Part 168

SIR: My last (No. 3) was written at Burlington, the principal town in the northern part of the State of Vermont. I am now at the principal town in the eastern section.

The fallacy of men's opinions, when they act under the influence of sensibility, and are strongly excited by those hopes which always animate a rising party, led me to doubt the correctness of the opinions which I received in the northern section of this State; which from its contiguity to Canada and necessary intercourse with Montreal, has a stronger interest in promoting a good understanding with His Majesty's Government. Therefore, since my departure from Burlington, I have sought every favorable occasion of conversing with the Democrats on the probable result of the policy adopted by the General Government. The difference of opinion is thus expressed. The Federal party declare that, in the event of a war, the State of Vermont will treat separately for itself with Great Britain; and support to the utmost the stipulations into which it may enter, without any regard to the policy of the General Government. The Democrats, on the other hand, assert, that in such a case as that contemplated, the people would be nearly divided into equal numbers; one of which would support the Government, if it could be done without involving the people in a civil war, but, at all events, would risk every thing in preference to a coalition with Great Britain. This difference of opinion is not to be wholly ascribed to the prejudices of party. The people in the eastern section of Vermont are not operated upon by the same hopes and fears as those on the borders of the British colony. They are not dependent on Montreal for the sale of their produce nor the supply of foreign commodities. They are not apprehensive of any serious dangers or inconvenience from a state of war; and although they admit that the Governor, Council, and three-fourths of the representation in Congress are of the Federal party, yet they do not believe that the State would stand alone and resist the National Government. They do not, however, deny that, should the State of Vermont continue to be represented as it is at present, it would in all probability unite with the neighboring States in any serious plan of resistance to a war which it might seem expedient to adopt. This, I think, is the safer opinion for you to rely on; if, indeed, reliance ought to be placed on any measure depending upon the will of the rabble, which is ever changing, and must ever be marked with ignorance, caprice, and inconsistency. As the crisis approaches, the difficulty of deciding upon a hazardous alternative will increase; and, unfortunately, there is not in Vermont any man of commanding talents capable of attracting general confidence, of infusing into the people his own spirit; and, amidst the confusion of conflicting opinions, dangers, and commotion, competent to lead in the path of duty or safety. The Governor is an industrious, prudent man, and has more personal influence than any other; but his abilities are not suited to the situation in which a civil war would place him. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 5.

AMHERST, (N. H.,) Feb. 23, 1809.

SIR: A gentleman going direct to Canada affords a safe and favorable opportunity of giving you some further account of my progress.

I will not make use of the post offices when I can avoid it, because private occasions supersede the necessity of writing in cipher; and the contempt of decency and principles, which forms part of the morals of the subaltern officers of a democracy, would incline them to break a seal with the same indifference that they break their words, when either curiosity or interest is to be indulged.

I have not had sufficient time nor evidence to enable me to form any opinion for myself, of the lengths to which the Federal party will carry their opposition to the National Government in the event of a war; which may be inferred from the result of the election of Governors which, within two months, will be made in the States of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. From all I know, and all I can learn of the General Government, I am not apprehensive of an immediate war. The embargo is the favorite measure; and it is probable that other means will be employed to excite England to commit some act of hostility, for the sole purpose of placing the responsibility of war on that country. This I most particularly recommend to the consideration of ministers. The dread of opposition, and of the loss of popularity, will certainly keep the ruling party at Washington inactive. They will risk any thing but the loss of power; and they are well aware, that their power would pass away with the first calamity which their measures might bring upon the common people, from whom that power emanates, unless, indeed, they could find a sufficient excuse in the conduct of Great Britain. This impression cannot be too deeply felt by His Majesty's Ministers; nor too widely spread throughout the British nation. It will furnish a sure guide in every policy that may be adopted toward the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

A. B.

No. 6.

BOSTON, March 5, 1809.

SIR: I am favored with another opportunity of writing to you by a private conveyance; and think it probable, at this season, that the frequency of these will render it unnecessary to write to you in cipher.

It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover to any person the purpose of my visit to Boston; nor is it probable that I shall be compelled, for the sake of gaining more knowledge of the arrangements of the Federal party in these States, to avow myself as a regular authorized agent of the British Government, even to those individuals who would feel equally bound with myself to preserve, with the utmost inscrutability, so important a secret from the public eye. I have sufficient means of information to enable me to judge of the proper period for offering the co-operation of Great Britain, and opening a correspondence between the Governor General of British America, and those individuals who, from the part they take in the opposition to the National Government, or the influence they may possess in any new order of things that may grow out of the present differences, should be qualified to act on behalf of the Northern States. An apprehension of any such state of things as is pre-supposed by these remarks, begins to subside, since it has appeared, by the conduct of the General Government, that it is seriously alarmed at the menacing attitude of the Northern States. But, although it is believed that there is no probability of an immediate war, yet no doubts are entertained that Mr. Madison will fall upon some new expedients to bring about hostilities. What these may be, can only be deduced from what appears to be practicable. A non-intercourse with England and France will probably supersede the embargo; which, by opening with the rest of Europe a partial, legitimate commerce, and offering strong temptations to that which is illegal, will expose the vessels to capture, detention, and embarrassment; will justify the present policy, and produce such a degree of irritation and resentment as will enable the Government of this country to throw the whole blame and responsibility of war from its own shoulders upon those of the British Ministry. If, in this, the party attached to France should calculate with correctness, and the commerce of New England should greatly suffer, the merchants, being injured and discouraged, would not only acquiesce in the restrictive system, but even submit to war. On the other hand, should the small traffic, permitted by a non-intercourse law, be lucrative and uninterrupted, the people would be clamorous for more, and soon compel the Government to restore the friendly relations between the two countries.

While I offer my opinion upon this subject, I cannot but express a strong hope that, if any terms should be proposed by either Government, to which the other might think proper to accede, that a principal motive to the adjustment of differences should be understood to arise from the amicable disposition of the Eastern States, particularly of the State of Massachusetts. This, as it would increase the popularity of the friends of Great Britain, could not fail to promote her interests. If it could not be done formally and officially, nor in a correspondence between Ministers, still, perhaps, the administration in the Parliament of Great Britain might take that ground, and the suggestion would find its way into the papers both in England and America.

It cannot be too frequently repeated, that this country can only be governed and directed by the influence of opinion, as there is nothing permanent in its political institutions; nor are the populace, under any circumstances, to be relied on, when measures become inconvenient and burdensome. I will soon write again, and am yours, &c.

A. B.

(In cipher.) No. 7.

BOSTON, March 7, 1809.

SIR: I have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, the course intended to be pursued by the party in Massachusetts that is opposed to the measures and politics of the Administration of the General Government.

I have already given a decided opinion that a declaration of war is not to be expected; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, should the Congress possess spirit and independence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by so strong a measure, the Legislature of Massachusetts will give the tone to the neighboring States, will declare itself permanent until a new election of members, invite a Congress, to be composed of delegates from the Federal States, and erect a separate government for their common defence and common interest. This Congress would probably begin by abrogating the offensive laws, and adopting a plan for the maintenance of the power and authority thus assumed. They would, by such an act, be in a condition to make or receive proposals from Great Britain; and I should seize the first moment to open a correspondence with your Excellency. Scarcely any other aid would be necessary, and perhaps none required, than a few vessels of war from the Halifax station, to protect the maritime towns from the little navy which is at the disposal of the National Government. What permanent connection between Great Britain and this section of the Republic would grow out of a civil commotion, such as might be expected, no person is prepared to describe; but it seems that a strict alliance must result of necessity. At present the opposition party confine their calculations merely to resistance; and I can assure you that, at this moment, they do not freely entertain the project of withdrawing the Eastern States from the Union, finding it a very unpopular topic; although a course of events, such as I have already mentioned, would inevitably produce an incurable alienation of the New England from the Southern States.

The truth is, the common people have so long regarded the Constitution of the United States with complacency, that they are now only disposed in this quarter to treat it like a truant mistress, whom they would, for a time, put away on a separate maintenance, but, without further and greater provocation, would not absolutely repudiate.

It will soon be known in what situation public affairs are to remain until the meeting of the New Congress in May, at which time, also, this Legislature will again assemble. The two months that intervene will be a period of much anxiety.

In all I have written I have been careful not to make any impression analogous to the enthusiastic confidence entertained by the opposition, nor to the hopes and expectations that animate the friends of an alliance between the Northern States and Great Britain.

I have abstracted myself from all the sympathies these are calculated to inspire; because, notwithstanding that I feel the utmost confidence in the integrity of intention of the leading characters in this political drama, I cannot forget that they derive their power from a giddy, inconstant multitude; who, unless in the instance under consideration they form an exception to all general rules and experience, will act inconsistently and absurdly. I am yours, &c.

A. B.

No. 8.

BOSTON, March 9, 1809.