Appendix Ii[103]

THE EXERCISE OF FORCE IN THE INTEREST OF FREEDOM

Force is a moral adiaphoron. The stigma attaching to the use of force belongs rather to its abuse. The employment of force is good or bad according as the ends for which it is used are good or bad.

The precept of non-resistance in the Sermon on the Mount is to be understood as a piece of ethical irony.

The right, or to be more explicit, the duty, of society to coerce individual members of it rests on the same ground and holds within the same limits as the duty of the individual to coerce himself. Self-coercion depends on the difference in the quality of one’s impulses, on the choice one is bound to make between competitive ends. Self-coercion is of two kinds: stimulative and repressive; stimulative to overcome inertia, repressive to subject wrong to right impulses.

He who denies the duty of self-coercion, to be consistent, must fall back on the position of the Cynics. For the Cynics were indeed consistent. They asserted not only the right of the individual to be free from outside compulsion, but also the right of each individual moment of the individual’s life to be lived without regard or subjection to future moments. Hence they rejected civilization and its tasks, inasmuch as the prosecution of any task involves the subordination of the present to the content of some future moment.

But if the coercion of a man by himself be admitted, it follows that the exercise of force upon a man by society must in principle be likewise admitted. For we are social by nature; we take an interest in the achievement by each one of his ends, and we regard such achievement as a social-benefit.

As to the limits within which outside interference is to be permitted and welcomed, these can best be ascertained by fastening attention upon the end to be attained. And here the positive conception of freedom seems to be the most helpful,—freedom defined as the release in each one of his essential self, that is, of his distinctive gift and capability, or of that in him which is unique or most nearly so. A society in which such valuable contributions were elicited from each would be the ideal society. Stimulative and repressive social coercion are justified in so far as they provoke energy and check disturbing impulses,—always of course without discouraging spontaneity, which is the very good to be secured.

The antithesis of reason and force common in discussions of this subject seems misleading and inadequate; since reason is a faculty of inference and not of preference, has to do with the adapting of means to ends, and does not of itself afford guidance in the choice of ends.

The concept of freedom as defined is more illuminating. Let freedom and force be contrasted, not reason and force.

The idea of law that would follow from what has been said may be illustrated by comparing the action of law with that of automatism in the human body. The system of co-ordinations by which we learn to walk, or acquire any kind of skill, such as that of performing on a musical instrument, is at first painfully and consciously acquired. Consciousness superintends every step in the process. But after a time the sequences reel off automatically. Consciousness retires from the field, ascends to a higher plane, and devotes itself to more interesting and significant business. Law, taking it in its broadest sense, may be regarded as the automatic machinery of freedom. It is the system of stimulations and repressions which the experience of mankind at any given time has found conducive to the attainment of the superior ends of life. In the minds of the more advanced members of the community repressive laws like the prohibitions of murder, theft, etc., have already become automatic. Such a thing as questioning or transgressing these laws never once in a lifetime occurs to them. (Of the stimulative laws, such as the requirement to pay taxes in support of the progressive interests of society, the same is not yet true.) As regards the backward members of society, however, the repressive laws are educative. Just as in certain diseases the convalescent needs to acquire anew the art of walking, which his neighbors exercise without thinking, so the backward members of society have to learn painfully those habits of repression which for others have sunk below the threshold of consciousness.

Social compulsion therefore may be defined as discipline in the interest of positive freedom. We may expect that in future this salutary kind of compulsion will go to even much greater lengths than it has yet gone. Society as organized in the state has undoubtedly the right to interfere in the choice of the sexes by prohibiting the marriage of persons afflicted with infectious disease. If the study of human character could ever be so far developed as to determine what kind of temperaments are radically incompatible with one another (a bare throw in the air of course), it would be within the province of the state to prohibit the conjugal union of such temperaments, and thus to prevent the disastrous effects on real freedom which such incompatibilities are apt to cause.

I am well aware of the perils of this point of view. There is a brutal factor in the action of society, as in that of individuals. A given community is apt to mistake its prejudices for principles, its torpor for conservatism, its superstitions for spirituality. Such apprehensions as those that weighed on the mind of John Stuart Mill as set forth in his Essay on Liberty are not to be lightly dismissed. And yet the main trend of his argument was plainly determined by an individualistic conception of liberty which many of us no longer share. It is safe to say that on the whole the benefits of coercion outweigh the detriments. We have only to picture to ourselves a state of society in which these coercions should not exist to realize that this is so. The dangers are real, but are due to the abuse of force and not to the exercise of it under the controlling idea of positive freedom which is here proposed.

FOOTNOTES:

A paper read before the Fourth Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy at Columbia University, November, 1915. (Reprinted from the International Journal of Ethics, April, 1916, pp. 420-423.)

INDEX

Achilles, 210

Africa, exploitation of, 187f, 335

Altruism, 79, 218, 220, 256

Antæus, 355

ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, 228

A priori knowledge, 105f, 111

Architecture, 286n

Aristotle, 105, 127, 168n, 190, 281, 305, 319, 365

Ark of the Covenant, 77

Arnold, Matthew, 10, 298

Arnold von Winkelried, 358

Art, relation to Ethics, 277f; limitations, 287n; students of, 296

Asceticism, 363

Bacon, On Studies, 10

Baptism, 353

Beatrice, 170

Beauty, 281f

Bereavement, 64, 162f

Bergson, 108, 131n

Blackstone, 185

Blake, William, 356

Bloch, 242

Bluntschli, 327f

Buddha, 16, 32, 199, 347

Cæsar Borgia, 172

Cana, feast at, 206

Categorical Imperative, 75f; and hypothetical, 80

Causality, “prejudice of,” 110f, 136, 141, 171

Christianity, an estimate of, 30-42; other-worldliness of, 140, 268; national, 321; forced on the East, 331

Church, 347

Citizenship, 322

Confucius, 16, 31, 299

Congo, atrocities in, 330, 335, 338

Conscience, origin of, 78

Copernicus, 141

Creation, doctrine of, 139, 356

Cromer, Lord, 331n

Crucifixion, of man, 357f

Cynics, 366

Dante, 198n, 283

Darwinism, 59, 78f, 120

“Death in Life,” 225

Decalogue, 198

Democracy, ethical aspect of, 125, 143; political, 319n; evils in, 321, 330n; new conception of, 340n

Dependence, 226

Dilke, Sir Charles, 335n

Discipline, 244f

Duality, of character traits, 208f

Duty, in Kant, 75f; conflicts of, 317f

Education, state, 252; as vocation, 291f; for adults, 301f; moral, 302n

Edwards, Jonathan, 163

Egoism, 220

Elisha, the prophet, 61

Emerson, estimate of, 27-29; Essay on Love, 164n

Ends, proximate and ultimate, 50-51; in Kant, 74, 89; instrumental, 138, 166, 229f, 268; unattainable in finite world, 149f, 158; hierarchy of, 363

Enemies, 205; intellectual, 207n

Erastianism, 342

Ethical Culture, Society for, 58, 346n; School, 58n, 276

Ethics, as non-violation of personality, 7, 35, 54; individuality of, 24; as science of ends, 40, 50f; and social reform, 48; relation to other subjects, 66; Kantian, 73f; an independent discipline, 84f, 132f; energizing quality of, 93, 101, 135n, 221, 228, 274, 363; contrast with physical science, 93, 99; its peculiar manifold, 109f, 114f, 126, 132, 141; verification in, 112; and social structure, 191; and empirical traits, 212f, 223f, 242f; the law of levitation, 222; as science of relations, 233; and industry, 272f; and art, 277f; and nationality, 325f; historical systems of, 346; and worship, 349, 352

Evil, problem of, 32-34; immediate reform, 49; contrasted with sin, 172f

Family, as empirical group, 133, 249f; spiritual view of, 251f

Festivals, religious, 353

Feudalism, 142

Force, as ethical discipline, 356f; and freedom, 366f

Forgiveness, 202f

Fouillée, Alfred, 209, 324

Freedom, 148f, 300, 306, 366f

Freud, 79

Friendship, 234f

Froebel, 295

Frustration, in marriage, 62f, 235; in bereavement, 64; in intellectual ambition, 65f, 227; cosmic, 67; in social betterment, 69; in achieving ethical uniqueness, 118; and ethical plan, 137, 140, 147, 150f; mission of, 152f, 165, 195, 365; in science, 265; in vocation, 269; final realization of, 356f

“Functional Finalities,” 106, 111f

Galileo, 97n

Gang Loyalty, 77

George, Henry, 44

Goethe, 67n, 176n, 198n, 220, 243, 285

God, idea of, 136, 139, 362; submission to will of, 156; worship, 350

Greek, art, 16n; philosophy, 105; treatment of suffering, 155, 166; idea of evil, 172; social system, 190f; epic, 283; education, 299

Grotius, 332

Hague Conference, 326

Happiness, 227f

Harnack, Adolf, 39

Hebrews, sex purity, 7; religion, 14-26; as elect people, 19; their mission, 21f; and problem of evil, 33

Hegel, 139, 343

Helmholtz, 196, 267

History, value of, 247n; ethical aim of, 275f

Humboldt, William von, 126

Hume, 111

Ilion, 283

Imagination, 267

Immortality, 139, 166f, 359

Individual, the, 246, 250, 295, 319f

Industry, organization of, 271, 274; representation of, 312

Insanity, 161n

Intellect, 227

Internationalism, 325f; obstacles to, 332f; organized, 338n

Isaiah, 22

Jerusalem, siege of, 33

Jesus, as exemplar, 25; his teaching, 30-42; and the problem of evil, 33f; and socialism, 37; attitude toward sin, 204n, 205

Jews, 347

Justice, social, 194f; commercial, 215f; ethical, 217; legal, 289

Kant, individualistic ethics, 9; and holiness idea, 59; Critique of Ethical Ideal, 73f, 137f; his pre-occupation with physical science, 84f, 88, 100, 133; doctrine of ends, 74, 80, 87, 100; Critique of Pure Reason, 84, 95, 102; not a pure rationalist, 95f; a priori doctrine, 111; doctrine of worth, 119; and God idea, 126f; and ontological argument, 129; on marriage, 257

Keats, 282

Labor, remuneration of, 193

Lange, Albert, Die Arbeiterfrage, 10; History of Materialism, 11

Law, 290, 307; international, 332f; divine, 345; and freedom, 367

Lawyer, vocation of, 289

Lear, King, 282

Leibnitz, 196, 247n, 332

Lessing, 150

Life, right to, 179f

Louis XIV, 316

“Lycidas,” 282

Manifold, of time and space, 96; in physical science, 107f; ethical, 109f, 132, 134, 141

Marcus Aurelius, 120

Marriage, and happiness, 61f; tabu notion of, 77; spiritual relation in, 163, 258f; monogamic, 251, 254; infelicitous, 257; state control of, 307

Marx, Karl, Das Kapital, 44; type of socialism, 45f

Materialism, of middle class, 52

Mayer, Robert, 196

Mill, J. S., 368

Mommsen, 276n

Monasticism, 40

Monotheism, 20f

Moral Law, as worshipful, 10, 12; obligation to obey, 75; universality of, 177; and worship, 350

More, Sir Thomas, 205n

Moses, 26, 355

National Character, 324; sins of, 330, 336f

Nature, exploitation of, 186f

Necessity, applied to ethics, 85f; Kantian, 88

Newton, 84, 94, 196

Nietzsche, 47, 152, 214

Non-resistance, doctrine of, 182

Noumena, Kantian, 127n

Numen, spiritual, 220, 224, 228, 231

Œdipus Rex, 173, 281n

Ontological Argument, 129f

Ostwald, 94

Pantheism, 8n

Paul, St., 38

Peace, spiritual, 360

Pekin, 330

Personal Factor in Ethics, 3-6

Personality, 197, 222, 247, 321

Pestalozzi, 295

Peters, Karl, 335

Philistinism, 52

Philosophy, monism and pluralism, 110

Plagiarism, 197

Plato, transcendent vision of, 16; his idea of justice, 31; ethics of, 74, 120, 132; influence of, 198n; and eugenics, 214; and art, 286; and the State, 305, 313, 319

Poverty, evils of, 44f; relief of, 51

Pragmatism, 106n, 136n

Prayer, 351f

Property, its rights, 185f; as a social concept, 189

Ptolemy, 105n

Public Good, 314

Punishment, its object, 176, 203; capital, 204

Race Prejudice, 236n

Ranke, 247n

“Reality-producing functions,” 114f, 124n, 126, 130, 132, 265

Religion, Types of, 363

Religious Society, 341f; its teaching, 343f; organization, 347f; worship, 349f

Repentance, 203f

Representation, in State, 310n, 322; proportional, 322

Reputation, right to, 196f

Responsibility, definition, 173f; for others’ life, 180; for poverty and suffering, 183f

Reverence, three-fold, 241f, 250; in family, 253; in artist, 284f; in education, 292; among nations, 324

Reymond, Dubois, 128

Rousseau, Confessions, 6; idea of State, 305

Schiller, 285n

School, 292; and home, 294; objects of, 295f; prevocational, 298; moral education in, 303; self-government in, 304

Schopenhauer, 120, 131n

Science, as vocation, 263f; and internationalism, 334

Self-discipline, 362f

Self-sacrifice, 212f

Sermon on the Mount, 4, 198, 366

Service, 226f

Shelley, 282

Sin, 171f, 202f

Social reform, 48f; fallacies of, 53f, 268; spiritual view of, 56; its object, 261; various schemes of, 273; ethical program of, 275n

Socialism, 11, 37, 43f, 56n, 196, 271f, 274

Socrates, 122

Sophocles, 173

Spencer, Herbert, 94

Spinoza, 8

Spiritual Nature, 148, 224, 231

State, ethical conception of, 305f; sovereignty of, 308f; organization of, 310f; as lawmaker, 313; duty towards, 319; and individual, 319n; international relations, 326f; and religion, 342f

Stephen, the Martyr, 38

Stevenson, R. L., 208n, 211n

Stoicism, 154, 159

Suffering, various attitudes toward, 154f; ethical attitude, 159f

Sympathy, as ethical motive, 49f, 99n, 156

Tabus, 77, 179

Tariff, 314, 315n

Tasks of Life, 268

Thomas à Kempis, 258

Tolstoy, 184

Trade, international, 334f; slave, 335

Tyndall, 268

Tyrrel, Father, 39, 150n

Universe, spiritual, 125f, 134; last blessing of, 360

University, ideal of, 298f; American, 300f

Value, vs. Worth, 117n

Vattel, 332

Verification in ethics, 112, 118, 135n

Virtue, 211

Vocation, influence on development, 58f; vs. occupation, 260f; an ethical classification, 262f; practical, 270f; educational, 289f; represented in State, 310f, 322

Wages and wage-earners, 194, 215n, 216

Waitz, Anthropologie, 209

War, when justified, 182f

Wealth, 51; stewardship of, 192

Whole, ideal of, in ethics, 100f, 114f, 121

Women, in State, 311; in religious societies, 348

Wordsworth, 282

Worship, religious, 349

Worth, in human personality, 57, 68, 70, 224n, 247; Kant’s doctrine of, 82f, 89f, 101; ethical justification of, 91f, 98n; attributed to man, 101n, 102f; as member of ethical manifold, 117, 119, 121; vs. value, 117n; homage to, 349, 360

Zeno, 108

Zionism, 24

Zoroaster, 15