Part 4

... the state of the Army in Canada ... for a supply of medicines is truly deplorable. General Gates sets out to-morrow to take command of the Army in Canada. Dr. Potts will accompany him. I have therefore given orders to supply him from the General Hospital with a large chest of such medicines as I can best spare, and which can be got ready to-morrow before his departure.

Until July 24, the only medicines to arrive at Fort George were the "few that Dr. Potts brought with him" even though Morgan had, according to Stringer, promised to send "by the first sloop twenty half-chests of medicines" put up at New York for ten battalions in the north. Stringer therefore asked permission of General Gates at Ticonderoga to "go forth to York and see the medicines forthwith forwarded by land, until they can be safely conveyed by water." Permission was granted on July 29 and Stringer departed for New York. Meanwhile, Morgan had written Potts on July 28 that he had sent Dr. James McHenry to Philadelphia for drugs, and that he was sending Andrew Craigie to Fort George to "act as an Apothecary." Morgan also asked for an inventory of drugs on hand in the Northern Department.

Stringer spent only a day or two in New York with Morgan--just long enough to intensify their personal feud over responsibilities and authority. Stringer determined that the "twenty half-chests" apparently were a figment of someone's imagination, because supplies in New York were almost as bad as they were in the north. Also, he learned that Morgan was sending a box of medicine northward "under the care of the Surgeon of Col. Wayne Regt." that was undoubtedly intended to serve only as a regimental chest. Stringer then hurried on to Philadelphia just in time to intercept McHenry, who had obtained "an order from the Committee of Congress for 40 lb. Bark, 10 [lb.] Camphire and some other articles."

Stringer wrote Potts on August 17 that at last he had obtained an order for medicines that would be packed in two days, but added "when you'll receive them God knows." He also reported that "there will also arrive another Box under the care of Doct. McHenry containing only 5 articles of which there is but 30 lbs. Bark and I think not a purgative except some few pounds of Rhubarb and a little Fol. Senae." McHenry, however, only got as far as New York with his meager supplies, because Stringer discharged him from the service in an attempt to show both Morgan and Potts who had the most authority.

Stringer's inexcusably long absence from his hospital post and failure to send the needed medicines so aroused General Gates that he wrote the President of the Congress on August 31 as follows:

The Director of the General Hospital in this department, Doctor Stringer, was sent to New-York three and thirty days ago, with positive orders to return the instant he had provided the drugs and medicines so much wanted. Since then, repeated letters have been wrote to New-York and Philadelphia, setting forth in the strongest terms the pressing necessity of an immediate supply of these articles.

Finally, almost a month after his arrival in Philadelphia, Stringer set out for Albany with a small stock of drugs. On September 7 he wrote Potts from Albany that he hoped the small supply that he obtained and the chest of medicines that Morgan had just sent would hold out until he could obtain additional supplies in New England, where he was then headed "to ransack that Country of those articles we want."

Meanwhile, Potts at Fort George had started making the desired inventory of medicines. It came as no surprise to anyone that the situation was deplorable--indeed, it was worse than that. On August 31 a committee of surgeons at Ticonderoga prepared at General Gates' order "A Catalogue of Medicines Most Necessary for the Army." This list, undoubtedly representing the minimum requirements of each battalion, called for 20 pounds of bark, 4 pounds of gum camphor, 2 pounds of gum opium, 3 pounds of powdered ipecac, 4 pounds of powdered jalap, 2 pounds of powdered rhubarb, 15 pounds of Epsom salts, and 3 pounds of tartar emetic among two dozen different medicines. Instead of these minimum requirements, regimental surgeons at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Mount Independence, and Fort George presented inventories (mostly dated September 8) that clearly emphasized their destitute condition.

The first New Jersey battalion at Ticonderoga reported "No Jallap, Rhubarb, Salts, or Ipecac"; while Colonel Whilocks' regiment at Ticonderoga reported "No medicines exclusive of private property." The five companies of artillery at Fort George reported "Medicines--None," as did the 24th Regiment at Mount Independence. Others reported small or "tollerable" assortments of medicine. A close examination of the inventory of the Pennsylvania 6th Battalion at Crown Point shows it to have been lacking bark, ipecac, rhubarb, camphor, and salts; and only one-half ounce of jalap and 2 ounces of gum opium remained in the chest outfitted by Christopher and Charles Marshall on April 25 in Philadelphia. The 15th Regiment of Foot at Mount Independence claimed 2 ounces of bark and 1-1/2 ounces of gum opium, while the 6th Regiment at Ticonderoga was as well off as any with one-half pound of bark and 4 ounces of gum opium. Compared with the minimum need of 20 pounds of bark and 2 pounds of gum opium, even this was not of much comfort.

The inventory "of the Medicines in the Continental Store at Fort George" dated September 9 was not very comforting either. While the store included 137 different items, including equipment and containers of all the capital medicines, only Epsom salts appeared to be available in a sufficient quantity. Seven pounds of rhubarb were also on hand, but conspicuous by their absence were bark, ipecac, jalap, gum camphor, and gum opium.

With their continuous requests and demands, the regimental surgeons made life miserable for Potts. Surgeon Mate of the Pennsylvania 1st wrote that the "Chest of Medicine ... is not yet arrived but expect it hourly...." Trumbull asked: "Have your Medicines arriv'd? Have Stringer or McHenry made their appearance yet? Our people fall sick by Dozens. I not a Pennys worth of Medicine have for them, even in the most virulent disorders." Surgeon Johnston begged: "Pray if possible send me 4 pounds Pulv. Cort. Peruv. and 3 ounces Tart Emet. With those medicines I think I could restore a number of our best Men to perfect Health."

In those instances where some drugs were on hand, the shortage of pharmaceutical equipment hampered, if not prevented, the preparation of proper dosage forms. Surgeon McCrea on board the Royal Savage wrote on September 2 that he "found a great inconvenience for want of scales & waits," and the surgeon at Crown Point wrote on September 19 that "the Medicines which I rec'd a few days ago will be of very little Benefit as I have no fit Mortar &c to prepare them with & must use them in Decoction."

It wasn't until October that any relief arrived, and even then there were disappointments. Andrew Craigie, at Fort George, received a wagonload of herbs on October 3, but, as Craigie reported to Potts, "one half the load is entirely useless, containing Saffron, Pink flower, and whole Hd Pennyroyal, &c. &c. Dr. Brown thinks his broad shoulders would carry all the articles that are worth anything." Craigie recommended to Potts that payment should not be made for all the useless articles.

The long-lost Stringer finally arrived at Albany from Boston on October 5 and reported to Gates that he had met the greatest success in procuring £5,000 of medicines. Ten days later, Stringer wrote Potts that he was now forwarding "by waggon two Barrels & 1 Box of Medicines ... [which] will suffice for the present, not thinking it prudent to send up the whole, especially as we can always get them up as they are wanted."

Even after the long delay, most of the supplies were still held in Albany instead of being distributed among the surgeons who needed them. This infuriated Potts to a point that even Stringer found it necessary, on October 25, to explain:

I received yesterday a letter from you ... before this time you will have rec'd such of the articles you desired as we had to spare the Medicines I purchased at Boston ... I thought not proper to risque up here; neither were any of them in powder, and all that were so at this place we sent you, and have two hands busy in preparing more for our own use. I hope that [the shipment] sent will be sufficient for your purpose.

Andrew Craigie had sent three barrels and four boxes of supplies to Ticonderoga on October 22, but the shipment obviously did not suffice. On November 7 Stringer wrote that "as soon as possible the Medicines you wrote for shall be prepared and sent, but they are chiefly to be pulverized." In his typical style he added, "I cannot conceive what use you will have for five sieves when you have no large mortar."

The November 27 report of the committee of Congress on the conditions in the general hospital at Fort George indicates that the supply situation was at last reasonably good, but by this time the season was far advanced and the forces had to retire to winter quarters. Stringer was relieved of his command along with Morgan early the following year. Unlike that of Morgan, Stringer's dismissal appears to have been based on reasonably good grounds.

Privateers to the Rescue

Despite Congress' slow start in providing medical supplies, its members realized as early as December 1775 that additional sources of supply outside the Colonies would be required. On December 23 they heard that £2,000 of medicines, surgeon's instruments, and lint and bandages were required by the army, and on January 3, 1776, the Secret Committee reported to Congress that these supplies should be imported as soon as possible.

In September 1775 Congress had created the Secret Committee to supervise the export and import of vital materials required for the war. Licenses to leave port were given shipmasters on the condition that they would return with vital military stores. Under this dispensation, American ships set out for Europe, Africa, and the West Indies in search of essential supplies. Many months were required, however, to establish such importation as a significant source of supply, and this was especially true with regard to medical supplies.

The delay in initiating importation can hardly be charged as the only or even the main reason for medical supply shortages in 1776. For example, in August of that year, when at least a half-dozen medical supply officers were pleading for drugs from Congress in Philadelphia, John Thomson of Petersburg, Virginia, advertised that he had for sale "Rhubarb and Jalap, Glauber and Epsom Salts, Jesuits Bark" and a host of other supplies. Whether or not Thomson's supplies constituted any significant amount, the very fact that he had to advertise them indicates a lack of coordination and communication between those urgently seeking supplies and those selling them.

Even more frustrating were those suppliers right under Congress's nose advertising essential drugs. Suppliers like Dr. Anthony Yeldall at "his Medicinal Ware-House" were still advertising "Bark, Camphire, Rhubarb, &c" in July of '76. Philadelphia was second only to New York for Loyalists, and Yeldall was later proven to be a strong Tory. Then there were those who were neither Patriot nor Loyalist; they were just indifferent to the cause for American independence, and thus insisted on cash, even though six months' credit was the common practice just prior to the war. In 1771 in Philadelphia one druggist regularly gave a 15 percent discount on all purchases if paid within six months and 7-1/2 percent discount was allowed for payments between six and nine months, but interest was expected on all debts over a year's standing.

The business-minded members of Congress tried to follow prewar methods by seeking credit. Merchants who sold on credit found that, when they finally were paid, they received paper money backed only by a promise to exchange for gold and silver at some future time. Furthermore, they were caught in a spiraling inflation, and often found that when they finally received their money from Congress it then would cost them twice as much to replenish their stocks. Medical supply officers therefore found it necessary to pay ready cash for merchandise out of their own pocket, and sometimes they had to wait six months for reimbursement from Congress.

As we have noted, by the fall of 1776 Boston had become a better source of supply of drugs than Philadelphia, although it had been occupied by the British for nine months and Morgan had removed most of the drugs left there the previous May. This was primarily due to a single factor--the American privateer. British shipping was vulnerable to the American privateers, which were fast vessels well suited to this kind of enterprise. Well over 1,000 captures were made during the war by Massachusetts privateers alone, and the arrivals of rich prize ships at New England ports became frequent.

The Greenleaf ledger confirms that drugs were included in some of these prize ships. On December 14, 1776, Greenleaf records the receipt of £62 from the Massachusetts government in payment for "an invoice of Druggs taken from the prize ship Julius Caesar." Greenleaf received an even larger stock "of druggs taken in the prize Brig Three Friends" in March 1777. This was valued at over £170, and was also used by Massachusetts to pay on its account with Greenleaf, largely for outfitting its privateers.

On June 30, 1777, J. G. Frazer of Boston wrote Dr. Potts, still at Ticonderoga, as follows:

I have the pleasure to give you this Early notice of a prize ship being sent into Casco Bay last week with four tons of Jesuits Bark on board for one valuable article besides a great quantity of other stores for the British Army at New-York.