Section 18, and Book Ii, Chapter Xxiii, Section 4. These Sections Are

not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class.

Section 62. See the note to section 51.

Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first wrote it, merely supplementing it here.

We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume entitled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of philosophical essays entitled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903).

Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. This method means:

"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in