Part 229

The war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory Orders in Council--a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes of the war; so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before this House, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate, would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true they wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending that they did not choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to another fact that transpired--an important fact material for the nation to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. MCKEE) moved, in Committee of the Whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of whom seven belonged to this side of the House, and three only to the other.

It is said that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of France; and that had she furnished the document in time, which was first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen every thing they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense of that injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was undoubtedly extremely exceptionable. But I maintain that, had it made its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed; and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British Government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than to the letters of the British Minister, addressed to the Secretary of State, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will be recollected by the committee that he exhibited to this Government a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly avowed, that to produce the effect of the repeal of the Orders in Council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on the 10th of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed this House, and was pending before the Senate, (and which, I have no doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: "I have no hesitation, sir, in stating that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without the greatest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other States, upon condition that France would except singly and specially America from the operation of her decrees." On the 14th of the same month, the bill still pending before the Senate, he repeats: "I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure you, that if you can at any time produce a full and unconditional repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it in your character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet you with a revocation of the Orders in Council. Previously to your producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our Orders in Council." Thus, sir, you see that the British Government would not be content with a repeal of the French decrees as to us only. But the French paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy the British Government. It could not, therefore, have induced that Government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders in Council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended that, in point of fact, it did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council. This I deny. After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the British Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the world knows, that the repeal of the Orders in Council resulted from the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the effect upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law, or to the warlike attitude assumed by this Government, or to both. But it is said that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me into an examination of the grounds for continuing the war.

I am far from acknowledging that had the Orders in Council been repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the declaration would have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this, from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what would have been the effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer for himself. I have no hesitation then, in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great struggle for a nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The war of the Revolution is an example of a war began for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged in its commencement against the right asserted by the parent country to tax the colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence. The idea of independence was repelled. But the British Government would have relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and they achieved our independence. When nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy, which are acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment? And, sir, what is this principle? She contends that she has a right to the services of her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in our vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I deny that she has any right, without her jurisdiction, to come on board our vessels on the high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further contends that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns. I do not mean to go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain, in the very case of foreign seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints upon naturalization than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the Sovereign having possession of the subject would have a right to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive Sovereign, he may resume his right to his services, of which the subject by his own act could not divest himself. But his primitive Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of another Sovereign, or upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it belongs to the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle, objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her practice--no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist without the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable to the principle--a principle which, if it were theoretically right, must be forever practically wrong. We are told by gentlemen in the opposition that Government has not done all that was incumbent on it to do to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government has done too much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants to his negro slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without molestation." What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to take all who are not provided with them. From their very nature they must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison and attempt to reconcile him to his wretched condition. She would say to him, in the. language of the gentlemen on the other side, "Great Britain intends you no harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her by peaceable means to release you, but I cannot, my son, fight for you." If he did not consider this mockery, he would address her judgment, and say, "You owe me, my country, protection; I owe you in return obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts, where live my aged father, my wife and my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty. Will you refuse to do yours?" Appealing to her passions, he would continue, "I lost this eye in fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution when the Guerriere struck." If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress and despair,

"Hard, hard, is my fate! once I freedom enjoyed, Was as happy as happy could be! Oh! how hard is my fate, how galling these chains!"

I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven by an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be, that his country will refuse him protection!

It is said that Great Britain has been always willing to make a satisfactory arrangement of the subject of impressment; and that Mr. King had nearly concluded one prior to his departure from that country. Let us hear what that Minister says upon his return to America. In his letter dated at New York, in July, 1803, after giving an account of his attempt to form an arrangement for the protection of our seamen, and his interviews to this end with Lords Hawkesbury and St. Vincent; and stating that, when he had supposed the terms of a convention were agreed upon, a new pretension was set up (the mare clausum,) he concludes: "I regret not to have been able to put this business on a satisfactory footing, knowing as I do its very great importance to both parties; but I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the interests of our own country, in refusing to sanction a principle that might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim to prevent." The sequel of his negotiation, on this affair, is more fully given in the recent conversation between Mr. Russell and Lord Castlereagh, communicated to Congress during its present session. Lord Castlereagh says to Mr. Russell:

"Indeed there has evidently been much misapprehension on this subject, and an erroneous belief entertained that an arrangement in regard to it has been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in Congress--I mean those who were opposed to going to war with us--have been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct of the American Government. This error probably originated with Mr. King; for, being much esteemed here, and always well received by the persons in power, he seems to have misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations, and their warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of America in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction on their part of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had proposed. But Lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be attended with formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles. This is obvious from a letter which his Lordship addressed to Sir William Scott at the time."

Here Lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before him, in which Lord St. Vincent states to Sir William Scott the zeal with which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject of impressment, confesses his own perplexity, and total incompetency to discover any practical project for the safe discontinuance of that practice, and asks for counsel and advice. "Thus you see," proceeded Lord Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King on this subject was entirely unfounded."

Thus, continued Mr. CLAY, it is apparent, that, at no time, has the enemy been willing to place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I will speak hereafter of the overtures made by the Administration since the war.

The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of terminating the contest. If our achievements upon the land have been less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen, it is not because the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization, discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist on the part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost every thing is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation that our country abounds with the richest materials, and that, in no instance, when engaged in action, have our arms been tarnished. At Brownstown, and at Queenstown, the valor of veterans was displayed, and acts of the noblest heroism were performed. It is true, that the disgrace of Detroit remains to be wiped off. That is a subject on which I cannot trust my feelings, it is not fitting I should speak. But this much I will say, it was an event which no human foresight could have anticipated, and for which the Administration cannot be justly censured. It was the parent of all the misfortunes we have experienced on land. But for it the Indian war would have been in a great measure prevented or terminated, the ascendency on Lake Erie acquired, and the war pushed perhaps to Montreal. With the exception of that event, the war, even upon the land, had been attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the other. The expedition under the command of Governor Edwards and Colonel Russell, to Lake Peoria, on the Illinois, was completely successful. So was that of Captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that river still higher. General Hopkins destroyed the Prophet's town. We have just received intelligence of the gallant enterprise of Colonel Campbell. In short, sir, the Indian towns have been swept from the mouth to the source of the Wabash, and a hostile country has been penetrated far beyond the most daring incursions of any campaign during the former Indian war. Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed than that by Newnan's party from Georgia. And the capture of the Detroit, and the destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to our maritime or land account,) for judgment, skill, and courage, on the part of Lieutenant Elliott, has never been surpassed.

What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war has been removed? We sought indemnity for the past and security for the future. The Orders in Council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated, now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration has given the strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary of State writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions only; and what are they? That the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen cease, those already impressed being released. The proposition was for nothing more than a real truce; that the war should in fact cease on both sides. Again, on the 27th July, one month later, anticipating a possible objection to these terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe empowers Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms for an armistice, having only an informal understanding on these points. In return, the enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment of his seamen in our service, thus removing entirely all pretext for the practice of impressment. The very proposition which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. PITKIN) contends ought to be made, has been made. How are these pacific advances met by the other party? Rejected as absolutely inadmissible; cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr. Russell's powers, and the want of an act of Congress is intimated. And yet the constant usage of nations I believe is, where the legislation of one party is necessary to carry into effect a given stipulation, to leave it to the contracting party to provide the requisite laws. If he fails to do so, it is a breach of good faith, and a subject of subsequent remonstrance by the injured party. When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. Afterwards, in conversation with Mr. Russell, the moderation of our Government is misinterpreted and made the occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of the war. The proposition of Admiral Warren is submitted in a spirit not more pacific. He is instructed, he tells us, to propose that the Government of the United States shall instantly recall their letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders and instructions for any acts of hostility whatever against the territories of His Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects. That small affair being settled, he is further authorized to arrange as to the revocation of the laws which interdict the commerce and ships of war of His Majesty from the harbors and waters of the United States. This messenger of peace comes with one qualified concession in his pocket, not made to the justice of our demands, and is fully empowered to receive our homage, the contrite retraction of all our measures adopted against his master! And in default, he does not fail to assure us, the Orders in Council are to be forthwith revived. Administration, still anxious to terminate the war, suppresses the indignation which such a proposal ought to have created, and in its answer concludes by informing Admiral Warren, "that if there be no objection to an accommodation of the difference relating to impressment, in the mode proposed, other than the suspension of the British claim to impressment during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding, without the armistice, to an immediate discussion and arrangement of an article on that subject." Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and it remains to be seen if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PEARSON) supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were passed, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation that, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail, let us fail like men--lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's rights and free trade."

Mr. MCKEE moved an amendment to the bill, going to place the appointment of the other field officers of each regiment, as well as the Colonels, in the President and Senate. The motion was agreed to.

MONDAY, January 11.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men for one year.

Mr. SHEFFEY said he felt grateful for the opportunity which had been afforded him, to deliver his sentiments on the subject before the committee. It was now about a year ago, when he had stated his reasons at length on the question of the war then meditated against Great Britain. Since that time, he had been generally a silent, though not an inattentive spectator. Conscious that there had fallen to his share a full portion of the frailty common to man, he felt disposed to distrust his own opinion. He had even hoped he might be mistaken, he had hoped that experience would prove the fallacy of his apprehensions; that the predictions of gentlemen, who differed from him in sentiment, would be realized; that the rights of the country would be secured by arms, to which the majority had resorted; and that the evils anticipated would vanish before us. On a review, however, of the reasons which had then influenced him, aided by the experience of the last year, he found his opinions, not only unshaken, but strongly confirmed.

The bill before us, said Mr. S., contemplates an addition of twenty thousand men to the army heretofore authorized to be raised. By the measures preparatory to the war, upwards of thirty-six thousand men were directed to be enlisted; with the addition now contemplated, our regular army will amount to more than fifty-six thousand men. The question which at once presents itself to every mind disposed to inquire, is, what is the object of this vast military force? We are here not left to conjecture; this inquiry has been anticipated, and we have been directly told by the chairman of the Military Committee, (Mr. WILLIAMS,) that it is intended for offensive purposes; that the conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, is to be achieved. If I have any right to deliberate on this subject, and to express the opinion which my view of the real interests of the country dictates, I at once say, that I cannot give my assent to raise such a force for such a purpose. Was an augmentation of the army required to defend us against any enemy, either on the maritime or inland frontier, no member of this House would more readily accord the means of defence and protection than myself. In such event, I shall not inquire how we got into the situation, or by whose temerity the enemy has been brought on our borders. I shall consider defence as a matter of imperious necessity, forbidding all calculation as to means and consequences. But, as it is admitted by all, that the force already authorized is more than sufficient for every defensive purpose; as it is expressly avowed that it is required for offensive operations in the territories of the enemy, the question assumes a different shape; it is stripped of the overruling influence which attends necessity; it becomes a mere question of expediency, controlled by the various considerations which reason and policy may dictate. So far as my conduct is concerned, before I can consent to the prosecution of the war, in the manner contemplated, I must be convinced that the objects in controversy are not only just, but of sufficient importance in their practical effect on the community to justify such an experiment, and not attainable in any other way; that there is a reasonable probability that such a war will secure to us those objects; and that we are not endangering the greater good, to obtain an exemption from the lesser evil; hazarding certain great rights, to secure others of far inferior importance.

I regret that I cannot, consistently with my sense of duty, yield the unlimited confidence in their measures, which the majority demand. My reason must be convinced, before my confidence can be bestowed. There are, indeed, cases where superior virtue and wisdom, tested by long and successful experience, have a strong claim to our confidence. But this, in my opinion, is not the case here. A retrospect of the transactions of the last eight years, will show how much gentlemen have been mistaken and disappointed in their views of our foreign policy; particularly that part which is connected with the difficulties in which we now find ourselves, and which may be said to be the groundwork of them. In making this declaration, and in leading your attention to the facts, it is not my object to give offence to any one. I believe gentlemen are actuated by the purest motives, and sincerely disposed to render essential service to the country. I speak of facts only, intending to show a mistaken, not a corrupt or vicious course.

Our difficulties with Great Britain commenced soon after the treaty of 1794 (generally called "Jay's Treaty") expired by its own limitation, in consequence of the peace of Amiens. About that time the British Government offered to our Minister, then resident in London, a renewal of the treaty. That instrument had been negotiated under the auspices, and received the sanction of WASHINGTON, the father and benefactor of his country. It is true, that its stipulations did not embrace every subject which we could have wished; and those that were embraced, were not so advantageously settled as might have been done, had we had it in our power to have dictated the terms. But it is equally true, that experience refuted all the speculations, and dissipated all the apprehensions, with which the country was filled at the time of its ratification. During its operation we enjoyed a degree of prosperity unexampled in this or any other country. Our leading interests flourished in a manner unknown before, and unexperienced since; our agriculture was encouraged by high prices and ready markets for its products; the freedom of navigation, and the enterprise of our people, carried our commerce to every part of the globe. I ask this House and this nation, whether their hopes or wishes extend beyond what we then enjoyed? If they do, they hope for that which is opposed by all human probability, and they wish for that which has scarcely ever fallen to the lot of man. We were, indeed, not exempt from every evil, or gratified by every possible good. What nation or individual ever reached that state? But the great essentials of national prosperity were in our possession. Our Government, however, was not satisfied. The overture of the British Government was rejected, under the impression, no doubt, that better terms could be obtained; that the situation of Great Britain would compel her to yield to our demands, however extensive.

Soon after the rejection of this overture, Great Britain assumed the right to interdict the trade in the products of her enemies' colonies, when taken directly from those colonies to the mother country, conformably, as she asserted, to the principles adopted in the war of 1756. In consequence of which, our Government, with a view to coerce her into a relinquishment of her pretensions, passed the partial non-importation act of 1806. It had not the intended and promised effect. They again resorted to negotiation, and repealed the restriction. About this time, a change happened in the British Cabinet, highly auspicious to our interests. "Our friends," yes, our old friends, who had espoused our cause in time of peril and danger, who had defended our rights during all the vicissitudes of the Revolution, and who had manifested their friendship for us on every occasion since, got into power. With these men, a negotiation was opened by our Government through the instrumentality of our Ministers, Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, which resulted in a treaty, as our own Ministers declared, "both honorable and advantageous to the United States," and the best that could be obtained. It was not only "advantageous" as it respected our commerce, but the informal understanding which accompanied it, would have secured us against the abuses of impressments; so our own Ministers believed. But it was rejected without being even submitted to the Senate. The reasons have never been disclosed to the nation. I presume, however, that it was confidently expected that such was the situation of Great Britain, that any terms that we should dictate would be granted.

The terms which our Government demanded not being accorded on the part of Great Britain, a new policy was resorted to by our Government, which was held up to the nation as a sovereign remedy for all our difficulties, which were daily increasing. An embargo, not limited in its duration, was laid on our shipping. The prominent virtues of this remedy were supposed to be--that it would coerce the belligerents, but particularly Great Britain, into an abandonment of their injurious measures; and above all, that it would save us from being involved in war. The experience of one year, however, manifested how little its supporters understood of the means and resources of other nations, and of the character of our own. The privations to which a great portion of our people were subjected in consequence of this measure coerced our Government into a repeal, long before any sensible impression could be made on Great Britain. The embargo was abandoned, because the people would bear it no longer, and the non-intercourse system was adopted in its stead. This also had its day--but this, like the embargo, experience condemned as injurious and ruinous policy; and the public voice called for its repeal. It was succeeded by the act of the first of May, 1810, the source of our present difficulties.

When this act passed this House, we were told that its provisions held out the strongest inducement to each of the great belligerents, to precede its rival in the abrogation of the injurious edicts affecting the commerce of this country, and that whoever might lead the other would unquestionably follow. It required very little sagacity to penetrate this subject. It was easily foreseen that this measure would be employed to detach us from our neutral situation, which it was so much our interest, and had been so much our desire, to maintain. This apprehension experience has realized. We now feel the consequences in their fullest extent.

After we had become the dupes of French perfidy, by putting in force the non-importation system against Great Britain, under the belief, that on the first day of November, 1810, the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed, the falsehood of which has since been placed beyond all rational doubt, it happened as had been anticipated, that finding the inefficiency of the restrictive system against Great Britain, the nation was called on, about the commencement of last session, to assume a threatening attitude towards that power. We were then told by the supporters of our foreign policy, that war would not be necessary. That justice was withheld from us by the Government of that nation under the impression that force would not be used to maintain our rights, which impression it was only necessary to remove by manifesting a determined spirit in making warlike preparations. This prevailed with many, and the army was voted. But it did not intimidate our enemy. We were then told, that it was necessary to declare war, as affording conclusive evidence of our sincerity: but that it would not be necessary to continue it beyond a few weeks, when our objects would be attained by a just and honorable peace. We were also told, at the same time, that in six weeks after the declaration of war, we should be in possession of a great portion of the enemy's colonies. All these promises have been disappointed. We have effected nothing by commercial restrictions, nothing by arms, and nothing by negotiation; and, if there is not a change in our policy, the war promises to be perpetual.

Having detained you thus long with these preliminary topics, permit me to draw your attention to those that grow directly out of the bill before the committee. I have said, that the causes ought not only to be just, but important in their effect on the community, to justify a resort to arms. I will say more. A nation situated as this is, who has so much to lose, and so little to gain, ought not to relinquish its peaceful state but in the last extremity. Are the causes which existed at the time when this war was declared, of that character which, according to this idea, justified its commencement; and are those now remaining sufficient to sanction its continuance?

I exclude all consideration of the abstract justice of our complaints against Great Britain. Upon that subject I never had but one opinion. I always did believe that her conduct towards this country was not only unjust as it affected us, but impolitic as it affected herself.

Before the war commenced last Summer, the Orders in Council formed the principal ground of complaint against Great Britain. I venture to assert, without the dread of contradiction, that if the repeal which has since taken place had happened and been known here before we resorted to the sword, we should have remained at peace. I make this declaration on (what I deem) the most unquestionable authority. The proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, through our Minister in London, proposed to the British Government to relinquish the embargo as to her, on condition the Orders in Council were revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made the same condition the sole foundation for restoring amicable intercourse between the two nations. In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between our Government and that of Great Britain were confined almost exclusively to that subject. And in 1812, preceding the declaration of war, the Secretary of State informed the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council were revoked, the non-importation act would cease immediately. During the whole of this period, our complaints were directed to the Orders in Council, and our measures, (I speak of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye to their repeal. Until the war was declared, I did not suppose that it would be waged for any other object.

The Orders in Council, though a violation of our maritime rights in point of principle, were practically of very little injury to our commerce at the commencement of the war in which we are now engaged. The reasons are obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland, Italy, &c., never was of great importance. And the effect of the French "municipal regulations" had caused it to dwindle into insignificance. The exclusions, restrictions, impositions, and confiscations, so permanent in the commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon, had inspired our merchants with a due portion of caution, how they ventured their property into the power of a Government actuated by no liberal principle, and bound by no faith. From this state of things, it was not difficult to conjecture that the period was not distant when Great Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency of the Orders in Council, so far as respected their retaliatory object on her enemy. How could France be distressed by the British interdiction of her foreign commerce, when France herself was hostile to that commerce--when she adopted every measure to narrow, to shackle, and ultimately to exclude it? We had even strong evidence that British statesmen began to waver on the subject. The vote in the House of Commons, during the last Winter, showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated most clearly that before long the Orders in Council were doomed to perish. But, with this information before our eyes, we hurried on to war without waiting for the event, or even without waiting for preparation.

The Orders in Council have since been repealed. The manner has indeed been objected to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. CLAY,) because the right to secure them in certain events is reserved. But surely this cannot be and has not been considered by our Government a serious objection; for without such reservation the power to revive them existed to every possible extent. The only question is, do they cease to violate our neutral commerce? This is not doubted. The remaining obstacle, therefore, to a good understanding between the two nations, and the sole ostensible cause for persevering in the war, is the subject of impressments.