Part 235

Do we know, at this moment, as a Legislature, the causes of that disastrous business--I call it so from its consequences--or by whose authority this war was made? Or, is it come to this: that Governors of our Territories are to consider themselves as so many Hastings and Wellesleys of our country, and that, while they do not involve us in war with Christians like themselves, they may go to any extent in exterminating the Red Barbarians here as in the East Indies Governors and Proconsuls of the British Government do there in regard to uncivilized powers of that quarter of the globe? Is it discovered that our Territorial Governors may at pleasure invade the territory of other nations--for, inconsiderable and contemptible though they be, the Indian tribes are nations--in like manner that the British authorities make war upon those nations of the East? Yes, sir, not only is this a war of our own seeking--not only we had it in our power to keep the peace--but in the country which was the scene of the battle, and in the adjacent country, it was the most popular war ever waged. The frontier people of this country have been in the habit of driving the heathen before them; and to them the chase of the deer, the elk, and the antelope, is not so grateful as that of the red men they hunt. I believe that it is the cause of serious regret to many of the people of the West that there is now no longer any motive to drive them from their lands. As to the Red Men, the Big-Knives have, without any foreign prompting or instigation, driven them off from a country more extensive than that over which the Emperor of France wields his sceptre. So I put aside this item of Indian war altogether as a matter of account in the list of our grievances against the British Government. There is not a shadow of foundation for believing that these Indians were or could have been instigated to take up the hatchet against us until hostile arms had been taken up against them. When driven to the wall they must fight or die--the last alternative left to them--for which nobody can blame them.

It was, sir, a saying of one of the best men who ever wrote, in correspondence with a friend, that he had no time to write a shorter letter; and I can truly say that I have not time to deliver a shorter speech. I know that this question will be taken to-day, for I have been so admonished; and my own very severe and sudden indisposition, which I am almost ashamed to name, will compel me to detain your attention much longer than under other circumstances would have been the case.

A word, now, on the subject of impressment. Our foreign trade had grown beyond the capacity of either our tonnage or seamen to manage. Our mercantile marine was an infant Hercules; but it was overloaded beyond its strength: the crop was too abundant to be gathered by our hands alone. The consequence was, and a natural one too, that not only the capitalists flocked into our country from abroad to share in our growing commerce, but the policy also of our Government was adapted to it, and a law was passed to enable us to avail ourselves of the services of British seamen and seamen of other countries. And, in doing this, we availed ourselves of the pretext--which, as long as the countries to which they belonged winked at it, was fair for us to use--of taking these British seamen for Americans. It was in 1796 that commenced the act, to which reference has been made, and that system of "protections," as they were called, the very mention of which, at this day, causes a burst of honest indignation in the breast of citizens whose situation enables them to ascertain their true character. If these "protections," so termed, have not been forged all over Europe, it is only for the reason that the notes of a certain bank of which I have heard have not been forged, viz: that, the bank being broke, its notes were so worthless that people would not even steal them. The "protections" are attainable by everybody; by men of all ages, countries, and descriptions. They are a mere farce. The issuing of them has gone far to disgrace the character of the country, and has brought into question and jeopardy the rights of real American citizens. This question of impressment, delicate as it has been said to be--difficult as in one view it certainly is--is, of all others, in my judgment, the most compact. With the gentleman from New York, I will say that the tide of emigration has brought to the shores of our country many most valuable characters; some of them persons with whom I have the honor of being in habits, not only of intimacy, but friendship. I believe there does not exist one man of this description, who comes bona fide to this country to settle himself and children here, that would require you to go to war on his account. And, sir, I believe that the belligerent position itself in which you now find yourself will relieve you in a great degree of this evil, for many seamen who have so long, by virtue of these "protections," passed themselves off for American, will find it to be very convenient to be Portuguese or Swedish seamen, or seamen of some other State than the United States--some State that is not at war with England. Sir, there is a wide difference between the character of American seamen and seamen of every other country on earth. The American seaman has a home on the land, a domicil, a wife and children, to whom he is attached, to whom he is in the habit of returning after his voyages; with whom he spends, sometimes, a long vacation from the toils of maritime life. It is not so with the seamen of other countries. For the protection of men of the first description, I am disposed, if necessary, to use the force of the country, but for no other. I know, indeed, that some gentlemen who have spoken much on the subject of the principle of impressment, will tell you that the right to take from a neutral vessel one seaman, if carried to its extent, involves a right to take any, or all seamen. Why, sir, in like manner, it might be argued that the taking illegally of one vessel at sea involves the right to take every vessel. And yet, sir, who ever heard of two nations going to war about a single case of capture, though admitted not to be justified by the laws? Such a case never did and never will occur.

Of one thing we are certain: it rests upon no doubtful ground: that Great Britain, rather than surrender the right of impressing her own seamen, will nail her colors to the mast, and go down with them. And she is right, because, when she does surrender it, she is Samson shorn of his strength: the sinews of her power are cut. I say this openly in the House of Representatives; and I am not communicating to the enemy a secret of any value, because she has herself told us that she can never surrender it. She has told us so, not when she stood in the relation of an enemy toward us, but in the friendly intercourse of the British Ministry with our late Commissioners at London. Turn to the book: I wish the honorable gentleman, if he has it, would for a moment let me have the use of it. You are told in that book that every effort was made by the American Commissioners to effect a relaxation of this right; that the British Ministry evinced the sincerest desire to give satisfaction to them on this point: but what? The Admiralty was consulted; they waked up out of their slumbers the Civilians at Doctors' Commons to deliberate upon it; and they came to the conclusion that the Government of Great Britain could not give up that right. Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, the Commissioners of the United States to negotiate a treaty with the Government of Great Britain, in their correspondence with their own Government, give this fact to excuse themselves for failing to accomplish their object, and to prove that every thing had been done that could be on their part, and every thing conceded on the other side that the most friendly disposition could warrant--and here I do not speak of masked friendship, but of real friendship. Although every thing possible had been done, this right of impressment of her own seamen was a sine qua non on the part of Great Britain--one which would not, could not, must not, be surrendered. And, sir, if this question of the right of impressment was one on which we were to go to war with Great Britain, we ought to have gone to war then; because we were then told by the highest authority in that Government that this was a point which never would be given up.

I find, sir, that I cannot trust my broken voice to read the book, now that it is in my hand, but must rely upon my recollection for facts.

Now, this question lies as I have said, in a very small compass. The right of Great Britain to take her own seamen from your merchant vessels, (if it be a right,) is one which she has exercised ever since you were a People, wherever occasions for its exercise have occurred. Will you not only go to war, but wage a bellum ad internecinum for it? Will you wage an endless war of extermination for this right, which, you have known for two and twenty years of your national existence, she will not relinquish? A gentleman from Tennessee, of whose capacity few men have more respectful opinion than myself, has quoted the diplomatic correspondence as far back as 1792, to show what General WASHINGTON's opinions were on this question of impressment, and this opinion of the Father of his Country is now held up to the people of the United States for the purpose of enlisting their prejudices in the conviction that, by involving the country in warfare, we are at this moment treading in the footsteps of that great man, and acting upon his principles. Nothing can be more untrue. To say that the Treaty of Louisiana was negotiated two years after the letter of instruction quoted from the Washington Administration, and that that treaty contained no provisions on this point, is a reply in full on this course of argument. But what does the correspondence referred to prove? What every treaty, what every negotiation, has proven: that England would not give up this point, although she made offers for guarding against abuse--offers more favorable to us than ours to her. And yet the Administration of this Government have had the hardihood or the folly to plunge the nation into a war for it--for a point on which General Washington, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jefferson, men differing from each other as may be in every aspect, had been content to negotiate, rather than go to war for its assertion.

What was the offer made to our Government by the British Ministry? If I do not forget, their offer was that they would not impress American seamen. Their offer to us was not accepted, but it was beyond question, in my opinion, more beneficial than the proposition which we on that occasion made to them.

But it may be said that the right of search cannot be endured; that the protection of our flag must be held inviolate; that if a search of our ships be permitted for British seamen, they may actually take American seamen. Sir, there is no doubt of the fact that by mistake, sometimes perhaps by wilful misconduct, on the part of officers engaged in the search, such a thing may happen. But, should we not think it exceedingly strange that the misconduct of an officer of the American Government, in one case in twenty if you will, should be a cause of war for any nation against us? It is one of those cases which does occur, and will forever occur, to a neutral power, whenever a general war is lighted up. It is one of the prices which this country has to pay for its rapid accession of wealth, such as is unheard of in the annals of any other nation but our own. And this, sir, is the state of things in which we have undertaken, in children's language, to quarrel with our bread and butter; and to identify ourselves with one of the belligerents in a war in which we have no proper concern. I will not touch at all the abstract question of the right of impressment: it has been so much more ably handled by others that I shall not say a word about it. I address myself to the common sense of the planter, the farmer, the agriculturist of our country--are you willing upon such grounds as these to continue this war? I have no doubt what will be their answer.

On these subjects I have delivered my sentiments more than once before in this House. I think of them with horror as the accursed cause of this war. Not that the men who are in power are worse men than other people, but that they have brought upon this land of peace and freedom issues the end of which it would be impossible for any human being to divine.

One thing is certain, that the right of search does practically exist, and has been acknowledged by all nations. The President of the United States and his Secretary of State, as great masters of the Law of Nations, will be among the first to acknowledge it; they have acknowledged it, and by our treaties with foreign powers, this country has heretofore acknowledged it, so far as concerns the right to search for contraband goods and enemy's property. Suppose that there are notorious abuses under this right: should we be justified in declaring that no search whatever of our merchant vessels shall be allowed? There is no doubt that, under the color of the right of search--for I am advocating its lawful purposes only--abuses have been committed on neutrals; and as long as men exist it will be so. The liability to abuse of this right is the price which neutrals pay for the advantages which they derive from their neutrality; and I should like to know whether it would be for me to join in the contest in which these belligerents are engaged for the recovery of my neutral rights. Where are those rights when great maritime powers become belligerent? There are neutral rights undoubtedly, but there are also neutral duties. And shall a neutral nation, a nation which has in that character prospered and flourished more than any people on the face of the globe, sacrifice those rights and those advantages, and resort to war against one of those belligerents--and for what? For a point of honor! Yet, whilst in this Quixotic spirit we have gone to war with England; although we have been robbed, reviled, contemned throughout by the Emperor of France, we can see no cause of war with him!

What shall we say of the French doctrine in relation to this subject of impressment? If that has been dwelt upon in this debate by any honorable gentleman of this House it has escaped my notice. What is the French doctrine on this subject--established at the time when the United States stood in relations of peace and amity to that power, when every heart beat high with sympathy for the success of French freedom; when some of those who have since transferred their admiration, I will not say their love, to the present head of the French Government, to the enemy of French freedom, and all freedom, to all commerce, and right, and religion--at the time when some of those who have since so lamentably changed on this subject felt an interest for freedom and France scarcely inferior to that which they felt for freedom and America? What were then the doctrines of the French Government? That all who spoke the English language should be treated as Englishmen, unless they could give proof to the contrary; the onus probandi lying on those who spoke the language of Locke, and Newton, and Milton, and Shakspeare. Yes, sir, whilst the English Government establishes no such doctrine, the French Government acts upon the principle that speaking the English language is prima facie evidence of your being a British subject, and would justify their treating you as an enemy, the burden of the proof to the contrary being thrown upon yourself.

And, sir, is it nothing to the bill which we are now debating, for raising an additional army of twenty thousand men--or is it a departure from order to hint on this floor at a circumstance which all men are employed and occupied in discussing at their firesides?--that this army, to constitute an aggregate of fifty-five thousand regular troops, is about to be put under the control of the man who was the author of the Anonymous Letters at Newburg at the close of the Revolutionary war, inciting a handful of men, the remnant of the old American army--perhaps not numbering six thousand altogether--to give a master to the nation? Is that a consideration to have no weight upon such a question as this? With me, sir, it is conclusive. I will tell gentlemen on both sides of the House that a Government or a man may despise a calumny--that the arrows of slander will fall blunt and harmless upon them--provided that the Government and the man be true to itself and himself. Yes, sir, ask yourself this question in regard to any man, to whom you are about to confide important trusts: Does he pay his just debts? Is he a man of truth? Does he discharge as he ought the duties of a friend, a brother in society? After having done that, be his politics what they may, and his peculiarity of opinion in politics what it may, he is a good man; he acquires the esteem of all who know him; he is impenetrable to mere vulgar calumny. This Government ought to employ men of real worth and capacity: it is not always that those showing qualities attracting attention in private life, or as companions, are of real capacity. Do those who administer the Government make it a rule to employ in the public service none but men of real capacity, or worth, of integrity, and of high character? Do they give their contracts and offices without fear, favor, or affection, to men of responsibility and character--to such men as you would in private life give your own contracts to? Or do they bestow them, as is done in some Governments differently constituted from ours, where church preferment and military preferment are sometimes made a dirty job of Parliamentary interest? Do they employ men of clean hands, with fair characters; or is every caitiff, without examination, welcome to their arms, provided he can bring with him the proof of his treachery to his former employers? It depends on these facts whether confidence is due to any Administration of the Government.

Sir, I have much yet to say which appeared to me, when I rose, not to be unworthy your attention; but I confess to you, with feelings something like contrition, that my opinion on this subject has undergone a change.

There is one point, however, on which I do not know how to speak in this place with the reverence which is due to it. I cannot pass it over, and yet I know not how to touch it. Yes, sir, there is one reflection pressing itself as a crown of thorns upon my own head, which I am bound to present to the consideration of this Assembly and this people. Is it fitting that the only two nations among whom the worship of the true God has been maintained with any thing like truth and freedom from corruption; that the only two nations among whom this worship has been preserved unstained, shall be the two now arrayed against each other in hostile arms in a conflict in which, let who will conquer in the fight, his success in one point, if that be an object, will have been attained: so much of human life, liberty, and happiness, will have perished in the affray--in the service of this scourge with which it has pleased God, in his wisdom and justice, not in his mercy, to inflict mankind? Is it fitting that those hands which unite in giving to idolaters and to the heathen the Word of God, the Book of Life--that those hands, and those alone, should be thus drenched in each other's blood? Will you unite as a Christian with your Protestant brother across the Atlantic for these noble purposes, and then plunge the dagger into his breast with whom you are associated in a cause so holy--one so infinitely transcending the low, the little, the dirty business we are called upon here to transact? I hope that the sacrifice may be stopped. We have nothing to expect from the mission of our Minister to the Ruler of France, whether at Moscow, or wherever else he may be. The Deity or Devil whom we worship is not to be mollified by our suppliant appeals. Let us turn from him--come out of his house--and join in the worship of the true and living God, instead of spilling the blood of his people on the abominable altar of the French Moloch.

Sir, I have done. I could have wished to continue my remarks further, but I cannot.

When Mr. RANDOLPH concluded, the House adjourned.

THURSDAY, January 14.

Additional Military Force.

The House then resumed the consideration of the bill to raise twenty additional regiments of infantry for one year.--The question being on the passage of the bill.

Mr. STOW, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the delicacy and novelty of my situation, as well from the indulgence of the House, as from the neutral course which I mean to pursue. He must have been indeed an inattentive observer of mankind who proposes to himself such a course without being exposed to difficulties and dangers from every side. Our country has experienced them too long from the great belligerents of Europe, and an individual will quickly find them here. For even this House is not exempt from its great party belligerents who issue their conflicting decrees and Orders in Council; and, in imitation of the hostile Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of condemnation to have been spoken with by the adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all these dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on this tempestuous ocean, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, and humbly hoping for the approbation of my country and my God.

The proper extent of the discussion growing out of this bill seemed to be confined to these inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained? If obtained, will it accomplish the end proposed? And lastly, will the force be an economical one? If the discussion had been confined to these limits I would have listened, and not have spoken; but, sir, it has taken a wider range, and assumed a more important aspect. It has embraced the present, and past, and the future. The causes of the war, and the mode of conducting it, have been investigated, and even confident predictions have been made as to its end. The history and the state of our negotiations have been carefully examined--and the Presidential order of succession has been scrutinized by the light of experience as well as that of prophecy. We have sometimes been forced into the scenes of private life; and, at other times, we have been chained to the car of Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has ranged as wide as existence, and, not content with that, the speakers "have exhausted worlds, and then imagined new." I do not pretend to censure this--it may be well for the people to have their political concerns thus splendidly dressed and passed in review before them. But still I will attempt to call the attention of the House from the regions of fiction, of fancy, and of poetry, to the humble, but I trust no less profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing by many of those things which have amused by their ingenuity, or surprised by their novelty, but which do not deserve a serious answer, I will endeavor to state distinctly the grounds taken by the opponents of this bill, or rather the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that the war was originally unjust." Secondly. "That if the war was originally just, it has become unjust to continue it in consequence of the revocation of the British Orders in Council." Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute the war, because we have no means of coercing our enemy or enforcing our claims." Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the war." And fifthly. "That, in consideration of all these circumstances, the House ought to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war."

First, then, it was alleged that the war was originally unjust. Here let me call on the House to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient. Nothing can be more important than to have clear and distinct ideas about those words which lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry. This is happily illustrated in mathematics--there every word, by the help of diagrams, is carefully defined; and the consequence is, that there are no disputes among mathematicians, while their labors have done honor to mankind. A thing may be just and yet inexpedient: the justice of an act relates to the conduct of another, the expediency of our own situation. It may be just for me to sue the man who withholds from me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient as to be even ridiculous. Thus a war may be perfectly just, and at the same time highly inexpedient. This, if I mistake not, was the ground generally taken the last year by the opponents of the war, particularly by the gentleman from Virginia before me, (Mr. SHEFFEY,) which pointed out the distinction which I have endeavored to do, though with more ability and success. I hope the House will bear this distinction in mind; because it is of the greatest importance in the investigation which I intend to make. Before I enter further on the argument, I ask the House to indulge me for a moment while I explain my views relative to the commencement of the war. I never saw any want of provocation on the part of Great Britain. I never for an instant doubted the justice of the war, while I urged its inexpediency with all my might. I considered man placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a fertile soil, and in a happy climate, enlightened by science, and protected by the wisest of laws. By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from the old world, before the storm which was about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly hoped that this new world would furnish one fair experiment of what science, liberty and peace, might achieve, free from those corruptions which have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see the country improved, and bound together by roads and canals, to see it adorned by literary institutions, and by every establishment which reflects honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe that this was an Utopian vision, or an idle dream. I still believe it might all have been realized by a different course--but the nation has determined on war, and, though it was not my choice, I still maintain that it is not unjust.

I shall now examine the second proposition, "that if the war was originally just, its further prosecution is unjust." On what ground does this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council were the cause of the war; those orders having ceased, the prosecution of the war becomes unjust. Here again justice and expediency are confounded. It was never maintained, that the Orders in Council rendered war more just than many other outrages, though they went farther to prove its expediency, and even necessity. It therefore follows, that their repeal does not affect the justice of the war; unless accompanied with compensation for the spoliations committed under them, and atonement made for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it pretended, has been done; except so far as relates to the affair of the Chesapeake, and which I purposely left out of the catalogue of grievances. An injury which was a just cause of war, remains a just cause for its continuance, till atonement is offered, or till it is settled by negotiation. But, sir, an ample justification of war remains in the impressment of our seamen. The claim on our part is not, as has been alleged, a claim to protect British seamen--it is a claim to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as respects the justice of the continuance of the war, it is a claim only, that they will cease from the practice during the truce, that it may be seen whether it is possible to arrange it by negotiation. Is it unjust to continue the war, till this demand is complied with? or does any American wish to see his country prostrated still lower?

Having thus far explained my ideas relative to the justice of the commencement and continuance of the war, I will now proceed to answer the third objection, namely: That it is inexpedient to carry it on, because we have no means of coercing our enemy--of compelling him--to what? barely to a just and honorable peace; for that is all we demand. And have we no means of doing this? Better, then, to surrender the charter of our independence, confess we are incapable of self-protection, and beg his most gracious Majesty to again take us under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is as unfounded, as it is degrading to the American character. We have ample means of compelling Great Britain to do us justice; they are to be found in the value of our commerce; in the enterprise of our privateers; in the gallantry of our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces. Our custom (considering her in the light of a mechanic or merchant who supplies) is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is not to be measured by its amount, in pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the strength and support she derives from the intercourse. For, while I admit that Great Britain does not send half her exports to the United States, I do maintain, that the custom of this country is of more importance to her, than that of the whole world besides. It is with a nation as with an individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries, or superfluities, such as ribands for ribands, which he consumes, he adds nothing to his wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his ribands, for bread, or for such materials as give scope to his industry, he is then benefited, and enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation of Great Britain with regard to America. She, and her dependencies, receive more of provision, and raw materials, from America, than from all other parts of the world together. Our trade exactly gives effect to her industry, her machinery, and her capital. And it is this which has, in a great degree, enabled her to make such gigantic efforts in the awful contest in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will they have no effect on Great Britain? Will she learn nothing from the loss of three or four hundred ships? And will she be insensible to the efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch no nerve in which Britons feel? Far different are my conclusions, from what I have seen in British papers--they show that she is tremblingly alive to that subject.

Sir, I will now consider her provinces, about which so much has been said. I, too, will speak of that wonderful country, called Canada, which unites in itself all contrarieties! Which is so cold and sterile, as to be not worth possessing; and so fertile, that if, by any calamity it should become ours, it would seduce away our population; which is so unhappy under the British Government as not to lure our inhabitants; yet so happy, that it is criminal to disturb their felicity;--whose inhabitants, if united with ours, would destroy us, because they have none of the habits of freemen; and who, well knowing the privileges of their free Government, will defend them to the last. A country which is of no importance to Great Britain, and whose loss would not make her feel; a country which is so valuable to Great Britain that she will never give it up. A country so weak that it is inglorious to attack it; and a country so strong that we can never take it. But, sir, leaving these, and a thousand other contradictions, the work of fancy or of spleen, I will present to the House what I believe to be a true view of the subject, drawn from a near residence and much careful examination. Canada is of great importance both to Great Britain and the United States. It is important to Great Britain in the amount and kind of its exports. In the last year preceding war, its exports amounted to between seven and nine millions of dollars, an amount almost as great as the exports of the United States preceding the Revolutionary war. And had the most discerning statesman made out an order, he could not have selected articles better adapted to the essential wants of Great Britain. It has been said that Canada is of less value than one of the sugar islands of the West Indies. Sir, in the present state of the world, Canada is of more importance to Great Britain, in my opinion, than the whole West India Islands taken together. In danger, as she is, of being shut out from the Baltic, and fighting for her existence, she wants not the luxuries, the sugars, and the sweetmeats of the West Indies--she wants the provisions, the timber, the masts, and the spars of the North.

Canada is also of the greatest importance to the United States, in a commercial and political point of view. I have in a great measure explained its commercial importance, by stating its exports; a large portion of which were the products of the United States. Let an attentive observer cast his eye for one moment on the map of North America; let him bear in mind, that from the forty-fifth degree of latitude the waters of Canada bound for a vast extent one of the most fertile, and which will become, one of the most populous parts of the United States; and he will readily perceive that the river St. Lawrence must soon be the outlet for one-third of all the products of American labor. The same circumstances will enable it to lay an impost on one-third of our imported articles. Nor will the evil to our revenue end here. Great Britain will be enabled to smuggle her goods through this channel into all parts of the Union. It will be in vain that you attempt to counteract her by laws; from the great length and contiguity of her possessions, she will forever evade them, unless by your laws you can change the nature of man. But its greatest importance is in a political point of view: for, although not as happy in its government as the United States, it is sufficiently so to draw off multitudes of our new settlers, when the intermediate lands of the State of New York, which separate it from New England, shall be fully occupied. From this circumstance it will divide the American family, and, by the commercial relations which I have pointed out, it will exert a dangerous influence over a part of our country; for the transition from commercial dependence, to political allegiance, is too obvious to be insisted on. Having endeavored to show the importance of Canada to both of the contending nations, I I will only add that it is within our power.

The fourth objection is, that we cannot support the war--that we have not the ability to carry it on. Before I proceed to answer this objection, permit me, sir, to notice a single inconsistency of the gentlemen by whom it has been urged. It is this: in one part of their argument, they represent the people as too happy to enlist, and in another part as too poor to pay! Both of these propositions, I presume, cannot be true. Not to dwell longer, however, upon this contradiction, I do maintain, sir, that the nation is fully able to prosecute the war. On what does the ability of a nation depend? A person who will give himself the trouble of examining things rather than words, will find that it is proportioned to the number of laborers and the productiveness of their labor. Wherever, from soil, climate, or improvement, the labor of a country will produce more than a supply of the necessaries of life, it is evident that the surplus time may be devoted to idleness, to the production and consumption of luxuries, or to the carrying on of war. To illustrate this farther--suppose the labor of a person for five days will support him six, then it is clear, that the labor of five men will support the sixth man in idleness or in war. Now, sir, there is nowhere that the labor of seven millions of people will produce so much as in this country; consequently, nowhere have seven millions of people so great an ability to carry on a war. The quantity of circulating medium, whether made of paper or of silver dollars, has very little to do with the subject. If it is made of paper, and to a great extent, it only shows that the people are in their habits commercial; and that the faith of contracts is well supported. The real ability of a nation lies in what I have stated; and he must be a weak politician who cannot call it forth.

Mr. Speaker, I will now consider the last, and by far the most important objection of all; and one, without which, I certainly would not have spoken. It is, that in consideration of all the circumstances in which we are placed, it is the duty of this House to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war. It will not be denied, I trust, that this is a fair statement of the scope and object of most of the reasonings which have been employed; and that without this construction, they would be irreconcilable with common sense. This doctrine, in my opinion, goes not only to the overthrow of our constitution, but to the destruction of liberty itself. The principle of our Government is, not only that the majority shall rule, but that they shall rule in the manner prescribed by the constitution. So that if it could be proved that a majority of the people were in favor of certain measures, it would not be sufficient till they had pronounced that decision through the constitutional organs. In short, it must have been a principal object with the framers of our constitution to suspend, at least for a limited time, the effects of popular opinion. The constitution has committed the legislative power to three co-equal branches; and to the same hands has it entrusted the power of declaring war; while it has expressly confided the treaty-making power (and which alone can make peace) to two only of those branches. The claim now set up, goes to invest that branch which has no authority in the matter, not only with the treaty-making power, but also with a complete control over the other two branches. Thus one branch of the Government forcing the nation to desist from doing what three, including itself, had thought best to perform. Let us test the correctness of this principle by applying it to another co-equal branch of the Government. Let us suppose the President has made a treaty of peace, which is disapproved of by the Senate--and suppose upon this he should say, the war ought not to be further prosecuted, and refuse to employ the public force, would you not impeach him? Most unquestionably you would. I expressly admit that cases may be imagined, where such a course would be proper--where it would be not only the duty of this House to withhold supplies, but where it would be the duty of an individual to resist the laws; but such are extreme cases, not provided for by any organization of Government. What, sir, has been the practice of the British House of Commons? Have they ever refused supplies because a war was unpopular, since their revolution? Did not the same Parliament, which resolved that they would consider any man as an enemy to his country, who would advise his Majesty to the further prosecution of offensive war in America, still vote the means for carrying on the war? A similar case occurred when Mr. Fox came last into power--he disapproved of the commencement and conduct of the war, and yet he called for and received the necessary supplies.