Part 224

Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my opinion, it is not calculated to produce the desired effect, or that which is intended by it: that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest of the Canadas in the given time. I will ask how many regiments you have in your present establishment? Say thirty-five, and you add twenty, making together fifty-five: what use is there in multiplying regiments without men? The Chairman did state that from prudential motives, he had thought it inexpedient to give the number now actually in service, or enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it is not my wish to go into a strict inquiry; the regard I have for the honor of my country forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand, and, I believe, that is large; then there is left officers for eighteen thousand men. Are these not sufficient for the recruiting service? to engage every man who is willing to serve his country? to place a recruiting officer in almost every town and village in the United States? They are; and, therefore, you ought not to create an unnecessary addition. If the present establishment is not full, what is the reason? Either that the pay and bounty are not sufficient inducements, or there is a dislike to the service; your creating more regiments will not remove that difficulty. I am against the bill, because the term of service is too short to answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them intended to operate as a force against Canada. Let us see how that will answer the purpose: You send out your warrants to commence the enlistment of the proposed troops at this time; how long a time, is it contemplated, will be necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is, that you will not have them half full in four months; it is then time to take the field, and they are then raw troops. The honorable Chairman (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS) states to you the number of troops necessary for defensive operations, according to his calculation, to be ten thousand; deducting that number from the present establishment, supposing it to be full. It is not for me to say how far the present establishment is short of the whole number, or will be at that time; but we know that it is far short; we do not know that it can be filled, and if it cannot, then those calculations are fictitious. He also states to you that the regular force in the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax, besides their militia. According to this, and my views, you cannot enter Canada the next campaign with man for man; and surely that is not sufficient for conquest in an enemy's country. But I will suppose that you conquer a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned if you will keep it. In a year from the time of enlistment their term expires, and what becomes of your conquest, without force to keep it, supposing it to be made? Say that the officers will be called into service in four months, and there is some of the men enlisted six or eight months hence; the officers must serve until the expiration of the term of the last man engaged, or a derangement must take place--always a disagreeable occurrence in an army.

Sir, if you have not numbers sufficient to bear down all opposition, invade it not: act on the defensive until you have engaged your men, and for a term of time sufficient to answer your purpose; then may you count upon success and honor. I do not say that I believe land conquests will produce an acknowledgment of our rights on the ocean. I believe it will not; but unless you act with great regularity, system, and economy, you cannot avoid it; you must meet with nothing but disappointments and disgrace.

Mr. LAW said as he was originally opposed to the war, and the preparatory steps which led to it, he could not admit the principle, that because war was declared he was bound to acquiesce, and lend his aid to promote every plan for prosecuting the war which might be proposed, however wild and extravagant the same might appear. He said he felt it a duty, and he claimed it as a right, (although he was not ambitious very often to exercise the right,) to offer objections to any measures which might be introduced, if he supposed they were not calculated to produce the effect intended, although he might not be in favor of the object itself; or if he believed the measure proposed would be productive of real evil. Now, sir, on this important occasion it would be wise for a moment to look back, and if we can bear the pain of retrospection, consider what this nation once was, what it might be, and what it in fact is. Time was, and that within the recollection of us all, when industry, commerce, prosperity, and peace, gladdened the hearts of this once happy people, and the use of arms was known only as a pacific pastime. The nation, like some individuals, could not bear the intoxicating influence of prosperity. It might have preserved its enviable condition, but it labored and groaned under the weight of national blessings; it submitted to regard the sinister views and malign influence of foreign powers; it listened--fatally listened--to a serpent more fell than the serpent of old. And now how sad is the reverse, let a dejected and impoverished nation answer; in the past, we see departed comforts; before us, we behold ruin and distress. The unhappy crisis to which we have arrived has been progressive. Had the transition been sudden, the nation would have been driven to desperation. We have been often admonished by those who foresaw the present evils; and had we been wise, might have avoided the calamities in which the country is now involved, and from which there is at present no prospect of speedy relief.

Sir, we will no longer dwell on times past; we will now briefly notice the causes which were alleged in the manifestoes which immediately preceded the declaration of war, and what was said to be the object, and attempt to show that the bill now under consideration is unnecessary for the attainment of the original object; that it will be injurious to the militia, and may endanger the liberties of the country.

As to the causes of the war, without admitting or denying their justice on national principles to justify the act at the time it was declared, he might say that some of the pretended causes have never been seriously relied on by our own Government. The principal one has been wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious catalogue now remains, and that might easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten, that the act declaring war was carried with great labor and much reluctance; and such was the majority in each branch of Congress that it might well have justified a doubt as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides, a large proportion of the United States were then, and even since have been opposed to the act. And this opposition was not confined to those who have been slanderously reported to be in the interest of Great Britain. The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some of the best patriots and purest bosoms in the country. Experience has also proved that the public sentiment was against the war; witness the feeble ranks of your volunteers, the slow and reluctant march of the militia, and the tardy progress in the recruiting service. Sir, the disgrace and disasters which have hitherto attended the army, have resulted more from a want of confidence in the justice and propriety of the war, than from the lack of talents in those who have conducted the battles, incompetent as they have been represented to command. A nation like this cannot be driven to war. They must feel the justice and necessity of it, and the justice must be so strong as to pierce every heart. This would be felt in a necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the nation would smite with one arm. Before such a people, roused in such a cause, the veteran legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite the dust. Such, alas! is not our case. We have a war, without the spirit or unanimity which springs from these causes, and without the pecuniary means of supporting it. Such a war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the honor of this nation now suspended? On the Navy! that little navy which was despised, neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself into notice, and rescued the sinking honor of the country.

What, sir, was the avowed object of this war? It has ever been said that conquest, with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging our dominion, was not the wish of this Government. The idea of this Republic following the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations, was so repugnant to the genius of the American people, and the constitution under which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest advocates of the war dare avow it.

The pretence was to take, or rather to receive Canada; for it was vainly supposed the inhabitants of that province would readily join our standard, on the first invitation. But we must go through the form of conquest to protect them from the charge of treason to their own Government. We were to hold Canada until peace should return, and then it was to be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights. And this it was supposed would be a powerful weapon in our hands in the negotiation. With this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising the volunteers, and transferring the militia, passed. By the present bill, and the project connected with it, the original plan is abandoned with the volunteers and militia, and we are now presented with a compound system of conquest, extermination, and defence. It would seem with the force of fifty-five thousand regular troops, we are to conquer all the residue of North America; exterminate every tawny infidel this side of the Isthmus of Darien, and defend a seacoast many hundred miles in extent from the incursions of the enemy! This is truly a gigantic project. He said he could not give it his aid; and he thought some honorable gentlemen who voted for the war would, when they reflected on the magnitude of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion to retire, unwilling to entail on themselves and posterity the expense and ruin which would flow from the project, if carried into execution.

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I fear that the state of my health may prevent my doing justice to my sentiments concerning this bill. I will, however, make the attempt though I should fail in it.

The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be added to the existing Military Establishment. This, at present, consists of 35,000 men. So that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal of the Executive, an army of 55,000. It is not pretended that this addition is wanted either for defence or for the relief of the Indian frontier. On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged that the present establishment is sufficient for both of those objects. But the purpose for which these 20,000 men are demanded is, the invasion of Canada. This is unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS,) the organ, as is admitted, of the will and the wishes of the American Cabinet.

The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into deliberation, the conquest of Canada, either as an object, in itself desirable, or consequentially advantageous, by its effect, in producing an early and honorable peace.

Before I enter upon the discussion of those topics, which naturally arise from this state of the subject, I will ask your indulgence, for one moment, while I make a few remarks upon this intention of the American Cabinet thus unequivocally avowed. I am induced to this from the knowledge, which I have, that this design is not deemed to be serious by some men of both political parties; as well within this House as out of it. I know that some of the friends of the present Administration do consider the proposition as a mere feint, made for the purpose of putting a good face upon things, and of strengthening the hope of a successful negotiation, by exciting the apprehensions of the British Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I know, also, that some of those who are opposed in political sentiment to the men who are now at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes of invasion; and deem them hardly worth controversy, on account of their opinion of the imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the embarrassment of its resources.

I am anxious that no doubt should exist upon this subject either in the House or in the nation. Whosoever considers the object of this bill to be any other than that which has been avowed, is mistaken. Whosoever believes this bill to be a means of peace, or any thing else than an instrument of vigorous and long-protracted war, is grievously deceived. And whoever acts under such mistake, or such deception, will have to lament one of the grossest, and perhaps one of the most critical errors of his political life. I warn, therefore, my political opponents; those honest men, of whom I know there are some, who, paying only a general attention to the course of public affairs, submit the guidance of their opinions to the men who stand at the helm, not to vote for this bill under any belief that its object is to aid negotiation for peace. Let such gentlemen recur to their past experience on similar occasions. They will find that it has been always the case, whenever any obnoxious measure is about to be passed, that its passage is assisted by the aid of some such collateral suggestions. No sooner do the Cabinet perceive that any potion, which they intend to administer, is loathed by a considerable part of the majority, and that their apprehensions are alive lest it should have a scouring effect upon their popularity, than certain under-operators are set to work, whose business it is to amuse the minds, and beguile the attention of the patients while the dose is swallowing. The language always is: "Trust the Cabinet doctors. The medicine will not operate as you imagine, but quite another way." After this manner the fears of the men are allayed, and the purposes of the Administration are attained under suggestions very different from the true motives. Thus, the embargo, which has since been unequivocally acknowledged to have been intended to coerce Great Britain, was adopted, as the Executive asserted, "to save our essential resources." So, also, when the present war was declared against Great Britain, members of the House were known to state that they voted for it under the suggestion that it would not be a war of ten days: that it was known that Mr. Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements, in his pocket; and that the United States had only to advance to the point of war, and the whole business would be settled. And now an army, which, in point of numbers, Cromwell might envy, greater than that with which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped through a reluctant Congress, under the suggestion of its being only a parade force, to make negotiation successful; that it is the incipient state of a project for a grand pacification!

I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen are apt to place great reliance on their own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these will tell you that the invasion of Canada is impossible. They ask where are the men--where is the money to be obtained? And they talk very wisely concerning common sense and common prudence, and will show, with much learning, how this attempt is an offence against both the one and the other. But, sir, it has been my lot to be an observer of the character and conduct of the men now in power for these eight years past. And I state, without hesitation, that no scheme ever was, or ever will be, rejected by them, merely on account of its running counter to the ordinary dictates of common sense and common prudence. On the contrary, on that very account, I believe it more likely to be both suggested and adopted by them. And, what may appear a paradox, for that very reason, the chance is rather increased that it will be successful.

I could illustrate this position twenty ways. I shall content myself with remarking only upon two instances, and those recent; the present war, and the late invasion of Canada. When war against Great Britain was proposed at the last session, there were thousands in these United States, and I confess to you I was myself among the number, who believed not one word of the matter. I put my trust in the old fashioned notions of common sense, and common prudence. That a people, which had been more than twenty years at peace, should enter upon hostilities against a people which had been twenty years at war; that a nation, whose army and navy were little more than nominal, should engage in a war with a nation possessing one of the best appointed armies and the most powerful marine on the globe; that a country, to which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest, should throw that great blessing away for a controversy in which nothing was to be gained, and every thing valuable put in jeopardy; from these, and innumerable like considerations, the idea seemed so absurd that I never once entertained it as possible. And now, after war has been declared, the whole affair seems so extraordinary and so utterly irreconcilable to any previous suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I know not what to make of it or how to believe it. Even at this moment my mind is very much in the state of certain Pennsylvania Germans, of whom I have heard it asserted that they are taught to believe, by their political leaders, and do at this moment consider the allegation, that war is at present existing between the United States and Great Britain, to be a "federal falsehood."

It was just so with respect to the invasion of Canada. I heard of it last June. I laughed at the idea, as did multitudes of others, as an attempt too absurd for serious examination. I was in this case again beset by common sense and common prudence. That the United States should precipitate itself upon the unoffending people of that neighboring colony, unmindful of all previously subsisting amities, because the parent State, three thousand miles distant, had violated some of our commercial rights; that we should march inland, to defend our ships, and seamen; that with raw troops, hastily collected, miserably appointed, and destitute of discipline, we should invade a country defended by veteran forces, at least equal, in point of numbers, to the invading army; that bounty should be offered and proclamations issued, inviting the subjects of a foreign power to treason and rebellion, under the influences of a quarter of the country upon which a retort of the same nature was so obvious, so easy, and, in its consequences, so awful; in every aspect, the design seemed so fraught with danger and disgrace, that it appeared absolutely impossible that it should be seriously entertained. Those, however, who reasoned after this manner were, as the event proved, mistaken. The war was declared. Canada was invaded. We were in haste to plunge into these great difficulties, and we have now reason, as well as leisure enough, for regret and repentance.

The great mistake of all those, who reasoned concerning the war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it was impossible that either should be seriously intended, resulted from this, that they never took into consideration the connection of both those events with the great election for the Chief Magistracy which was then pending. It never was sufficiently considered by them, that plunging into war with Great Britain was among the conditions on which the support for the Presidency was made dependent. They did not understand, that an invasion of Canada was to be in truth only a mode of carrying on an electioneering campaign. But since events have explained political purposes, there is no difficulty in seeing the connections between projects and interests. It is now apparent to the most mole-sighted how a nation may be disgraced, and yet a Cabinet attain its desired honors. All is clear. A country may be ruined, in making an Administration happy.

I said, Mr. Speaker, that such strange schemes, apparently irreconcilable to common sense and common prudence, were, on that very account, more likely to be successful. Sir, there is an audacity, which sometimes stands men instead both of genius and strength. And most assuredly, he is most likely to perform that which no man ever did before, and will never be likely to do again, who has the boldness to undertake that which no man ever thought of attempting in time past, and no man will ever think of attempting in time future. I would not, however, be understood as intimating that this Cabinet project of invasion is impracticable, either as it respects the collection of means and instruments, or in the ultimate result. On the contrary, sir, I deem both very feasible. Men may be obtained. For if forty dollars bounty cannot obtain them, a hundred dollars bounty may, and the intention is explicitly avowed not to suffer the attainment of the desired army to be prevented by any vulgar notions of economy. Money may be obtained. What by means of the increased popularity derived from the augmentation of the navy, what by opening subscription offices in the interior of the country, what by large premiums, the cupidity of the moneyed interest may be tempted beyond the point of patriotic resistance, and all the attained means being diverted to the use of the army, pecuniary resources may be obtained, ample at least for the first year. And, sir, let an army of thirty thousand men be collected, let them be put under the command of a popular leader, let them be officered to suit his purposes, let them be flushed with victories, and see the fascinating career of military glory opening upon them, and they will not thereafter ever be deficient in resources. If they cannot obtain their pay by your votes, they will collect it by their own bayonets; and they will not rigidly observe any air-lines or water-lines in enforcing their necessary levies; nor be stayed by abstract speculation concerning right, or learned constitutional difficulties.

I will now proceed to discuss those topics which naturally arise out of the bill under consideration, and examine the proposed invasion of Canada, at three different points of view.

1. As a means of carrying on the subsisting war.

2. As a means of obtaining an early and honorable peace.

3. As a means of advancing the personal and local projects of ambition of the members of the American Cabinet.

Concerning the invasion of Canada, as a means of carrying on the subsisting war, it is my duty to speak plainly and decidedly, not only because I herein express my own opinions upon the subject, but, as I conscientiously believe, the sentiments also of a very great majority of that whole section of country in which I have the happiness to reside. I say then, sir, that I consider the invasion of Canada as a means of carrying on this war, as cruel, wanton, senseless, and wicked.

You will easily understand, Mr. Speaker, by this very statement of opinion, that I am not one of that class of politicians which has for so many years predominated in the world, on both sides of the Atlantic. You will readily believe, that I am not one of those who worship in that temple, where Condorcet is the High Priest and Machiavel the God. With such politicians the end always sanctifies the means; the least possible good to themselves perfectly justifies, according to their creed, the inflicting the greatest possible evil upon others. In the judgment of such men, if a corrupt ministry at three thousand miles distance shall have done them an injury, it is an ample cause to visit with desolation a peaceable and unoffending race of men, their neighbors, who happen to be associated with that ministry by ties of mere political dependence. What though these colonies be so remote from the sphere of the questions in controversy, that their ruin or prosperity could have no possible influence upon the result? What though their cities offer no plunder? What though their conquest can yield no glory? In their ruin there is revenge. And revenge to such politicians is the sweetest of all morsels. With such men, neither I nor the people of that section of country in which I reside hold any communion. There is between us and them no one principle of sympathy either in motive or action.

That wise, moral, reflecting people, which constitute the great mass of the population of Massachusetts--indeed, of all New England--look for the sources of their political duties nowhere else than in those fountains from which spring their moral duties. According to their estimate of human life and its obligations, both political and moral duties emanate from the nature of things, and from the essential and eternal relations which subsist among them. True it is, that a state of war gives the right to seize and appropriate the property and territories of an enemy. True it is, that the colonies of a foreign power are viewed, according to the law of nations, in the light of its property. But in estimating the propriety of carrying desolation into the peaceful abodes of their neighbors, the people of New England will not limit their contemplation to the mere circumstance of abstract right, nor ask what lawyers and jurisprudists have written or said, as if this was conclusive upon the subject. That people are much addicted to think for themselves, and in canvassing the propriety of such an invasion, they will consider the actual condition of those colonies, their natural relations to us, and the effect which their conquest and ruin will have, not only upon the people of those colonies, but upon themselves, and their own liberties and constitution. And above all, what I know will seem strange to some of those who hear me, they will not forget to apply to a case occurring between nations, as far as is practicable, that heaven-descended rule which the great author and founder of their religion has given them for the regulation of their conduct towards each other. They will consider it the duty of these United States to act towards those colonies as they would wish those colonies to act, in exchange of circumstances, towards these United States.

The actual condition of those colonies, and the relation in which they stood to the United States antecedent to the declaration of war, were of this nature. Those colonies had no connection with the questions in dispute between us and their parent State. They had done us no injury. They meditated none to us. Between the inhabitants of those colonies and the citizens of the United States, the most friendly and mutually useful intercourse subsisted. The borderers on this, and those on the other side of the St. Lawrence, and of the boundary line, scarcely realized that they were subjects of different governments. They interchanged expressions and acts of civility. Intermarriages took place among them. The Canadian sometimes settled in the United States; sometimes our citizens emigrated to Canada. After the declaration of war, had they any disposition to assail us? We have the reverse expressly in evidence. They desired nothing so much as to keep perfect the then subsisting relations of amity. Would the conquest of those colonies shake the policy of the British cabinet? No man has shown it. Unqualified assertions, it is true, have been made, but totally unsupported by any evidence, or even the pretence of argument. On the contrary, nothing was more obvious than that an invasion of Canada must strengthen the Ministry of Great Britain, by the excitement and sympathy which would be occasioned in the people of that country in consequence of the sufferings of the innocent inhabitants of those colonies, on account of a dispute in which they had no concern, and of which they had scarcely a knowledge. All this was anticipated--all this was frequently urged to this House, at the last and preceding sessions, as the necessary effect of such a measure. The event has justified those predictions. The late elections in Great Britain have terminated in the complete triumph of the friends of the British Ministry. In effecting this change, the conduct of the United States in relation to Canada has had, undeniably, a mighty influence, by the disgust and indignation felt by the British people at a step so apparently wanton and cruel.

As there was no direct advantage to be hoped from the conquest of Canada, so also, there was none incidental. Plunder there was none--at least, none which would pay the cost of the conquest. Glory there was none. Could seven millions of people obtain glory by precipitating themselves upon half a million, and trampling them into the dust? A giant obtain glory by crushing a pigmy! That giant must have a pigmy's spirit who could reap, or hope, glory from such an achievement.

Surely a people, with whom we were connected by so many natural and adventitious ties, had some claims upon our humanity. Surely if our duty required that they and theirs should be sacrificed to our interests or our passions, some regret mingled in the execution of our purpose. We postponed the decree of ruin until the last moment. We hesitated--we delayed until longer delay was dangerous. Alas! sir, there was nothing of this kind or character in the conduct of the Cabinet. The war had not yet been declared, when General Hull had his instructions to put in train the work of destruction. There was an eagerness for the blood of the Canadians--a headlong precipitation for their ruin, which indicated any thing else rather than feelings of humanity, or visitings of nature, on account of their condition. Our armies were on their march for their frontier, while yet peace existed between this country and the parent State; and the invasion was obstinately pursued, after a knowledge that the chief ground of controversy was settled by the abandonment of the British Orders in Council; and after nothing remained but a stale ground of dispute, which, however important in itself, was of a nature for which no man has ever yet pretended that for it alone war would have been declared. Did ever one Government exhibit towards any people a more bloody and relentless spirit of rancor? Tell me not of petty advantages--of remote, and possibly useful contingencies which might arise from the devastation of those colonies. Show any advantage which justifies that dreadful vial of wrath which, if the intention of the American Cabinet had been fulfilled, would, at this day, have been poured out upon the heads of the Canadians. It is not owing to the tender mercies of the American Administration, if the bones of the Canadians are not at this hour mingled with the ashes of their habitations. It is easy enough to make an excuse for any purpose. When a victim is destined to be immolated, every hedge presents sticks for the sacrifice. The lamb who stands at the mouth of the stream, will always trouble the water, if you take the account of the wolf who stands at the source of it. But show a good to us bearing any proportion to the multiplied evils proposed to be visited upon them. There is none. Never was there an invasion of any country worse than this, in point of moral principle, since the invasion of the West Indies by the Buccaneers, or that of the United States by Captain Kidd. Indeed, both Kidd and the Buccaneers had more apology for their deed than the American Cabinet. They had at least the hope of plunder; but in this case there is not even the poor refuge of cupidity. We have heard great lamentations about the disgrace of our arms on the frontier. Why, sir, the disgrace of our arms on the frontier is terrestrial glory, in comparison with the disgrace of the attempt. The whole atmosphere rings with the utterance, from the other side of the House of this word "glory"--"glory" in connection with this invasion. What glory? Is it the glory of the tiger, which lifts his jaws, all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim, and roars for his companions of the wood to come and witness his prowess and his spoils? Such is the glory of Genghis Khan, and of Bonaparte. Be such glory far, very far, from my country. Never, never may it be accursed with such fame.

"Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil, Nor in the glistering foil Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies, But lives and spreads aloft, by those pure eyes, And perfect witness of all-judging Jove, As he pronounces lastly on each deed."