Part 2

Lest this remark might be misunderstood, let me say that I have no word of criticism against Mr. McAdoo's administration of the railroads, as far as I have been able to observe it.

I think, on the contrary, that he is entitled to great praise and that he has handled the formidable and complex task confided to him with a high degree of ability, fine courage, indefatigable energy, and with the evident determination to keep the running of the railroads clear of politics and to make them above all things effective instruments in our war effort.

For a concise statement of the results accomplished elsewhere under government ownership I would recommend you to obtain from the Public Printer, and to read, a short pamphlet entitled "Historical Sketch of Government Ownership of Railroads in Foreign Countries," presented to the Joint Committee of Congress on Interstate Commerce by the great English authority, Mr. W. M. Acworth. It will well repay you the half hour spent in its perusal. You will learn from it that, prior to the war, about fifty per cent. of the railways in Europe were state railways; that in practically every case of the substitution of government for private operation (with the exception, subject to certain reservations, of Germany) the service deteriorated, the discipline and consequently the punctuality and safety of train service diminished, politics came to be a factor in the administration and the cost of operations increased vastly. (The net revenue, for example, of The Western Railway of France in the worst year of private ownership was $13,750,000, in the fourth year of government operation it fell to $5,350,000.) He quotes the eminent French economist, Leroy-Beaulieu, as follows:

"One may readily see how dangerous to the liberty of citizens the extension of the industrial regime of the State would be, where the number of functionaries would be indefinitely multiplied.... From all points of view the experience of State railways in France is unfavorable as was foreseen by all those who had reflected upon the bad results given by the other industrial undertakings of the State.... The State, above all, under an elective government, cannot be a good commercial manager.... The experience which we have recently gained has provoked a very lively movement, not only against acquisition of the railways by the State, but against all extension of State industry. I hope ... that not only we, but our neighbors also may profit by the lesson of these facts."

Mr. Acworth mentions as a characteristic indication that after years of sad experience with governmentally owned and operated railways, the Italian Government, just before the war, started on the new departure (or rather returned to the old system) of granting a concession to a private enterprise which was to take over a portion of the existing state railway, build an extension with the aid of state subsidies, and then work on its own account both sections as one undertaking under private management.

I may add, as a fact within my own knowledge, that shortly before the outbreak of the war the Belgian Government was studying the question of returning its state railways to private enterprise and management.

Mr. Acworth relates a resolution unanimously passed by the French Senate a few years after the State had taken over certain lines, beginning: "The deplorable situation of the State system, the insecurity and irregularity of its workings." He gives figures demonstrating the invariably greater efficiency, economy and superiority of service of private management as compared to State management in countries where these two systems are in operation side by side. He treats of the effect of the conflicting interests, sectional and otherwise, which necessarily come into play under government control when the question arises where new lines are to be built and what extensions to be made of existing lines.

He asks: "Can it be expected that they (these questions) will be decided rightly by a minister responsible to a democratic legislature, each member of which, naturally and rightly, makes the best case he can for his own constituents, while he is quite ignorant, even if not careless, of the interests, not only of his neighbor's constituency, but of the public at large?" And he replied: "The answer is written large in railway history.... The facts show that Parliamentary interference has meant running the railways, not for the benefit of the people at large, but to satisfy local and sectional or even personal interests." He maintains that in a country governed on the Prussian principles railroad operation and planning may be conducted by the Government with a fair degree of success, as an executive function, but in democratic countries, he points out that in normal times "it is the legislative branch of the government which not only decides policy but dictates always in main outline, often down to the detail of a particular appointment or a special rate, how the policy shall be carried out."

For corroboration of this latter statement we need only turn to the array of statutes in our own States, which not only fix certain railroad rates by legislative enactment, but deal with such details as the repair of equipment, the minimum movement of freight cars, the kind of headlights to be used on locomotives, the safety appliances to be installed, etc.--and all this in the face of the fact that these States have Public Service Commissions whose function it is to supervise and regulate the railroads.

The reason why the system of state railways in Germany was largely free from most, though by no means all, of the unfavorable features and results produced by government ownership and operation elsewhere, is inherent in the habits and conditions created in that country by generations of autocratic and bureaucratic government. But Mr. Acworth points out very acutely that while German manufacturers, merchants, financiers, physicians, scientists, etc., "have taught the world a good deal in the twenty years preceding the war, German railway men have taught the world nothing." And he asks: "Why is this?" His answer is: "Because they were state officials, and, as such, bureaucrats and routiniers, and without incentive to invent and progress themselves or to encourage or welcome or even accept inventions and progress.

It is the private railways of England and France, and particularly of America, which have led the world in improvements and new ideas, whilst it would be difficult to mention a single reform or invention for which the world is indebted to the state railways of Germany."

The question of the disposition to be made of the railroads after the war is one of the most important and far-reaching of the post-bellum questions which will confront us. It will be one of the great test questions, the answer to which will determine whither we are bound.

And, it seems to me, one of the duties of business men is to inform themselves accurately and carefully on this subject, so as to be ready to take their due and legitimate part in shaping public opinion, and indeed to start on that task now, before public opinion, one-sidedly informed and fed of set purpose with adroitly colored statements of half truths, crystallizes into definite judgment.

My concern is not for the stock and bond holders. They will, I have no doubt, be properly and fairly taken care of in case the Government were definitely to acquire the railroads. Indeed, it may well be, that from the standpoint of their selfish interests, a reasonable guarantee or other fixed compensation by the Government would be preferable to the financial risks and uncertainties under private railroad operation in the new and untried era which we shall enter after the war. I know, indeed, that not a few large holders of railroad securities take this view and therefore have this preference.

Nor do I speak as one who believes that the railroad situation can be restored just as it was before the war. The function, responsibility and obligation of the railroads as a whole are primarily to serve the interests and economic requirements of the nation. The disjointed operation of the railroads, each one considering merely its own system (and being under the law practically prevented from doing otherwise) will, I am sure, not be permitted again.

The relinquishment of certain features of our existing legislation, the addition of others, a more clearly defined and purposeful relationship of the nation to the railroads, involving amongst other things possibly some financial interest of the Government in the results of railroad operations, are certain to come from our experiences under Government operation and from a fresh study of the subject, in case the railroads, as I hope, are returned to private management.

Personally I believe that in its underlying principle, the system gradually evolved in America but never as yet given a fair chance for adequate translation into practical execution, is an almost ideal one. If preserves for the country, in the conduct of its railroads, the inestimable advantage of private initiative, efficiency, resourcefulness and financial responsibility, while at the same time through governmental regulation and supervision it emphasizes the semi-public character and duties of railroads, protects the community's rights and just claims and guards against those evils and excesses of unrestrained individualism which experience has indicated.

It is, I am profoundly convinced, a far better system than government ownership of railroads, which, wherever tested, has proved its inferiority except, to an extent, in the Germany on which the Prussian Junker planted his heel and of which he made a scourge and a horrible example to the world; and the very reasons which have made state railways measurably successful in that Germany are the reasons which would make government ownership and operation in America a menace to our free institutions, a detriment to our racial characteristics and a grave economic disservice.

PUNITIVE PATERNALISM IN TAXATION

I have spoken of the treatment of our railroads in the past ten years as "punitive paternalism." In some respects this same term may be applied to our existing and proposed war taxation.

Of course, the burden of meeting the cost of the war must be laid according to capacity to bear it. It would be crass selfishness to wish it laid otherwise and fatuous folly to endeavor to have it laid otherwise.

We all agree that the principal single sources of war revenue must necessarily be business and accumulated capital, but these sources should not be used excessively and to the exclusion of others. The structure of taxation should be harmonious and symmetrical. No part of it should be so planned as to produce an unscientific and dangerous strain.

The science of taxation consists in raising the largest obtainable amount of needed revenue in the most equitable manner, with the least economic disturbance and, as far as possible, with the effect of promoting thrift.

The House Bill proposes to raise from income, excess or war profit and inheritance taxes $5,686,000,000 out of an estimated total of $8,182,000,000. In other words, almost seventy per cent. of our stupendous total taxation is to come from these few sources. It seems to me that the effect and meaning of this is to penalize capital, to fine business success, as well as thrift and self-denial practised in the past, thereby tending to discourage saving.

The House Bill fails, on the other hand, to impose certain taxes the effect of which is to promote saving. Intentionally or not, yet effectively, it penalizes certain callings and sections of the country and favors others.

Let me say at the outset that my criticism does not refer to the principle of an eighty per cent. war profits tax. Indeed, I have from the very beginning advocated a high tax on war profits. To permit individuals and corporations to enrich themselves out of the dreadful calamity of war is repugnant to one's sense of justice and gravely detrimental to the war morale of the people.

Strictly from the economic point of view, the eighty per cent. war profits tax is not entirely free from objection. Whether England did wisely on the whole in fixing the tax at quite so high a rate is a debatable point, and is being questioned by some economists of high standing in that country, not from the point of view of tenderness for the beneficiaries from war profits, but from that of national advantage.

Moreover, conditions in America and England are not quite identical and I believe it to be a justifiable statement that British industry is better able to stand so high a tax than American industry, for reasons inherent in the respective business situations and methods.