Part 2

He was chosen Ensign of the Company of Minute Men, and finally delegate to the First Provincial Congress. This Congress appointed him to a very important Committee on Correspondence with Canada, and that winter the committee sent him to Canada with full power to get information, confer with Canadians, whether English or French, and report back the condition of affairs and whether they would act with the Colonies. This mission was peaceful in its aim. He conferred with men from Montreal and Quebec, assuring all whom he met that the Colonies desired peace with Great Britain, but, if war came, they would surely respect the rights of all men to worship God in their own way and would maintain a democratic form of government.

Mr. Brown showed himself to be diplomatic and faithful. He endured much personal hardship and risk during the winter, and his report was most valuable. The part of it best known is under date of March 29, 1775, wherein he recommended that, if war came, Ticonderoga should be taken. "The people in the New Hampshire Grants," he wrote, "have engaged to do the job." Recently it has been stated that in February, 1775, he was at Chesterfield, Mass., and that about that time he led a party of Berkshire and Hampshire men to Deerfield and arrested a Tory or some Tories who were suspected of being in direct communication with General Gage at Boston. April 27, 1775, there appeared in the Hartford Courant a notice signed "John Brown" by order of the Committee of Inspection in the towns of Pittsfield, Richmond, and Lenox, in the following words: "Whereas Major Israel Stoddard and Woodbridge Little Esq., both of Pittsfield in the County of Berkshire, have fled from their respective homes and are justly esteemed the common pests of society and incurable enemies of their country and are supposed to be somewhere in New York Government moving sedition and rebellion against their country, it is hereby recommended to all friends of American liberty and to all who do not delight in the innocent blood of their countrymen, to exert themselves that they may be taken into custody and committed to some of his Majesty's jails till the civil war which has broken out in this Province shall be ended." Surely, Brown was an active partisan, though not at Lexington in April, 1775. In May he was at Ticonderoga with Ethan Allen, not holding any military rank. Allen commended him to the government as fit for military command.

The oft-told tale of how Ethan Allen took the fortress, proclaiming its capture in the name of "Almighty God and the Continental Congress," need not be rehearsed here. Allen took possession of Ticonderoga, its garrison, and its valuable military property with the aid of Connecticut and Berkshire men, and at his request Brown rode his horse rapidly to Philadelphia to announce to the Continental Congress the capture which was attained without their authority or aid. At this point Benedict Arnold must be referred to. In April, 1775, he had broken open an arsenal at New Haven, and with his militia company hurried to Cambridge. As he rode one day from New Haven towards Cambridge, he met Captain Parsons, who was going to Hartford to plan with some Connecticut leaders for the capture of Ticonderoga. Hearing Parsons's plan, Arnold pushed on to Watertown and got a commission from the Massachusetts government as colonel as well as an order for power to recruit men, for horses and ammunition. Meeting Ethan Allen on his way to Ticonderoga, Arnold produced his Massachusetts authority, but not his men, on the same day that Allen was fully prepared for his work. Arnold began his interference with the concerted plan, hoping for a separate command and the glory of victory. He promised payments of money to Berkshire men from the southern towns, which he failed to pay from funds given him for that purpose. This was the beginning of an angry and long-continued dispute between Easton, Brown's colonel, and Brown, on the one hand, and Arnold, on the other. Unhappily for Easton and Brown, as for all men who possess the truth about the characters of men who are undoubtedly able to fight battles, though brutal and even wicked in their lives, the controversy was long and bitter, but, while war exists, the common law and legal procedure rarely have weight and even martial law becomes ineffective.

"War is hell," said the great Sherman. Hell is irrational, as is war. Reason fails to have even its usual part in man's destiny during all wars. Chance has sway, and men often get what is called glory when others, almost unknown to fame, should win the approval of all men.

Whether Washington had his doubts about Arnold's character may never be known, but more than once he gave him opportunities to hold high command because he fought battles through. So Lincoln, when told that Grant drank whiskey, asked for more such whiskey for other generals. Sparks, the historian, a Unitarian clergyman, when writing Arnold's life, detailed his sins, his youthful desertion from the British army, his financial dishonor at New Haven, his overbearing self-assertion, and yet he added, when telling of the attitude of the members of Congress towards Arnold, that "these stern patriots, regarding virtue as essential to true honor, did not consider great examples of valor, resource, and energy even of arousing and sustaining the military ardor of a country as an adequate counterpoise to a dereliction of principle and a compromising integrity." "How far a judicious policy and a pure patriotism were combined on this occasion," writes Sparks, "as to what extent party zeal contributed to warp the judgment, we need not now inquire."

And here, my friends, is our solemn warning against war. No inquiry will ever justify war. War is justified only upon the sad assumption that, as men are "poor weak mortals" and naturally wicked, they will go to war, and justice fails where might makes right. Who thinks I can here and now fully justify John Brown as a soldier, if he was too aggressive in attack or too ardent in his antagonism of a dastardly traitor whom he knew through and through, but whom Washington, Schuyler, and other generals felt obliged to support? Perhaps not fully justify on the grounds that seem necessary to the success of war, but I can fully support Brown as a man who fought nobly for his country and in defence of the unprotected inhabitants of the Mohawk Valley, who was never false to his aims as an American patriot, who served with distinction under Allen, Montgomery, Schuyler, Arnold, Lincoln, and Van Rensselaer, and finally died while attempting to defend the Canajoharie settlements from the hostile attack of a murderous foe and acting in obedience to the command of his superior officer.

When the Massachusetts government understood the situation at Lake Champlain, Brown was appointed major of the Berkshire Regiment, and sent again to Canada with four scouts. This time the business was very dangerous. The French Canadians often helped him, but he might have been treated as a spy, and a military police chased him for many miles with two parties of fifty men each. On his return he reached Crown Point within a day of the time General Schuyler had expected him, after five days on the lake in a canoe. Early in August, 1775, he urged by letter and every other means in his power the immediate invasion of Canada. Soon he was put in command of a flotilla on Lake Champlain, and then followed his well-known exploits at St. Johns and Chamblee, where he co-operated with James Livingston, a brave New Yorker. His capture of Chamblee on the 19th of October, 1775, just five years before his death, brought promises of reward from Congress. Then came the reckless expedition of Ethan Allen which led to his capture, and which has long been believed to be the result of a failure on the part of Brown to co-operate with Allen when he could have supported him. Here the burden of proof rests on the accusers of Brown, and they never have had other proof than an implication drawn from the "Allen's narrative" that he did not make his best effort to help him, although Allen does not make any direct charge. Furthermore, the narrative is often far from correct; and as Allen was reckless in act and statement, and as Brown was continued in service under Montgomery, who was friendly to him, we may infer that Brown's failure was unavoidable. Allen's plan was not approved by Schuyler or Montgomery. Washington hoped that Allen's misfortune "would teach a lesson of prudence and subordination to others who may be anxious to outshine their general officers."

It has been intimated that Brown was one of these junior officers who chafed under the limitations set by his superiors, but he certainly retained his position as a regimental officer, and achieved such results in this Canadian invasion during the advance to Quebec that he was highly commended by his associates, promised promotion by Montgomery, and finally given his Lieutenant-colonelcy by Congress. He took part in the attack of December 31, 1775, on Quebec, and on the death of Montgomery served under Arnold for months, commanding a detachment of Berkshire and other men who were willing to re-enlist if he stayed. [See Note 2.] One of his letters written to his wife, March 15, 1776, when commanding an outpost near Quebec, says he expects to be "another Uriah because he does not agree very well with Mr. General Arnold." He had been "ordered to attack with his attachment of two hundred men, one-half of whom were sick in the hospital" (his brave brother, Captain Jacob Brown, died of small-pox). He himself marched out with his men, but the enemy retired into their fort too soon for him to attack them. He "expected another storm from Arnold, or to be punished for disobedience to orders." Truly, he was not easily subordinate to Arnold, but he was not again "set in the forefront of the battle, that others might retire from him and that he might be smitten and die," as David planned for Uriah, because he was truly loyal to the cause he so nobly served, and Arnold did not dare to destroy him.

To fully describe his conduct in denouncing Arnold and Arnold's tergiversation and intrigues against him would lead me far afield. No doubt his accusations interfered with Arnold's promotion by Congress,--promotion he earned as a great leader in battle,--but as an officer responsible for property he was repeatedly unsuccessful. Brown again and again renewed his charges against the arch-traitor, but was not able to get proper attention from the tribunals that should have relieved him from Arnold's false charges. [See Note 3.]

Again and again historians declare that Arnold was led to treason because he had been unjustly treated by the Continental Congress. What a false view this is! He is willing enough to throw himself into battle for glory and for his country's honor at Saratoga without definite authority, and again he was ready for a fight or an expedition for the relief of this valley when he could lead, but he was always in trouble financially. His Philadelphia extravagances and the increase of his indebtedness did not escape all censure.

Although Washington mildly rebuked him, he gave him new offers of high command. It is clear to me that any such statements as are indulged in by historians are of no weight or consequence.

I cannot help referring to Colonel Brown's hand-bill of the winter of 1776-77, published and posted in public places, wherein he attacked Arnold with great severity, concluding with the words, "Money is this man's God, and to get enough of it he would sacrifice his country." A prophecy! Unhappily, the same might be said of too many men of to-day. Another incident painful to recall, but characteristic, was told to my great-uncle in 1834 by Colonel Morgan Lewis, a friend of Colonel Brown's, and printed elsewhere. At the camp and in the tent where Arnold sat with other officers at some time during the Saratoga campaign, Brown faced the arch-traitor and denounced him as a scoundrel, and then, apologizing to those present, left the tent. His reiterated charges were not regarded as worthy of him as a soldier, although he had resigned from the Continental service because he could not get justice and because Arnold was not tried for his crimes. Schuyler deplored Brown's conduct as an accuser though respecting him as a brave man.

I am unable to account for the record which accredits him with thirteen months' and eighteen days' service at German Flats, New York. From April 1, 1776, to May 18, 1777, he was Lieutenant-colonel of Elmore's Connecticut Regiment, which was stationed at Albany and later at Fort Stanwix. I suppose his resignation from the Continental army was accepted about May 18, 1777, but, whatever his loyal service in New York may have been, he again marched in September, 1777, in command of Massachusetts militia under direction of General Lincoln, from Pawlet, Vt., with a separate detachment to harry the British at Ticonderoga and Lake George. On the 18th of September, 1777, early in the day he made sudden and successful attacks on the landing-place near Ticonderoga, Mount Defiance, and that neighborhood, demanding the surrender of the fortress; but this time General Powel, of the British army, made a manly reply. His captures of men and material were very valuable. Some American prisoners were released, and a Continental standard of colors was recaptured and sent to General Lincoln with much delight. All the joy of conquest is expressed in his report from Pawlet, Vt., October 4, 1777, but in his letter of September 20, written at eleven o'clock at night to General Lincoln, he said he was censured by officers and men for not suffering them to make a rash attempt to carry the fortress at Ticonderoga, although on mature consideration he thought it impossible to take possession without too great loss of life. Here as late as 1777 appears the tendency of the militia to be insubordinate. He withdrew from Lake Champlain, and planned the capture of Diamond Island in Lake George, a place where some German troops were guarding a large amount of supplies. He had manned an armed sloop and boats, but was thwarted by the escape of a prisoner and a sudden and violent storm on the lake. The prisoner gave warning to the garrison, and the result of the storm gave time for the preparation of a defence, so that after two hours' hot engagement he withdrew after destroying some of his boats. General Lincoln commended him highly for the success of this expedition. He wrote to General Lincoln September 19, 1777, telling him he had given the men all the plunder to encourage them before the attack, although "going beyond the letter of the law." This action General Lincoln approved.

The question of plunder and the martial law governing it must have been a great source of trouble in this war among Indians and white men in the invasion of Canada and the Tory invasions hereabouts. [See Note 4.] It seems probable that, when Arnold falsely charged Easton and Brown with plundering the baggage of British officers at the Sorel, he could easily cast a shadow because of the uncertainty about the rules of war and the orders given by general officers. Plunder was promised the men by recruiting officers as early in the war as when the plan was laid by Ethan Allen to capture Ticonderoga in April or May, 1775. [See Note 5.]

In the early part of the summer of 1780 rumors were received tending to show that Sir John Johnson might again invade the Mohawk Valley, this time by way of Lake Ontario and Lake Oneida. Therefore, on the twenty-second day of June, 1780, the General Court of Massachusetts, at the earnest request of General Washington, directed that 4,726 men should be raised from the militia by draft, lot or voluntary enlistment, to serve three months in New York territory after they arrived at Claverack on the Hudson. These levies, by reason of apparent danger to the cause in Rhode Island, with the exception of 315 or more men raised in Berkshire County, were sent to General Heath at Tiverton, R.I. Various meagre statements are in print in reference to the men who served under Brown at this time. I find in the Massachusetts Archives the names of officers and privates, in all 381 men, who served in the Mohawk Valley probably after August 5, 1780. [See Note 4.] It may be that some of his men were stationed in different forts or block-houses in other places than Stone Arabia, and that only 217 men of the Berkshire Regiment were in the battle of October 19, 1780. The killed and wounded are all from three of the five companies. [See Note 4.] Some writers say that Colonel Brown had New York men with him, and one statement refers to Captain John Kasselman, of Tryon County Rangers, as being in conference with Brown on the day he fell. [See Note 4.]

Each soldier was equipped at his own expense with a good fire-arm, with a steel or iron ramrod and a spring to retain the same, a worm priming wire and brush, and a bayonet fitted to his gun, a scabbard and belt therefor, and a cutting sword or a tomahawk or hatchet, a pouch containing a cartridge-box that will hold fifteen rounds of cartridges at least, a one-hundred buckshot, a jack-knife and tow for wadding, six flints, one pound of powder, forty leaden balls fitted to his gun, a knapsack and blanket, a canteen or wooden bottle sufficient to hold one quart.

Long after the Stone Arabia fight, claims were presented to the General Court of Massachusetts for felt hats, coats, vests, linen overalls, shirts, shoes, blankets, canteens, and handkerchiefs, and of course for muskets,--all lost on the 19th of October, 1780.

Brown's major was Oliver Root, his adjutant James Easton, Jr., son of his old colonel. Dr. Oliver Brewster was surgeon, and Elias Willard quartermaster. He assumed command July 14, 1780, at Claverack, and marched probably August 5 to some of the Mohawk settlements or forts. His mission was to protect various neighborhoods from sudden raids.

September 5 he was sent with two hundred men from Fort Rensselaer to Fort Schuyler to guard twelve boats with provisions for the relief of the garrison. September 11 he is reported as one of the officers of Van Rensselaer's force at Fort Rensselaer (part of which--a well preserved stone house--remains at Canajoharie under the care of young citizens of that town, being the place where the Tryon County Committee of patriots met). I cannot tell where he was for the month prior to the 19th of October, when he was in command at Fort Paris, a palisaded enclosure of stone block-houses fit for a garrison of over two hundred men, built in 1776-77 by Captain Christian Getman's Rangers on a most commanding position on the beautiful plateau called Stone Arabia, north of the Mohawk between Garoga Creek and Johnstown, where Sir William Johnson's baronial hall was. The fort was more than a dozen miles from Johnstown, and was named for Isaac Paris, who took part in the terrible affair at Oriskany. Sir John Johnson and his career in Tryon County and elsewhere in New York is well known. To me the whole subject of Indian warfare in all our wars seems to open every possible avenue to the extremest horrors and brutalities of war. Philip Schuyler, one of the noblest men who ever lived in New York State, had from his early youth been friendly to Indians. In fact, before he reached twenty-one years of age, he was given a chief's name among the Oneidas for his services to that tribe. His skill and patience made him all important in making treaties and negotiations with "The Six Nations" and other Indians. The Patriots very early realized that the Indians were to become a stumbling-block to any attempt at treating with Canada or maintaining what is called civilized warfare (can any warfare be civilized?). Schuyler, Hawley, Oliver Wolcott, and other distinguished men of high character attempted in vain to hold the Indians to neutrality. Congress at one time voted that Indians should not be employed in the service excepting where a whole nation, after full consideration, decided to act together. At another time Congress asked Schuyler to employ two thousand Indians for military service. Sir John Johnson's career, his apparent acquiescence in Schuyler's demands, his conduct when taking and when breaking his parole, his apology being that the Patriots had no established authority, and his repeated invasions of this country showed him to be the growth of the treachery which is bred among men who use the sordid and brutal nature of savages for evil purposes.

It is interesting to me that Lieutenant-colonel Mellen led Massachusetts militia to Fort Schuyler to aid Gansevoort, and that, when in August, 1777, Arnold set out to the relief of Gansevoort he led Massachusetts volunteers from Colonel Learned's battalion, and that again in the summer and fall of 1780 Brown led Massachusetts men to defend this neighborhood from the murderous invasion of Sir John Johnson. At Oriskany, Herkimer was hurried into action by his inferior officers in the manner characteristic of the independent and valorous spirit of his time, and Oriskany in 1777 was one of the most brutal conflicts between Tories and Patriots. Sullivan's retaliating expedition of July, 1778, was as bad in its character and effects as anything ever done on behalf of any cause, good or bad. The destruction of many Indian villages by Sullivan and General James Clinton was no doubt thorough, but of little avail, although it was thought wise to retaliate for the horrors of Wyoming.

Early in May, 1780, the information came to this neighborhood that Sir John Johnson was moving from Lake Champlain towards Johnstown with a considerable force, that Brant was marching against the Canajoharie settlements with a body of savages and that the Tories would join them. Johnson landed at Bulwagga Bay, near Crown Point, and, pushing through the forest and down the valley of the Sacandoga, he appeared near Johnstown. On the 21st of May, 1780, his forces divided, and poured into the lower valley of the Mohawk along a line of ten miles. From Tribes Hill upward they plundered, murdered, and destroyed. Every man capable of bearing arms was said to have been killed. Johnson withdrew hastily, as he was pursued by militia. Of course hundreds of people fled to Albany and Schenectady. Governor Clinton hurried at the head of troops from Kingston to Fort George, and, ordering others to meet him at Ticonderoga, he pushed on to Crown Point, but was too late to capture Sir John.

Brant delayed his attack until late in July, 1780, and then made a feigned attack on Fort Schuyler. General Van Rensselaer, then at Stone Arabia, hastened to the relief of Fort Schuyler, and Brant in early August fell upon the Canajoharie settlements and destroyed them mercilessly. Troops were sent from Albany to protect the settlements, but they were not sufficient.

September 7 an extra session of the New York legislature sat at Poughkeepsie, and authorized Governor Clinton to order out such number of militia as he thought necessary. Brigadier-General James Clinton was assigned command at Albany and authorized to call for assistance from the brigades of Generals Ten-Broeck and Van Rensselaer. As I have already said, Colonel Brown on the 18th of October was in command at Fort Paris, subject to orders of General Robert Van Rensselaer. Fort Paris was two or three miles north of the Mohawk. In September and early October Sir John Johnson led his forces by way of the Oswego River, Oneida Lake, and across country to the Susquehanna Valley. He ravaged the Schoharie Valley, laid siege to Middle Fort unsuccessfully, then, turning north, raided all the country from Fort Hunter. He let loose his forces for the general purpose of devastation. He again did his work thoroughly,--brutally, as was customary in Indian warfare at that time. Major Jelles Fonda, one of the victims of this ruthless destruction, who had been a confidential officer under Sir William Johnson, was absent, being a State senator. Sir John's forces burned his homestead, "The Nose," at Palatine, and destroyed, it is said, $60,000 worth of his property. On the night of October 18 Sir John encamped with his forces nearly opposite or rather above the Nose, and on the 19th he crossed the river to the north at Keder's Rifts, near Spraker's Basin. A detachment of 150 men proceeded at once against Fort Paris, but, after marching two miles, the main body joined them.

October 18 General Van Rensselaer found Caughnawaga in flames. He was in camp on a hill near Stanton Place in Florida, perhaps twenty miles from Fort Paris, when he heard that that fort was to be attacked the next morning. 'Tis said he sent a messenger with a letter to Colonel Brown and another to Colonel Dubois at Fort Plain, telling Brown to march out of the fort at nine o'clock the next morning and hold the enemy in check, while Dubois and he with his force were to co-operate. Furthermore, it is said, Brown's officers and men advised him to disobey the order, as that was not the time to leave the fort. However, he marched forth at the head of his detachment, but, being deceived by the false advice of persons pretending to be patriots, he was led to turn aside from the road upon which he marched out into a somewhat narrow clearing in the forest near a small work called Fort Keyser, and was killed nearly two miles from Fort Paris, being attacked on every side in what amounted to an ambuscade.

Captain John Ziele, of the Second Regiment of Tryon County militia, Colonel Klock's Regiment, had charge of Fort Keyser that day; and after Brown's defeat George Spraker, John Wafel, Joseph and Conrad Spraker, William Wafel, and Warner (?) Dygert, with two or three other young men, were ready to defend the place from attack, but the enemy fled, whereupon William Wafel, Joseph and Conrad Spraker, and W. Dygert proceeded to where Brown lay and carried his body to Fort Keyser. His scalp was entirely removed, and he was stripped of all his clothing excepting a ruffled shirt. After hard fighting, thirty men or more being killed, some of his men got back to Fort Paris and defended themselves successfully, thus saving the refugees therein from harm. Major Root was in command, and acted skilfully and bravely. Mr. Grider describes the battle as a running or moving fight extending from the eastward to the south-west at least across six farms, and you all know how valuable the evidence is showing that the large boulder with its inscription was the stone behind which six men found refuge and shelter until surrounded and killed.

Washington wrote to the Continental Congress: "It is thought, and perhaps not without foundation, that this invasion [of the Mohawk Valley] was made by Sir John Johnson upon the supposition that Arnold's treachery was successful."

If Johnson acted upon that supposition, Arnold was in some measure the cause of Brown's death, but, however that may be, John Brown died honorably after living honorably at Stone Arabia the 19th of October, 1780,--it is said between nine o'clock and ten o'clock in the morning.

I said that poets had not presented him to popular imagination, but his devoted classmate at Yale, David Humphreys, aide-de-camp to General Washington in 1780, wrote verses to his memory. Among his words are these:--