Part 87

Mr. D. said he would submit to the House one consideration: the appearance which the passage of such a bill would present to the world after the resolutions passed at the commencement of the present session. For his own part, indeed, he had deemed it useless to make declarations of national independence, or to resolve against submission; but at the commencement of the session a resolution had been passed respecting what had taken place between Executive and the British Minister, and then Congress had pledged themselves to call forth the whole force of the nation to stand by and support the President. He had supposed this unnecessary, improper, and exceptionable in some respects. But at the same session, when the controversy was chiefly respecting maritime privileges, if they should not only reduce but sell the Navy, what would the world say, when they had seen the beginning and end of the session? Would it be possible that foreign powers could look up with any reverence to their acts? We shall, said he, be reduced to such a situation that even the apprehension of our hatred could not insure respect from foreign Governments, if we suffer our conduct to be so completely at war with our own acts. In order to possess some appearance of respectability in the estimation of others, the most expedient course would be to establish economy and provide for a less profuse distribution of the public moneys, but to retain the public armed vessels, that we may be in the condition for effectual service whenever it is deemed expedient. By this course we may save more of property as well as character than by an abolition of the Navy; and if we save both it is better than to save the one and lose the other.

In allusion to a remark of Mr. MUMFORD against the bill, Mr. D. said that in regard to what was formerly said respecting millions for defence and not a cent for tribute, that doctrine was a very good one, but it had no connection with crawling within ourselves in time of danger--with the terrapin policy--with drawing in head and claws so that no part of the body should be exposed; and those who were for that course, (because really they had not provided any shell,) could not very well appeal for their justification to the doctrine of "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute," and yet he believed that the gentleman from New York himself had voted for that system of terrapin defence. Although, said Mr. D., I was against that thing, yet there were men distinguished for talents and worth, and who are eminent in the councils of their country, who entertained sentiments widely different. This policy was borrowed from the colonial system; we did not assume the spirit of a nation, perhaps; we recollected what we had done before when we were colonies, and perhaps gentlemen thought the efforts of children might succeed when they had attained to manhood. It was a delusion. If gentlemen, however, now see through their error, their desire to correct it ought not to be condemned.

Mr. BASSETT was of opinion with Mr. D. that reform rather than reduction of the Naval Establishment ought to be their object. He was glad to find that when the Navy was brought into view, other ideas than those of mere commerce began to be associated with it. Heretofore it had only been advocated as a means for the protection of commerce. Mr. B. said he lived in a district which was sensibly alive to the benefits of a navy. The district which he represented had within it more water than land. It therefore became essential to the defence of his constituents that they should have a floating protection. It was impossible, in the nature of things, that they could be defended but by a floating defence. Surely there could be no gentleman in the House who was not sensible of the necessity of protection! It might be a favorite point in a monarchy to keep the country unprotected, and thus under the control of the Government, but the motto of Republics should be universal justice, equal rights, and common defence. He asked gentlemen to look at the magnitude of the object of defending our seacoasts, which could not be less than three thousand miles in extent, and, taking into consideration the sides of our navigable rivers, that extent would be doubled. If gentlemen would but for a moment consider the immense space which was exposed, they would see all the importance of securing an adequate defence. The House had been told, and certainly very truly, that there was a maritime force rising in our neighborhood. The House had been told, also, and told correctly, too, that at least two large vessels were building in their own waters for the use of that growing maritime power. At the very moment, said Mr. B., that we know that the blacks of St. Domingo are building vessels, shall we dispose of Our public armed vessels? Let me ask who will buy them when put into the market? Who but Christophe and Petion? It is reduced to a certainty that if we put them now to the hammer, they must go in that direction. I ask gentlemen seriously to weigh that consideration.

The situation of our Navy is at present sufficiently reduced. We have only five frigates in actual service. The Chesapeake, for want of repairs, is now in harbor. If gentlemen are anxious that she should be laid up in ordinary, I would accord in it; but I would prefer to leave this subject entirely to the discretion of the Executive. I know, sir, how apt a proposition of this sort is to be met by a suggestion of Presidential confidence; but when we come to consider our particular situation, that we are putting it into the power of the President, not to add to the burdens of the people, but to relieve them, that will be thought a sound argument to justify the course of leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the President. The wisdom of the last and of the present Congress has kept in service five frigates. We cannot remain in session at all times; and we are at this moment, extremely doubtful as to the aspect our affairs will assume as to foreign nations. I would ask gentlemen if former experience does not warn us that if we have an accommodation with one belligerent, it will but lead to a wider breach with the other? But if this occurrence does not take place, and every thing should turn out happily, my proposition would leave it in the power of the Executive to secure the public against loss. The expense is not drawn upon us by the Executive, but it is such as the wisdom of the National Legislature has thought proper to incur. Therefore I think it fair to consider the subject in this way. As we are about to separate, and as present appearances would not warrant our giving up any species of protection, we shall be justified in giving a discretionary power to the Executive to put down such part of the Naval Establishment as he may in future think it justifiable to part with.

I am not one of those who think the expense of the Navy a sufficient argument for disposing of it altogether. I have been asked what has the Navy done. I can answer for a large portion of my constituents, that it has kept them quiet in mind. Is it not important that the men who live on the seaboard should know that we have a force to repel attack? What sort of attack have we cause to expect? A serious invasion? Certainly not. The sort of attack which we ought to guard against is the predatory attack, made at small expense, to our great injury. If we do away the naval system entirely, our whole seacoast will be liable to be ravaged. A single frigate, a single privateer, a single pirate, might come into your waters and injure your citizens to a considerable amount. It has been mentioned, and I have seen an official intimation of it, that two or three vessels, in the shape of pirates, had stopped vessels at the mouth of the Mississippi. The force now embodied on the ocean is not more than adequate to the security of the nation against predatory warfare. I am willing, notwithstanding this, to leave it to the Executive discretion to lessen the burden.

I regret much that at this period of the session we cannot go into an examination of the expenditures the gentleman from Connecticut complains of. I think it proper to observe that for one I shall be willing to receive his assistance in detecting abuses. I believe the gentleman at present at the head of the Navy Department has every disposition to correct them. But at the same time that is not sufficient for us. I do not know of any unnecessary expenses, or I should bring them to public view; I do believe there is not that want of system which the gentleman seems to suppose. This much I know, that at all the navy-yards are proper officers for distributing stores. There all the rigging, ropes, &c., &c., are kept apart, and, as far as a landsman, a lubber like myself, can judge, appear in great order.

In relation to the smaller vessels it appears by the report of the Secretary of the Navy that they are in perfect repair. The expense of sailing them is the only expense. I cannot but again repeat, because I think it of the last importance, that the security which these small vessels gives us greatly outweighs all disadvantages of expense. If we can lessen the expense, let us do it, in the hope that at another session we shall be able to find out where the evil exists. It is generally said, when this subject is under consideration, that we cannot attempt to cope with Great Britain. Because we cannot, are we to succumb to others? To provide no protection against smaller powers? At this moment the master of an American merchant vessel is employed in the service of the Emperor of China, a country possessing the greatest population in the world, for the purpose of protecting the citizens of the Emperor against some small pirates. Is there a fact can speak more strongly to us, that, without some sort of naval defence, with such a seacoast as we have, (and let it be recollected, sir, that our seacoast is much greater in proportion to our population than the Chinese,) we shall be at the mercy of the worst of the human race?

It was asked what mighty good the Navy has done. Let me ask the gentleman who asked that question, what mighty good our Army has done by land? When we consider the point of expense, let us consider the evils of different sorts. Let me ask gentlemen if the evils depicted to exist in Peru, where gold abounds, do not equal any thing they can imagine to proceed from the want of money? We must forget the evils that force produces in the necessity which exists for having it. We cannot say, because some evil results from force, that we will not have it; for, if you have it not, others will. Our own experience should teach us the necessity of it. What was the effect of our eloquent addresses, when colonies, placed at the foot of the British throne? They (the British) sent a fleet and army to Boston. They did not tell you power was right; but they said it with their fleet and army. Reason will tell us the same now; it is impossible to meet force but by force. The effects of naval force are well remembered. It is well recollected that in the Revolution Cornwallis marched from Charleston to Virginia. When he got there, a French fleet was on the coast. The very moment the fleet advanced by water, Cornwallis surrendered. Here was evidence of the effect of naval force. And it is by its efficiency that we must balance the great objection of expense. I have heard it stated here how much more expense a sailor is than a soldier. If we look to the fact, and contrast the efficiency of the two, we shall find that the superior efficiency of the sailor greatly outweighs the additional expense. There is one fact, very strongly illustrative of this principle, drawn from British history. It is found, by the papers laid before Parliament, that the present naval establishment costs seventeen millions annually. The expense of the army is nearly the same. With seventeen millions of water force, the navy of Great Britain makes her mistress of the ocean; with seventeen millions, the land force of Great Britain is contemptible. As concerns ourselves, all the attack we can expect to receive is on the ocean or on the seacoast, and we can by this fact see demonstrably that we can procure more protection for a certain number of dollars expended on the water than we can from the same number of dollars expended on the land. History shows that Republics are always naval powers; and navies have preserved their existence. The history of England, instead of destroying this argument, is in favor of it; the celebrated exploits of the Dutch confirm it. England, though a monarchy, is the freest in Europe, and all nations have enjoyed the greatest naval celebrity when they have been most free. A navy has no great general at the head of it, wielding an immense body of armed men. The commanders of ships have a very different influence. The admiral himself cannot act on the land. History does not show an instance where an attack was made on the liberty of a nation from that quarter. I am therefore disposed to give my feeble aid to support an efficient force upon the water rather than upon the land; and I believe the present establishment is by no means beyond what ought to exist.

Mr. RANDOLPH said, that as his objections to the Navy went to the whole system, he would make his observations at large, in preference to reserving them in detached parts on the various details of the bill. My object, said Mr. R., is to endeavor to persuade the House that they ought not to concur in the report of the Committee of the whole House. I have ever believed that the people of the United States were destined to become, at some period or other, a great naval power. The unerring indications of that fact were presented to us in a tonnage and number of seamen exceeding those of any other nation in the world, one only excepted. When, therefore, I proposed to reduce the Naval Establishment of the United States, it was not for the pitiful object of putting down some five or seven gunboats and two or three unimportant navy-yards, or of making the mighty reduction contemplated in the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. In other words, it was for the purpose of making barely such a retrenchment in the naval expenditure as might enable Government, after such retrenchment was effected, to go on with the aid of loans and taxes. We had two views of the probable state of the nation presented to us during this session. The first was a view of war, in which case it was agreed on all hands that loans and taxes would be necessary; the next was a view of peace, in which case it was believed that loans and taxes were unnecessary, and was so pronounced from the highest authority in the country on financial concerns. But now it seems to have a view of reduced military and naval expenditure which does not obviate the necessity of loans and taxes. My object in the proposed reduction was not to enable the Government to get on with the aid of loans and taxes, but to make such a reduction as would have enabled the Government to dispense with a recurrence to them.

I have said, sir, that the United States were, in my opinion, destined to become a great naval power; and I have read unerring indications of it in the commercial prosperity of our country, out of which alone it can grow. But I believe, if any thing could retard or eventually destroy it--if any thing could strangle in the cradle the infant Hercules of the American Navy--it would be the very injudicious mode in which that power has been attempted to be prematurely brought into action, and kept in action, during the two last administrations. Again, a naval power necessarily grows out of tonnage and seamen. We have not only driven away our tonnage, but have exerted ourselves with no little zeal, even at this very session, to prevent its ever coming back. We have not been willing to consent that vessels polluted by the unpardonable sin of a breach of the embargo should return. True it is, that we have not made the same provision in relation to seamen: we have conceived the guilt rather to reside in the wood or iron, than in the men who conducted it. But, although we have no provision for the express purpose that they should not return, unfortunately they have not returned; and the proof of this fact is evinced by another, viz: that landsmen are at this moment employed on board our few ships of war, because seamen cannot be procured. Our tonnage and seamen, then--the sinews of naval power--are wounded by our own measures, to a considerable degree. Again: it has always been understood, according to my view of the subject, that one of the principal uses of a navy was to protect commerce; but our political rule for some time past has been that of inverse proportion, and we have discovered that commerce is the natural protector of a navy. The proof of this is found, if not in every act of this House, certainly in most of the speeches delivered on this floor. I need only allude to a speech made by a colleague of mine, (Mr. GHOLSON,) who usually sits on my right hand, a few days ago, in which he stated that the power to regulate commerce was specially given by the constitution to the United States--not as a means of raising revenue, equalizing duties throughout the United States, and making all in fact one family--but, that it was put into the hands of Congress as a scorpion-whip to bring the other nations of the world to our terms; that, by turning away the light of our countenance--the sunshine of our commercial bounty--they might wither and decay.

I had always thought too, sir, that the revenue which a Naval Establishment naturally calls for was to be founded on commercial greatness; in other words, that commerce was to give us revenue, and revenue was to support a navy, which in return was to protect commerce. But, it seems we have changed all this--we have perverted the whole course of procedure--and why? Sir, shall we keep up an expensive Naval Establishment, necessarily driving us into loans and taxes, for the protection of a commerce which the Government itself says we shall not carry on; and when members of this House tell us that the natural protection of commerce is the annihilation of it? The Navy has now become a sort of fifth wheel to the political coach, and I am unwilling to keep it up, at this expense, on these grounds.

If, sir, the construction which I have taken of the sense of the House and of the Government be not correct, whence comes it that we have such cases before us as that of Daniel Buck? Whence comes it that we hear of Treasury instructions, not issued in the first instance for the purpose of expounding a law touching the clearances of vessels, that uniformity may prevail in the different districts, but supplementary instructions, becoming in practice the actual law of the land? In other words, if my construction be not correct, whence comes it that every principle formerly called federal--every principle of Executive energy and power--has been strained of late to an extent heretofore unparalleled? Whence comes it, that in the archives of this Assembly, we find copies of licenses given by the Executive power of the nation--to do what? To permit one part of this confederacy to supply another part with bread! We have had Executive licenses, graciously permitting that a portion of our citizens should not starve while the rest were revelling in plenty, and suffering for want of a market! Let us suppose, that in the fragments of history of the ancient nations of the earth, of those periods which are most involved in obscurity, we should find an Imperial rescript to this effect, what would be the inevitable conclusion of the historian? That, if the Chief Magistrate of the Government could at pleasure starve one part of the people while another was rioting in plenty, that the individual who held this power was the greatest despot on earth, and the Government a purely unmixed despotism. But, sir, it would be improper to draw any such conclusion here, because we are the most enlightened people on earth--I believe we have placed that on record. It was nothing but the protection of the Navy of the United States, and a desire of avenging the attack on the Chesapeake--for, among all the causes of the embargo, we hear of none oftener than the attack on the Chesapeake;--it was nothing but a defence, not only of the commercial interests, but of the naval strength of the nation, which created this dictatorship in the person of the Chief Magistrate. It was not that we are naturally more prone to slavery than others, but it was for the preservation of our national defence, (if that be not positively opposed to national defence which costs four millions, and which, when Greek meets Greek, and the tug of war comes, must take refuge under such measures as those I have mentioned.) No, sir; my object in the bill which I presented to the House was a great one: it was to enable us to dispense with a loan to the acknowledged amount of $5,150,000--to enable us to dispense with taxation, to an amount which no man can calculate, (if, indeed, the system which passed this House was constructed to bring in revenue at all). It was not a little, paltry affair of reducing a couple of navy-yards; not to bury the dead, who have been already interred in the marshes of the Mississippi; not twice to slay the slain: it was for a great public object. Really, sir, the reduction of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SMILIE) reminds me very forcibly of an incident which is said to have taken place at the discovery of the gunpowder plot. When commissioners were sent into the Parliament vaults, to examine into the situation of the gunpowder and combustibles collected together for the purpose of blowing up the King, the Parliament, and the whole constitution, they returned and reported that they had found fifty barrels of gunpowder; that they had removed five-and-twenty barrels, and humbly trusted that the remaining five-and-twenty would do no harm! This is precisely the reduction which the committee and the gentleman from Pennsylvania have agreed to make. It is a reduction which will not do any effectual service, and I therefore hope the House will not accord in it.

But, we are told that great and gigantic events in Europe are to be arrested. That which the British navy cannot do, I suppose, or that which the combined Continental forces opposed to her cannot effect, is to be decided here by three frigates; for that is precisely the extent to which, if I understand him, he is willing to go. It seems, we are also to suffer a total loss of the ships to be sold, they being unfit for every other purpose. Are they unfit for the East India trade? Was not the first vessel which ever doubled the Cape of Good Hope, under the flag of the United States, the old frigate Alliance? And would not these vessels, if sold, be purchased for that and for other purposes; more especially when we consider the immense loss of tonnage which the United States have sustained--I will not say how, but when--within the last two years? But this, if well founded, would be no objection with me to the reduction of the Navy. I am willing to put a clause in the bill to authorize the President to give the frigates away, if he cannot sell them. My objection to the expense is not merely to pounds, shillings, and pence--not merely to the counting-house calculation--but to expenses utterly incommensurate to the object to which those expenses profess to go, and to a system of organized public plunder. If we agree to make this reduction, however, according to the statement of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BASSETT,) foreigners will purchase from us ships of the best construction in the world, on the best terms. I believe, if the gentleman's knowledge on the state of our public ships was as accurate as perhaps it is on other subjects, he would hardly suspect foreigners of coming to our markets for the purpose of buying those ships to annoy our commerce. Who will become the purchasers--Great Britain? After having given her hundreds of thousands of tons of your shipping now sailing under the British flag, and manned her navy with your seamen driven from your employment, do you believe the Admiralty will send across the Atlantic to buy the hulks rotting at the navy-yard; or would it be a formidable accession to the British navy, especially when four of these vessels are absolutely unfit for any purpose whatever? I presume that even the Emperor of France, if it were an object with him to have these famous models of naval architecture at Antwerp, would hardly venture to purchase them, and run the risk of getting them across the ocean. I conceive you could hardly get insurance done on them at Philadelphia or Baltimore. The idea of keeping these vessels is absolutely idle, unless gentlemen are disposed to send their commerce on the ocean, and employ force in the protection of it.

Sir, I am extremely exhausted already--and I presume the House are fully as fatigued with me as I am with myself--but I will endeavor to go along with my loose remarks. The panegyric which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) has been pleased to bestow on the American naval officers, I have not the least indisposition to subscribe to, so far as my knowledge will permit me to go. As far as my information extends--as far as I have the pleasure, and I may add the honor, of being acquainted with those gentlemen--there is no class in society whom I think more highly deserving. And I did hope, when the gentleman went into this eulogium on the one hand, and inference at least of censure on that which he has been pleased to term "The Staff of the Navy"--but which I suppose I may as well call the civil branch, who have the control and management of the civil service; not the men who fight the battles, but who pocket the greatest part of the emolument--that he would have been more particular. Sir, I do know that comparisons are extremely unpleasant, and no consideration would induce me to go into them, especially after the observation of my friend before me, (Mr. MACON,) but the discharge of an imperious public duty. I can have no hopes of deriving any thing further than experience from the past Administrations. It is to make use of this experience that I call the attention of the House to the comparative expenses of the Navy under the several Administrations.

I find, from the Treasury statement in my hand, made on the 5th of this month, that the Navy under General Washington's administration, cost $1,100,000; that during the four years of Mr. Adams's administration, it cost $9,700,000, in round numbers; that, in the eight years of the succeeding Administration, it cost $12,700,000. I make these remarks, because the statement differs from that made by the worthy gentleman from Connecticut in this respect; that, when he made the expenditure under the last Administration to amount to fourteen millions, he did, in my opinion, improperly saddle that Administration with the expenditure of the year 1801, viz: $2,111,424, authorized and voted under Mr. Adams's administration. From the mere glance at this paper it will be seen, that from 1801 to 1802, the expenditure fell from the above sum of $2,000,000, to $900,000, marking distinctly the retrenchment at the period of Mr. Jefferson's accession. The first year properly chargeable to the last Administration is that succeeding the one in which they came into office, viz: 1802. I find, also, from a comparison of the statements in the same document, that the most extravagant year of the second Administration was the year 1800--the year after I first had the honor of a seat in this House--when the expenditure amounted to $3,448,716. The most extravagant year of the last Administration was the year succeeding its going out of office, the expenses of which were incurred and voted by it, viz: to the amount of $2,427,758.

Against the administration of Mr. Adams, I, in common with many others, did and do yet entertain a sentiment of hostility, and have repeatedly cried out against it for extravagance, and for profusion, and for waste--wanton waste--of the public resources. I find, however, upon consideration--whether from the nature of man, or from the nature of things, or from whatever other cause--that that Administration, grossly extravagant as I did then and still do believe it to have been, if tried by the criterion of the succeeding one, was a pattern of retrenchment and economy; and I ask the House to put the question to themselves, whether we are likely to see, at any future period, an Administration more economical than that of which we have just now taken leave? And this I say, without meaning to cast the slightest imputation on the present. The person now at the head of affairs, has, at least in one respect, conducted himself in his high office in a spirit dear to my heart--it is the spirit of a gentleman. The first session of Congress under the last Administration was a period of retrenchment. Throw the session of last summer out of the question, and this must be the session of reform under the present. Have we any reason to conclude, from what we have seen or heard, that we can look forward to any policy more economical than that of the Administration of which we have just taken leave? I wish it to be clearly understood, that in the year 1800, in which our expenses amounted to $3,448,060, we had three 44-gun frigates; six frigates, from 44 to 32; two of 32, of a large size; four of 32, smaller; eight from 32 to 20; three sloops of war and four brigs, from 18 to 16; and five brigs and schooners, from 14 to 12 guns--employing a total of 7,296 seamen. This Administration, too, it should be remarked, not only built every frigate, every vessel of respectable force--yes, sir, built them from the stump--which the United States now have, but many others, which have been since sold, and the proceeds of which have gone into the Treasury. At this time, then, when the United States had this formidable force afloat; when nearly 8,000 seamen were employed; (I know the documents only state 7,300, but I am told from the best authority there were nearly 8,000;) when our flag at least triumphed in our own seas; when we had nothing of that system of drawing within our shell, which the gentleman from Connecticut so justly derides; when we had not reached the soft-shelled state in which we were placed by the non-intercourse law;--at that time, the Navy of the United States cost nearly three millions and a half, making for each seaman about $472. I know, sir, that these statements are dry, but they are useful in proportion as they are dry. According to the statement which my colleague (Mr. BASSETT) has made, and which he has told you not only came from the Secretary of the Navy, but was in the Secretary's own handwriting, the number of seamen which he had last year in employ was 2,723, which cost the nation $2,427,000--for each man employed, within a trifle of $900! Now, sir, if every seaman under the last Administration cost double the expense which was incurred for the same man under the preceding one, if the same system is continued, we have no reason to doubt that the seamen next year will cost double of their present expense. But, even suppose the expense to remain the same as it now is, will the Representatives of the American people agree to maintain a naval force which costs us $900 (within $13) per man, the use of which no man has attempted to guess, much less to demonstrate!

I wish to be indulged in a little further comparative political economy. I believe, sir, that the same good results in politics from comparing the merits of different Administrations, that results in medicine and surgery from the dissection of the human body--that they are fairly to be tried by the same rules. I find, then, that in the year 1800 the estimated pay of the officers is $391,000, and that the estimated pay of the seamen in the same year is $818,000. And yet, sir, by the estimate now before me, and which any gentleman can turn to, made for the year 1800, the subsistence of the officers, their pay, and that of the seamen, amounts only to $296,000--a sum less, by nearly $100,000, than the estimated pay alone of the officers in 1800--while the expense of the whole Establishment approach for the last year within $1,000,000 of the expense of the year first mentioned. I am at a loss to account for these manifest inconsistencies, and I might say solecisms, in our political arithmetic. We have a Navy which we are told employs 2,700 men, which costs within a third as much as a Navy employing nearly 8,000 men, and yet, when we come to compare the great objects of expense--to wit: pay and subsistence of the officers and seamen, the reward of valor and merit--we find a contrast which I believe no man in this House is prepared to explain.

Now, sir--for the whole subject, thank God, is now before us--let us look at the expenses of the Marine corps. I have always understood that marines were necessary in proportion to the extent of the Navy--that such a force is put on board of every ship of such a number of guns. I find that in the year 1800, when we had nearly forty ships of war in commission, manned with nearly 8,000 men, the expenses of the Marine corps amounted to $162,000; and in 1809, when we have ten or fifteen vessels of all sorts, manned with 2,300 seamen, the expense of the Marine corps amounts to $211,000. And yet, sir, if we look at the items, there does not seem to be a very great variation between some of the most important--for instance, I find that the clothing in 1800 was estimated at $33,000, in 1809 at but $32,000--and yet, the troops whose clothing costs $1,000 less, cost in the aggregate $50,000 more. But, if we look at some of the items of this account, we shall be struck at once with the difference. The pay and subsistence for instance in 1800 was $102,000, in 1809 it was $160,000. I have been at the pains even to note the prices of the most material articles of provision, and find that in the old estimate beef is rated at $13, pork at $14, and flour at $10 per barrel; while in the last year the same articles stood in the estimate of $14, $18, and $8. The material article (flour) being much lower than in 1800, and the market value of the others also, I believe the inference would necessarily follow, that the subsistence ought to have been cheaper. But, sir, look at their establishment at the navy-yard, and I believe we shall want no ghost--certainly no argument of mine--to show the cause of this difference of expense.

Then comes the navy-yards. Of these, that of Washington alone has cost nearly one-half of the sum expended on them all. Well might my colleague say it was worth as much as the whole, when it had cost as much; when, indeed, we have witnessed a considerable town--and the most flourishing town, too, in this wide region called the City of Washington--built out of the public treasury.

Yes, sir, we have economized until we absolutely have reduced the annual cost of a seaman from $472--as it was under the very wasteful expenditure of Mr. Adams's administration--down to the moderate sum of $887! We have economized until a paltry fleet, consisting of vessels built to our hand--to say nothing of those that have been sold, and the warlike stores of which have been retained and preserved; which fleet was built, equipped, and every cannon and implement of war purchased under the old Administration--has cost us $12,000,000, when it cost the preceding Administration but $9,000,000! Is this no argument for reduction? The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) tells you he does not wish an annihilation, but a reform of the Naval Establishment. Sir, as long as a single chip remains in that navy-yard, you will never see any thing like reform; as long as you have a chip of public property--one chip of live oak belonging to the United States--you will have a man riding in his carriage, with a long retinue and deputies and clerks to take care of it. And, sir, if the gentleman from Connecticut does not mean utterly to disgust the people of the United States against a navy--if in truth he is a friend to a navy--he ought to join and put down this navy-yard, and not, with my friend from North Carolina, (Mr. MACON,) keep it up, in hopes the enormity of the evil will at some time or other correct itself. Among the many reasons offered to this House for retaining the various parts of this Establishment, no one said a word in favor of the Marine corps--that went sub silentio--but a great deal was said in favor of Washington. We were told that our fleet might be Copenhagened, and that it was therefore necessary to stow it away here. We also heard of the great press of work in the large towns--of the mercantile employ which there came in competition with that of the United States. I believe, sir, that our workmen, and men of all descriptions, from the highest to the lowest--I speak of subordinates--have long ago found the truth of the old proverb, that "The King's chaff is better than other men's corn." But it seems, that in order to get a commodity cheap, we are not to go where it is to be had--oh no, there is competition!--but we must bring workmen here in the mail-coach, by which conveyance I understand not only live stock for the navy-yard but copper bolts, and such light articles, are sometimes brought, I suppose, to get out of the way of competition--competition in the markets of Philadelphia and Baltimore, where they are bought at private sale. In this way have seamen, in some instances, been conveyed; and unquestionably every material of ship timber and naval store has been repeatedly brought from Norfolk to this place at an immense cost, worked up here by men collected from Baltimore, Philadelphia, &c., in order that, so worked up, it might go back to Norfolk, there to remain. But, sir, if our object really be to prevent our fleet from being Copenhagened, we had better put it above the Falls of Niagara. There it would unquestionably be most secure, unless the party on the other side of the lake should fit out a fleet to attack it; in which case, I suppose, we must resort to another series of measures similar to those lately adopted for the protection of commerce and the Navy. An embargo to protect ships of war! This is, indeed, putting the cart before the horse. We are to have a navy for the protection of commerce, and all our measures in relation to it are calculated on the basis of keeping it (poor thing! like some sickly child) out of harm's way! On the same principle of economy on which the navy-yard is kept up here, viz: for fear that merchants and others should come into competition with the Government, I presume, we have sent abroad for workmen to carry on the public buildings. If the navy-yard is to be kept up here merely that it may be under our eye, I would humbly suggest, sir, that we first pluck out the beam that has so long blinded us. We need only to do that to see this building falling to pieces over our heads; and yet an enormous appropriation is called for towards finishing it, which I have no doubt my worthy colleague (Mr. LEWIS) will press very strongly before the close of the session.

I had forgotten the gunboats; and perhaps the best notice which can be taken of them, is that which is taken on some occasions of other things--to pass by them with contempt. They are not worth bringing into account, except for their expense. Children must have toys and baubles, and we must indulge ourselves in an expense of many millions on this ridiculous plaything!

But, sir, the sale of our superfluous vessels met with the high objection that they were to be purchased up by Christophe and Petion, and that the constituents of my colleague (Mr. BASSETT) are to be terrified, if not into bodily fear, at least out of their peace of mind, by these vessels; and, at the same time, we are told that Christophe was in such good credit, only forty miles off, that vessels are building at Baltimore for his use; and yet, sir, no gentleman has brought forward a bill making it penal to supply these barbarians with ships of war and warlike stores. In other words, sir, to avoid the possibility of Christophe and his seamen foundering on board these rotten hulks, my colleague would much rather drive him into Baltimore, where he can purchase good vessels, which will answer his purpose much better than these frigates, which the barbarians would not know how to manage, and which are not calculated, from their great draught, for predatory warfare in the West India seas. My worthy colleague has given us a curious illustration of the superiority of naval over military force, by comparing the navy of Great Britain with her army. I suppose, if the argument were retorted on my colleague by a comparison of the army of Bonaparte with his navy, he would say that the same amount was not there expended upon the navy as upon the army; whereas in England, the amount of money expended on each is equal. But, does not my colleague know that one and the chief cause of the superiority of the British navy over the army, is, that in the navy men rise by merit--that they do not get in, to use a seaman's phrase, at the cabin windows--and that the army, if we give credit to the Parliamentary investigation, is a mere sink of corruption--a mere engine of patronage--a place in which a corrupt commander-in-chief acts according to his vile pleasure, and the pleasure of all the pimps and parasites and harlots who environ him. This, sir, is the cause of the superiority of the naval over the military force of Great Britain. But, when the British navy shall have effected what the armies of other nations from time immemorial have done--when it shall have subjugated whole continents--then will I agree in the superior power of naval over military force. I have no hesitation in saying that I would rather vote for naval than military force, and it is because a naval force has not the same power as a military one. I have never heard of a despotic power created by a naval force, unless perhaps in the chieftain of a band of pirates.

But it would appear that the politics of my unfortunate friend from North Carolina, (Mr. STANFORD,) who sits near the Speaker, are a mere counting-house business of pounds, shillings, and pence, or dollars and cents; that, in fact, the spirit of lucre is transferred from the warehouses and counting-rooms of the merchants to the tobacco-fields and cotton plantations of the Southern planters; and that, to such a pitch has the patriotism of the mercantile class risen, that they are really ready to sacrifice one-half of their property for the protection of the Government of their country. If the gentleman from New York (Mr. MUMFORD) will permit me, I will protest against this idea. I have once before protested in company with that gentleman, and I hope he will permit me to protest, even when I have not the sanction of his respectable authority. With regard to the politics of my worthy friend from North Carolina, I recollect very well, in the days which were called the days of profusion, patronage and terror, his politics were not of that minute and microscopic grade that no scale could be graduated sufficiently low to measure them; that, if his republicanism was a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, then and now, it was not that sort of republicanism which was too cheap to be measured by the value of the smallest known coin, even by a doit. I really feel something like sympathy with the gentleman from North Carolina--and it is not at all to be wondered at; for the republicanism of that gentleman used to be that which I always have professed--and if the remark applied to the gentleman from North Carolina, who I believe is not yet quite out of the pale of the political church, how much more forcibly did it apply to an unpardonable political sinner like myself! With respect, sir, to this patriotism, or this republicanism, that has left the tobacco fields and cotton plantations, and taken up its dwelling in the counting-house, I beg leave to express my doubt of the fact. I never have had that high opinion of the mercantile class expressed by some gentlemen in this House. I think of them as of other men--that in proportion to the temptations to which they are exposed, so are they virtuous or otherwise. But, sir, I have not and cannot have confidence in a man to whom the great Emperor has given a paternal squeeze, whose property is sequestered at Bayonne or St. Sebastian--I disclaim any thing like personal allusion; I speak of a class--I cannot have the confidence, on the subject of our foreign relations, in a man so situated, that I can have in the planter or farmer whose property is growing on his land around the house in which he nightly sleeps--and why? Because, mutatis mutandis, I should not have the same confidence in myself. I should not believe it possible, if I had rich cargoes under sequestration in France, that I could vote free from the bias which the jeopardy of that property would throw on my mind.

Sir, I have been very irregular, because I have been compelled to follow, not the current of my own ideas, but the objections started by gentlemen in different quarters, and (as it is the fashion to express it) on different sides of the House, whom I have found united against the bill as reported by myself. I would ask, in a few words, if we ought to continue this establishment in its present state? I ask if it is necessary? For the expense of a navy has been proved to be in inverse ratio to its utility. To what purpose do we keep up the Marines, another branch of the Establishment? If I am correctly informed, these men are willing to run away whenever they have a chance to desert--if they can get an opportunity--and I am willing that they shall quit the service without being exposed to be brought to a court martial for desertion. Nothing, indeed, was said on the subject of the Marine corps, when the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. KEY) moved to strike out the whole section of the bill. Fertile as the gentleman may be in reasons, he did not offer one. He must have supposed it to be perfectly correct that a Marine establishment should be kept up for a navy employing 2,700 seamen, more expensive than the same establishment for a navy employing 8,000. It was, indeed, facetiously urged in the select committee, as a reason why these men should be retained, that they came to this House regularly on Sundays to serve the Lord--to assist at the weekly pageant here performed. Sir, far be it from me to say, or even to think, with the Protector Cromwell, that this is a House where the Lord has not been served for many years. But, permit me to state, that in our country, it is the practice to pay no man out of the public purse, even for advocating the cause of other people with the Most High, much less for advocating his own. In other words, that when men with us serve the Lord, they do it at their own expense.

We have heard to-day, sir--and I hope the report of Congress at their next session will verify it--that a grant of power to the Executive in relation to any subject--say borrowing of money--does not necessarily imply an exercise of that power. We have heard, too, that notwithstanding the power devolved on the President of the United States, by the bill authorizing him to borrow to an amount of upwards of five millions of dollars, which this day passed this House, to enable the Government to get along, we shall at our next session probably be presented with the joyful tidings that it is not necessary to make use of the power, at least in its full extent; but it depends upon our own act, whether this expectation be realized or not. We are, in this instance at least, of that description of prophets who have it in their power to bring about the event they predict. And I do earnestly hope that the House will not, by a disagreement with the report of the select committee, insure the defeat of their hope--the nonfulfilment of the prediction. I hope we shall take up the subject, and go through with it; that we shall account, and account rationally too, for some of the facts at least which I have presented to the House this day, in terms extremely defective, I know; but the time was short--now or never--and I presented them in the only mode in which I could possibly do it.

In the course of my observations, I think I forgot to mention that when the United States kept forty sail of armed vessels afloat, and employed 8,000 seamen, we had no navy-yards at all. If we had, there must have been some extraordinary oversight committed by the then Secretary of the Treasury; and I believe politicians were not any more apt then than now to omit any items of public expense; they crowded in all they could. In the estimate which I hold in my hand, there is no item of that expense. I hope, if the House agree (which God forbid!) to so much of the report of the Committee of the Whole as retains the frigates and ships of war, that they will at least consent to put down the navy-yard at this place, and break down the supernumerary Marines. Really, sir, I am fond of music, but I do not mean to grant $211,000 of the people's money annually for a song. I hope at least that the Marines will be reduced, and that we shall retain at least not more navy-yards than ships. What would an honest Dutchman in the West think of a man who kept as many stables as horses, and those of the most expensive construction, too?

I have done, sir. I have endeavored to discharge my duty. No man is more sensible of a failure in the manner than I am; but I will thank any one to convince me of the utility of a navy, according to the doctrines and practice of the new school, and to facts, as far as they have been stated.

Mr. BASSETT said that his colleague could not always adhere to the principle that it was his duty to ferret out every error. Error is the lot of human nature, said Mr. B., and no one is infallible. Give a small authority to-day, and it will increase to an unexpected amount before to-morrow. I am authorized to state that such has been the case in the Navy Department; that under the late Secretary of the Navy large expenses had been incurred; and that before he left his office he commenced a reduction of them. Since the present Secretary (Mr. HAMILTON) has been in office, the expenditures have been much reduced. In the navy-yard at this place, for example, a permanent reduction has been made in the expenses to the amount perhaps of 30 or 40 per cent., and a very considerable reduction also as to immediate disbursements. It is nevertheless our duty, after the suggestions that have been made, to commence a thorough investigation, and I can only regret that the subject has been introduced to our attention at so late a period of the session. Instead of regretting what has been said, I am glad of it, and hope that at an early period in the next session an investigation will be made. Without any particular direction of the House, the committee of the Naval Establishment thought it their duty to examine the whole establishment at the navy-yard in this city. All the good expected from doing so was to convince them that the eye of the Government was upon them. I am proud to say that not only myself, but every gentleman of the committee with me, was much pleased with the appearance of things as they stood. It was not in our power to investigate minutiæ. On visiting the establishment of the Marine corps we saw every thing in order; we saw the armory establishment, wherein we discovered that arms which had been injured were usefully and handsomely repaired. As well as we could discover by the eye, every thing was pleasing to my mind--and one innovation in discipline in the Marine corps gave me very great satisfaction, viz: the substitution of solitary confinement for personal chastisement. In the navy-yard, the expense of which has been much complained of, we saw great piles of useful buildings. These were not constructed without cost. The present establishment there, in addition to store-houses, &c., consists of an extensive forgery, where all the iron work for the navy is done, a lead foundry, a brass foundry, where articles are made out of worn-out old metals, which otherwise would be of no use. I was desirous, both for my own information as well as that of the House, to procure an account of the work done at the navy-yard, to compare it with the expense--for that is the only way of fairly estimating the value of the establishment; but the time allotted to us during this session is not sufficient to attain that object.