Part 33

The Western State shall be bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Wabash rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash and Post Vincennes, due north, to the Territorial line between the United States and Canada, and by the said Territorial line to the Lake of the Woods and Mississippi.

The middle State shall be bounded by the said direct line, the Wabash, from Post Vincennes to the Ohio; by the Ohio, by a direct line drawn due north from the mouth of the Great Miami, to the said Territorial line, and by the said Territorial line.

The Eastern State shall be bounded by the last-mentioned direct line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said Territorial line: Provided, however, and it is further understood and declared, that the boundaries of these three States shall be subject so far to be altered, that if Congress shall hereafter find it expedient, they shall have authority to form one or two States in that part of the said Territory which lies north of an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan. And whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State Government: Provided, the constitution and government so to be formed shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the Confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there shall be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.

By the aforesaid article, it appears to your committee that the line fixed as the boundary of the States to be formed in the Indiana Territory is unalterable, unless by common consent; that the line of demarcation, which the Wabash affords between the eastern and western portion of said Territory, added to the wide extent of wilderness country which separates the population in each, constitute reasons in favor of a division, founded on the soundest policy, and conformable with the natural situation of the country. The vast distance from the settlements of the Wabash to the present seat of Territorial government, renders the administration of justice burdensome and expensive to them in the highest degree. The superior courts of the Territory are, by law, established at Vincennes; at which place suitors, residing in every part of the Territory, are compelled to attend with their witnesses, which, to those who reside west of the Wabash, amounts almost to a total denial of justice. The great difficulty of travelling through an extensive and loathsome wilderness, the want of food and other necessary accommodations on the road, often presents an insurmountable barrier to the attendance of witnesses; and, even when their attendance is obtained, the accumulated expense of prosecuting suits where the evidence is at so remote a distance, is a cause of much embarrassment to a due and impartial distribution of justice, and a proper execution of the laws for the redress of private wrongs.

In addition to the above considerations, your committee conceive that the scattered situation of the settlements over this extensive Territory cannot fail to enervate the powers of the Executive, and render it almost impossible to keep that part of the Government in order.

It further appears to your committee, that a division of the said Territory will become a matter of right under the aforesaid article of the ordinance, whenever the General Government shall establish therein a State Government; and the numerous inconveniences which would be removed by an immediate separation, would have a direct tendency to encourage and accelerate migration to each district, and thereby give additional strength and security to those outposts of the United States, exposed to the inroads of a savage neighbor, on whose friendly dispositions no permanent reliance can be placed.

Your committee have no certain data on which to ascertain the number of inhabitants in each section of the Territory; but, from the most accurate information they are enabled to collect, it appears that west of the Wabash there are about the number of eleven thousand, and east of said river about the number of seventeen thousand, and that the population of each section is in a state of rapid increase.

Your committee, after maturely considering this subject, are of opinion that there exists but one objection to the establishment of a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, and that objection is based on the additional expense which would, in consequence thereof, be incurred by the Government of the United States. But, it is also worthy of observation, that the increased value of the public lands in each district, arising from the public institutions which would be permanently fixed in each, to comport with the convenience of the inhabitants, and the augmentation of emigrants, all of whom must become immediate purchasers of these lands, would far exceed the amount of expenditure produced by the contemplated temporary government.

And your committee, being convinced that it is the wish of a large majority of the citizens of the said Territory that a separation thereof should take place, deem it always just and wise policy to grant to every portion of the people of the Union that form of government which is the object of their wishes, when not incompatible with the constitution of the United States, nor subversive of their allegiance to the national sovereignty.

Your committee, therefore, respectfully submit the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is expedient to divide the Indiana Territory, and to establish a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, agreeably to the ordinance for the government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, passed on the 13th day of July, 1787.

Mr. THOMAS, from the same committee, presented a bill for dividing the Indiana Territory into two separate governments; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next.

A motion was made by Mr. WYNN, that when this House adjourns, it will adjourn until Tuesday morning, eleven o'clock: And the question being taken thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 60, nays 45.

MONDAY, January 9, 1809.

Another member, to wit, JOHN ROWAN, from Kentucky, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Naval Establishment.

The amendments of the Senate to the bill sent from the House for employing an additional number of seamen and marines, were taken up. [The amendments propose the immediate arming, manning, &c., all the armed vessels of the United States.]

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL expressed a hope that the House would disagree to the amendments. The President was already authorized by law to fit out these vessels, whenever, in his opinion, the public service should require it; and the expense which would attend them was a sufficient argument against it, if no urgent occasion existed for their service, which he believed did not.

Mr. STORY entertained a very different opinion from that of the gentleman from Tennessee. In case of war there must be some ships of war of one kind or other; and it would take six months at least to prepare all our ships for service. At present they were rotting in the docks. If it were never intended to use them, it would be better to burn them at once than to suffer them to remain in their present situation. He believed if out at sea they might be useful and would be well employed. Why keep them up at this place, whence they could not get out of the river perhaps in three weeks or a month? He believed that a naval force would form the most effectual protection to our seaports that could be devised. Part of our little navy was suffered to rot in the docks, and the other part was scarcely able to keep the ocean. Could not a single foreign frigate enter almost any of our harbors now and batter down our towns? Could not even a single gunboat sweep some of them? Mr. S. said he could not conceive why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and now in particular, when many of our native seamen (and he was sorry to say that from his own knowledge he spoke it) were starving in our ports. Mr. S. enumerated some of the advantages which this country possessed in relation to naval force. For every ship which we employed on our coasts, he said, any foreign nation must incur a double expense to be able to cope with us. The truth was, that gentlemen well versed in the subject, had calculated that it would require, for a fleet competent to resist such a naval force as the United States might without difficulty provide, four or five hundred transport ships to supply them with provisions, the expense of which alone would be formidable as a coercive argument to Great Britain. He wished it to be shown, however small our naval force, that we do not undervalue it, or underrate the courage and ability of our seamen.

Mr. COOK followed Mr. STORY on the same side of the question. He compared the nation to a fortress on which an attack was made, and the garrison of which, instead of guarding the portal, ran upon the battlements to secure every small aperture. He thought their attention should first be directed to the gates, and that a naval force would be the most efficient defence for our ports.

Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS called for the yeas and nays on the amendments.

Mr. SMILIE said that raising a naval force for the purpose of resisting Great Britain, would be attacking her on her strong ground. If we were to have a war with her on the ocean, it could only be carried on by distressing her trade. Neither did he believe that these vessels of war would be of any effect as a defence. They did not constitute the defence on which he would rely. If we had a navy, it would form the strongest temptation for attack upon our ports and harbors. If Denmark had possessed no navy, Copenhagen would never have been attacked. The only way in which we could carry on a war on the ocean to advantage, Mr. S. said, would be by our enterprising citizens giving them sufficient encouragement. Were we to employ a naval force in case of war, it would but furnish our enemy with an addition to her navy. He hoped the House would disagree to the amendments of the Senate and appoint a committee of conference.

Mr. DANA said that the amendments sent from the Senate presented a question of no small importance to the nation. Without expressing any opinion on the question, it appeared to him to be at least of sufficient importance to be discussed in Committee of the Whole. Coming from the other branch of the Legislature, and being so interesting to the nation, he wished that it might be discussed fairly and fully; and, therefore, moved a reference to a Committee of the Whole.

Messrs. DANA, TALLMADGE, and STORY, urged a reference to a Committee of the Whole on account of the great importance of the subject, on which a full discussion would be proper; and Messrs. MACON, G. W. CAMPBELL, and HOLLAND opposed it, because the seamen proposed by the original bill were now wanted, and the subject of the amendment was already referred to a Committee of the Whole in a distinct bill. Motion lost, 58 to 55.

Mr. MACON observed, that the immediate expense of this arrangement, if agreed to, would be at least five or six millions of dollars, and but four hundred thousand were appropriated by the bill. When he compared this bill with the report of a select committee made to the House of Representatives, he said he was astonished. A part of that report was a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in which the very number (two thousand) contained in the bill as it went from this House, was desired. Mr. M. adverted to the observation of Mr. STORY, that it would cost Great Britain as much to keep one frigate as it would cost us to keep two. He thought the expense would be about equal. The expense of the transportation of provisions would be counterbalanced by the difference of expense between the pay of the British and American seamen, the latter being double of the former generally. He objected to this bill from the Senate because no estimate accompanied it. He thought they would go far enough if they gave the departments all that they asked. This House had indeed as much right to judge of the force requisite, as any other department; but he did not wish to be called upon to supply a deficit in the appropriation, which never failed to occur even in the ordinary appropriations for the Navy Department. Give the four hundred thousand dollars asked for, and the deficit in the appropriation will be at least ten times the amount of the sum appropriated.

Mr. COOK contended strenuously in favor of a naval force. He detailed the advantages which would accrue to the nation from a few fast sailing frigates. He said they were essentially necessary to defence. He expatiated on the difficulty with which any foreign power could maintain a force on our coast.

Mr. HOLLAND did not profess to have much knowledge on this subject, but he said it did not require much to overthrow the arguments of gentlemen on the subject. What defence a few frigates would be to the extensive coast of this country, he could not understand. There certainly never had been a time when this country should rely on a maritime force as a sufficient protection. Indeed, he said, if we had fifteen or twenty or more sail-of-the-line, he should hesitate much before he would go to war with Great Britain, because these would undoubtedly be lost. Our power of coercion was not on the ocean. Great Britain had possessions on this continent which were valuable to her; they were in the power of the United States, and the way to coerce her to respect our rights on water, would be attacking them on land. He said he certainly did not undervalue the disposition and prowess of our seamen; and it was because he valued them, that he did not wish them to go into an unequal contest, in which they must certainly yield. Gentlemen might understand naval matters; but it was no reason that they should therefore understand the efficiency of a naval force. There was sufficient evidence in history to warn the United States against it.

Mr. TROUP said he rose but for the purpose of stating facts which struck him as being applicable to the subject before the House. He referred chiefly to an extract of a letter written to himself and published in the paper of to-day. [Mr. T. then read the extract which appeared in the National Intelligencer on the 9th instant.] In addition to these facts, letters had been received, in the course of this morning, containing further particulars, which he begged leave to state to the House. After the officer (commander of a British armed vessel) had been forced on board his vessel, and while lying in our waters and within our jurisdiction, he had fired several shots at pilot-boats, passing and repassing, had been very abusive, and threatened the town with what he called vengeance; and, in addition to these facts, letters had reached Savannah from Liverpool, giving satisfactory information that vessels of fifteen or twenty guns had been fitted out for the purpose of forcing a cotton trade with South Carolina and Georgia. This information, Mr. T. said, came from unquestionable authority. And it was because he was unwilling that the people of this country should longer submit to the abuse of British naval officers; because he was unwilling that they should be exposed to the insolence of every British commissioned puppy who chose to insult us; because he was unwilling that armed vessels should force a cotton trade, when every man knew that nine-tenths of the people of Georgia would treat as traitors the violators of the embargo; it was for this reason that he was disposed to vote for the amendments from the Senate. The great objection which had been taken to them was the expense which they would produce. Economy, Mr. T. said, was a good thing in time of peace; but if this contracted spirit of economy predominated in our war councils, if we were forced into a war, so help him God, he would rather at once tamely submit our honor and independence than maintain them in this economical way. If we went to war, we ought not to adopt little measures for the purpose of executing them with little means; neither should we refuse to adopt great measures, because they could not be executed but with great means. It was very true that, in war as well as in peace, calculation to a certain extent was necessary; but, if they once resolved on an object, it must be executed at whatever expense. He was no advocate for standing armies or navies, generally speaking; but, in discharging his duties here, he must be governed by the circumstances of every case which presented itself for his decision, and then ask himself, Is it wise, politic, and prudent, to do this or omit that? He said he would never go back to yesterday to discover what he had then said or done, in order to ascertain what he should now do or say. Political conduct must depend on circumstances. What was right yesterday might be wrong to-day. Nay, what was right at the moment he rose to address the House, might, ere this, be palpably wrong. Conduct depended on events, which depended on the folly or caprice of men; and, as they changed, events would change. It might have been a good doctrine long ago that this country ought to have a navy competent to cope with a detachment of the British navy; it might have been good doctrine then, but was shocking doctrine now.