforce this principle; for, if it is to be carried out, it should be in such a manner as will satisfy the public with the least possible interference with the duties of the Shipowner.

In the meantime I must direct the attention of my readers to the unseaworthiness of too many of our seamen, which is of really greater national importance than the unseaworthiness of our ships. However desirable it may be to make certain, if we can, that no unseaworthy ships shall leave our ports, the incompetency, carelessness, and drunkenness of seamen demand much more seriously our attention; and, as all legislative enactments have hitherto failed to raise them to the requisite standard, we ought to direct our attention more earnestly than we have yet done to their education. If education is necessary on shore, it is still more so with seamen, and yet we have done, practically, nothing, as a Nation, to assist them in gaining knowledge, and, especially, that description of knowledge required in their calling. Indeed, we have not seriously attempted any great practical scheme for their education or for the amalgamation of the services of the Royal Navy and those of the mercantile marine, which, while invaluable to us as a nation, would tend so much to elevate the social position of that neglected portion of their class, who, not having the good fortune to be enrolled in the Navy or on the lists of the large Shipowners, must seek their daily bread at sea in any ship where employment can be found.

On the contrary, we have, in some respects, pandered to their pernicious habits. For instance, when a clause in the first Government Bill of last Session (1875) was introduced to render advance notes illegal, the House of Commons rejected it. From my own experience I can have no hesitation in stating that the system of advance notes (I do not include the allotment notes, which are most useful) tends to lower the character of seamen, promotes intemperance and insubordination, and has been the indirect means of far more disasters at sea than either overladen or otherwise unseaworthy vessels.

Besides, any such system is unknown to any other class of the community. What should we think of a mechanic or house servant who could not enter our service unless we paid him a month’s wages in advance? We should have nothing to say to him—1st, because we should not care to trust our money to a person who, on some frivolous excuse, might decline to repay us by his faithful service; and (2ndly) because we should, naturally, consider anyone requiring such an advance an improvident if not a worthless person. These advances must, necessarily, discourage frugality and prudence; while, in the case of seamen, they most assuredly lead, directly, to intemperance and vice. Nor is there any real occasion for making advances in their case. The mechanic or the house servant may have been for some time out of employment, and, as his wages are paid weekly or monthly, he may not have laid by anything; but, in the case of seamen, their wages are paid at the end of the voyage, often in large sums, and by means of savings-banks and money-order offices, specially established for their use, they have every facility afforded them for retaining their earnings. But they do not. Why? Because the Legislature has encouraged their natural and proverbially improvident habits, by acknowledging a system of advance of wages unknown to any other class of workmen, on which advance they depend for an outfit, after too frequently squandering the wages they had earned on a previous voyage.

But I should prefer my readers considering carefully the Report of the Commissioners on this subject instead of my own views, and therefore I do not hesitate to give these conclusions at length, as a large mass of evidence was brought before them. They, as statesmen and philanthropists, had no object in view beyond the national good, and, more especially, the welfare of the seafaring population.

“The evidence before us leads to the conclusion that the system of advance notes is one great obstacle to the amelioration of the condition of merchant seamen. All the witnesses whom we have examined admit that the system is most pernicious, but it is defended on the ground that, without this advance, the sailor could not pay for his lodging on shore, or procure the clothes requisite for him when he joins a ship.

“In practice it seems that the advance note is handed over to the lodging-house keeper, not usually in exchange for cash, but in discharge of debts which the sailor has been induced to incur. The lodging-house keeper charges a heavy discount, and the sailor is frequently brought on board half-clad and intoxicated.

“Shipowners and captains of merchant ships concur in stating that a large portion of the ship’s crew is very often brought or even lifted on board in a condition of helpless drunkenness, that the vessel must often be detained for twenty-four hours in order that the men may be so far recovered as to be able to get her under weigh, and that there is great risk of life and property at the commencement of the voyage from the consequent inefficiency of the seamen.

“The advance note is not payable until some days after the sailing of the ship; but if the ship then puts back or touches at another port, the seaman often takes the opportunity of making some complaint, in order to get free from his engagement, and will even incur a month’s imprisonment with this object, whilst the Shipowner or the person who has cashed the note loses the money which has been paid in advance.

“It is said that if there were no advance note, the crimp in a foreign or colonial port would not have the same inducement to entice the sailor to desert.

“After careful consideration of the numerous evils attending this mode of prepayment, we recommend that advance notes should be declared illegal, that no payment or order for payment made in advance for wages shall be a discharge for the payment of any portion of a seaman’s wages when due, and that no money paid by a Shipowner to or for a seaman shall be debited to the seaman, except wages already earned, the allotment notes, and the cost of such supplies as the seamen may receive after joining the ship.

“There will be some inconvenience felt at first from the abolition of the existing system of advance notes, and there will be perhaps considerable opposition to the change in the ports, and amongst the lodging-house keepers, who profit by these notes. We feel, however, convinced that unless this mischievous mode of payment be discontinued, the seamen will never be raised from their servile dependence on crimps, and taught to rely on their own industry and intelligence.”

But there is a question of quite as great importance to which I shall again have occasion to refer when I review the history of our steam companies, and show the remarkably small amount of loss that some of them have sustained through the system and order prevailing on board their vessels. There we shall see how losses are prevented. In the meantime, we should do well to inquire how losses are encouraged by allowing policies of insurance to be effected for a greater amount than the value of the ship or the cargo she contains.

A contract of marine insurance is in its essence a contract of indemnity, and the spirit of the contract is violated if the assured can make the occurrence of a loss the means of gain. But the law has allowed a very considerable deviation from this fundamental principle. Mr. T. H. Farrer, in his evidence, happily illustrates this in the case of a ship with a chartered freight, bound from London to Calcutta and back. He supposes her to be lost on her outward passage in the Bay of Biscay. Presuming that the owner only insured her prudently and not exorbitantly, he would recover in this case not merely the value of the ship at the commencement of the voyage, but also the freight of the outward and homeward voyages, while he would be exempted from paying the seamen’s wages from the date of the disaster, the expenses necessary to carry his ship to Calcutta, to remain there, and to return on her homeward passage, so that he would be, actually, a very considerable gainer by the loss. Nor is the matter less flagrant in the case of valued policies, when the value of the property is fixed by agreement beforehand between the assured and the underwriter. The effect of this, as the Commissioners justly remark, is, “that unless the policy is altogether void, on account of fraud, or the concealment of a material fact, the assured can, in the case of a total loss, receive the value which has been stated in the policy, however much it may exceed the actual worth of his property.” In confirmation of their opinion, they add “that, in certain decided cases, the Shipowner has been allowed to recover 50 and even 100 per cent. more than the actual value of his vessel.”

Various witnesses recommended that, in case of a total loss, the underwriter should be allowed to question a valued policy, when he considered that the value had been overstated; but many Shipowners and underwriters objected to this proposal, contending that, where a value had been agreed on between the Shipowners and underwriter, subsequent interference would be mischievous or futile, as it might induce Shipowners to insure abroad. It was contended that the value of a ship might depend on a variety of circumstances; for instance, the loss of a steamer to a Shipowner, about to start a new line of steam communication, would be inadequately replaced by the cost of the vessel, though estimated values of this sort are very problematical.

As regards insurance of freight, it was further suggested that the Shipowner should not, in case of total loss, be entitled to recover his freight, without deducting the expense saved to him by reason of the loss of the vessel. On the other hand, it was alleged that the necessity of estimating these uninsured expenses would give rise to doubt, difficulty, and litigation, and that, if the suggestion were adopted, the Shipowner would be to a great extent deprived of the legitimate advantage he now enjoys of being able to obtain with facility an advance on his freight.

After carefully considering all these matters, the Commissioners arrived at the conclusion that they ought not to recommend any alteration of the law with regard to valued policies in cases of total loss, as there were weighty reasons against any interference on the part of the Legislature with contracts made by persons capable of taking care of their own interests, without carefully ascertaining the effect this interference was likely to produce on the entire system of law relating to such contracts. But they were of opinion that the “whole system of insurance law requires complete revision, for not only does it allow the assured, in some cases, to recover more than the amount of the loss actually sustained by him, but it also, on the other hand, deprives him of an indemnity in cases in which he ought to be protected by his insurance.”

The Commissioners, however, with great force, remark, that “a complete and thorough revision of our laws relating to marine insurance is a task of equal importance, difficulty, and delicacy, requiring evidence of an extensive character, and necessitating a very lengthy and careful investigation, and it touches directly on so many subjects unconnected with the security of life at sea, on which it has only an indirect and somewhat remote bearing, that we do not think it properly falls within the scope of our commission. We should also have been reluctant to undertake the complete revision of our system of marine insurance law, because, for many reasons, it appears to us to be important that, before such a task is undertaken, an attempt should be made to induce foreign nations to concur with us in framing and adopting a general code of insurance law. To alter the English law of marine insurance to any considerable extent, might have the effect of throwing the business of insurance into the hands of foreigners, and there is so much insurance of foreign property in England, as well as of English property abroad, that it is most desirable that the law of insurance should, as far as possible, be the same among all commercial nations. An examination of the foreign codes leads us to hope that there would be found no insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining this important object.”

Although the Commissioners do not at present recommend any alteration to be made in the law relating to valued policies, they think that the Shipowner should not be able to recover his insurance, whether under a time or voyage policy, in cases where it is shown that he or his agent had not done everything reasonably within their power to make and maintain the ship in a seaworthy condition, where that unseaworthiness occasioned the loss. They further consider that the Shipowner’s liability for damage to property or person should be unlimited in cases involving the death of the seaman or the damage to person or property. They are also of opinion that the present system by which insurance cases are tried before a judge and jury is altogether unsatisfactory, as a single judge and two assessors would constitute a far better tribunal. In conclusion, they recommend that the Marine Department of the Board should be revised and strengthened by having a legal adviser exclusively attached to it (a recommendation which has been since carried out). “It will,” they remark, “be the duty of the Board of Trade to check the negligent and to punish the culpable shipowner, but it is desirable that these functions should be performed without harassing the great body of Shipowners, who, by their ability and indefatigable energy, have contributed to the prosperity of the empire.”

I have now endeavoured to give as succinct an account of the whole course of the maritime legislation of the British Empire and its effects upon ships, seamen, and commerce as my space will permit, from the earliest period up to the close of the year 1875. Although it is not the province of an historian to enter upon controversial questions, much less to dive into the future, yet history is of little value unless we can gain knowledge from the past which can be made useful hereafter. I may therefore be permitted to close this volume with a few remarks on the subject of further maritime legislation, especially as the subject is one to which an unusual amount of public attention has been devoted during the last two or three years, and as it has been, officially, announced that it will be again dealt with by Government in the ensuing Session of Parliament.

Shipowners say that there is far too much legislation already, and I certainly agree with them; but when they charge the Government as they do, and especially the Board of Trade, or rather Mr. T. H. Farrer, as its permanent Secretary, with forcing all this over-legislation upon them, I must remind them of the facts. What Government did, and did wisely and well, as I have endeavoured to show, was to frame such mercantile marine laws as had become essential after the repeal of the Navigation Laws. The laws then passed have, unquestionably, been of great service, not merely to the nation, but to Shipowners themselves. Having completed all that was considered necessary, Government directed its attention to the amendment, as cases for its necessity arose, and to the consolidation of existing laws; and I can, of my own knowledge, state that Mr. Farrer has, since then, opposed all further legislation which had for its object the interference with the details of a Shipowner’s duty. But the House of Commons would not allow Government to rest with its good work. “Independent members” of that House, actuated by various motives, some of them not very clearly defined, commenced to “amend” (?) in their own way, these laws (see Hansard’s ‘Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings’), by proposing numerous fresh clauses and fresh Bills which, if Government had not resisted, would most likely have doubled the existing number of the mercantile marine statutes. They next commenced to introduce Bills of their own, to teach Shipowners how to construct and equip their vessels. Among the first of these measures was the Act to test chains and anchors, introduced by Sir J. D. H. Elphinstone and the late Mr. John Laird. So far from that Bill receiving the approval of Government, when I moved its rejection, was strongly supported by Mr. Milner Gibson, the then President of the Board of Trade. We were, however, defeated, and the Bill passed and became law.

Encouraged by this success, other independent members followed, and, since then, most of the measures connected with the mercantile marine of this country have been forced upon Government either by Bills introduced by individual members, or by questions asked, or by deputations from interested constituencies, or “philanthropists,” who, however good in their intentions, are, too frequently, mischievously ignorant of the subjects they force upon the attention of Parliament. No one of my readers conversant with these matters can say that the Bills of the last three or four years, except so far as necessary amendments, were Government measures. They were nearly all forced upon the executive, while the only real and valuable measure of Government, the consolidation and codification of existing laws, has been, Session after Session, rejected, or, at least, “shunted” aside by the House of Commons.

For more than two centuries we attempted to regulate our maritime commerce by means of the Navigation Laws and their innumerable additions and amendments, the fallacy of which I have endeavoured in these volumes to expose; yet we are now following the same course our forefathers adopted by attempting, by means of a library of Mercantile Marine Laws, to regulate the details of the business of our Shipowners. Commerce, in all its branches, flourishes most when left alone. Leave our Shipowners alone, except when they do wrong. Leave them to manage their own affairs in such a manner as they consider most conducive to their own interests, and we may rest assured that, if they have a fair and free field and no special favours, they will maintain, against all nations, the maritime supremacy of England.

My advice, therefore, to the House of Commons, if an old member may venture to give it, would be to do nothing next Session in the way of fresh legislation, but to confine itself to necessary amendments, and to the codification of existing laws, so that Shipowners may have one law for their guidance; at present they are bewildered by the numerous fragmentary laws now in force. But, in addition to whatever reorganisation and changes may be found necessary, increased facilities would still seem requisite for the immediate payment of seamen’s wages on their discharge; and, though the mode of inquiry into the causes of the loss of life and property at sea has already been altered, greater rigour is still demanded for such inquiries, and more prompt means of detecting and punishing persons who ignorantly or negligently lose the vessels in which they serve. In cases of wilful loss, which I hope and believe are of rare occurrence, the law cannot be too prompt, too stringent, nor too severe. A man who wilfully loses his ship, I rank without hesitation with the “villain and the murderer.”

Nor should I have much more mercy on the Shipowner who recklessly loses his ship, or who is accessory to her loss; and I should subject to punishment, though in a different and more modified form, any Shipowner who, either ignorantly or negligently, sends his ship to sea in an unseaworthy state. In these matters, the law is still open to improvement, both as regards greater facilities for the discovery of crime and its prompt punishment, arising, as this does, in no small degree, from its too complex character.

Although the Shipowner is now made liable for criminal neglect, and cannot, by contract, relieve himself from this liability, such neglect is difficult of proof, and a jury deciding against a Shipowner on a question of damages, may, often, hesitate to make him criminally responsible. If it were possible to enforce this liability in all cases where guilty; if every Shipowner were made to feel that the proper construction, equipment, loading, manning, and navigation of his ship were matters to which it was his duty to attend, and if these duties were enforced, it would produce much more salutary effects in the way of saving life and property at sea than any Government surveys with a legion of inspectors at their back: each one of these relieves the Shipowner from a duty which belongs to him alone, and relieves, or, at the least, might relieve, him from a part of his responsibility; for if, as in the case of compulsory pilotage, a Shipowner is relieved from responsibility in case of accident, he cannot, in common justice, be held criminally liable when he has acted in conformity with such laws as have been passed for his guidance and control.

Whether it would be possible, as has been recommended, to establish by positive enactment an absolute and indefeasible obligation on the part of every Shipowner to his shippers, passengers, and underwriters, that he and the agents to whom he trusts his ships, shall do all in their power to make and keep his ship seaworthy, is a problem I am not, at present, prepared to solve; moreover, it raises numerous questions of great difficulty and delicacy.

Some amendments may be, also, required in the tonnage and measurement law, which, though, as I have already explained, now a vast improvement on any previous law, still presents features of hardship alike on Shipowners and seamen, as, in the case of the latter, frequent instances occur where the law is evaded by the stowage of cargo or stores in spaces appointed by the present Act for the accommodation of the crew.

Such are the leading measures which may still require the attention of the Legislature; but, before closing my remarks, I desire my readers to recollect the existence of a Merchant Shipping Code, which has not yet become law. It embraces all the laws relating to Merchant Shipping, and if the First Minister would take up this Bill and amend it in detail, he would not merely confer a boon on the largest shipping community the world has ever seen, but one by which his name would be long remembered.

If the Legislature did nothing else during the ensuing Session, it would be a Session well spent: ten clear sittings would, however, suffice, if there was a determination on both sides of the House to allow no party spirit to interfere. Nor should any such feeling be displayed, for the questions now to be considered are almost wholly of an executive and not of a political character; while all the materials are now ready, the lengthened inquiries and discussions to which almost every point except insurance (and on this there must be further inquiry before there is any legislation) has been already subjected, render further discussion, in a great measure, unnecessary.

I have endeavoured to show how much progress has been made during the last quarter of a century—a progress eminently due to the repeal of our Navigation Laws and to many of the earlier measures of the Board of Trade, in confirmation of which I may point to the magnificent ships now produced, to the enormous extent of our mercantile fleets, as compared with those of all other nations, and to the superiority of our officers to what they were before the repeal of the Navigation Laws.

There is, nevertheless, a wide and noble field in which the statesman might employ his power and genius to great advantage, and earn for himself an imperishable name. The means are now in a great measure at his disposal. But he must decide between two principles. He must not, on the one hand, give way to the question of sentiment or to the popular cry that merchant ships and their cargoes shall be under Government survey, and, at the same time, hold Shipowners responsible for acts which legislation has placed beyond their control. If he adopts the former course, he must double or treble the existing staff of officials; but I venture to warn him that, in so doing, he will place a canker-worm at the root of our maritime greatness, which will as surely destroy the mighty fabric we have raised by individual genius, energy, and skill, as ever did the “dry rot” in our wooden ships of war and commerce.

Seeing what our Shipowners have already accomplished, he might to advantage afford them facilities for self-government. The means, as I have shown, are already at his disposal. We have Lloyd’s Register, with its large staff of competent surveyors ready to aid, at our disposal, as also a similar association in Liverpool. We have mercantile marine boards, elected by popular constituencies, at all the leading seaports in the kingdom, under whose supervision the shipping officers are now placed, as well as the examination of all masters and mates. Leave them as they are; but, as I understand that these boards are not overburdened by the duties now devolving on them, could not their duties in relation to the crews be extended and some arrangement be made whereby these different institutions, formed into one, two, or more central and district boards, might perform all the work of detail now required by Parliament? By some such amalgamation everything the country requires could be done more economically and efficiently than at present.

Lloyd’s Registry now tests all anchors and chains as required by Parliament, without any disturbance of their functions or the work for which they were originally constituted, the voluntary classification of ships. Why should we not place in their hands such duties connected with the ship herself as the regulation of load-lines, certification of seaworthiness, if found expedient, and the supervision of all matters of detail which Parliament may consider necessary, in the construction, equipment, loading, and navigation of our ships? All these matters would be much better done by a popularly elected board chosen from merchant Shipowners and underwriters than by any Department of the Government. In their hands might be safely placed the appointment of surveyors: one Department of this new Board attending to the hull of the ship, the other to her navigation, as at present; all these matters being subject, of course, to such regulations as Parliament might consider it expedient to impose, and represented in Parliament by the President of the Board of Trade, or, in lieu thereof, by a Secretary of State for Commerce, should that be desirable.

I merely throw out these remarks for consideration, being aware that many obstacles, though few real difficulties, would require to be overcome in carrying out some such re-organisation as I venture to suggest. But whatever changes Ministers may consider most expedient to adopt, they must not lightly tamper with the merchant fleets which the skill and genius of our people have created, or with the position they have achieved since relieved from those legislative enactments, by which they were bound for more than two centuries. These fleets are now the largest, and unquestionably the finest, in the world, and instead of foreigners overstocking our own ports as was prophesied, we now conduct the greater portion of the maritime commerce of foreign nations. It is, therefore, no idle boast to say, that while the sun never sets on the dominions of our Queen, there is no ocean, no sea, and, I might add, were it not for the exclusive policy of the United States and of France, with a few other insignificant exceptions, no lake, no river, where the British flag is not unfurled, and where it does not shed its civilising and beneficial influence, over many peoples of varied tongues, who might otherwise still be living in darkness, if not in barbarism.

It behoves, therefore, our Statesmen to take care how they deal with this great interest—made great by the freedom of our laws and by the energy of our people; and, whatever further legislation may be necessary, it is seriously to be hoped that Government will confine its measures to their legitimate object; viz. the clear definition of the legal duties and responsibilities of Shipowners, the maintenance of lighthouses, buoys and beacons on our coasts, the general regulations necessary for the proper conduct of maritime commerce, the investigation into the true cause of all accidents at sea, and the prompt punishment of all persons who wrongfully and wilfully violate the law.

FOOTNOTES:

This term had its origin in the early part of the present century, when so many of H.M.’s 10-gun brigs, employed in carrying the mails, or on other short services, were lost, especially on their Atlantic voyages, that they got the name of “coffins.”

See Appendix, No. 13, p. 634, where a list will be found of the different Acts of Parliament which have been passed relating to merchant shipping since 1849.

See ‘History of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping,’ Appendix, No. 12, p. 624.

See ante, vol. iii. pp. 48 and 50.

See Parl. Paper C. 630, 1872.

+---------------------------------------------------+ | WRECKS, &C., OTHER THAN COLLISIONS IN THE | | UNITED KINGDOM. | +-------------+-----------+----------------+--------+ | Year. |Total Loss.| Partial Damage.| Total | +-------------+-----------+----------------+--------+ | 1856 | 368 | 469 | 837 | | 1857 | 384 | 482 | 866 | | 1858 | 354 | 515 | 869 | | 1859 | 527 | 540 | 1,067 | | 1860 | 476 | 605 | 1,081 | | 1861 | 513 | 658 | 1,171 | | 1862 | 455 | 695 | 1,150 | | 1863 | 503 | 830 | 1,333 | | 1864 | 386 | 653 | 1,039 | | 1865 | 470 | 832 | 1,302 | | 1866 | 562 | 876 | 1,438 | | 1867 | 656 | 1,020 | 1,676 | | 1868 | 527 | 841 | 1,368 | | 1869 | 606 | 1,047 | 1,653 | | 1870 | 411 | 730 | 1,141 | | 1871 | 398 | 826 | 1,224 | | 1872 | 439 | 1,110 | 1,549 | | 1873 }| | | | |Jan. to June}| 212 | 522 | 734 | | +-----------+----------------+--------+ | Total | 8,247 | 13,251 | 21,498 | +-------------+-----------+----------------+--------+

Annual average of 17 years, 472-11/17 total wrecks, and 748-13/17 casualties resulting in partial damage.

Note.—In the above statistical statement no earlier date than 1856 is taken, as the machinery had not in 1855 being sufficiently organised to ensure that nearly all the wrecks, &c., in that year were reported; and there is reason to believe that some may not have been reported in the years 1856, 7, and 8.

The following table shows the number of lives saved, and the number of lives lost on and near the coasts of the United Kingdom, 1855-1873.

-------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------- | LIVES SAVED. | +------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+ Year. | By |By Rocket,|By Luggers,|By Ships| By | By | By | Total | | Life |and Mortar| and | and | Ships’ |Individual| other | Lives | |Boats.|Apparatus,|Coastguard | Steam | own |Exertion. | means. | Saved. | Lives | |Lines, &c.| and other | Boats. | Boats. | | | | Lost. | | | Boats. | | | | | | -------+------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+-------- 1855-6 | 336 | 499 | 1351 | 489 | | 22 | | 2,697 | 485 1856-7 | 634 | 383 | 606 | 587 | | 21 | | 2,231 | 521 1857-8 | 120 | 149 | 683 | 244 | | 17 | | 1,213 | 539 1858-9 | 220 | 154 | 878 | 622 | | 16 | | 1,890 | 353 1859-60| 367 | 407 | 681 | 769 | 951| 9 | | 3,184 | 1,647 1860-1 | 771 | 415 | 467 | 858 | 1,499 | 14 | 362| 4,386 | 537 1861-2 | 322 | 415 | 371 | 919 | 1,425 | 27 | 396 | 3,875 | 884 1862-3 | 291 | 252 | 414 | 1,319 | 1,289 | 9 | 531 | 4,105 | 690 1863-4 | 472 | 256 | 424 | 1,533 | 1,465 | 10 | 439 | 4,599 | 620 1864-5 | 293 | 347 | 338 | 1,003 | 1,459 | 22 | 232 | 3,694 | 516 1865-6 | 480 | 490 | 462 | 1,000 | 2,195 | 7 | 374 | 5,008 | 698 1866-7 | 378 | 527 | 385 | 986 | 2,728 | 13 | 765 | 5,782 | 896 1867-8 | 377 | 310 | 843 | 1,060 | 1,902 | 6 | 660 | 5,158 | 1,333 1868-9 | 504 | 333 | 317 | 719 | 2,062 | | 561 | 4,496 | 824 1869-70| 532 | 354 | 383 | 714 | 2,067 | 8 | 443 | 4,501 | 933 1870-1 | 473 | 203 | 500 | 1,062 | 2,795 | 2 | 459 | 5,495 | 774 1871-2 | 403 | 293 | 265 | 990 | 1,737 | | 245 | 3,933 | 626 1872-3 | 548 | 715 | 582 | 647 | 1,888 | 6 | 388 | 4,774 | 590 -------+------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+-------- Total | 7521 | 6502 | 9950 | 15,522 | 25,462 | 209 | 5855 | 71,021 | 13,466 -------+------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+--------

The figures in this column show the number of lives lost between the 1st January and 31st of December in each year. The number of lives lost during the first six months of 1873 is 728.

No record kept for former years.

We expended between 1555 and 1873 143,660l. (see ‘Wreck Returns, 1874,’ p. 11) in providing apparatus for saving life, and in rewards to individuals as well as awards of the National Lifeboat Institution (apart altogether from the efforts of that noble Society, about which see ante, note, p. 315), and Her Majesty was graciously pleased (12th April, 1867) to issue her warrant instituting two decorations, the “Albert Medal of the first class,” and the “Albert Medal of the second class,” to reward brave men, who have been conspicuous for saving life at sea or on the coast.

The total number of vessels and their tonnage, including their repeated voyages, that entered and cleared at the ports in the United Kingdom with cargoes and in ballast from and to foreign countries and British possessions for the year 1873 was 130,075, of 44,439,986 tons; the entrances and clearance coastwise with cargoes only, 332,148 vessels, of 40,632,014 tons. If I add to these the coasters in ballast and those with the description of cargo of which no note is taken at the Customs, as also the vessels frequenting the Channel, and bound for Hamburg, Bremen, and the Northern ports of Europe, which do not enter any of the ports of the United Kingdom, of which no return is kept, it will be found that I have not over-estimated the number which now annually pass along or frequent our coasts.—‘Navigation and Shipping of the United Kingdom for the Year 1873.’ Presented to Parliament, 1874.

This point involves many grave questions. Happily, men do not altogether live for the purpose of making money—they have other and far nobler objects in view. Some, indeed, but they are rare and grand characters, live altogether for the benefit of mankind and the progress of the human race. There are others who follow a business or profession, not altogether because it yields them profit, but because it affords them pleasure. Such is the case to a large extent in this country. We are a seafaring people, and we pursue occupations in connexion with it frequently as much for pleasure as for profit. We enjoy the business of Shipowners, because it is natural to us, and we take a delight in improving the forms of our ships. I have seen a captain whose heart was in his ship, caress her!—yes, caress her, by clapping the taffrail where he stood when she was performing her work to his satisfaction, as if she had been a living thing, and heard him exclaiming, “Go a-head, my beauty!” just as many persons may have been heard extolling the performance of a favourite horse. Care must, therefore, be taken not to interfere by unnecessary legislative enactments with what is not merely our business but our pride and pleasure, or we may be driven, to the serious loss of the nation, to seek other investments for our capital. We have now arrived at that point where competition has become so close that if we tax our Shipowners to any greater extent than they are now taxed, directly or indirectly (interference with their affairs is the heaviest as well as the most obnoxious of all taxes), we shall most assuredly drive their ships from the trades in which they are now engaged, or compel them to submit to the humiliation of seeking a Foreign register, and hoisting a Foreign flag.

See ante, p. 465.

The year previous to 1873-4 was a much more disastrous one than the year before it, as there were 728 lives lost in the six months ending 30th June, 1873, which is in some measure accounted for by the wreck of the ship Northfleet, when 293 lives were lost.

See Parl. Paper, 214, 1875, pp. 4 and 11.

As it has often been broadly stated that employment in British ships is much more dangerous now than it was in 1836, when the first Committee sat to inquire into the cause of shipwrecks, I may reply that the most careful analysis shows that, while the losses were then on the average of the three previous years 3·72 percentage of the number of vessels (or rather of their tonnage) employed, they were for the three years previous to 1873 only 2·95 per cent., although these years were exceptionally fatal to ships laden with timber, grain, and coal (see Appendix to ‘Commission on Unseaworthy Ships,’ pp. 780 and 791), arising from the enormous increase in the oversea trade of these articles. For instance, while in 1861, 57,745,993 cwts. of corn were imported, the imports in 1872 amounted to 97,765,298 cwts. The imports of timber rose between the same periods from 3,358,589 to 4,949,786 loads; and the oversea exports of coals from 7,934,832 in 1861 to 13,198,494 tons in 1872.

Lighthouses, 6 & 7 Wm. IV. cap. 79.

Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 16 & 17 Vict. cap. 131.

Merchant Shipping Act, 36 & 37 Vict. cap. 85.

Parl. Paper, C. 1152, 1875.

However beneficial in its results, it may well be questioned if any body of surveyors ought to be empowered at their pleasure, without complaint, to thus retard trade and stop the ordinary course of commerce; and I am disposed to question alike the policy and the wisdom, as well as the necessity, of this regulation. There appear to be now employed in these questionable operations, no less than 117 Government surveyors, “shipwrights,” and “engineers,” stationed at different ports in the United Kingdom, twelve of whom are retired officers of the Royal Navy, besides a good many so-called “shipwrights,” who can have very little knowledge of the construction of merchant ships or of their requirements. In making these appointments, the fact seems to have been overlooked that, at all our ports, there are the surveyors of Lloyd’s Register, or of other similar associations, whose services might have been utilised with a great saving of public expenditure, and with, perhaps, greater efficiency. Yet I read, to my astonishment, in the public journals not long since a letter (6th August, 1875) from Mr. Plimsoll, addressed to the President of the Board of Trade, in which, among much irrelevant matter, he urgently recommends eighteen more surveyors to be appointed by Government, at a salary of not less than 1000l. per annum. I sincerely trust no such appointments will be made; but that Government will direct its attention to other more economical and more efficient modes of removing the evils of which Mr. Plimsoll complains, if indeed they exist at all to the extent alleged. There is no use hiding the fact that all such appointments must be filled, in a great measure, through patronage, and that it would be impossible to find men, even at the tempting salary named, competent for the numerous technical and responsible duties that would be required of them. But if such men could be found, are we to hand over the whole of the vast maritime interests of this country, from the time the keel is laid to the despatch of the ship to sea, to the supervision and control of a certain number of Government officials, however competent? As it is, the duties of the surveyors, already appointed, are too frequently as ludicrous as they are questionable. I daresay Mr. Plimsoll must have felt this when he recommended in his letter to Sir Charles Adderley, that “we ought not to have less than four detaining officers in Ireland, four in Scotland, and ten in England, and that the minimum average(?) salary should be 1000l. per annum.” Of course he meant them to look after the officers already appointed as well as after the ships; and that they should be “apart altogether from the Permanent Secretary, and the Secretary of the Marine Department,” whom he charges, in the same letter, without, by the way, one tittle or shadow of evidence, with the grossest dereliction of duty.

The staff of the Board of Trade, and its cost for salaries, in 1875 were as follows:—

---------------------------------------------------+-------+--------- | |Aggregate Employment. |Number.| Salary. ---------------------------------------------------+-------+--------- | | £ In the Board of Trade and registry of seamen | 237 | 48,760 Examinations | 13 | 3,355 Mercantile marine offices | 237 | 24,416 Surveyors, emigration officers, tonnage measurers,}| | recorders of draught of water }| 154 | 30,078 Nautical assessors | | 3,000 +-------+-------- Total | 641 | 109,609 ---------------------------------------------------+-------+---------

I feel no hesitation in giving, from the public journals, an account of this most extraordinary and unusual scene, not merely as an episode in the history of Merchant Shipping, but to explain the circumstances under which the temporary Act now in force was passed at the close of the Session of 1875:—

“Mr. CHARLEY asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether he could hold out any hopes of being able to afford facilities for the third reading of the Infanticide Bill in time to enable the House of Lords to consider it this Session.

“Mr. DISRAELI said he thought he could hold out some hopes to the hon. member. He felt some difficulty on Monday in stating the intentions of the Government, but this arose from their desire to pass the Merchant Shipping Bill this Session; but, finding it impossible to get through the committee on the Agricultural Holdings Bill this week, they had come to the conclusion to abandon the Merchant Shipping Bill. It had been submitted to the Government that they might pass the Bill in a modified form, but he declined to deal with the subject in that fragmentary manner. All he could say was that they would take the earliest opportunity of bringing forward the measure next Session.

“Mr. GOSCHEN, speaking on behalf of the shipping interest, expressed his extreme regret that the Merchant Shipping Bill had been sacrificed for the Agricultural Holdings Bill.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL earnestly entreated the Government not to consign thousands of their fellow-creatures to an undeserved grave. There were, he said, shipowners of murderous tendencies—(‘Order, order!’)—who had frustrated the passing of the Bill by protracted debates. The secretary of Lloyd’s had assured a friend of his that he did not know of a single ship which had been broken up during the past thirty years because it was worn out. The result was that hundreds of brave fellows were sent to unhallowed graves by these speculative scoundrels—(cries of ‘Order!’ and uproar).

“The SPEAKER informed the hon. member that his remarks were out of order. When the Merchant Shipping Bill, which was on the orders of the day, came up for consideration he would have an opportunity of addressing the House.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL said he would give notice that on Tuesday next he would put a question to the President of the Board of Trade with reference to certain vessels which had been lost, entailing a great sacrifice of human life, and would ask whether those vessels were not owned by Mr. Edward Bates, the member for Plymouth, or a person bearing the same name. He should also have some questions to put, with respect to members on the Liberal side of the House, for he was determined to unmask the villains who sent these people to their death—(cries of ‘Order!’ and tremendous uproar).

“The SPEAKER said: The hon. member has used the term ‘villains.’ I trust that he did not apply it to any members of this House.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL: I did, sir, and I shall not withdraw it.

“The SPEAKER: The conduct of the hon. member is altogether unparliamentary, and I call on him to withdraw the language—(cheers).

“Mr. PLIMSOLL (excitedly): And I must again decline to withdraw it.

“In reply to a third interrogation by the Speaker, the hon. member again declined to withdraw. The SPEAKER: The hon. member declines to withdraw, and I must submit his conduct to the judgment of the House.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL, standing in the centre of the House, said he would submit to the judgment of the House. Once more approaching the table, holding a paper in his hand, said, ‘This, sir, is my protest,’ and was proceeding to address the House, but in obedience to loud cries of ‘Order!’ he took his seat on the front bench below the gallery.

“Mr. DISRAELI rose and said that the conduct of the hon. member was almost unparalleled.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL, jumping up and interrupting: ‘And so is that of the Government’—(tremendous uproar).

“Mr. DISRAELI, continuing, said: I feel that it is my duty, as far as I can, to uphold the dignity and honour of the House; for the conduct of the hon. member has been not only violent, but so offensive, that it is impossible for the House to pass it over. As the hon. member has declined to withdraw the word used, it is my duty to move that he be reprimanded by the Speaker for his disorderly and violent conduct—(loud cheers).

“The SPEAKER said that according to the practice of the House the hon. member for Derby would answer in his place, and then withdraw.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL retired to the bar, and as he reached it, turned round apparently with the intention of saying something, but the members there prevailed on him to pass out, and as he did so, he exclaimed: ‘You do not know the men as well as I do. This will cost the lives of thousands.’ The hon. member then left the House.

“The Marquis of HARTINGTON rose and was about to address the House, but was informed by the Speaker that the motion before the House was, that the hon. member for Derby be reprimanded.

“The Marquis of HARTINGTON said he need hardly state that he should support the motion—(cheers). It was evident that the hon. member was labouring under great excitement, but he was not justified in using the language he had employed. No doubt, when he had a little time for reflection, he would see his conduct in a different light—(cheers).

“Mr. SULLIVAN said the scene they had witnessed was without precedent in the House, but he appealed to the House to be indulgent to the hon. member. He was aware that the hon. member was extremely ill, and his state of mental excitement arose from his overstrained feelings. Without seeking to justify the transgression of the hon. member, he wished the House would allow him to have a week’s rest, by which time he would be in a position to apologise for his misconduct. He (Mr. Sullivan) held in his hands the documents which had wrought the hon. member up to his present state of excitement, and for some time past his friends had been caused the most serious uneasiness by the deplorable state of his mind. If the House would afford him a few days’ rest, he would no doubt be able to set himself right—(cheers).

“Mr. DISRAELI then moved that the hon. member for Derby be requested to attend in his place on this day week—(loud cheers).

“Mr. FAWCETT said that Mr. Plimsoll was at present in an extremely painful state of excitement. He had gone out to him in the lobby, and found him in the most lamentable condition. By great effort he had persuaded him to take a walk in the open air—(great laughter). At the end of a week there was little doubt that he would withdraw the violent expressions he had used—(cheers).

“Mr. BASS, as the colleague of Mr. Plimsoll, offered his grateful acknowledgments to the House for the course they had taken—(cheers).

“The matter then dropped.

“On the motion for discharging the Merchant Shipping Bill,

“Mr. BATES said that he wished, with the indulgence of the House, to make a statement with respect to what had fallen from the hon. member for Derby earlier in the sitting. All who had witnessed the extraordinary exhibition would agree with him that the hon. member for Derby was not responsible for his actions. With respect to himself it was unfortunately true that he had lost during the last two years five ships; but ships better found in every respect were never sent to sea. They were all of them iron ships, and classed A 1. To himself, personally, pecuniarily the loss was very severe, as he never insured his ships for more than one-half or two-thirds of their market value. That was not so much the matter; but he did deplore the loss of his men, and his only consolation was that, as far as human foresight could go, the ships were as good and as safe as man could make them. He felt assured that the statement of the hon. member for Derby would be looked upon by all, as he looked upon it, with pity—(cheers).

“The House shortly afterwards adjourned.”

Mr. Plimsoll subsequently apologised for his conduct to the House. But it is much to be regretted, on his own account, that he neither attempted to substantiate the charges he had brought against Mr. Bates, nor asked leave to withdraw them.

When the Bill was withdrawn there stood upon the orders of the day of the House of Commons no less than 178 amendments to it, many of them on subjects of great importance and difficulty, as well as of great intricacy. See Times’ report of Mr. Disraeli’s speech at the Mansion House, 4th August, 1875.

‘Unseaworthy Ships,’ 38 & 39 Vict. cap. 88.

Already there seems to be a misapprehension. Mr. Plimsoll, as would appear by the newspapers, has been spending his vacation on the shores of the Black Sea and Danube, visiting the grain ports, and instructing the masters of all vessels loading grain how to stow it in accordance with the conditions of the new Act. That he is clearly of opinion that inspectors should be appointed is evident from the fact that he appointed forty of them! and that the Foreign Office approves of what he has done! What next and next? But the Board of Trade, by the correspondence which has been published, is of an entirely different opinion, and maintains that the Act of Parliament gives no such power. Nor does it! Nor should it! It is not the duty of Government to appoint inspectors to see that its laws are carried into effect. I say nothing as to the expense and impracticability of having surveyors at every port in the world where a ship is to load grain; but, if such is the meaning of the Act as applicable to grain ships, where is this sort of legislation to end? Are we to have Government inspectors to see to the loading of all our ships at home and abroad? And if so, why should this new system not be applied to every branch of commerce? Nay, why should it not extend into our houses? Surely heavy penalties would, in the case of grain ships, be a much more effectual mode of enforcing the conditions of the Act. Is there to be no end to the folly of unauthorised individuals appointing surveyors to inspect the loading of our ships abroad, or interfering with duties alone within the power of the Executive Government? It is high time we put a stop to these well-meaning, but Quixotic, proceedings.

I cannot understand what is meant by the word “keep.” A ship sails in a seaworthy condition, but an accident happens on the voyage which may render her “unseaworthy”: is the master, under such circumstances, to put back to the nearest port for repairs? and if he does not do so, and his ship is lost, it may be from causes wholly different, is his policy of insurance to be invalid, and is he to be responsible for any loss of life that may thus occur?

In Mr. Plimsoll’s protest, which, as the rules of the House of Commons would not allow him to present, he either threw upon the table, or had dropped into the House from one of the galleries, he says, “I charge the Government that they are wittingly and unwittingly, for they are both, playing into the hands of the maritime murderers inside the House and outside the House to secure a further continuance of the present murderous system.”... “I desire to unmask the villains who sit in the House, fit representatives of the more numerous, but not greater, villains who are outside the House.” I offer no comment on this language. It tells its own tale of the state of mind of its author.

The disgraceful scenes in the House of Commons could not have arisen from Mr. Plimsoll’s momentary excitement, when the Government announced the withdrawal of its Bill, but must have been premeditated, as this carefully prepared protest too clearly shows.

Mr. John W. A. Harper, Secretary to the Salvage Association. See Question 8769, p. 311.

See also evidence, W. J. Lamport, Question 5556, p. 192. With regard to the question of overloading, Mr. Lamport made a remarkable statement, which I do not hesitate to give at length, because it differs entirely from an opinion prevailing at present in the public mind.

The CHAIRMAN asked (Question 556): “From your knowledge of the shipping in Liverpool during forty years, Do you think that there has been a great deal of overloading?”—“Since it was intimated to me that I was to be asked to give evidence in this room, I have been trying to task my memory for cases in which when vessels had foundered or had not been heard of, I myself had felt a reasonable suspicion that the cause was overloading. I have not been able to bring to my recollection a single instance of the kind. Now this result, I must confess, was a little startling to myself, and in order to check it I spoke to the overlooker of my firm, who is a man older than myself, who has had longer experience than I have had, and who, from his outdoor business, would probably hear of such things more frequently than I should. The overlooker told me that he himself did not remember a single instance, in which he had suspected that any vessel which had left the port of Liverpool had been lost because of being overloaded.”

I may add, from my intimate knowledge of Mr. Lamport, which extended over a period of thirty years up to his untimely death, that these were no mere words of course. Indeed, the statement agrees with my own experience; and, from the inquiries I have made elsewhere, there are comparatively very few ships lost from overloading, except in the coasting and short-voyage trades. In confirmation of this opinion, the Commissioners, in their final report, state that “It is chiefly among the small coasting vessels that any habitual overloading prevails,” and “that there are a large number of ships in ballast annually lost, while the losses from collisions show that the management and negligence of sailors are not less disastrous than the carelessness of shipowners.”

It appears to me to be a grave mistake to require the insertion in the ship’s articles of the draught of water. These articles are an agreement between owner, master, and crew, and are binding on all. How can a drowned sailor’s family claim compensation for a vessel being loaded to a draught the sailor himself agreed to?

Mr. Gray, the Assistant-Secretary to the Board of Trade, stated (Question 10,088) that the Board had received a letter from Mr. Plimsoll, suggesting that the Department should employ the staff of ‘Lloyd’s Register’ to assist in the survey of certain merchant ships.

In going carefully through the evidence taken before the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, I cannot find that any witness objects to the principle that no ship should be allowed to proceed to sea that is unseaworthy, nor do I find that any Shipowner would object to a survey of his ship for the purpose of ascertaining her seaworthiness. Indeed, Mr. Charles McIver, of Liverpool, the senior partner of the Cunard Company, and a gentleman of great experience, though he does not class any of his ships for somewhat the same reason as I have stated, considers it advisable that all ships should be classed—not merely certified as seaworthy, but classed. The Chairman (Question 9245, p. 331) remarked: “You said you would not have any objection to have your vessels classed;” and then he asked, “Do you think it advisable that all ships should be classed?—I think so, from what I have seen in the last two or three years. If you will allow me, I will give another reason. I once got nearly cast away in an unclassed vessel about forty years ago. I was going to the States. She was a wooden vessel. I had taken a passage in her along with my sister, because I knew the captain of the ship. She was loaded with steam-engines and coals. I shall not mention the ports or the owners, because they are all dead and gone, the captain included. Off the Azores we fell in with a gale of wind. It only lasted for twelve hours; but, if it had lasted for twenty-four hours, she would have gone down. The captain came to me, and said, ‘If I had known that she was as bad as this, I would not have let you come.’ He said, ‘Her beams are away from the sides.’ I said, ‘I know that she is making water very rapidly, because it is coming out as clear as it went in,’ and they were pumping every two hours, and so forth. Now, I do not mean to say that there may not be culpability in the owner, but, sometimes, it is ignorance. So it was in that case; they did not believe that the ship was as bad as she was. My remark to the captain was, ‘When you go home you had better throw up command of this vessel or you will lose your life.’ He did so; but, in some way or other, he mixed up Mr. McIver’s name with it. The owner said, ‘Mr. McIver is frightened.’ The captain said, ‘No, he is not frightened, but he knows too much.’ He said, ‘I will give up the ship.’ Now, to show you that I did not think that there was any intentional culpability on the part of the owner, but simply ignorance, or simply that they could do what I could not do, because I knew too much, they gave that ship to the mate, and sent that vessel away in his charge for a long voyage abroad, and she did it safely. The next voyage she was never heard of. Now, any sort of classing, I think, would have prevented that ship from going to sea.”

Appendix No. 12, p. 624.

The writer of a letter which appeared in the ‘Nautical Magazine,’ headed “‘Lloyd’s Register’ and the Great Steam Lines,” and which was afterwards published separately (Pewtress & Co. London. 1872), says, “It is very remarkable that the classing of large steamers with Lloyd’s was nearly wholly omitted until 1870;” arising, I may add, from the fact that the ‘Liverpool Register’ allowed, in such ships, scantlings and arrangements of which Lloyd’s surveyors disapproved. “But,” continues the same writer a little further on, “it is much more remarkable that February 1870 is the date of Lloyd’s new rules, which are, it is supposed, an abandonment of the principle and scantlings of the old rules.” We have here exemplified in the most forcible manner the evils of competing classification associations.

Safety depends much more on the nature of the cargo, and the manner in which it is stowed, than most people, or even some shipowners, suppose. Dead weight, when stowed close and very low, while it makes a vessel stiff—that is, “stand up” to a heavy pressure of canvas, makes her roll in a calm when there is a heavy swell (like the pendulum of a clock), to the injury of her spars and rigging, and, not unfrequently, to roll her masts overboard. Railway and other bar iron, which is now a very common description of cargo, should always be stowed in a triangular form, and the heavier the bars the wider should be the angles. Ores of every description, on an oversea voyage, should be stowed in a boxed hold, or on platforms in the centre of the ship, thoroughly blocked from the sides. In a word, the proper stowage of a ship, whether as regards her form or the nature of her cargo, is a science which has not been sufficiently studied.

We must ever remember that although, since we relieved our Shipowners of all the restrictions to which they were subjected by the Navigation Laws, they have advanced above all other nations, the shipping of many of those nations are now running them a very close race. If we burden them with load-lines, which prevent them from carrying as much cargo with safety as a foreign vessel would be allowed to do—half a foot, or even three inches less depth may deprive them of all their profit—or saddle them with charges for surveys and so forth, already very heavy, and to which their competitors are not subjected, we, in either case, drive them from the trade. We must further, if we adopt the principle of a certificate of seaworthiness, recollect the interests of a great number of small coasters, and carefully consider if it would not seriously affect them.

See ‘Final Report of Royal Commissioners on Unseaworthy Ships,’ p. 15.

The following graphic description of the state of too many of our ordinary merchant vessels when they sail is so true that I do not hesitate to transfer it to these pages. I do so with the hope that the Legislature may direct its earliest attention to the improvement of the lamentable state of things here described, and with the conviction that the first step towards that improvement would be the abolition of the system of advances to seamen: “The ship is about to leave the dock, when the crew, generally of a very inferior description, are brought on board, and, frequently, in such a state of intoxication that they are worse than useless during that day, and the ship must anchor for the night. Next day the motley crew commence work reluctantly, in a thoroughly strange ship, under strange officers, and are strangers to each other. The chief officer has the unenviable task of getting them into order, not having a man that he can depend upon. Yet it is from that strange crew he must select look-out men, helmsmen, and leadsmen during the ten or twelve hours’ darkness of the following night.”—Extract of letter from Captain H. A. Moriarty, R.N., to the ‘Nautical Magazine’ for November 1875.

My readers should be informed that a premium of insurance on chartered freight out and home is much higher in proportion, than if insured out only, and then, after arrival at port of destination, home only.

Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, Appendix to the Report No. 51, and Questions 11,516 and 13,072.

See ‘Final Report,’ p. 16.

See ante, p. 318, note, and p. 480.

See ante, p. 321. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, which is quite as large as the Merchant Shipping Code Bill, now ready, passed through Committee in one forenoon sitting.

------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ Years.| Ships belonging to the British | British Steam Vessels Entered | Empire at the end of each Year,| and Cleared in the Foreign | 1850 to 1874 inclusive. | Trade in the United Kingdom, | | 1850 to 1874 inclusive. ------+--------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------- | Number. | Tons | Number. | Tons. 1850 | 34,281 | 4,232,962 | 8,350 | 1,802,955 1852 | 34,402 | 4,424,392 | 7,059 | 1,980,473 1860 | 38,501 | 5,710,968 | 12,777 | 4,186,620 1862 | 39,427 | 6,041,358 | 15,201 | 5,239,493 1870 | 37,587 | 7,149,134 | 29,369 | 13,341,058 1872 | 36,804 | 7,213,829 | 35,570 | 17,430,029 1873 | 36,825 | 7,294,230 | 37,175 | 18,943,653 1874 | 36,935 | 7,533,492 | 37,606 | 19,408,527 ------+--------------+-----------------+--------------+---------------

See Appendix No. 14, p. 637. Tonnage entered and cleared in the United Kingdom, United States, France, Holland, Norway, Prussia, and Sweden, distinguishing between national and foreign ships from 1850 to 1873.

APPENDICES.

No. Page

1. CONVENTION OF COMMERCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1826 563

2. LETTER FROM MR. W. S. LINDSAY TO LORD LYONS, BOSTON, U.S., 1860 567

3. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE RESPECTING THE LIABILITY OF BRITISH SHIPOWNERS IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 571

4. LETTER TO THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NAVIGATION LAWS OF FRANCE, 10TH JANUARY, 1861 582

5. LETTER FROM M. FLEURY AND REPLY, 17TH AND 23RD JUNE, 1862 590

6. LETTER TO THE COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION, LISBON, 28TH JANUARY, 1863 596

7. SUMMARY OF THE ACTS PASSED FOR THE REGULATION OF PASSENGER SHIPS 600

8. PASSAGES OF CLIPPER SHIPS ENGAGED IN THE TRADE WITH CHINA 611

9. LOG OF THE SAILING SHIP ‘THERMOPYLÆ’ 613

10. STATISTICS OF TONNAGE BELONGING TO GREAT BRITAIN, UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND HOLLAND, FROM 1821 TO 1874 618

11. EXEMPTION IN FAVOUR OF CERTAIN BRITISH SHIPS FROM LOCAL PORT CHARGES IN 1852 620

12. HISTORY OF LLOYD’S REGISTER OF BRITISH AND FOREIGN SHIPPING 624

13. ACTS OF PARLIAMENT PASSED BETWEEN 1849 AND 1875, INCLUSIVE, RELATING TO BRITISH SHIPS AND SEAMEN, AND OTHER PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS REFERRING THERETO 634

14. TONNAGE OF SHIPPING ENTERED AND CLEARED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, FRANCE, HOLLAND, NORWAY, PRUSSIA, AND SWEDEN, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NATIONAL AND FOREIGN SHIPS FROM 1850 TO 1873 637

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX No. 1.

Convention of Commerce between his Britannic Majesty and the most Christian King, together with two additional Articles annexed, signed at London, 26th January, 1826.

Article 1.—French vessels coming from or departing for the ports of France, or if in ballast, coming from or departing from any place, shall not be subject in the ports of the United Kingdom, either on entering into or departing from the same, to any higher duties of tonnage, harbour, lighthouse, pilotage, quarantine, or other similar or corresponding duties, of whatever nature, or under whatever denomination, than those to which British vessels, in respect of the same voyages, are or may be subject, on entering into or departing from such ports; and, reciprocally, from and after the same period, British vessels coming from or departing for the ports of the United Kingdom, or if in ballast, coming from or departing for any place, shall not be subject, in the ports of France, either in entering into or departing from the same, to any higher duties of tonnage, harbour, lighthouse, pilotage, quarantine, or other similar or corresponding duties, of whatever nature, or under whatever denomination, than those to which French vessels, in respect of the same voyages, are or may be subject on entering into or departing from such ports, whether such duties are collected separately or are consolidated in one and the same duty, his most Christian Majesty reserving to himself to regulate the amount of such duty or duties in France, according to the rate at which they are or may be established in the United Kingdom, at the same time, with a view of diminishing the burdens imposed upon the navigation of the two countries. His most Christian Majesty will always be disposed to reduce the amount of the said burdens in France in proportion to any reduction which may hereafter be made of those now levied in the ports of the United Kingdom.

2. Goods which can or may be legally imported into the ports of the United Kingdom from the ports of France, if so imported in French vessels, shall be subject to no higher duties than if imported in British vessels; and, reciprocally, which can or may be legally imported into the ports of France from the ports of the United Kingdom, if so imported in British vessels, shall be subject to no higher duties than if imported in French vessels. The produce of Asia, Africa, and America, not being allowed to be imported from the said countries, nor from any other in French vessels, nor from France in French, British, or any other vessels into the ports of the United Kingdom for home consumption, but only for warehousing and re-exportation, his most Christian Majesty reserves to himself to direct that in like manner the produce of Asia, Africa, and America shall not be imported from the said countries, nor from any other, in British vessels, nor from the United Kingdom in British, French, or any other vessels into the ports of France for the consumption of that kingdom, but only for warehousing and re-exportation.

With regard to the productions of the countries of Europe, it is understood between the high contracting parties that such productions shall not be imported in British ships into France for the consumption of that kingdom, unless such ships shall have been laden therewith in some port of the United Kingdom; that his Britannic Majesty may adopt, if he shall think fit, some corresponding restrictive measure with regard to the productions of the countries of Europe imported into the ports of the United Kingdom in French vessels, the high contracting parties reserving to themselves the power of making by mutual consent such relaxation in the strict execution of the present article as they may think useful to the respective interests of the two countries upon the principle of mutual concessions, affording each to the other reciprocal or equivalent advantages.

3. All goods which can or may be legally exported from the ports of either of the two countries shall on their export pay the same duties of exportation, whether the exportation of such goods be made in British or French vessels, provided the said vessels proceed, respectively, direct from the ports of the one country to the other. And all the said goods so exported in British or French vessels shall be reciprocally entitled to the same bounties, drawbacks, and other allowances of the same nature which are granted by the regulations of each country respectively.

4. It is mutually agreed between the high contracting parties that in the intercourse of navigation between the two countries the vessels of any third power shall in no case obtain more favourable conditions than those stipulated in the present convention in favour of British and French vessels.

5. The fishing-boats of either of the two countries which may be forced by stress of weather to seek shelter in the ports or on the coast of the other country shall not be subject to any duties or port charges of any description whatever; provided the said boats when so driven in by stress of weather shall not discharge or receive on board any cargo, or portion of cargo, in the ports or on the parts of the coast where they shall have sought shelter.

6. It is agreed that the provisions of the present convention between the high contracting parties shall be reciprocally extended and in force in all the possessions subject to their respective dominions in Europe.

7. The present convention shall be in force for a term of ten years from the 5th April of the present year; and further, until the end of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate its operation; each of the high contracting parties reserving to itself the right of giving such notice to the other at the end of the said term of ten years, and it is agreed between them that at the end of twelve months’ extension agreed on both sides this convention and all the stipulations thereof shall cease and determine.

8. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London on 26th day of January, 1826.

GEORGE CANNING.

WILLIAM HUSKISSON.

LE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC.

Additional Articles.

Article 1.—French vessels shall be allowed to sail from any port whatever of the countries under the dominion of his most Christian Majesty, to all the colonies of the United Kingdom (except those possessed by the East India Company) and to import into the said colonies all kinds of merchandise (being productions the growth or manufacture of France) with the exception of such as are prohibited to be imported into the said colonies, or are permitted to be imported only from countries under the British dominion; and the said French vessels, as well as the merchandise imported in the same, shall not be subject in the colonies of the United Kingdom to other or higher duties than those to which British vessels may be subject, or importing the same merchandise from any foreign country, or which are imposed on the merchandise itself.

2. French vessels shall be allowed to export from all the colonies of the United Kingdom (except those of East India Company) all kinds of merchandise which are not prohibited to be exported from such colonies in vessels other than those of Great Britain; and the said vessels, as well as the merchandise exported in the same, shall not be subject to other or higher duties than those to which British vessels may be subject on exporting the said merchandise, or which are imposed on the merchandise itself, and they shall be entitled, to the same bounties, drawbacks, and other allowances of the same nature to which British vessels would be entitled on such exportation. These two additional articles shall have the same force and validity as if they were inserted word for word in the convention signed this day. They shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at the same time.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, 26th January, 1826. GEORGE CANNING. LE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC. WILLIAM HUSKISSON.

A Treasury letter, dated 28th March, 1826, directs that French vessels and their cargoes legally imported or exported on board the same, according to the terms of the convention in the preceding pages, are from 5th April, 1826, to be charged with such and like duties only of whatever kind they may be that are charged on British vessels and similar cargoes laden on board thereof, and in like manner the same bounties, drawbacks, and allowances are to be paid on articles exported in French vessels that are paid, granted, or allowed on similar articles exported in British vessels. And the necessary instructions are to be transmitted to the officers in the colonies for carrying into effect the stipulations contained in the two additional articles of the said convention respecting French vessels and their cargoes from 1st October, 1826.

APPENDIX No. 2.

Boston, United States, 21st September, 1860.

MY LORD,

Mr. Hammond was good enough to read to me a letter which Lord John Russell had addressed to your Lordship on the subject of my visit to the United States. As reports have been current since then that my visit to this country was one of a semi-official character, I may remark that I am here merely in search of a little recreation after the labours of the session. But as I am intimate with many of the leading Shipowners and merchants of this country, Lord John Russell was pleased to furnish me with copies of the correspondence which had passed between our own Government and that of the United States with regard to various maritime questions (to which, as your Lordship may be aware, my attention has for some years been directed), in the hope that I might be able to aid your Lordship in their settlement.

These papers I have studied on the passage to this place. I see they deal with questions of very considerable importance to both countries; but there are also others which equally impede our commercial intercourse, and all these various questions are well worthy of consideration, and should be adjusted as soon as possible. They are:—

1st. The rules of the road at sea and collisions.

2nd. Signal lights.

3rd. Limitation of Shipowners’ liability.

4th. The Foreign Deserter’s Act.

5th. The punishment of offences committed on the high seas.

6th. The settlement of disputes between the masters of ships and their crews in foreign ports; and the extension of the use of our shipping offices to the vessels of the United States.

There are, besides these questions, others of a much more difficult and delicate character, such as belligerent rights of sea, the coasting trade of the United States, and the registration in America of British-built ships, all of great political as well as commercial importance, and therefore I fear my services in their solution can be of little value. It is, however, my intention to enter into conversation bearing upon all these questions with the leading merchants and Shipowners to whom I am known; and with the Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce of this and other places, including New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland, and various seaports in the New England States to whom I have letters of introduction. I shall at least ascertain their views, and may thus be enabled to pave the way to the settlement of some of those questions. And if I find that their views can be brought into harmony with those entertained by our own Government, I shall endeavour to prevail upon the different bodies to memorialise their Government on the subject.

My first, and I fear imperfect, impressions in regard to the questions I have named may be briefly stated as follows:—

1st. The rules of the road at sea.—I think these rules should be the same for the vessels of all nations. Different opinions prevail in regard to our own rules; but, though they differ from the old maritime law (acted upon by almost every other nation and at times by ourselves), and are an improvement upon it, the decisions in our Admiralty Courts are too often conflicting. Our rules, as a whole, are perhaps, however, more satisfactory than those of any other. But be that as it may, it would be most desirable if all nations would agree to adopt one and the same rule of road at sea, and would tend greatly to the safety of life and property.

2nd. Signal lights.—Our recent regulations in regard to lights have answered very well, and have been adopted by the owners of steam-vessels belonging to the United States. The application of these rules to sailing vessels is all that is now necessary, and is very desirable.

3rd. The limitation of shipowners’ liability.—This is a question of great importance, and the laws in regard to it are in an unsatisfactory state. May I refer your Lordship to the evidence taken last session before the select committee on merchant shipping on this subject, and to their report? From the correspondence I have read I think the Government of the United States might be induced to adopt the principles laid down in that report. If so, it might then (as the laws of each country are similar) be mutually arranged by a convention, or otherwise, to place our ships and those of the United States respectively, on an equal footing with regard to claims raised in the courts of either country in respect of any loss of life or personal injury arising from collisions at sea, so as to limit such claims to the same extent in each case, and also that the mode of procedure shall be as provided by the laws of the country where the claim is made.

4th. The application of our Foreign Deserter’s Act to the ships of the United States.—As your Lordship is aware, the United States Government has positively declined to become a party to this Act, because it contains the words “not being slaves,” which were inserted, I believe, after the Bill was introduced. Now it appears to me that there is no necessity for these words. The Act is meant to deal solely with voluntary agents, who, having of their own free will entered into an agreement, break it at foreign ports. I think the case would be met if instead of the words “not being slaves” there were substituted the following words—“seamen who have voluntarily engaged themselves in, or apprentices duly indentured to, the sea service.” I question if there are any cases on record where slaves have been shipped as seamen to English ports.

5th. Offences committed on the high seas.—Your Lordship cannot fail to be aware of the unsatisfactory state of the law in regard to these offences. Why, on the representation of the ministers or consuls, should the courts of England and of the United States not have jurisdiction over offences committed on board of vessels of the respective countries? I ask this question because I can at present see no objection to the principle I have ventured to lay down, though the mode of putting it into practice would require some consideration, and could best be dealt with by the legal authorities of the two countries. The same may be said with regard to the settlement of disputes between masters and crews in the ports of either country.

6th. The extension of our shipping offices to the vessels of the United States.—If the Government of the United States would not agree to establish similar offices and a machinery somewhat in accordance with our own (I see no reason why such offices which have answered so well in England should not be adopted), then we might stipulate that all British seamen entering the service of American Shipowners in the ports of Great Britain should be engaged before our shipping masters, and we might grant to American shipowners the privilege of engaging all the seamen their vessels required (when in any of the ports of Great Britain), through the medium of our offices, on the same conditions as our own shipowners now engage their seamen. This would pave the way to an international arrangement, and tend to abolish the system of crimpage which still prevails to a great extent in our ports, and is alike injurious to the interests of British and American shipowners.

Though belligerent rights, the coasting trade, and the admission of British-built ships to American registration are difficult questions for me to deal with, involving as they do the policy of the respective nations bearing upon other interests than those of commerce, I may remark that it is easy of proof in regard to the two latter that the policy of the United States, while it is unjust towards England, is injurious to the people of America, and contrary to the principles laid down by their own most eminent statesmen in their intercourse with other countries. Nevertheless, I fear the Government of the United States will not be disposed to make concessions unless we are prepared to make a bargain with them. With that object in view, I think if we agreed to relieve the shipowners of the United States from the charge of light dues on our coast (which have been the source of great complaint), and also from compulsory pilotage as recommended in the merchant shipping report; provided they opened to us the trade between their eastern and western ports, viâ Panama and round Cape Horn, if not prepared to throw open entirely their coasting trade, some progress might be made. The Government of the United States might also be induced to make some concession with regard to the registration of British-built ships, for through the want of iron screw vessels (which cannot be produced at as moderate a price in the States) they are fast losing the most valuable portion of the trade between England and this country. And their coasting trade (especially that on the inland lakes) is not developed to one-half the extent it would be if the Shipowners of America were allowed to own the description of vessels I have named. They are also losing the share they once had of the Newfoundland fisheries from the fact that we can produce in the colonies vessels adapted for that trade at 25 per cent. less cost than they can build and equip similar vessels.

I daresay your Lordship can form little idea of the hindrance to commerce and the constant irritation the questions I have named create on both sides of the Atlantic; and I hope by holding intercourse with the people of this country to pave the way, as I have said, for the settlement of at least some of them. With that object I shall take notes of the opinions entertained by the members of the different Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade throughout this country, and also the views of those members of the government whom I may meet, and which I shall forward to your Lordship, and if you think any satisfactory results are likely to follow, you may then deem it desirable to communicate with Lord John Russell, with a view of entering into formal negotiations with the Government of the United States. I have for many years anxiously desired to see settled these various questions, considering their settlement of great importance to both countries; and if I can, in the way I propose, aid your Lordship in this good work, my long promised visit to this country, though made with no such object, will not be made in vain.

I am, my Lord, Your faithful and obedient servant,

(Signed) W. S. LINDSAY.

To His Excellency LORD LYONS, H. B. Majesty’s Minister, &c. &c. &c., Washington.

APPENDIX No. 3.

Foreign Office, 21st September, 1866.

SIR,

I am directed by Lord Stanley to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, in which you call his Lordship’s attention to the state of relations existing between this country and the United States with regard to the Navigation Laws; and in expressing to you Lord Stanley’s thanks for this further communication, I am to inform you that the same has been referred to the Board of Trade, whose observations thereupon will be communicated to you as soon as their answer shall have been received; and the delay in receiving their report is the reason for your letter not having been sooner acknowledged.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

E. C. EGERTON.

To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq., Manor House, Shepperton.

Foreign Office, 26th September, 1866.

SIR,

With reference to my letter of the 21st instant, I am directed by Lord Stanley to state to you that his Lordship is fully alive to the importance of the points on which you have urged that a satisfactory understanding is desirable with the United States, but that since the date of your letter to Lord Lyons of the 21st of September, 1860, the first two of the seven questions enumerated in it have been settled by the adoption of one uniform system of rules of the road, and of lights to be carried at sea by maritime nations generally, including the United States.

As regards the third question, viz., the limitation of shipowners’ liability, the Lords of Trade have pointed out to Lord Stanley that the law of this country has undergone some modification since 1860. By the Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Act, 1862, the limit of such liability was readjusted, and the limitation was extended to foreign ships in cases arising in British courts concerning matters within their jurisdiction.

Inasmuch, however, as this extension was not made specially for the benefit of foreigners, but with the view of establishing a just and uniform rule of law, no steps were taken to secure reciprocal legislation in foreign countries.

If the law at present in force in the United States is liable to the same objection as the law formerly in force in this country, and is found to be attended with the inconveniences which were experienced here, it may be presumed that the United States Government will probably find it for their interest to amend it in a similar sense and on similar grounds; but Lord Stanley sees no reason at present for opening special communications with that Government on the subject.

With respect to the remaining four questions alluded to in your letter, I am to state to you that the matters to which they relate are under consideration.

I am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

E. C. EGERTON.

To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq., Manor House, Shepperton.

Manor House, Shepperton, Middlesex, 29th September, 1866.

MY LORD,

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letters of 21st and 26th inst., and I am glad to learn that two of the questions to which I ventured to direct your Lordship’s attention have, since 1860, been settled in a satisfactory manner.

As regards the third, viz., the limitation of shipowners’ liability, may I trouble you with an extract herewith from the ‘New York Herald’ of 10th October, 1860, as the question is therein, I think, correctly stated. Since then I am aware that there has been an amendment in our law relating to the liability of Shipowners; but it would appear from the communication you have received from the Lords of Trade that while we have extended the limitation to foreign ships in cases arising in British courts, we have overlooked altogether the still more important part of the question so far as this country is concerned, and that is the unlimited liability of British shipowners in cases arising in foreign courts. If such is the fact, then we, I fear, have neglected a favourable opportunity of inviting foreign nations to place our ships in their courts on the same terms as we had placed their ships when thrown into our courts. Had we done so, I think the Government of the United States would have readily met us in so just and reasonable a request.

Considering, then, the position in which British shipowners would be placed if an action was raised against them in foreign courts for the recovery of claims arising through a collision at sea, your Lordship will perceive that this is not a question in which foreigners alone are interested, for we have given them all they asked in our courts, but one which deeply affects the interests of British subjects, and which, now more than ever, requires adjustment by special communication with the United States and those other countries where the responsibility of British shipowners is still unlimited. Since we have conceded all they require, it may be found more difficult now to obtain the necessary alterations in their law than it would have been at the time to which my previous communications referred; but I daresay that when the justice of our claim is represented, steps will still be taken to grant in their courts the same limitation of responsibility to our Shipowners as we have granted to their Shipowners in our courts.

I am gratified, to learn that the other questions are under consideration, and

I remain, my Lord, Your most obedient humble servant,

W. S. LINDSAY.

To the Right Hon. Lord STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c.

Foreign Office, 3rd October, 1866.

SIR,

I am directed, by Lord Stanley, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and its inclosure of the 29th ultimo, respecting the liability of British shipowners in suits arising in foreign courts out of collisions at sea; and I am to acquaint you in reply, that Lord Stanley will not fail to give this question due consideration, and will communicate with you further on the subject after he has consulted the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

E. C. EGERTON.

To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.

Foreign Office, 14th November, 1866.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 29th September last regarding the laws of the United States and of other foreign countries, with regard to the liability of British shipowners in cases of loss by collisions at sea, I am directed by Lord Stanley to inform you that his Lordship learns from the Lords of Trade that, by the common law of this country, and by the maritime law, as administered in our Admiralty Courts, the Shipowner was formerly personally liable to the whole extent of his fortune for any damage done by his ships through default of his servants. The legislature, however, long since passed statutes limiting the liability, and the limitation, with some variations, still continues.

It was, however, held that the statutes being municipal laws, did not affect cases where foreign ships were concerned, and where the collision or casualty happened on the high seas, but that such cases must be governed by the general maritime law of the world, which was assumed to be the same with our common law. This was, perhaps, too hastily assumed, inasmuch as most maritime countries adopted the principle of limiting the Shipowners’ liability much earlier, and to a greater extent than Great Britain.

The consequence was, that if a collision happened between two British ships, the British law of liability applied, and whichever might be in fault, the liability was limited. On the other hand, if a collision happened between a British and a foreign ship on the high seas, or between two foreign ships on the high seas, and the case came into our courts, then whichever was in fault, the liability was unlimited.

This law was unequal, but in no way specially injurious to the foreigner. The British ship, if in fault, was equally liable with the foreigner; and as the British ship is generally to be found at home, and as the British shipowner resides here, the British shipowner being thus more likely to be the defendant, was likely the more often to suffer.

The law was consequently altered by making the limitation of liability apply in all cases coming into our courts, whether the ships were both British or both foreign, or one British and one foreign.

And as the change was simply an improvement of our own law, and conferred no especial advantage upon foreigners, it was not thought necessary or desirable to delay it for the purpose of obtaining similar changes when desirable in the laws of foreign nations.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

JAMES MURRAY.

To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.

Manor House, Shepperton, Middlesex, 28th November, 1866.

MY LORD,

I received in due course your Lordship’s letter of the 14th inst., which does not, however, appear to me to touch the main point of my previous communication, viz., the unlimited liability to which our Shipowners would still be subjected in cases of collision arising in various foreign courts. For instance, if one of our Transatlantic steam ships engaged in the conveyance of our mails came into collision—a very possible event—with one of the numerous steam vessels owned in the United States, freighted with passengers, cargo, and specie, of great value, the consequences, under the existing law of that country, might prove not only most disastrous to the owners of the British ship, but also very detrimental to the public service.

As I understand the law of the United States, the owners of our mail steamer, if at fault, would be responsible to the full extent of their means for all the loss the owners of the American steamer had sustained; if so, the result would be the seizure of the British steamer whenever she reached an American port; and, possibly, if the loss sustained was very great, the seizure of all the vessels in port belonging to the same owner, and thus our mail service for the time might be suspended.

It is to this grave contingency I am anxious to direct your Lordship’s attention, in the hope that you may see the urgent necessity of taking such steps as you may deem most expedient to induce the Government of the United States to place our vessels in their courts on the same footing in regard to the limitation of liability as we now place the owners of their vessels in our courts.

I am, my Lord, your most obedient humble servant,

W. S. LINDSAY.

To the Right Hon. the Lord STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c.

Board of Trade, Whitehall, 25th February, 1867.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 29th September, 1866, addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to previous correspondence upon the subject of the law of the United States as affecting the liability of the Shipowner in cases of loss by collision at sea, I am now directed by the Board of Trade to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch and inclosures received through the Foreign Office from her Majesty’s Minister at Washington upon this subject.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

THOMAS GRAY.

To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq., Manor House, Shepperton.

(Copy.—M. 1268.)

Washington, 23rd January, 1867.

MY LORD,

In reply to your Lordship’s despatch, marked “Commercial No. 7,” of the 14th November last, on the liability imposed by the laws of the United States on Shipowners in cases of collision, I have the honour to enclose copy of an opinion of Mr. Carlisle, the legal adviser of this Legation.

Your Lordships will gather from it that the principle of limited liability has been adopted by the laws of the United States, and is applied in the Federal courts. But the injured party may apply to a State court if the defendant is within its jurisdiction, and bring an action on the case, and it is doubtful whether such a court would limit the measure of damages by the principles contained in the Act of Congress.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

To Lord STANLEY, &c. &c.

(Copy.)

Washington, 22nd January, 1867.

SIR,

I have the honour to return herewith the papers in relation to the question of the liability of Shipowners in cases of collision.

The only Act of Congress touching the subject is that of March 3rd, 1851, which in its third section limits the liability in such cases. A copy of this section is enclosed herewith. This language is explicit and comprehensive, making no distinction on account of the nationality of the ship; nor have I been able to find that such a distinction has been suggested in any adjudicated case under this statute.

For my own part I entertain no doubt that the limitation of liability which it prescribes would be held in all courts of the United States as applying equally to foreign as to American ships.

The Courts of Admiralty are, by the constitution of the United States, exclusively of the Federal Government. If therefore the remedy in cases of collision were exclusively in Admiralty Courts, the Act of 1851 would completely cover the question.

But there is a remedy at common law, which is open to the injured party at his election. He may maintain his action on the case, which is a transitory action, wherever he can find the owner of the offending vessel, in the same manner and to be determined by the same principles as if the plaintiff’s coach or his person had been injured by a collision occasioned by the unskilful driving of the defendant’s coach.

Such an action may be brought in any court of general jurisdiction in any of the States of the Union; and it may be doubted whether this Act of Congress would be available to limit the measure of damages in these courts, though undoubtedly a convention between Great Britain and the United States, with a proper Act of Congress to carry it into effect, would accomplish the object.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. M. CARLISLE.

To Sir F. BRUCE, S.S.B., &c. &c. &c.

(Copy.)

An Act to limit the Liability of Shipowners and for other purposes.

(Approved March 3, 1851.)