Part 114

Put down this bank, and how then are your revenues to be collected? Through the medium of the State banks? You do what no prudent man, in his individual concerns, would think of doing. You discard a faithful, honest, responsible agent, whose integrity and fidelity you have known for twenty years, and you place your estate in the hands and at the disposal of twenty or thirty entire strangers, of whose character and responsibility you know nothing, nor have the means of acquiring any knowledge, and over whose conduct you have no control. Should an individual act thus with his property, he would be deemed to have lost all regard for it, if not considered a madman. In resorting to the State banks, we are offering the amount of our revenue as a bounty for intrigues, cabals, and factions, through the country. In almost every State there are a number of banks, and each will endeavor to get the revenue collected in that State, to keep and trade with. It must be given to one, or divided among them all. If one is selected as the favorite, all the rest become jealous, dissatisfied, and exert their capital and influence against the favorite bank and its patron, the Government. This will awaken a spirit of faction in every State, yet unknown in this country. If all are to be gratified in their request for the deposits, the Government must open separate accounts with all the different banks in the country, to the amount of fifty or sixty; and new companies will be formed, and new applicants request to divide the business, and share the profits. Indeed, there will be no end to the scenes of speculation and intrigue, which will soon appear, if this course is adopted by the Government.

Mr. SEYBERT.--It may be said that this subject has been exhausted by the discussions of the ablest politicians of the country. I will premise, the remarks which I shall offer are intended solely to justify the vote which it is my intention to give on this momentous occasion.

The question pending the United States' Bank has excited a peculiar interest throughout this nation, more especially in our seaports. The dissolution of this institution, which from its limitation, will expire on the fourth of March next, has been portrayed in colors of the darkest shades, and the distresses which many maintain will be consequent to that event, call seriously for a fair and deliberate investigation. I hope, sir, I shall be pardoned for imposing on the patience of the House, when it is recollected that the community which I represent have employed four-tenths of the capital stock of the United States' Bank. If evil consequences are to attend the dissolution of this establishment, or if beneficial results proceed from its continuance, in either case I must feel myself essentially interested; it is therefore my wish to be distinctly understood upon the important principles which have connection with the great question now before us.

At the last session of Congress, I presented the memorial of the President, Directors, and Stockholders of the Bank of the United States; at that time I entertained no positive opinion on the subject; the discussions which took place in the committee to whom the memorial was referred, necessarily, as a duty on my part, excited that attention which the importance of the question imperiously demanded. Under circumstances of doubt, I voted in favor of reporting a resolution in support of the bank, for the purpose of giving to the establishment every chance which reason could urge; at the same time reserving to myself the right to pronounce a final decision, according as policy and expediency, but more especially as principle should dictate. I will admit, sir, that this is not the time or place to institute the general inquiry, whether banks are or are not beneficial to a nation? Because, whether the charter of the United States' Bank be renewed or not, the several States, who have the unquestioned authority to incorporate bank establishments, have already created many, which it is not in our power to control. I do not hesitate to declare, though many persons in the United States are decidedly opposed to a banking system, under every possible circumstance, I am not of this class. Experience has proved, in a manner very satisfactory to my mind, the advantages which are derived from the banks when they are impartially directed, and when the accommodation afforded by them is prudently employed; the great difficulty seems to be to confine the system within its proper limits. I understand the proposition as applicable to the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial interests of the United States.

For my proofs of this proposition, I will not rely upon the famous Bank of St. George, at Genoa, whose authority, by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. FISK,) has been considered of much weight. I will recall to the mind of my friend the remark of an intelligent traveller, who, when he visited this bank of antiquity, exclaimed: Here lies concealed the enigma, whether the bank possesses millions of millions, or whether it is indebted millions of millions! He concludes, Upon this important secret rests the safety of the State. Unhappy State, say I, whose safety depends upon a secret concealed within the vaults of a bank. Perhaps to a development of this secret may we attribute the present servile condition of the people of the once far-famed and powerful Republic of Genoa.

Sir, I am decidedly opposed to a prominent, and what to me appears to be a very dangerous feature in the bill now under consideration. I allude to the eighth section, which admits of an increase of the present capital stock of the bank. Adopt this provision, you will thereby create an Herculean power, which will have at its mercy all the minor institutions of the States; thus constituted, it can oppress and destroy them, as whim or interest may dictate. The steps which have been taken preparatory to a dissolution of the present bank, it is said, occasion much embarrassment, and threaten with ruin many of our citizens; if the present capital of ten millions can thus affect society, who will pretend to accumulate present evils, or risk entailing misery on posterity, solely for the purpose of a temporary gain to the Government? In this question Pennsylvania is deeply concerned; she has several millions of dollars invested in her banks; this to her is a valuable source of revenue; upon this may she predicate much of her future prosperity; hence will she derive the funds requisite for future internal improvements; but if you fill up the blanks in this section with a considerable sum, all these prospects will be blasted forever; you will thereby destroy the tree from whose ramifications were to emanate the blessings of peace and the sinews of war. Those of her representatives who may deem it politic and constitutional to vote for a continuance of the charter of the United States' Bank, ought surely to oppose any increase of the present capital; we have been told that that which now exists has been found sufficient for all purposes, at a time when our commerce was much more extensive than we have reason to suppose will soon again be the case.

The history of the banks in our country informs us, that the one usually termed the Bank of North America was the first establishment of the kind which received the sanction of the Government. This institution was incorporated by an act of Congress, in the month of May, 1781, under the authority of the "Articles of Confederation." The present Bank of the United States was incorporated by an act of Congress, on the 25th of February, 1791, during the operation of the present Constitution of the United States.

Without an attempt to examine every hypothesis, which has been or which might be proposed, respecting the constitutionality of the principle, I will content myself with the statement of the case, such as it appears to my mind. The first public act which I performed as a member of the Congress of the United States, was, to swear solemnly that I would support the Constitution of the United States. It therefore is my duty to examine and consider its precepts, according to the best of my ability.

The "Articles of Confederation" and the present Constitution of the United States do not differ as regards any power delegated by the States to Congress, touching charters of incorporation. I can never persuade myself that the constitution was intended other than to have a definite meaning; or that it was ever contemplated to speak an equivocal language; ambiguity arises solely from the misconceptions of its interpreters; it is very plain and of easy comprehension, especially as it relates to the present question, since it is totally silent on the right to create corporations--its wisdom is further illustrated by the special provision for the only exclusive privilege which is consistent with a free and equal government, and that is in favor of genius.

The powers delegated by the States are special and defined, and, it is expressly declared by the constitution, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." This language needs no interpretation. I cannot for a moment permit myself to suppose, that the patriots who were tested during the long-continued uncertainty of the most important events of our Revolutionary period, and to whom was ultimately assigned the right and power to construct the instrument which is to guide us in the political labyrinth--that they intended this their great work should alone be explicable by that refined reasoning to which common sense is a stranger, I never can admit. Surely that which they framed for the good and security of every individual in the nation, must be expressed in a manner to be understood by ordinary men, and those whom it was intended to direct. Sir, if simplicity was not originally contemplated by the framers of the constitution, why the imposition on the people in publishing it to the world? Was it not a prodigal waste of labor and materials, to furnish every citizen of our country with a copy of that which can only be understood by professional men, or such as are eminently skilled in scholastic research? It had better remain a secret, concealed amongst the musty rolls in the archives of State, than be a puzzle for mankind. As long as this instrument is preserved pure and untarnished, it will receive a becoming respect from your fellow-citizens--it will be regarded as "the stupendous fabric of human invention." Remember, the present argument, in several important points of view, affects posterity in common with ourselves. You had better commit the unintelligible jargon to the flames, than by the agency of construction, neutralize wisdom by folly. Sir, if we have a constitution which the people cannot understand, I then say, cut the original into slips, and provide the means for a better; or, if that is not to be done, and we are to be ruled by the iron hand of power, in that case, as one of the American people, I will pray you to be graciously pleased to grant a plain bill of rights for our better government.

If we look back, and attentively view the occurrences which took place, when the law incorporating the present bank of the United States was enacted, we shall find our reasoning supported and confirmed by many important circumstances; we shall then perceive, that the act of incorporation was opposed on constitutional ground, by men who were and continue to be esteemed for their talents, political skill, judicial knowledge, probity and patriotism; and it has been admitted, that the arguments formerly urged are unanswerable. That the power to create corporations was never intended to be ceded on the part of the United States, is proved beyond all manner of contradiction; for we are told by the highest authority, by one who was a member of the General Convention, that it had been proposed to cede to Congress the power to create corporations, and that the proposition was rejected, after a deliberate discussion. In my opinion this decision is in proof of the sagacity and wisdom of those who made it; it was highly justifiable to retain this power to be exercised by the States; because, corporations are generally founded on circumstances, which are entirely local--as such, they can be better understood by the Legislatures of the respective States, than by that of the General Government.

The experience of every session proves that the decisions of Congress vary with the men who at different times compose that body; therefore, the act of February, 1791, can have no force in settling the principle contended for.

I have heard it urged, that the States have recognized the constitutionality of the United States' Bank, by their laws. I know of no law in any of the States, which declares this charter constitutional. Were it even proved, that several of the States had published this declaration, with me it would signify nothing, unless the sanction of two thirds of the States was thus had. On a former occasion, several of the States were induced, from peculiar circumstances, to relinquish for a time their right in favor of a particular case--I allude to the first establishment of the Bank of North America. If this had been intended to decide this very important question, without any reservation of their power in other cases, they would have expressed it in the most positive and unequivocal manner.

Sir, it may be asked, how did the Congress, whilst acting under the "Articles of Confederation," incorporate the Bank of North America, though their powers were no more extensive than those of the present Congress? We shall not lose by this investigation--they declared that "the exigencies of the United States rendered it indispensably necessary that such an act be immediately passed," and, at that period, the Board of War confessed they had not money sufficient to pay the expense of forwarding an express to the Commander-in-chief of the Army! Notwithstanding such urgent necessities on the part of the General Government, they were too conscious of the rights of the States to attempt a usurpation of authority, or to pretend to force this act without their sanction; accordingly, we find the resolution by which this bank was established followed by another, which recommended to the Legislature of each of the States the necessity to pass such laws as they judged requisite for giving the ordinance, by which the subscribers to the Bank of North America were incorporated, its full operation; every provision in the charter of this bank, to have full effect, was recommended to the Legislatures of the several States for their approbation. (See Journals of Congress for 1781, vol. 7th, pp. 257 and 258.)

It is a well-known and an important fact, that the subscribers to the Bank of North America did not rest satisfied of the authority of Congress to incorporate them; subsequently to the original act of incorporation, they accepted from the Legislature of Pennsylvania a charter by which their privileges were very much abridged.

Some maintain, the States having made it penal to pass counterfeits of the notes of the United States' Bank, is in proof of their recognizing the constitutionality of the institution. No one will pretend that these laws were intended other than to guard the people against fraud. These statutes were enacted without any connection with or reference to the principle upon which the original act was founded. It is but too well known, notwithstanding these salutary provisions, that counterfeit bank notes of every denomination are in daily circulation. I will ask, what would be the case if such laws had not been passed by the States? Sir, if it requires all our care to prevent an inundation from such bank paper as is acknowledged to be genuine, for Heaven's sake do not risk the security of the people, by an indirect sanction of such as is known to be spurious!

FRIDAY, January 18.

A motion was made by Mr. FISK, that the House do now adjourn; and the question being taken thereon, it was determined in the negative--yeas 6, nays 59.

Bank of the United States.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.

Mr. BURWELL'S motion for striking out the first section being still under consideration.

Mr. P. B. PORTER.--Mr. Chairman: As this bank has excited so extraordinary an interest in every part of the United States, and particularly in the State which I have the honor to represent; as I am apprehensive, from what took place yesterday, that I shall be found, on this question, in opposition to a majority of my colleagues; and, (what will always be an imperative motive with me,) as I think this bill aims a deadly blow at some of the best principles of the constitution, I feel it my duty to state to the House the grounds on which I shall be constrained to vote for striking out the section now under consideration.

I acknowledge that I had not, until lately, paid any particular attention to the question of the constitutionality of this institution. I stand, therefore, in this respect, on safer ground than the respectable member from North Carolina (Mr. MACON,) for I have no reason to suspect myself of any long-rooted prejudices on the question. The Bank of the United States was established at a time when I was not in the habit of troubling myself with such questions. I had been accustomed to think of it as an institution, the constitutionality of which was conceded by common consent. But, sir, when the question was again stirred, I felt it my duty to give it a thorough investigation before I should sanction it by my vote. I have given it, if not a thorough, at least a candid and impartial examination; and the result has been, a full conviction that we have no right to incorporate a bank upon the principles of the bill on the table, or rather, upon the principles of the original charter, which this bill proposes to renew. The ground of my objection is, that it assumes the exercise of legislative powers which belong exclusively to the State Governments.

I shall not touch the question of the expediency of this bank, much less the expediency of banking generally. If I were competent, which I confess I am not, to the task, I should think it a very unprofitable one, to follow the gentleman through all the mazes of the banking system--a system, sir, about the various and important operations and effects of which on civil society, aside from a few obvious truths which it furnishes, I have found that those gentlemen who have professed to understand them best, have differed most. As I propose to confine myself to the constitutional question solely, I hope I shall be allowed to take a little broader range on this point, than has been taken by the gentlemen who have preceded me.

I am aware how ungracious constitutional objections to the powers of this House are with those, and there are many such, who believe that the powers of the Federal Government are, at best, too contracted; and who would be glad to see all the State rights merged and sunk into a consolidated government. Whatever may be my speculative opinions on this subject, I can never be influenced, by motives of expediency, to swerve from my allegiance to the constitution. This sentiment is indelibly fixed on my mind, and I trust it is a common one to the members of this committee. That, in adhering strictly to the obligation we have taken to support the Constitution of the United States, we not only perform a sacred duty to ourselves, but we render a better service to the real and permanent interests of our country than we could possibly render by a departure from that obligation; even though that departure were to avert so serious a calamity as a general bankruptcy--a calamity which, in order to alarm the timid, has been held out as the inevitable consequence of a refusal to renew this charter.

I should be surprised at the general acquiescence which seems to have been yielded to the constitutionality of this institution, did I not believe that others had been as superficial in their examination of the subject as I had myself. When objections are made to the constitutionality of the law, the people, in the cursory views which they are accustomed to take of such objects, are apt to adopt, as the tests of its constitutionality, the powers of the State and Federal Governments collectively; and if they find nothing in the law offensive to the principles of civil liberty, nothing uncongenial with the spirit of a Republican Government, they rest satisfied, and do not trouble themselves with nice distinctions between the powers peculiar to the one or the other of these Governments. Such reasoning would, however, ill become the sagacity of this House.

One of the most serious dangers with which our Government is threatened, and it is a danger growing out of the very nature and structure of the Government itself, consists in its tendency to produce collisions between State and Federal authorities. The Federal Government, as was observed by my learned colleague, (Mr. MITCHILL,) is imperium in imperio, a government within a government; and the misfortune is, that there exists no friendly third power to decide the controversies which may arise between these two great, independent, and, in many respects, rival authorities. The public peace must be kept, if kept at all, by the conciliatory dispositions of the parties themselves. As then we have a common interest in the preservation of both these Governments--as we are as well the subjects of the imperio as of the imperium, we ought to act with great circumspection and delicacy in the assumption of powers which do not clearly belong to us. It is better to forego the exercise of powers to which we are entitled, if the exercise of them is not very important, rather than hazard the assumption of doubtful ones, the fatal consequences of which my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. BURWELL) has so justly deprecated.

The great line of demarcation between the powers of the State and Federal Governments is well understood. The powers of the State Governments extend to the regulation of all their internal concerns: those of the Federal Government to the management of all our external relations--external as regards the individual States, as well as the States in their collective capacity. The general ideas upon which our Republic is founded, are these: That small territories are better adapted to the successful administration of justice than large ones. In a Republic, where the people are the sovereigns and source of power, it is important that, in order to enable them to execute this power discreetly, they should possess correct information in relation to the character and conduct of their rulers, and in relation also to the character of the measures which they pursue, or ought to pursue; and this information is better attained in a small than in a large territory. The individual States have therefore reserved to themselves the exclusive right of regulating all their internal, and, as I may say, municipal concerns, in relation both to person and property. But a single State may be inadequate to its own protection against foreign violence; it may also be unable to enforce the observance of proper rules and regulations for carrying on its foreign trade and intercourse. The Confederacy of the States is therefore formed for the purpose of attaining these two objects, namely, the regulation and protection of the trade and intercourse of the States with each other and foreign nations, and their security against foreign invasion. It has some other objects in view of minor consequence, and immediately connected with these principal ones. The Constitution of the United States is the basis of this confederacy; and it is only necessary to read the constitution to perceive that it is nothing more than a delegation of specific powers for these specific purposes, and that the general sovereignty of the States over their respective territories is expressly retained by the States.