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Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds · M. de Fontenelle — chapter 2 of 11 · ~2,291 words · public domain

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M. Bode has translated it into German; and his translation has already gone through three editions: the last is that of 1798, Berlin, in octavo, Bernard de Fontenelle, Dialogen ueber die Mehrheit der Welten.

When Voltaire published, in 1738, his Essays on the Elements of Newton, he began with these words: "Here is no Marchioness; no imaginary philosophy." It was supposed that he here alluded to Fontenelle; this he contradicts by saying: "so far from having his book in view, I publicly declare that I consider it one of the best works that ever were written." (Mem. de Trublet, p. 135).

This book has been printed a hundred times; the handsome edition of Fontenelle's Works, in folio, published at the Hague in 1728, with figures by Bernard Pickart; the still more beautiful edition of the Worlds alone, edited by Didot the younger, in 1797, in folio, are master-pieces of typography; but in them nothing is found but the original work; therefore I consider our edition far preferable.

I shall here give a short account of the author of this work.

Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle was born at Bouen, February 11, 1657. He died January 9, 1757.

The first efforts of his genius were directed to poetry: at the age of thirteen he had composed a Latin poem: about the year 1683 he devoted himself to literature and philosophy. In 1699 he began l'Historie de l'Académie des Sciences, which he continued with great success during forty-two years. Few persons have contributed more to the progress of the sciences than he has done, by accommodating them to every capacity, and inspiring by his panegyrics, a love of study. For my part, I feel a pleasure in acknowledging that I am indebted to him for the germ of that insatiable activity of mind I have experienced ever since the age of sixteen. I could find nothing in the world like the Academy of Sciences, and ardently wished for the happiness of seeing it, long before I had any idea of the possibility of one day belonging to it.

In 1727 he published his Elemens de la Géométrie de l'infini; this was merely the amusement of a man of genius who had heard a little of geometry, and chose to hazard his opinions on the subject.

We may find an eulogium on our author in l'Historie de l'Académie des Sciences for 1757, in the Mémoires de l'Académie des Belles-Lettres, and in a work written entirely on the subject, published by Trublet in the year 1761, entitled Mémoires pour servir à l'Historie de la vie et des Ouvrages de Fontenelle. In these memoirs a particular critique shews us the various merits of Fontenelle's works: there is also an article by Trublet in the edition of Moréri, published in 1759.

I have remarked in the twentieth book of my Astronomy, that in every period of time it has been believed that the planets were inhabited, on account of their resemblance to the earth. The idea of the plurality of worlds is expressed in the Orphics, those ancient Grecian poems attributed to Orpheus (Plut. de Placitis Philosoph. l. 2, cap. 13.) Proclus has preserved some verses in which we find that the writer of the Orphics places mountains, men, and cities in the moon. The Pythagoreans, such as Philolaüs, Hicetas, Heraclides, taught that the stars were all worlds. Several ancient philosophers even admitted an infinity of worlds beyond the reach of our sight. Epicurus, Lucretius, and all the Epicureans were of the same opinion; and Metrodorus thought it as absurd to imagine but one world in the immensity of space, as to say that only one ear of corn could grow in a great extent of country. Zeno of Eleusis, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Leucippus, Democritus, asserted the same thing: in short, there were some philosophers who, although they did not consider the rest of the planets inhabited, placed inhabitants in the moon; such were Anaxagorus, Xenophanes, Lucian, Plutarch, (De Oracular. defectu. De Facie in orbe Lunæ,) Eusebius, Stobius. We may see a long list of the ancients who have treated on the subject, in Fabricius, (Biblio. Græcæ, t. 1. cap. 20.) and in the Mémoire de Bonamy (Acad. des Inscriptions, tom. ix.) Hevelius appeared as firmly persuaded of this opinion in 1647, when he talked of the difference between the inhabitants of the two hemispheres of the moon: he calls them selenitæ, and examines at length all the phœnomena observed in their planet, after the example of Kepler (Astron. Lunaris.) It was maintained at Oxford, in certain themes which are mentioned in the News of the Republic of Letters, June 1784, that the system of Pythagoras on the inhabitants of the moon was well founded: two years afterwards Fontenelle discussed this subject in his agreeable work. There are farther details of the different astronomical opinions at the end of Gregory's book. For the objections, we may refer to Riccioli. (Almagestum, tom. 1, p. 188, 204). In 1686 the Plurality of Worlds was adorned by Fontenelle with all the beauties of which a philosophical work was susceptible. Huygens (who died in 1695) in his book entitled Cosmothéoros, published in 1698, likewise enters largely into the subject.

The resemblance between the earth and the other planets is so striking, that if we allow the earth to have been formed for habitation, we cannot deny that the planets were made for the same purpose; for if there is, in the nature of things, a connection between the earth and the men who inhabit it, a similar connexion must exist between the planets and beings who inhabit them.

We see six planets around the sun, the earth is the third; they all move in elliptical orbits; they have all a rotatory motion like the earth, as well as spots, irregularities, mountains: some of them have satellites, the earth has one satellite: Jupiter is flattened like our world; in short there is every possible resemblance between the planets and the earth: is it, then, rational to suppose the existence of living and thinking beings is confined to the earth? From what is such a privilege derived but the groveling minds of persons who can never rise above the objects of their immediate sensations?

Lambert believed that even the comets were inhabited. (Systême du Monde, Bouillon; 1770.) Buffon determines the period when each planet became habitable, and when it will cease to be so, from its refrigeration. (Suplèmens, in 4to. tom. 11.) What I have said of planets that turn round the sun, will naturally extend to all the planetary systems which environ the fixed stars; every star being an immoveable and luminous body, having light in itself, may properly be compared with our sun. We must conclude that if our sun serves to attract and enlighten the planets which surround it, the fixed stars have the same use. It is thought that the sun and fixed stars are uninhabitable because they are composed of fire; yet M. Knight, in a work written to explain all the phœnomena of nature, by attraction and repulsion, endeavours to prove that the sun and stars may be habitable worlds, and that the people in them may possibly suffer from extreme cold. M. Herschel likewise thinks the sun is inhabited (Philos. Trans. 179. p. 155, et suiv.)

Some timid, superstitious writers have reprobated this system, as contrary to religion: they little knew how to promote the glory of their Creator. If the immensity of his works announce his power, can any idea be more calculated than this to exhibit their magnificence and sublimity? We see with the naked eye, several thousands of stars; in every part of the firmament we discover with telescopes, innumerable others; with more perfect telescopes, we still find a multitude more. We compute, from the number seen through Herschel's telescopes in one region of the sky, that there are a hundred millions. Imagination pierces beyond the extent of vision, beholding multitudes of unknown worlds, infinitely more in number than those which are visible to our sight; and ranges unrestrained in the boundless space of creation.

Our only difficulty with respect to the inhabitants of so many millions of planets, is the obscurity of the final causes, which it is difficult to admit when we see into what errors the greatest philosophers have fallen; for instance Fermat, Leibnitz, Maupertius, &c. in attempting to employ these final causes or metaphysical suppositions of imagined relations between effects that we see and the causes we assign them, or the ends for which we believe them to exist.

If the plurality of worlds be admitted without difficulty; if the planets are believed to be inhabited, it is because the earth is considered merely as a habitation for man, from which it is inferred that were the planets uninhabited they would be useless: but I will venture to assert that such a mode of reasoning is confined, unphilosophic, and at the same time, presumptuous. What are we in comparison of the universe? Do we know the extent, the properties, the destination, and the connexions of nature? Is our existence, formed as we are, of a few frail atoms, to be considered any thing when we think of the greatness of the whole? Can we add to the perfection and grandeur of the universe? These ideas are expressed by Saussure, who in speaking of a traveller to Mont-blanc says: "if, during his meditations, the thought of the insignificant beings that move on the face of the earth offers itself to his mind, if he compares their duration with the grand epochs of nature, how great will be his astonishment that man, occupying so small a space, existing so short a time, can ever imagine that his being is the only end for which the universe was created."

From these considerations d'Alembert, in the Encyclopedia, (art. World) after examining the arguments for supposing the planets inhabited, concludes by saying: the subject is enveloped in total obscurity.

But Buffon affirms that wherever there is a certain degree of heat, the motion produces organized beings; we need not enquire in what way, but imagine these to be the inhabitants of the planets: if that should be the case, we may conclude it highly probable that they are inhabited, notwithstanding the preceding objections.

LA LANDE.

1802.

LINES ON FONTENELLE.

Muse! if thou canst, this picture's truth excel; Strive to pourtray the soul of Fontenelle: Him, to whose works, with wit and judgment warm, Indulgent Nature, gave a magic charm.-- 'Twas his to strew with flowers the toilsome road, Which leads to Science in her dark abode; And while he touch'd the pastoral reed, to prove, That courtly pomp, must yield to rural love. A Lucian rising from the silent tomb, 'Twas his, to pierce through Error's doubtful gloom; And, with resistless eye, at once to dart Full on the hidden secrets of the heart.-- Union divine!--in Fontenelle we find A glowing genius, and a gentle mind!

PREFACE

BERNARD DE FONTENELLE.

I find myself nearly in the situation of Cicero, when he undertook to write in his own language on philosophical subjects, that, till then, had never been treated of but in Greek. He tells us that his works were said to be useless, because those who delighted in philosophy, having taken the pains to study the books written in Greek, would not afterwards think of examining his Latin ones, which were not originals; and that persons who had no taste for philosophy, would neither care for the Greek nor the Latin.

To which he answers, that exactly the contrary would happen; that the unlearned would be allured to philosophy by the facility of reading Latin works; and that the well-informed, after studying the Greek authors, would be pleased to see how the subjects were handled in Latin.

Cicero might with propriety speak in this manner; his superior genius and great celebrity assured him success in this untried project, but I have not the same advantages to inspire me with confidence, in a similar undertaking. I was desirous of representing philosophy in a way that was not philosophical; I have attempted to compose a book that shall neither be too abstruse for the gay, nor too amusive for the learned. But if what was said to Cicero should be repeated to me, I could not venture to answer as he did: possibly in attempting to find a middle way which would accommodate philosophy to every class, I have chosen one that will not be agreeable to any. It is very difficult to maintain a medium, and I think I shall never be inclined to make a second attempt of this nature.

I should warn those that have some knowledge of natural philosophy, that I do not suppose this book capable of giving them any information; it will merely afford them some amusement, by presenting in a lively manner what they have already become acquainted with by dint of study. I would also inform those who are ignorant of these subjects that it has been my design to amuse and instruct them at the same time: the former will counteract my intention if they here expect improvement, and the latter, if they here only seek for entertainment.

I need not say that of all philosophical subjects I have chosen that which is most calculated to excite curiosity: surely nothing ought to interest us more than to know how our own world is formed; and whether there be other worlds similar to it, and inhabited in the same way: but let no one be disquieted if unable to answer these enquiries; they who have time to spare may examine such subjects; many have it not in their power.

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