Part 160

Mr. QUINCY had doubts whether both these officers were necessary. There was no such officer as Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war. If it were found hereafter that another besides the Quartermaster General was necessary, he could be appointed. There ought certainly to be a responsibility attached to the purchase of supplies, and this might be placed in the Head of the War Department or Quartermaster General. He had not sufficient light on the subject, to say that both these officers are necessary. He was in favor of the bill as it came from the Senate.

Mr. BLOUNT said, that though there was not a Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war, there was a Clothier, who did much the same business. If we are going to war, said Mr. B., he did not see how we could do without a Quartermaster General; and it would be improper for him to become the purchaser of supplies, which it is the duty of the Purveyor to purchase, because, as had already been stated, there would be no check in the business. There must be propriety in keeping the offices distinct.

Mr. MACON observed, it was impossible to go to war without a Quartermaster General; for there is no man has so much to do about an army as this officer. There was always more difficulty in settling the Quartermaster General's accounts than any other. The only instance in which a Quartermaster General has to purchase supplies, is when, by some miscarriage or accident, the supplies from the Commissary or Purveyor do not arrive in season. It is necessary that such a power should be vested in this officer, to be used on such extraordinary occasions. As had been stated by his colleague, though there was no Purveyor during the Revolution, there were clothiers or agents employed in different situations, which answered the purpose. The qualifications necessary for the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different; the one ought to be a soldier, the other a merchant.

The bill passed by a large majority.

Naval Establishment.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. CHEVES, the Chairman of the Navy Committee, moved to fill the blank in the first section of the bill with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," and said he believed it to be his duty at this time, to disclose to the Committee of the Whole the views and motives of the select committee in reporting the bill. Mr. C. said, I consider this subject as one of the most important that can be brought before this House; as a great question, involving, to a considerable extent, the fate of a species of national defence the most essential and necessary to the interests of this country. I know, said Mr. C., how many and how strong are the prejudices, how numerous and how deeply laid are the errors which I have to encounter in the discussion of this question; errors and prejudices the more formidable, as they come recommended by the virtues, and shielded by the estimable motives of those who indulged them. I have been told that this subject is unpopular, and it has been not indistinctly hinted, that those who become the zealous advocates of the bill will not advance by their exertions the personal estimation in which they may be held by their political associates. I will not do my political friends the injustice to believe that these exertions will diminish their confidence; but, could I think otherwise, I hope I shall never be diverted from a faithful discharge of my duty by considerations of this kind. I wish to lead no man, and I am determined not to be blindly led by any man. In acting with a party, I do so, because I adopt their leading principles and politics as the best, and because I believe, from the nature of free Government, it is necessary so to act to give efficiency to the exertions of any individual; but I do not feel myself, therefore, bound to renounce my deliberate opinions on all the great interests of the nation, or to take no independent part in the exertions of the party to which I belong. I sincerely believe that, if this infant Naval Establishment be either abandoned or put down, the party who now form the majority in this House, and in the country, may run great risk of becoming the minority, not only within these walls, but in the nation.

It has been said, by a strong and lively figure of rhetoric, that this country is a great land animal, which should not venture into the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleghanies, and its great sides swelling to the east and to the west, where do you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other. The figure explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature did not give to the United States a coast of two thousand miles in extent, not to be used. No; it was intended by this bounty to make us a great commercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject the enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? No, it has not and will not be neglected. A great portion of our people exist but upon the ocean and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not less truly than eloquently, said, that "the ocean is their farm," and it must and will be protected. But how is this protection to be afforded? I will endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done most cheaply and effectually by a naval force; and if I succeed in this, I shall hope for the concurrence of the committee. No proposition appears to me more true or more obvious, than that it is only by a naval force that our commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean can be protected. We are now going to war for the protection of these rights; but in what way, and under what circumstances? The mode is altogether accidental, and not founded on the permanent relations or means of the country. It is not my intention to condemn the course which has been taken. It has had my hearty concurrence, and my zealous, though feeble, support. I hope it may be altogether effectual; and I believe it will inflict a wound which will be felt with poignancy. But it is, notwithstanding, partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers on the ocean. Does it not then result, inevitably, as the dictate of common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has been heretofore so much neglected, that it is at present in a state of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whether we will suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "if you had asked for no more than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted your request." But, for myself, I would not thank any gentleman for this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to bring the question fully before the House in the shape in which they have exposed it. Not to ask merely what it would do to assist by naval co-operation, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly to speak to the House, and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other.

That a respectable Naval Establishment affords the only effectual means of causing our commercial rights to be respected, will, as a general proposition, be denied by few persons, if any. But its adoption by us is deemed improper by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the enormous expense which, it is said, the establishment will necessitate, and the inability of the nation, by any force which it can provide, to resist, with effect, the immense naval power of Great Britain. Is it not surprising that so much prejudice should exist against this establishment on account of its expensiveness, when it is ascertained that, during the whole eighteen years of its existence, from 1794 to 1811, inclusive, it has cost the Government only $27,175,695? I am afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in which I hope to bring conviction home to the minds of the House, is by entering, with minuteness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and statements; but the necessity of the case must be my apology for the course which I shall take. If the House shall have full confidence in my statements, much will be gained to the argument; for it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the hearer to follow me through an examination of these details, as the argument proceeds. For this confidence, therefore, I will venture to hope. I believe the statements on which I rely to be accurate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them for their own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident management, has but little exceeded $1,500,000, which is not much more than twice the amount of the usual annual appropriation for our economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed that it has been much more expensive than the Military Establishment, but I will show that this is not really the case. The expense of the Military Establishment, from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been $37,541,669, giving an annual average of $1,700,000, or $200,000 per annum more than that of the Navy. It thus appears that, in the gross amount, as well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, were victorious wherever it encountered an enemy, and probably laid the foundation of the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean, its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled, in an unexampled manner, the piratical and barbarous foe, and crowned itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism, which had not been exceeded by the exploits of any nation, and which must go down to a distant posterity. I mean not, by this comparison, to say any thing injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled. Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned an expense not warranted by its force or its services; and I cannot deny but that, from a variety of causes, the expense may have been unnecessarily great; an argument cannot thence be fairly drawn against its future use--the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest orator, and one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity, reasoned. The great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen, by his impetuous eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he, "were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our State demanded, there were then no hope of recovery." So may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskilful expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of the abuse; to effect this reform, is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee have declared in their report, that "a naval force within due limits and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier and that of an adequate naval defence. The experience of modern naval warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier, though they are more numerous and better than they have been at any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two thousand miles to protect, the expense of which could not be borne by the nation. A better defence would be furnished by such a naval force as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less expense.

The superior cheapness of naval defence seems to me to be satisfactorily established, and I am next to prove that the force proposed--I mean twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates--are sufficient to protect us in our own seas, and defend our ports and harbors against the naval power of Great Britain. The first evidence that is offered in support of this proposition, is the opinion of naval men; and if the representations of any man may be relied upon with confidence, so far, at least, as that they are not founded in deception, I believe those of a sailor may be. By naval men, I have been assured that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It is impossible for me to state with accuracy, or in a manner calculated to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in support of their opinion, but among them are those detailed in the report of the select committee. Indeed, they advance the opinion, and support it with reasons, the error of which, if they be erroneous, I am unable to discover, that it will require the enemy to employ a triple force to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United States. Their reasons are, as nearly as I can state them, these: there must be stationed on our coast, at any given time, an equal force; this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months' service. An equal force must be put in requisition and kept in readiness to relieve that on the station. But, as all the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the force destined to relieve the first must be despatched by the time the first may be supposed to have arrived on our coast, because it will be necessary, at a period as early as the arrival of the second, for the first to return; but the first could not proceed to Europe, be equipped, and return to relieve the second in time; and therefore a third equivalent force is necessary, and thus three times the force of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to, with confidence, to prove that neither Great Britain, nor any other nation, has ever been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas, a force equal to that which, in the opinion of naval men, is sufficient to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee--the dominion of the American seas, and the defence of our ports and harbors. There is one fact which, above all others, shows the inability of Great Britain to keep a large fleet on our coast. From the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for naval equipment or repair, except Halifax; and if, as the opponents of the Navy seem to think certain, and I hope their opinions may be realized, we shall, in the event of war, deprive her of that, she will be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas. Under such circumstances, any thing but temporary service would be utterly impracticable.

But, said Mr. C., on the subject of the British naval force, there is great misconception. The high-sounding number of a thousand ships appals the mind, and an examination of its actual force, and the numerous requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as an idle labor. Let this examination be made, and at least some part of the terror which it excites will vanish. Of the eight hundred and thirty-three ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801, and she never had more, it is believed there were only three hundred and eighty-three that exceeded the size and capacity of the large privateers that will probably be fitted out by the citizens of the United States, in the event of war. Of this last number, there were one hundred and forty-two of sixty-four guns, and above; twenty-two between fifty and sixty guns; one hundred and fifty-six between thirty-two and forty-four; and sixty-three between twenty and thirty guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission consisted of one hundred and seventy-four sloops, one hundred and forty-one gun-vessels, and one hundred and thirty hired vessels. These hired vessels are small vessels, of from four to ten guns, which, it is believed, are only employed for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration, I have no doubt, proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain, however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression almost universally received, from the high-sounding boast of her thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more misconceived than the application of it. The common impression is, that the Government can direct to any given point almost an unlimited number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be found that, notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it must be destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it all in requisition. This I will prove by reference to the distribution of her fleets in 1801. [Here Mr. C. read a statement of the force and distribution of the British fleet at that time.] From which of these stations, said Mr. C., could she have spared, with safety and prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she, from all, have stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been equal, under the disadvantages which have been pointed out, to twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates? How much less would she have been able to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval armament whose expense should equal that of the military preparations of the present year? But it may be said, that the ships which Great Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which any circumstances would require. This might be true, were her seamen unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible; but both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out vessels which she has in ordinary, would require, within a few thousand, all the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could bear. The true object of inquiry to ascertain her efficient power is, what number of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument, yet confirmatory of it, in the example of 1801, the year which I have selected for illustration, when it is confidently believed her equipment was greater, combining force and numbers, than at any other period of her history.

But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval power. They fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and seeking victory on all the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive expenses, and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly not contemplated by the report of the committee; nor can such events possibly happen, as long as we remain a free people. The committee have recommended such a navy as will give to the United States an ascendency in the American seas, and protect their ports and harbors. The people will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European power, to station large fleets on our seas, will equally forbid us to cross the Atlantic, or go into distant seas, for the purpose of frequent or habitual wars.

But a navy is said to be anti-republican, because it was opposed by the Republicans in 1798. I apprehend, however, that it was then objected to, not because it was anti-republican in itself, but because the Republicans of that time believed it was to be employed for improper objects; because, while it was unnecessary at the time, it was of such a nature as only fitted it for the time, because it was part of a system which embraced unnecessary armies and unnecessary taxes and loans, to continue a war beyond the just objects of war--a war which, to use the language of the day, was to be waged by every man, woman, and child, in the nation, to which we are opposed.

We are told, also, that navies have ruined every nation that has employed them; and England, and Holland, and Venice, and other nations, have been mentioned as examples. The vast debt of Great Britain is declared to be among the pernicious fruits of her Naval Establishment. This I deny. Her debt has grown out of her profuse subsidies, and her absurd wars on the land. Though the ruin, which is supposed to threaten England, is attributed to her navy, it is obvious that her navy alone has saved and still saves her from ruin. Without it she must, long since, have yielded to the power of France her independence and her liberties. We are told that the same wealth which she has expended in supporting her navies would have been employed more profitably for the nation in the improvement of its agriculture and manufactures, and in the establishment of canals and roads, and other internal improvements. But experience is better than theory. Let us compare England with nations which have no navies, or comparatively inconsiderable navies. The nations of the Continent of Europe are without such overgrown and ruinous Naval Establishments, but do you there find the highest improvements in agriculture, the most flourishing manufactures, or the best roads and canals? No, it is in this nation, that has been ruined by her navy, that you find all these improvements most perfect and most extended. I mean not either to be the panegyrist of England; but these truths may be declared for our instruction, without suppressing the feelings excited by the wrongs she has done us. England has not, then, I conclude, been destroyed or impoverished, but preserved and enriched, by her navy. Was Holland ruined by her navy? No; surrounded by the great powers of the continent, with a population not exceeding 2,000,000 of souls, she protected and secured her independence for more than a century, against her powerful neighbors, by means of her commercial riches, which were cherished and defended by her naval power. Did Venice owe her decline, or fall, to her navy? While the neighboring Italian States were subdued, year after year changing their masters and their tyrants, she long continued to ride triumphantly amidst the storm, independent, and, in a great degree, free. It was her naval and commercial power which made her rich and great, and secured her existence as a State so long. Look even at the little Republic of Genoa, whose inhabitants, but for its commerce and its navy, would scarcely ever have possessed "a local habitation," or "a name!" But I must have exhausted the patience of the House, I will therefore conclude the observations which I proposed to make on the general merits of the question.

SATURDAY, January 18.

Naval Establishment.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the Navy bill; when Mr. CHEVES finished his speech in favor of the bill, as given in full in preceding pages.

Mr. SEYBERT.--I rise under a pressure of more than ordinary embarrassment--prudence on one hand bids me shrink from the task which I am about to undertake; whilst on the other hand, a conscious duty impels me to engage in the consideration of the question now before the honorable committee. My friend from South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES) says this question is all important to this nation; in this I perfectly coincide with him, and therefore cannot rest satisfied with a mere vote on this occasion. Sir, it is not my intention to follow the gentleman from South Carolina through all the windings of the labyrinth into which he has ventured to penetrate. I will not pretend to chase reason on the wing.

I will not particularly follow the gentleman in his comparison of the Army and Naval Establishments of the United States. He has stated to us that the Army has cost this nation much more than the Navy; he concludes we ought to be equally liberal in our appropriations for both these purposes. Sir, I perceive no reason in this assertion. Some gentlemen on the other side of the House may say, that we have been lavish in our appropriations for an army; even admitting that in this respect we have been liberal to extravagance, it surely cannot be inferred that we should make ourselves doubly guilty of this charge. I will agree to make appropriations for the establishing a navy for the United States. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that when the war which we are about to wage, shall be over, our Army will leave us. Sir, I am happy to hear that on such an event the military will be readily disbanded--a dread of the contrary gave much uneasiness to many a few days since--this is just what we wish should take place. On the other hand, said he, "your proud Navy," will remain. It is for this, with many other reasons, why I am opposed to a navy. I wish he could have proved to us, that with the end of the war the Navy would also leave us; perhaps I should then agree with him in favor of its establishment: though the "proud Navy" will remain with us, he has neglected to tell us at what rate of expense.

Sir, the gentleman from South Carolina says many oppose a navy, because they deem it an anti-republican institution. On this head, I shall remark but little: I will only ask if it is to remain with us in times of peace with its numerous train of officers, may it not become a powerful engine in the hands of an ambitious Executive?

Sir, it was thought proper to make the foregoing remarks as preliminary to the subject. The question of a Naval Establishment for the United States more especially concerns those who inhabit commercial districts. As one of these I am much interested. Many persons maintain, that a naval system of defence is indispensably necessary to a nation, whose seaboard extends more than 1,500 miles, with a shipping interest amounting to 1,300,000 tons--in this respect, ranking the second of modern nations. The argument is as specious as it is plausible; it is liable to many, and in my opinion, to insuperable objections. The proposition before us will be considered as leading to a permanent Naval Establishment. This course is warranted by the report of the Secretary of the Navy as well as by the mode which was pursued by my friend from South Carolina. I shall not hesitate to declare my decided opposition to such an establishment, and will proceed to state the objections whereon my opinion is grounded. Sir, I deem it inexpedient to commence a permanent Naval Establishment at this time. We are quite unprepared for it--we are in want of all the necessary materials; though we have been told that our forests abound in all the necessary timber, it was said little of this material was to be found in our dockyards. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that a sufficiency of seasoned timber, to build four seventy-fours, was now on hand, and that the proper authority deemed it advisable to be used for frigates. Sir, this timber is a portion of that which was purchased some years since, for the purpose of building six seventy-fours. It now appears, that of this timber as much as was sufficient for two of these vessels, has been employed to build smaller vessels or gunboats, I presume. This is all a piece with our pretended economy. This mode of proceeding will not answer, sir. We are in the wrong from the commencement of our Navy. I do not wish it to be understood that I have decided a navy will never be a proper mode of defence for this nation--but whenever it shall be determined on, we should begin right; this can only be done by following those nations who have had most experience on the subject. Our first step should be to store away the proper timber. This should be done in times when we can best afford it--in times when our market is glutted--in times when labor can be commanded at fair prices--at a period when we enjoy peace, and surely not when we are about to engage in a war. We have heretofore paid the highest price for every article; we have given double wages for labor; and instances might be mentioned, when the workmen were transported in stage coaches, at an enormous expense, from our large seaport towns to the navy yard of this city. Contracts for timber were made in haste and at a very advanced price. As soon as it was obtained, it was put together, and in a few months we saw it floating in the form of a ship of war--rotten ships, I may say, sir, for I believe without exception in the frigates which were built by the United States, the more important parts decayed and were rotten in two, three, or four years. In many instances the expense for repairs was equal to the original cost. A single frigate, the Constitution, has cost for repairs, from October, 1802, to March, 1809, the enormous sum of $302,582 21, or upwards of $43,000 per annum for seven years in succession.

Let us view this subject in a more extended sense--I mean as regards our commerce generally--we shall still have cause to entertain the opinion which we first adopted. We cannot protect our commerce on the ocean. Our ships have vexed every sea--we trade to all parts of the world; of course, to protect our commerce, our ships of war must abandon our coasts and encounter all the force of the enemy or those of Europe. The ports we have in view are European. If your frigates, for convenience and safety, are to cruise only on your coasts, what will be the fate of the millions which are embarked beyond the Cape of Good Hope? By this management surely you cannot afford it protection. France, Spain, and Holland, when combined and backed by an armed neutrality in the north of Europe, could not secure their commerce. The fleets of Great Britain now sail triumphant over every wave of the deep. The Russians have a navy far superior to that which it is proposed we shall establish, and they cannot protect their trade in the confined limits of the Baltic. They count fifty or sixty sail-of-the-line, besides many frigates and smaller vessels.

Sir, the expenses which are incurred by a Naval Establishment, far exceed the profits which arise from the commerce which it is intended to protect. This proposition is warranted by the experience of Great Britain, the most commercial nation of modern times. In the year 1798, the total imports and exports of Great Britain amounted to £94,952,000. For the same year the expenditure for her navy amounted to £13,654,013, or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports, or fourteen per cent. on the total capital employed in commerce. What regular trade can yield such profits on the outward and inward cargoes? To me this is a secret. In the year 1799 Mr. Pitt computed the profits on the commerce of Great Britain at £12,000,000, or one and a half millions less than the expenses for her navy the preceding year!

Sir, the expenses which are necessarily connected with a Naval Establishment, constitute a very serious objection to it. At this time, the annual expenditures for the British navy amount to nearly £17,000,000, or $80,000,000. Every succeeding year brings with it an increase of expenditures. This has been the result year after year since the commencement of the institution. Our prospects will be the more evident when we take a view of the expenses which have been already incurred for the infantile establishment of our country; we shall be led to the same conclusions. The American navy was commenced in the year 1794, and by the end of the year 1811, the expenditures amounted to $27,456,979--a sum much greater than the one-half of the public debt on the 1st of January, 1812. This would have been much better applied, had it been placed with the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. I will ask the gentleman from South Carolina, what has the nation benefited for this enormous expenditure? What would have been the amount expended, had this engine been Herculean, with Admirals of the Red, White and Blue squadrons, with numerous dock and navy-yards, placemen, &c.? For we shall gradually advance to all this, if we do not stop short at this time. For the benefits of such appendages, I will refer you to a statement made to this House, the last session, concerning the navy-yards belonging to the United States; especially to the details of the expenditures of that connected with this city. The document I refer to, was laid before this House on the 25th February, 1811. It will inform you, sir, that the value of the work done from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1810, was $73,947 52. The commandant confesses, in his returns made to the Secretary, that this work, in many instances, is rated twenty per cent. above the prices paid in other places. The salaries in this same yard, for the same year, (1810,) amounted to $95,637 64-1/4. So that the pay for the salaries and the wages at this navy-yard, exceeded the value of the articles manufactured, even when rated far above the fair prices, in amount $21,790 12-1/4! This establishment is under the immediate eye of the Government; we might suppose every attention was paid to economy; if so, who will desire further proofs of the advantages of a navy!

Sir, I further object to a navy, because it will be the means of exciting many wars, which, without the establishment, may be honorably avoided. It is said, nations are involved in war, in proportion to the extent of their navies; and some assert (Brougham) that a perpetual war is one of the two modes which are necessary to support a powerful naval establishment. Sir, a naval establishment will create a new and a dangerous interest in our country. Nothing is more common than to be told, that such are the wishes of the naval interest of Great Britain, and that this or that war must be entered into to gratify them. For my part, sir, I shall be very sorry indeed, if ever the period arrives in the United States, when any particular interest or community shall direct the Government, whether it be naval, agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial--the general welfare should be the sole great ruling principle in the National Councils.

Sir, I am deterred, when I consider the fate of all those nations who at different periods have been famous for their navies. The naval strength of the Hanseatic League was such, two centuries past, as to excite terror on the part of England. These, sir, distant free cities, are now the appendages of mighty France, and have no political existence. Who has not heard of the once formidable fleets of Venice and Genoa? At one time England was indebted to the latter for officers to command her ships of war--alas! these republics are now consigned to oblivion. Denmark was at one time the mistress of the ocean; by means of her fleets she often invaded England, and held her in a state of subjection. The Danes heretofore burned London, Paris, and other great cities--they are now controlled by France, and they have had their Copenhagen defeat. Holland, with her Van Tromps, and De Ruyters, occupied the British Channel at pleasure; this power defeated the navies of England and France. Where is Holland now? Incorporated as a part of the French empire. Spain boasted her invincible armadas; Elizabeth of England, by nature haughty, proud, and ambitious, trembled at the very mention of them, until they were dispersed and destroyed by storms at sea; Spain is now the vassal of France. Not very long since the navy of France sailed triumphant along the British coast, looked into Portsmouth harbor, and taunted British spirit. I ask you, sir, where is the strength of which these nations formerly boasted? All are inoperative, and dread the gigantic power of the British navy--they are in part sick in dry docks, or are blockaded in their ports.

Mr. Chairman, Great Britain, though at this time triumphant in every sea, if she persists in her expensive naval establishment, with her present debt of £800,000,000, which was chiefly created for her navy--Great Britain, sir, I say, with all this, must sink under the heavy pressure. She will hereafter derive very little satisfaction from her brilliant victories on the 1st of June off Cape St. Vincent, Camperdown, Aboukir, and Trafalgar.

Shall I be pardoned, sir, when I fear our vessels will only tend to swell the present catalogue of the British navy? Of the 1,042 vessels which she possessed in July, 1811, one hundred and nine were captured from the French, forty-six from the Danes, twenty-five from the Spaniards, twenty-four from the Dutch, and three from the Italians; making a total of two hundred and seven captured ships, or one-fifth of her whole navy.