Part 215

Mr. BASSETT spoke several times in the course of the debate. The following is the substance of the whole of his remarks: He said, on rising, that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed the House. I shall, said he, have credit with every one in the assertion that I am most anxious that the proposition I have made should succeed. Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness of voice, the want of force, of manner, and promptness of mind and thought, which limit me? But I shall feel compensated if the House will, in heart, join me in regretting that a cause worthy of the first of advocates has fallen into such puny hands. For the cause, then, will they hear me, and for their country's good will they improve each hint I may let fall, by their better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little experience--I cannot boast of naval knowledge in our land--but, yet, we are not quite deficient. Let it be remembered, that it is on the first principles that we are to decide; that we are to mark the outlines only, which depend much on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we may resort to the experience of others. I will follow (though with unequal step) the course taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the question to fill this blank, bring the whole subject before the committee. It will be assumed, as then proved, that protection is due to every national right, which cannot be estimated by pecuniary calculation, but must be tested by national ability only to defend and protect them. To the mode of effecting so desirable an object, I shall confine myself. The report has assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to oppose like to like, and so says the history of man, whom we find ever availing himself of the improvements of his assailant for self-defence. Hence has the art of war become to all nations the most interesting science, and no citizen is more estimable than he who can direct the national force with most efficiency. The importance of a naval force is amply attested on record. I will first, sir, point you to the conflicts between the rival Republics of Rome and Carthage, and ask you to remember the agency that their vessels had in them. Had the Romans confined themselves to the land, never had Carthage been destroyed. The history of Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too familiar to all who hear me, to require reference to particulars. It is sufficient for me to call attention to the effect of naval power, as it passed from nation to nation. What was the power of Venice and Genoa when they led the van of naval power? How quickly did the sceptre of Portugal rise, as she assumed a station on the ocean! how sink as she lost her naval preponderance! How did a navy once support the United Provinces! and how is it now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then a fact, that a naval armament gives effect to the power of a nation, as do the musket and bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how, sir, is it attempted to rebut this fact? By showing a physical disability in the country to avail itself of this force? No. For then would they be rebutted by the extent of our coasts, by the materials for ship-building, (so ample,) and the known habits and genius of our countrymen, as each day is evincing. And here, sir, I wish I could follow up the beautiful figure of my friend, who, on a former occasion, showed you our continent, extending to either ocean, with the finger of Munificence pointing to the goodly heritage.

We have then these facts: that a navy is a powerful means of national operation; that our local situation is fitted for its use; and that we have the necessary materials. To which it is objected that your infant Navy must be opposed to one which has reached the full manhood of power on the ocean. I admit it. But shall we therefore abandon the ocean, yield our birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle? Or, shall we not rather, deducing argument from example, like the gallant Captain Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single ships.

I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful on this subject, and the experience of the past will not convince them. With diffidence, therefore, do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, as demonstrated last session. Let me ask of gentlemen who thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent of their argument. Does it not go, not only to the abandonment of the ocean, but to the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements for the magnitude of this sacrifice, with the observation, that abandoning the ocean involves the loss of one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping; and that in giving up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion of your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I will not dwell on the magnitude of this sacrifice, because I cannot believe that Americans will abandon any right which there is a prospect to maintain. I cannot, I admit, answer as conclusively the objection, that much time will be passed before this force can be procured; yet, I believe, that a mind which relied on that objection, might be satisfied that late preparation is better than none. Nor could a mind, so circumstanced, fail to see, that, while making preparation, you come every day nearer your object; in neglecting it, you are every day further from it, and you are, in neglecting it, blending ultimate loss with temporary sacrifice.

Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a popular Government, to be deterred by the want of preparation? What is it that the youth has not to prepare, or when was it that a popular Government taxed itself with previous preparation? But why this argument of despair? What were your preparations for the Revolutionary war, and when made? After an army was in your country. Yet were they then made and effectually made. By the bravery of our fathers our soil was secured; on us it rests to secure our rights on the water, common to every independent nation, and as clearly ours as they are essential to our interests. What is this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy of Great Britain a beginning? Yes. There was a time when Britain had no ship. What then? She was invaded, and more, she was conquered. At this day, her wooden walls, as they are proverbially called, are her defence and protection. Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her from attack? If so, would not a fleet secure us from attack also? But we have it not. Is it not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest, to provide this powerful, this necessary means of defence? But some are alarmed at the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation of the last year. And first, as to the information derived from British experience, whose example may be taken as precedent on maritime subjects; at least they make a powerful argument, where they are rejected as full proof. In recurring to British estimates, it certainly was unexpected to the American eye to see the same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor, viz: ---- dollars per month; and as unexpected, on investigating the British expenditures for a series of years, to find that the appropriations for the Navy are found less than those for the Army, as will be seen by reference to the Annual Register. In corroboration of this is our own history, as appears from the calculations made by my predecessor, of which I will avail myself.

Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and domestic experience, that a naval force is the cheapest the nation can resort to for defence and protection? Is it not also proved, that a force believed to be competent, might be obtained at a sum greatly within the means of the Government--say twelve millions of dollars--or a fourth less than the ordinary amount of revenue for a year in good times? Test this subject in another way. The cost of your Navy, twelve millions; give up the ocean, and you lose, for one item, one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars the ton, would be worth five times the sum. Yet that would unquestionably be the least item in the account, because that would be but one loss, while that of your coasting, and other trade, would swell into a great annual amount, and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as profit. Nor is such a conclusion the less to be deprecated, because it is difficult to foresee all the evils which must result from the abandonment of one essential right of an independent nation. I know it may be said by those who view this subject differently from me, that they do not mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then, for them to show the difference between not abandoning a right, and not defending it; for I cannot believe that any gentleman will contend that the national defence shall be left to privateers. They have most justly been considered an aid to the national arm, but Heaven forbid that they should be relied on as principal. A private arm, with power to shield the nation, is what I could not contemplate without terror. I cannot believe it necessary to pursue this argument.

To return then: The force adequate to the defence of our seas would cost twelve millions. I will not say that this whole expense ought to be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be remarked, that of the twenty frigates, nearly eight are ready for service. Let the principle be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation as to the portion which may be procured each year. The decision, too, would, in my judgment, be the strongest inducement to the enemy to make peace when they saw that you were progressing to a force which they could not meet. If, indeed, the force which has been named was not altogether adequate to the object of defending your own waters, you would find, having that force, that you could make any small addition that was requisite without difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others, in some measure, did the select committee determine on the number of ships, and their force, to be procured this year. Thus if the first blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun ships, they cost, per estimate, $333,000, and will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight gun ships, which, by estimate, cost $220,000, the requisite appropriation for them will be $1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last blank I have calculated at $61,200, which would require an appropriation of $367,200; which, with the necessary appropriation for the four frigates ordered to be rebuilt last year, viz: the Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and Boston, will amount to $3,500,000. This would give you four seventy-sixes and eighteen frigates, mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency of that force with the interest of three millions and a half, the cost, and you cannot but be gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman, the interest; because, though it was not in the province of the select committee to look out the ways and means, yet was it so interested as to their object, that they could but ask how was the money to be had; and they were satisfied that three millions and a half could, with facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state this with no view to limit the ways and means, but only that until the subject is given them to provide for, the House might not be embarrassed with the difficulty of money.

With the humble hope that the views of the committee have been shown to be at least most reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels proposed. I will not ask that the clerk should read that excellent letter from Captain Stewart, because I presume every gentleman who wishes information has read it more than once. From that and the other documents, the committee thought themselves warranted in recommending four seventy-six gun ships. In addition to the sufficient reasons offered there, that a large ship, with fewer men and a less cost, will be more efficient than small ones, by the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy four pounds fourteen ounces of ball for each man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument may be the more readily taken. Here, too, we have the fact, that six hundred and fifty men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while four hundred and twenty are required for a frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship, $202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in action, the larger ship is equal or superior to three frigates. To support this calculation by figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull, Stewart, and Morris; and Mr. Hamilton says, that all the officers in service concur in the opinion; and I am told that such is the real history of naval conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions one, and Captain Stewart mentions another, of four French frigates attacking a British seventy-four, of which one was sunk, two taken, and the other run off.

It is cause of some exultation to me, that our naval men, where the opportunity is afforded them, give the example to prove our theory. As I am told, orders were sent from Washington in September to Captain Chauncey, then at New York, who made his preparation, took his workmen with him to the Lakes, and some days since we had the account that he had built and launched, before November was out, a frigate of twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables me to present an argument that would, could I do it justice, I am sure, have much weight. Will any gentleman regret that this twenty-six gun ship has been built, though the mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without it? Neither shall we regret the building of the seventy-sixes, though peace, which God send, should come before they are launched. There is yet one other objection too important to be passed over, though it was on a former occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty of getting seamen. That difficulty exists, I do admit. Yet is not the difficulty insurmountable. Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of my friend from South Carolina.

The gentleman has again referred to the difficulty of manning your ships, and deems impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the weakness of our nation, and lament it too. Yet I cannot believe that the hard hand of tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I regret that in an assembly of freemen, that this, the most if not the only detestable example England has set us as to a navy, should be so much relied on. Look to the fact, that in five years forty-two thousand seamen deserted from the British navy. Look to the fact, that their prisoners require to be committed to return to their own country. It is with no little pride that I call the attention of the gentleman and the committee to our gallery. Did a British gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No, a seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his foot on shore but under the guard of an officer. Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that though Great Britain has been most successful, that she owes it to the hard, to the iron hand of impressment. It would not be difficult to find in her naval institutions other principles to which the mind would delight to attribute her superiority, rather than that from which we cannot but turn in disgust.

Mr. STOW said he should not consider the motion made by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SEYBERT) as going to defeat the main object of the bill, which was a liberal increase of the navy, because he understood his intention to be to move a larger number of frigates if the clause for seventy-fours should be stricken out. The question then he should consider as simply whether it was best at present to build any ships-of-the-line, or to confine our exertions to frigates only? He said his own opinions had leaned pretty strongly to the latter side till, as a member of the Navy Committee, he had been led to a more careful examination of the subject; and he confessed that that examination had fully convinced him of the utility, and he might say necessity, of building some line-of-battle ships. The propriety of building them, as well as a proportion of lighter ships, grew out of the different objects to which they were to be applied. There could be no doubt of the superior advantages of frigates and sloops of war when employed in cruising against our enemy's commerce, but whenever the object is to repel a powerful force, ships-of-the-line ought to be resorted to. They form batteries infinitely more effective in proportion to their expense than frigates. To illustrate this--the cost of a seventy-four is less than one-third more than that of a forty-four gun frigate, yet the force is as three to one, or according to the lowest estimate I have heard, as two to one. This is easily explained when we consider that to make a seventy-four is little more than adding another deck to a large frigate. It would then appear evident, that unless we resorted to this kind of force, we should fight our enemy on the most unequal terms. She could at any time lay a few heavy ships at the mouths of our harbors and in our narrow waters, and thus effectually destroy not only our foreign trade, but what was of infinitely more importance, she could destroy the whole of our coasting trade.

Further, said Mr. S., knowing that we have no powerful ships, she can easily protect by convoy all her valuable fleets; but if we had four ships-of-the-line she would be driven to the enormous expense of convoying every fleet of merchantmen sailing to any part of America by five or six seventy-fours, or they would be exposed to capture by our fleet.

But, said Mr. S., it is objected that they would be blockaded. This objection was equally against frigates; but he was perfectly willing to put it upon that ground, that Great Britain would attempt to blockade them. What then would be the case? She must employ six blockading ships, supported at an enormous expense, at such a distance; and as had been fully shown by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES,) last year, six more ships at least must be occupied in preparing and sailing to replace the first six--thus employing twelve ships to four. And after all, the attempt to confine our ships would frequently be rendered abortive by storms. Again, it has been objected that we had no harbors south of Montauk Point, in which, if pursued, our ships could take shelter. If by this was meant barely that we had no harbor properly fortified, he admitted it was true; and it was also equally true as applied to our heavy frigates; but if it was meant that there was no harbor in which ships could enter that was capable of being properly defended, it was entirely erroneous. For many such there were, and where sufficient works could be erected in a few months.

Mr. S. said a strong reason for building seventy-fours, and to which he particularly requested the attention of the committee, grew out of the state of our preparation. We have timber for four seventy-fours, seasoned and ready for use, which could not be applied to frigates, without great loss. And this explained the fact, that we could build seventy-fours sooner than frigates, unless the timber thus provided should be cut up, which, after years of deliberate preparation for seventy-fours, would appear like children's play. He said in a case of this kind, he thought great respect was due to experience. That many years ago all the ships of war belonging to the nations of Europe were small, but that, without one exception, they had resorted to a certain proportion of heavy ships. From this circumstance, as well as from the uniform opinion of our own officers, he inferred that these were the most conclusive reasons in favor of them.

The question was then taken on the motion to strike out the seventy-fours, and negatived. The committee rose and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, December 18.

Increase of the Navy.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.

Mr. CUTTS then moved to strike out the seventy-fours, with a view to increase the number of frigates to be built to ten, and to add a number of sloops of war.

Mr. C. spoke at considerable length in support of his motion, and in favor of frigates and sloops of war in preference to seventy-four gun ships.

The question was then taken on striking out the provision respecting seventy-fours, and was carried--for the amendment 56, against it 53.

Mr. CUTTS moved an amendment authorizing the building of ten ships of war, of forty-four guns, and ten sloops of war.--Motion lost by a great majority.

MONDAY, December 21.

On motion of Mr. BASSETT, the petitions of J. A. Chevallie, attorney of Amelie Eugene de Beaumarchais, presented on the 24th of December, 1805, and 2d of April, 1806, together with all the documents concerning the said claim, were referred to the Committee of Claims.

Encouragement to Privateering by Public Armed and Private Armed Vessels.

Mr. BASSETT, from the Committee on the Naval Establishment, presented a bill relating to captures; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The bill is as follows:

A Bill relating to captures.

Be it enacted, &c., That where any ship or vessel in the service of the United States shall have captured, or may hereafter capture, a ship or vessel belonging to an enemy, of equal or inferior force, and it shall become necessary to destroy such prize to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy, or for the security of such ship or vessel so in the service of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy is hereby required to issue his commission to one or more fit person or persons, who, on the best evidence that can be procured, shall proceed to estimate the value of such ship or vessel, prize as aforesaid, in the port into which the capturing vessel shall first enter, and make return on oath of said estimate or valuation to the Secretary of the Navy.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Navy shall thereon proceed to apportion the sum, which shall be equal to one-half the said valuation or estimate, as prize money, among the officers and crew making such capture, and cause the same to be paid to them accordingly.