CHAPTER IX.

I hold in my hand a lens. This lens, in its shape, resembles a certain other lens through which I look in examining it. It was, indeed, modeled after the other, which is a part of my organ of vision. I place the glass lens in a microscope, and a hitherto unknown world is revealed to me. It was there before, but I could not see it. Do I see it now with the lens? It is evident that the lens is merely an aid to vision, since the lens in my eye is also necessary to convey the picture to my mind.

But now another question: Do I see with the lens which is a part of my eye? Is not that also merely an aid to vision? Let us consider. Since I have two eyes, I may lose one of them without losing the power to see. If I am so unfortunate as to lose one, then, if the eye is not merely an aid to vision, but part of the vision itself, it would naturally follow that I should see only half as well as before; but this, very evidently, is not true.

I can read as well as ever. For the examination of anything on a flat surface, one eye is as good as two.

Notice, also, that the lens of the eye and the glass lens are not only alike in shape and transparency, but that both are composed of material substances that can be analyzed, and that both are used to acquire knowledge of such substances and the relations existing between them. The glass lens is merely a supplement to the lens of the eye. It is one step further removed from the vision, but even the lens of the eye itself is not the seeing power. That lies back of all.

Take now the ear-trumpet, a contrivance to concentrate sound to a given point. It is intended as an aid to hearing, but it is not inseparably associated with the power to hear. A person with normal senses does very well without it. How about the ear itself?

Does that constitute a part of the hearing power of a man? If it does, what is the necessity of the auditory nerve? If the hearing and the ear were one and the same, there would be no need of this connecting link with the brain. The external and the internal ear, like the ear-trumpet, are purely material, and by means of them we are able to cognize those material emanations called sound.

I speak of sound as a material emanation, because whatever sound comes to us through the ear comes from some material source. The ear, being material, is adapted to convey such emanations to the brain, through which the mind becomes conscious of their existence.

The sense of touch, also, is exclusively adapted to the acquainting of its owner with still another aspect of things material. Hardness, softness, smoothness, roughness, heat, cold, and other attributes of matter become known through this sense, and it may be considered a rule without exception that when the sense of touch is excited, some material object is responsible. The same thing is true of the senses of smell and taste, but as their field of action is comparatively limited, I will allow the first three named to represent the whole number.

The organs of sight, hearing, and touch, then, are the three principal avenues through which we obtain knowledge of matter, they themselves, however highly organized, being also material.

Now, I have said that there is an inhabited domain in immediate touch with the earth, although not discoverable by any of the scientific instruments of investigation. Sight, hearing, and touch do not sustain this, and declare such a domain non-existent. If we bear in mind that these organs deal with matter only, it may be freely admitted that they speak the truth. The world whose existence we are asserting is an immaterial world, and although it be immaterial, it can be shown that it has, nevertheless, a claim upon our profound attention.

Certainly, after what has been shown, it ought not to lose in interest on that account. For, if our bodily senses are, by their very constitution, unable to bring us any reports save such as pertain to matter, their silence in regard to the world we speak of counts for nothing.

But it may be said that all entities are material. This is a specious plea, but the generalization is too broad. Let us test it in a familiar way. Benjamin Franklin was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and attached his name to the immortal document in a clear and legible manner. All this has to do with matter. Even the emotions which he may be supposed to have experienced while affixing his name, although not in themselves material, had a material effect upon his frame.

I say that those emotions were not in themselves material. I might take my stand here, but prefer to go one step further, and put a question: What were those emotions? and then add, This question is not in itself material.

It might be made a subject of thought. An essay might be written upon it, which would be esteemed good, bad, or indifferent, according as the author rightly apprehended the character of the man.

The question may never have been put into language before, but it is now a real entity, and our mental powers, acting freely, will have no trouble in so regarding it. It will be seen that, while it may become associated with things material, may be written so as to be seen, spoken so as to be heard, or even stamped to reach the apprehension of the blind, these material associations are no essential part of the question, since it might arise in the mind without any such aid, and be examined there without calling into play any one of the bodily senses, or any combination of them.

It may be said that this is an idle question, unworthy to take an important place in an argument, but it cannot be said that it is a foolish question; and it may well stand as a representative of other questions, questions which might have been substituted; questions which have arisen in many minds at the same time, and the answering of which has involved the overthrow of kingdoms, thereby demonstrating, if necessary, the reality of their existence.