Part 158

Permit me to refer the House to the Journal of the first session of the Third Congress, for the proof of what I have stated. During this session, the difficulties then subsisting between this country and Great Britain, became the subject of discussion, and a proposition for prohibiting all intercourse with Great Britain, in case justice was not done us, was then submitted to the House, and the previous question was called upon it, and decided in the affirmative, after which the subject was not only postponed, but, as appears by the Journal, was both amended and debated. It appears also from the Journal in 1795, that a proposition was amended after an affirmative decision of the previous question. In the year 1798, when a resolution was before the House for publishing the instructions to, and the despatches from our Ministers to the French Republic, the previous question was moved and determined in the affirmative; and it appears by the Journal that immediately after such decision, on the same day, debate was had on the main question.

But, sir, to come to our own times: on the 15th of December, 1807, a construction was given to the rule, after mature deliberation, by a large majority of the House, that the main question might be debated, after an affirmative decision of the previous question. This was done on an appeal from the decision of the Speaker, "that after the previous question is called for and determined in the affirmative, it precludes all debate on the main question." The House reversed the decision of the Chair by 103 to 14. A similar decision took place on the 2d of December, 1803, in the House--101 to 18. And, sir, I have been unable to find a single decision of the House to the contrary, from the first organization of the Government until the close of the last session. Indeed, sir, the words of the rule itself, show that the construction, which had so long prevailed, was the only true construction which could be given to it. The words are, and until it (viz: the previous question) is decided, "shall preclude all amendment and further debate on the main question." By which it is evident, that amendment and debate of the main question is only precluded, until the previous question is decided, but that after such decision, it was not precluded.

The gentleman from New York, (Mr. GOLD,) and the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. NELSON,) have truly stated that the previous question was taken from the rules of the British Parliament, and they have likewise stated the reason of its introduction into that body. It was, sir, to prevent debate in the House of Commons upon questions of a delicate nature with respect to high personages, &c. Yes, sir, it was introduced there to enable the Ministry to prevent the Commons from opening their lips on subjects relating to the Royal Family and the great men of the realm. But, sir, we have gone further than the Ministry and their majorities, despotic and tyrannical as they have been, have ever dared to go in Parliament. For even there members are now, and always have been, permitted to debate on the previous question; but which members on this floor are not now permitted to do. Mr. Speaker, the nature of our Government forbids that the majority should have the power to prohibit all debate on questions which may come before this House. We have not, as yet, I trust, any high personages in this country about whom it would be indelicate or improper for the members on this floor to speak; and let me ask what subject of national importance can be proposed for adoption, on which a member should be deprived of the privilege of speaking at least once before he gives his vote? Nay, sir, let me ask gentlemen whether this House has a right to compel me, or any other member, to vote on any question, without giving me an opportunity of explaining my reason for that vote. I deny, sir, that they have this right; as a member of this body, I claim the privilege of delivering my sentiments, or what I may consider the sentiments of my constituents, on any subject, before I give my vote upon it. I claim it not, sir, for myself personally, but I claim it in the capacity of a Representative of a free people, sent here, not like a member of the French Council of Five Hundred, for the purpose of voting merely, but for the purpose of deliberating on subjects of high concern to their peace, their prosperity, their happiness. For what, sir, are we assembled here under a constitution the purest in the world? Is it not for the purpose of promoting "the general welfare" of the nation which we represent? And how is this to be done, except by a free communication of our sentiments to each other, on the various plans which may be proposed for that object? The peace, the honor, and interest of this country is confided to our care, and while we are here deliberating on the best means of preserving the one or securing and promoting the other, the constitution has very wisely thrown around us a shield of complete indemnity--"for any speech or debate in this House," we are "not to be questioned in any other place." Will then the majority claim the right of depriving a member of this privilege of speech, a privilege not only thus secured to him by the constitution itself, but for the due exercise of which he is not to be questioned elsewhere? But, sir, those who oppose the amendment say that the construction is founded in necessity; that individual members have abused the privilege of speech; that they have heretofore, and probably will again, make long speeches merely for the purpose of delay, and of embarrassing the proceedings of the House; and that therefore the majority must have it in their power to stop debate, whenever they think proper, and that this power will always be exercised with a sound discretion.

I deny, sir, that any such necessity exists; it is a plea easily made, but generally difficult and in this case impossible to be supported. Why has it so happened that this necessity has never existed until the last session of Congress? Was it then for the first time, that a division of sentiment appeared on this floor? were parties never before heard of in this country? Were not parties arrayed against each other in 1796 on the subject of the British Treaty, and in 1798-'9, on the question of a war with France? Were not the disputes in this House, in those times, as long and as bitter as they have ever been since? Those were times, which have been so often quoted in this House as hard, and unconstitutional; times when the reign of terror prevailed, when corrupt majorities, as has been often said on this floor, passed alien and sedition laws. And, yet, sir, with all the political sins which have been heaped upon those majorities, the sin of having taken away the privilege of speech on this floor never has been, and as I have proved from the journals, never can be laid to their charge. This House, by the constitution, has the power to "determine the rules of its proceedings;" and in making those rules, it has the right of regulating, but not of entirely preventing debate.

It would indeed be a strange anomaly in politics, as well as in law, that under a general power of making rules of proceeding, we should make a rule to prevent all proceedings whatever. Gentlemen may as well assume the power of preventing a member from voting, as they now do that of preventing him from speaking. I am willing to agree, sir, that the privilege of debate, on this floor, may have been and will again be abused; that on particular subjects individual members have spoken much longer than was necessary, and I may add, also, with much less sense than a majority might have wished; and in some instances they may have prolonged their speeches, merely for the purposes of delay. But, sir, will you deprive a member of the right of speaking at all, because he is unable to convey his ideas in few words, or because he may have very few or no ideas to convey? Or because some may have spoken merely to delay the proceedings of the House, will you make a general rule, by which a member may be wholly deprived of the right of speaking? If indeed, sir, evils do arise in consequence of the liberty of speech in this house, if the business of the nation does not progress with as much rapidity as in countries under the control of an individual; they are evils which flow from the very nature of our Government, from that freedom which we so highly prize, and from that very constitution which we have sworn to support. So long as we are men we shall be imperfect, we shall bring with us on this floor different views, different ideas on political as well as on other subjects; and it would be strange indeed if, on the various topics of national importance brought before us for discussion, we should not at times come into strong collision with each other.

The question on the amendment was determined in the negative--yeas 36, nays 76.

Mr. STANFORD moved to amend the rules by adding to the end of the paragraph relating to priority of business, the words "but no question of consideration shall be required upon an original motion;" which was also determined in the negative--yeas 30, nays 68.

On motion of Mr. WILLIAMS the said rules were amended by striking out the word "five," in the paragraph prescribing the manner in which the previous question shall be taken, and inserting the words "one-fifth of the."

The question was then taken to concur in the said rules as amended, and determined in the affirmative.

FRIDAY, December 27.

Mr. NELSON presented a petition of sundry inhabitants of the Territory of Louisiana, praying that the second grade of Territorial government may be extended to the inhabitants of said Territory.

MONDAY, December 30.

Burning of the Richmond Theatre.

Soon after the Journal was read,

Mr. DAWSON rose and addressed the chair. The lowness of his voice, owing to recent indisposition prevented his being heard distinctly; but his observations were nearly as follows:

Mr. Speaker--Virginia, my parent State, has long to mourn the loss of some of her most valuable sons and estimable daughters, who on the night of the 26th of the present month, met their untimely end.

Among those who perished in the flames, in the metropolis of that State, on that sad night, were the Chief Magistrate of the State, and a gentleman well known to many of us, and who, for years, held an honorable station in this House. Some of the most valuable and prominent characters in their professions, and others who promised ere long to be ornaments to their country. With these, sir, was the rising offspring of one of our present most valuable members, and many other amiable and virtuous women who adorned and improved society.

These, sir, with many others, have fallen victims to that unrelenting element, notwithstanding the bold and generous efforts which were made to save them.

Their ashes are now mingled with the dust, and their spirits have ascended to Heaven.

It is to us a great national calamity.

I well know, that on such occasions grief, although keen, is unavailing--that the decrees of fate are irrevocable and ought to be submitted to with humility. In order, however, to testify the respect and sorrow which this nation feels for the deceased, and to prove that we sympathize with the afflicted, without further comment on this painful subject, I beg leave to offer the following resolution:

Resolved, That the members of this House will wear crape on the left arm for one month, in testimony of the respect and sorrow which they feel for those unfortunate persons who perished in the fire in the city of Richmond, in Virginia, on the night of the 26th of the present month.

This resolution was unanimously adopted.

TUESDAY, January 7, 1812.

Statute of Limitations.

On motion of Mr. GHOLSON, the House resolved itself into a committee, on a report of the Committee of Claims on the subject of excepting certain claims from the act of limitations. The report of the committee being read, which concluded with a resolve that it is inexpedient to open the act of limitations for the claims in question:

Mr. GHOLSON hoped the committee would not agree to this report. Information had been received from the Treasury Department, stating in a distinct and unequivocal manner, that all this description of claims (which were all liquidated claims, such as indents of interest, certificates, &c.,) might be allowed by the Government, without danger of fraud or imposition; and, said Mr. G., if justice can be extended to this description of claimants, without danger, why should it be deferred? Only one solitary reason had been offered--that the persons really entitled to these claims upon Government might not get the money. He hoped this would not be sufficient to prevent Congress from doing what was just on the occasion.

Mr. CLAY (the Speaker) hoped the committee would disagree to this resolution. It appears that the officers of the Treasury are of opinion that provision may be made for this description of claims without that danger of fraud, which might possibly arise from a total repeal of the statute of limitations; that their whole amount does not exceed $300,000, and the probability is, that one-fifth will never be applied for, should they be authorized to be paid. What, said Mr. C, is this statute of limitations, which, whenever mentioned in this House, seems to make everybody tremble? It is a general rule prescribed by the Government for the direction of its accounting officers in order to exclude unjust claims. What are statutes of limitation as applicable to individual cases? A rule under which individuals claim protection whenever they choose to do so, and when, from the lapse of time, or loss of evidence, they would be injured, were they not to take this advantage. But in these statutes of limitation there are always exceptions in favor of cases of disability, infancy, coverture, insanity, absence beyond sea, &c. But what is the course which an individual would take who found himself protected by a statute of limitation? He would examine the justice of the claim brought against him; if the claim were just, if he had been deprived of no evidence by the delay, if as able to pay it as if it had been presented at an earlier day, he will not hesitate to discharge the claim, and scorn to take advantage of the statute. And, said Mr. O., shall the Government be less willing to discharge its just debts than an honest individual? Shall we turn a deaf ear to the claims of individuals upon Government because of this statute? He trusted not. The Committee of Claims ought to examine the merit of every claim which comes before it, and if it be just, decide in its favor. But what, said Mr. C, has been the history of claims for four or five years past? When a solitary claim was presented the House would say, we cannot legislate upon individual cases. They occupy too much of our time. The claim is put aside. The same individual some time after, appears in company with others. We then say there are too many of these claims--their amount is too large, and the Treasury too poor--that there are a great many other claims equally well founded--that justice cannot be done to them all. Sometimes there is a division between the two Houses. This House passes a bill in favor of some particular claim--the other tells you they will not legislate for particular cases; that if they act, they wish to take up the subject generally. Mr. C. said it was his wish, both in his public and private character, as far as possible, to do justice; he therefore hoped the course proposed by the Chairman of the Committee of Claims would be agreed to.