Associated in this House with gentlemen, all of whom, I am to presume, are actuated by the same love of country; who alike feel the obligations of honor, conscience, regard to the constitution and responsibility to our constituents--I cannot but believe they act on this occasion with motives as pure as my own. Yet, sir, feeling myself bound by these high sanctions to pursue the course pointed out by my own judgment, and the dictates of my own conscience, I am compelled to declare, that I disapprove the conduct of the administration in the affair with Mr. Jackson, and that I am decidedly opposed to the resolution before us.
From the view I have taken of the correspondence between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jackson, my mind is satisfied--
That the letters of Mr. Jackson do not contain the insult to our administration which is imputed to them by the resolution. That, if they did, the Congress of the United States are not required either by duty or policy to interfere in the business--and that if they will interfere, the resolution under consideration is improper. On each of these points I will submit a few observations.
In regard to the insult said to be contained in Mr. Jackson's letters, my remarks shall be brief, with no other reference to the letters already so often repeated, as to have become "dull as a tale twice told," than I may conceive necessary to be intelligible. The offensive idea "that the Executive Government of the United States had a knowledge that the arrangement lately made by Mr. Erskine in behalf of his Government with the Government of the United States, was entered into without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine for that purpose," is said in the resolution to be conveyed in Mr. Jackson's letter of the 23d of October, and to be repeated in that of the 4th of November. Yet, as if it was on all hands admitted that no such idea could be found in these letters, all who have most anxiously desired to find it, have endeavored to establish it by recurring to Mr. Jackson's letter of the 11th of October, and there point us to that part of the letter, where Mr. Jackson, in reply to Mr. Smith's declaration, that an explanation was expected of the grounds of the disavowal by His Britannic Majesty of the arrangement made between Mr. Smith and Mr. Erskine, informs Mr. Smith, that he had seen with pleasure the forbearance of Mr. Smith, to complain of this disavowal, "inasmuch as you could not but have thought it unreasonable to complain of the disavowal of an act done under such circumstances as could only lead to the consequences that have actually followed." He adds, "It was not known when I left England whether Mr. Erskine had, according to the liberty allowed him, communicated to you in extenso his original instructions; it now appears that he did not. But in reverting to his official correspondence, and particularly to a despatch addressed on the 20th of April to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I find that he there states, that he submitted to your consideration the three conditions specified in those instructions, as the groundwork of an arrangement which, according to information received from this country, it was thought in England might be made, with a prospect of great mutual advantage. Mr. Erskine then reports, verbatim et seriatim, your observations upon each of the three conditions, and the reasons which induced you to think that others might be substituted in lieu of them. It may have been concluded between you that these latter were an equivalent for the original conditions; but the very act of substitution evidently shows that those original conditions were in fact very explicitly communicated to you, and by you of course laid before the President for his consideration. I need hardly add, that the difference between these conditions and those contained in the arrangement of the 18th and 19th of April, is sufficiently obvious to require no elucidation; nor need I draw the conclusion, which I consider as admitted by all absence of complaint on the part of the American Government, viz: that under such circumstances His Majesty had an undoubted right to disavow the act of his Minister."
As the offensive idea is alleged to be an allusion to the circumstances under which the arrangement with Mr. Erskine was concluded, which justified the King in disavowing it; intimated to be known to our administration at the date of this letter; it is necessary to search, from the evidence before us, what those circumstances were upon which the King justified his disavowal; these found, we shall be at no loss to fix Mr. Jackson's allusion, and then to inquire whether these circumstances thus alluded to, were in fact known to our administration. It appears from the documents before us, that the King's Order in Council of the 24th of May, 1809, announcing the provisional agreement concluded by Mr. Erskine and the disavowal of it, assigns as the sole ground of the disavowal, that the said agreement "was not such as was authorized by His Majesty's instructions." And Mr. Pinkney, on the 28th of May, informs Mr. Smith that the British Minister, Mr. Canning, had in their interview on the 25th of May declared "that the British Minister (Mr. Erskine) had acted in his late negotiation and engagements with you, not only without authority, but in direct opposition to the most precise instructions;" that these facts were communicated by Mr. Pinkney, and known to our administration before the arrival of Mr. Jackson, appears from the correspondence between Mr. Smith and Mr. Erskine in July and August. Mr. Jackson also, in his letter of the 11th of October, says that his Government "with frankness, promptitude, and a most scrupulous regard to national honor, gave notice to the American Minister in London of the disavowal, of the motives of it, and of the precautions spontaneously taken by His Majesty to prevent any loss or injury accruing to the citizens of the United States from an agreement, however unauthorized, made in His Majesty's name." And in his letter to Mr. Smith, 23d of October, explicitly declares "His Majesty was pleased to disavow the agreement concluded between you and Mr. Erskine, because it was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it." And to dispense with a recital of each particular in which the instructions were disregarded, Mr. Jackson adds, "These instructions I now understand by your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were at the time in substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them which occurred, than by a reference to the terms of your agreement."
We thus find the British Government on every occasion, and through every agent, assigning the violation of instructions, and the want of authority in Mr. Erskine to conclude the agreement, as the sole ground of the disavowal, and relying on that ground, and no other, to shield them from the charge of perfidy. With this evidence before us; with the admission of Mr. Jackson "that the instructions were not made known in extenso;" with the correspondence of Mr. Smith and Mr. Erskine showing the knowledge of our administration of the instructions to Mr. Erskine and of the grounds of the disavowal of his arrangement prior to the arrival of Mr. Jackson in the United States, does it consist with candor and good sense; is it not a palpable violation of both, so to torture the language of Mr. Jackson in his letter of the 11th of October, in allusion to the circumstances which "could only lead to the disavowal," and to the knowledge of them by our administration, which prevented their complaints to him on his arrival, as to make them convey an idea that a distinct and different ground of disavowal existed than that which his Government and himself had before repeatedly assigned; to impute to him the insinuation that the restricted authority of Mr. Erskine was known at the time of the arrangement, when he had explicitly declared "that the instructions were not made known in extenso," and thus to fix upon him the absurdity of contradicting himself?
Such construction, and such an imputation, in my opinion, is at war with every sound rule of construction, and every honorable principle of just and fair dealing. It is worthy the observation of those gentlemen who so clearly see an insult in this letter of the 11th of October, that they have found what had escaped the jealous perspicacity of Mr. Smith, and the patient research of the draughter of the resolution; since Mr. Smith, in his reply of the 19th of October, gives no intimation of any thing offensive in this letter, and the resolution confines the insulting idea to the letter of the 23d of October. We come now to the letter of the 23d of October, in which, according to the resolution, is contained the "insolent and indecorous expressions, conveying the idea that the Executive Government of the United States had a knowledge that the arrangement lately made by Mr. Erskine with the Government of the United States was entered into without competent power on the part of Mr. Erskine." The offensive idea is said to be found in the following part of Mr. Jackson's letter: "I have no hesitation in informing you that his Majesty was pleased to disavow the agreement concluded between you and Mr. Erskine, because it was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it. These instructions, I now understand by your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were at the time in substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them which occurred than by a reference to the terms of your agreement." There is no equivocation in this language. He says the instructions were made known in substance--an expression which from its very terms excludes the idea of being made known in full extent; and that it is true, as Mr. J. here alleges, that the substance of Mr. Erskine's instructions were made known, appears from Mr. Smith's letter of the 19th of October. "Certain it is that your predecessor did present for my consideration the three conditions which now appear in the printed document; that he was disposed to urge them more than the nature of two of them (both palpably inadmissible, and one of them more than merely inadmissible) could permit, and that on finding his first proposals unsuccessful, the more reasonable terms comprised in the arrangement respecting the Order in Council were adopted." And Mr. Erskine himself declared to his Government, 20th of April, as stated by Mr. Jackson to Mr. Smith, 11th of October, and not questioned by him, "that he had submitted to the consideration of Mr. Smith the three conditions specified in his instructions, as the groundwork of an arrangement," and adds the reasons which induced Mr. Smith to think "that others might be substituted in lieu of them." These expressions of Mr. Jackson are unequivocal, free from obscurity, and cover no insinuation. They assert a single fact, the existence of which is established by the letters of Mr. Smith himself. To find in them a meaning "conveying the insolent and indecorous idea that our Government knew of Mr. Erskine's restricted authority," is to give to language a signification different from that heretofore received, and to exert a strength of imagination to which I have no pretensions. But in the letter of Mr. Jackson of November 4th, is said, by the resolution, to be found "the still more insolent and affronting "repetition of the same insinuation. In the conclusion of this letter Mr. J. complains, not intemperately, of the liberty Mr. Smith claimed of styling his remarks "irrelevant and improper," a freedom which I should regret to believe would be justified by our Secretary's ideas of decorum. Mr. Jackson concludes in the words which are said to contain this offensive repetition of the imaginary insult: "You will find in my correspondence with you, that I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact."
If Mr. Jackson had really uttered an unfounded insinuation, he here certainly repeats it, because he adheres to all he had before said, and retracts nothing. But if, as I believe, he had not made any insinuations, but had directly and obviously referred to facts which were either admitted or had been, substantially proved, and more especially as he has not anywhere made the insinuation charged, "that our Government were acquainted with Mr. Erskine's restricted authority," the conclusion seems to be irresistible, that he could not here repeat an insinuation which he had not previously made. This paragraph obviously means that he had abstained from such an insinuation because "he was unable to substantiate the fact." Nor can I conceive how this declaration could be offensive to Mr. Smith, unless received by him as presenting a contrast to his own deportment, in which case he owes his feelings to his own conscious sensibility.
Were it, however, otherwise, and if, instead of an insinuation so hidden that a Secretary of State only can discover it, Mr. Jackson had given a direct and unequivocal insult, the Congress of the United States are not required either by duty or policy to interfere. The constitution has wisely created different branches of the Government, committed to each its separate cares and duties, made each independent of the other, intending thereby to secure the separate deliberation and separate responsibility of each. To attain its blessings, these valuable objects of the constitution ought not to be defeated. To the President alone is given the power to receive Ministers and to treat with them, and as in the course of this duty he becomes personally interested in the deportment of foreign Ministers, if they demean themselves disrespectfully towards him, he is clothed with the power to break off intercourse with them at pleasure, and so far to suspend their ministerial functions. This power has been repeatedly exercised by our Presidents, as the constitution intended it should be, upon their own responsibility. And it is the highest policy of this Government, in order to obtain the advantages of the free judgment and decision of the President, so to conduct towards him that he should learn to act without fear of the censure of Congress on the one hand, and without any hope on the other, that their countenance shall shelter his measures from scrutiny. This policy, and the strict inviolability of the Executive power in all cases of treaty, were emphatically settled in the case of Jay's Treaty, in which the President, (whose independent example deserves more respect than it has met from his successors), standing upon his own responsibility refused to submit to the House of Representatives any papers relating to that negotiation, except the treaty itself. Yet if the plan proposed by these resolutions be adopted; if we by formal resolutions approve the conduct of the President in an affair so exclusively his own, as that of the rupture with Mr. Jackson, may we not on some future occasion, as observed by my honorable colleague, (Mr. MACON,) claim the right of censuring in matters equally within his sole and peculiar province? If, then, we are to interfere with Executive duties, not merely as sycophants, applauding his every act, but as freemen condemning what we do not approve, the inevitable consequence must be, a conflict between the Executive and Legislative Departments, in which the wounds of either can only be inflicted through the constitution; or (an issue equally fatal) the advantages intended to be derived from separate deliberation, distinct responsibility, and mutual jealousy and watchfulness of the separate departments disappear, in a miserable complaisance of acting by previous concert, and thus propping each other before the people.
The question was then taken on postponement as moved by Mr. GARDENIER, and negatived without a division.
And at length, at half past five o'clock, the main question on the final passage of the resolution was taken, and carried--yeas 72, nays 41, as follows:
YEAS.--Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jr., William Anderson, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, Adam Boyd, John Brown, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Matthew Clay, Howell Cobb, James Cochran, James Cox, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Jonathan Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Barzillai Gannett, Gideon Gardner, Thomas Gholson, jr., Peterson Goodwyn, William Helms, James Holland, Benjamin Howard, Jacob Hufty, Robert Jenkins, Richard M. Johnson, Thomas Kenan, William Kennedy, John Love, Aaron Lyle, Robert Marion, Samuel McKee, Alexander McKim, William Milnor, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Thomas Newbold, Thomas Newton, John Nicholson, Peter B. Porter, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, John Roane, Erastus Root, John Ross, Ebenezer Sage, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, Dennis Smelt, John Smilie, George Smith, Henry Southard, John Taylor, John Thompson, Uri Tracy, Charles Turner, jr., Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehill, and Robert Witherspoon.
NAYS.--Daniel Blaisdell, James Breckenridge, John C. Chamberlain, William Chamberlin, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, jr., William Ely, James Emott, Barent Gardenier, Thomas R. Gold, William Hale, Nathaniel A. Haven, Jonathan H. Hubbard, Richard Jackson, jr., Herman Knickerbacker, Joseph Lewis, jr., Edward St. Loe Livermore, Robert Le Roy Livingston, Nathaniel Macon, Archibald McBryde, Jonathan O. Mosely, Jos. Pearson, Benjamin Pickman, jr., Timothy Pitkin, jr., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, Richard Stanford, John Stanley, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Lewis B. Sturges, Jacob Swoope, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Jabez Upham, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Laban Wheaton, Ezekiel Whitman, and James Wilson.
The House then adjourned, at a quarter before six, after a session of nineteen hours, during the whole of which time the Speaker presided in the Chair with dignity and moderation, to Friday next.
FRIDAY, January 5.
Another member to wit, from Delaware, NICHOLAS VAN DYKE, appeared, and took his seat in the House.
Claim of Elizabeth Hamilton.
Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee of Claims, made a report on the petition of Elizabeth Hamilton, referred on the 5th ultimo; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The report is as follows:
That it is stated by the petitioner, that her late husband, Alexander Hamilton, served as Lieutenant Colonel in the Army of the United States during the Revolutionary war; that, in common with other officers he was entitled to five years' full pay as commutation for half-pay during life; that her husband, being in Congress at the time the resolution passed making this provision in favor of the officers of the Revolution, in a letter to the Secretary of War he relinquished his claim to commutation; and the petitioner prays for the amount of said commutation. It does not appear, from any evidence from the Secretary of War or of the Treasury, that the late Colonel Hamilton ever did relinquish his right to half-pay or commutation, nor can the committee believe that it would be proper or generous that such relinquishment should be relied on as a bar to a just claim upon the United States for meritorious services against the representatives of such claimant. It appears, from a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, that the late Colonel Hamilton received pay as an officer up to the end of February, 1782, and no later. And there is no evidence upon the Treasury books, or books of the War Office, whether at this or what period Colonel Hamilton resigned. The committee, however, have been furnished with a document, which induces the belief that Colonel Hamilton did not resign his commission until after the 28th day of October, 1783, which document is in these words: "In pursuance of an act of Congress of the 30th day of September, 1783, Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton is to take rank as Colonel by Brevet, in the Armies of the United States of America. Signed at Princeton, October 28, 1783, by Elias Boudinot, President," &c.
The committee are of opinion, that the resolution of Congress, upon a liberal construction, did not require actual service, and that the officer should be in the receipt of his pay to entitle him to commutation; but that he should have a commission, and be at all times liable to be called on to perform the duties of his station. The committee are confirmed in this opinion, when they recollect the situation of the United States and the Army in the year 1783, and in fact, from the capture of Cornwallis and his Army at Little York, in the State of Virginia, in the year 1781. But this claim is, like all other claims of this description, barred by the statute of limitation. The following resolution is offered:
Resolved, That the prayer of the petition ought not to be granted.
MONDAY, January 15.
Two members, to wit: from New York, GURDON S. MUMFORD, and from Kentucky, MATTHEW LYON, appeared, and took their seats in the House.
TUESDAY, January 16.
Another member, to wit, from South Carolina, RICHARD WYNN, appeared, and took his seat in the House.
WEDNESDAY, January 17.
A new member, to wit, DAVID S. GARLAND, returned to serve as a member of this House for the State of Virginia, in the place of Wilson Carey Nicholas, resigned, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.
WEDNESDAY, January 31.
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.