Part 44

One or two remarks upon the allusions that have been made to my observation, that we are about to assume censorial and inquisitorial powers, and I will dismiss the subject. What is the language of the resolution? Without the allegation of a single fact, it constitutes a committee to inquire whether the judges have not so acted in their official capacity as to render necessary the interposition of the constitutional powers of this House. The expression is unequivocal; the allusion to the power of impeachment is perfectly obvious. This is what is called a petitio principii; it takes for granted, at least in some degree, what remains to be proved, that the conduct of the judges has been improper and illegal. Else why adopt a language which implies suspicion and censure? But gentlemen are alarmed at the epithet inquisitorial, and imagination teems with the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition. If the creation of this committee be an unauthorized act, if in creating it we transcend those limits which we ought, by a reasonable construction of the constitution, to set to our own powers, it instantly becomes inquisitorial in its nature and in its operation. We must delegate to it more than general powers. We must authorize it to send for persons, and probably for papers and records. The proposition is hostile to republican principles, and, as a republican, I cannot give my vote in its favor.

Mr. HOLLAND.--When I before addressed the House on this subject, I had no doubt of the charge being sufficiently explicit to found an inquiry into the conduct of the judges. My only doubt was whether it was proper to proceed without affidavit. Since yesterday I have reflected on the course pursued in similar cases; and I will state to the House the proceedings adopted in two or three cases in the Legislature of which I was a member. In the year 1796, a charge was preferred against certain judges of the State of North Carolina for illegally extending their power. A committee was appointed to inquire into their conduct, and the result was, that the judges had exiled certain persons from the State. The proceedings did not go so far as an impeachment; for the judges wrote an explanatory letter, which gave satisfaction, and they were acquitted with honor. The other charge, to which I have alluded, was against the board of army accounts; that also was referred to a committee. The last case is the most recent. A suspicion existed that the Secretary of State had been guilty of misconduct. A letter had been received by the Governor from some citizens to that effect; in consequence of which, and of other corroborating circumstances, the Legislature appointed a committee of inquiry, of which I had the honor to be a member. That committee was empowered to send for persons and papers. There was no specific charge, but an impeachment was contemplated, if the officer should appear to be guilty. The Secretary was brought before the committee, who examined him on oath, and reported the existence of frauds much more extensive than had been imagined; in consequence of which the land office was shut up, and the Secretary notified that articles of impeachment would be exhibited against him. But the late period of the session not then admitting of a trial, it was postponed to the next General Assembly. At the succeeding Assembly the officer resigned, and superseded the necessity of an impeachment. He was afterwards indicted at common law. These precedents, drawn from the proceedings of the Legislature of the State which I have the honor to represent, induce me to think that the course proposed is proper; and I shall, accordingly, vote for the appointment of a committee of inquiry.

Mr. DENNIS said, he did not rise for the purpose of entering into an investigation of the merits of the question, but principally for the purpose of stating, in a few words, what appeared to be the difference between the friends and the opponents of the resolution. He had never experienced, on any occasion, a stronger conflict between inclination and duty than in the present instance. On the one hand, he was confident that, after the official conduct of the judges had been thus publicly implicated, it must be desirable to them that an investigation of the facts charged against them should take place, and it seemed to be a duty due to those gentlemen, that they should have an opportunity of being confronted with their accusers. On the other hand, we owe to the laws and constitution, as well as to those considerations which must always govern in the establishment of important precedents, a paramount duty, which appeared in this case irreconcilable with the indulgence of individual considerations. The true difference between the advocates and the opponents of the resolution appeared to be this: That the one thought it a proper procedure to raise an inquisitorial committee, without any definite or assignable object, and without stating in the resolution any specific charge. The other did not demand, as it had been supposed, the production of all the evidence in the outset of the proceeding, which might be necessary in the ulterior stages of the transaction, nor that precise and technical specification of the charges which might be proper in articles of impeachment, but only required that some fact should be stated, or charge alleged, as the basis on which to erect a committee. He believed, to create a committee by resolution, with general inquisitorial powers, without specifying any charge, or stating any reason in the resolution for the proceeding, was without precedent, and might become an engine of oppression. In order to satisfy the friends of the resolution on that, he did not wish to avoid that investigation which might be founded on proper principles, and which he believed, after what has been said, is rather courted than avoided by the judges in question. He would beg leave to read, in his place, the form of a resolution, such as he supposed ought to be the groundwork of a procedure like this:

“Whereas information hath been given to the House, by one of its members, that in a certain prosecution for treason, on the part of the United States, against a certain John Fries, pending in the circuit court of the United States, in the State of Pennsylvania, Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Richard Peters, district judge for the district of Pennsylvania, by whom the said circuit court was then holden, did inform the counsel for the prisoner that, as the court had formed their opinion upon the point of law, and would direct the jury thereupon, the counsel for the prisoner must confine themselves to the question of the fact only. And whereas, it is represented that, in consequence of such determination of the court, the counsel did refuse to address the jury on the question of fact, and the said John Fries was found guilty of treason, and sentenced by the court to the punishment in such case, by the laws of the United States, provided, and was pardoned by the President of the United States.”

He said he read this by way of argument, to show that the present resolution ought to be rejected, and though he would not offer it himself, in case the resolution before them should be rejected, yet he would pledge himself to vote for such a one, if the gentleman from Virginia or any other member would offer it. The resolution which has been read, embraces all the facts stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, which contains the only charge that has been exhibited. But if any gentleman possesses a knowledge of any other facts or charges, let him specify them, and he would be willing to vote for an extension of the powers of the committee to them also; for he did not wish to confine the inquiry to the specific charge stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if other gentlemen had charges to exhibit, and would state them in the resolution. If they would specify a charge or charges of a serious nature, and give us any reason to believe them true, although originating from hearsay evidence, he would vote for the inquiry proposed; and he begged that he should be understood as objecting rather on the ground that no charge had been specified, than on the ground of incompetent evidence. The vague charges verbally communicated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and none of which are reduced to writing, give no grounds of procedure; not only because, if true, they constitute no cause for impeachment, but because they are not specified in the resolution.

The motion was then further amended to read as follows:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania, and to report their opinion whether the said Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, or either of them, have so acted, in their judicial capacity, as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House.

Mr. SPEAKER stated the question, that the House do agree to the said motion, as so amended, when an adjournment was called for and carried--yeas 61, nays 43.

SATURDAY, January 7.

Mr. NICHOLSON, from the committee appointed on the memorial of Alexander Moultrie, agent for the South Carolina Yazoo Company, and of William Cowan, agent of the Virginia Yazoo Company, made a report, going considerably into detail, and concluding with a resolution adverse to the prayer of the memorialist. Referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday.

Official Conduct of Judge Chase.

The House resumed the consideration of the question depending yesterday, at the time of adjournment, “that the House do agree to the motion of the fifth instant, as amended by the House, for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania.”

Mr. J. RANDOLPH expressed his regret that the attempt which he had made yesterday to reply to the very personal allusions of a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. GRISWOLD,) whom he was sorry not to see in his place, had, by the adjournment, proved abortive. Such was his regard for the opinions of the House, that he should always, when called upon from a respectable quarter, justify any conduct which he deemed it proper to pursue in its deliberations. He felt it due to the respect in which he held the Chair and those around it, to reply to the remarks of the gentleman from Connecticut, and this consideration alone could have induced him to offer any thing in addition to what he had already advanced in favor of the motion. He should otherwise have left the resolution to its fate. In that fate he did not feel himself personally implicated. If it should be rejected, he would be satisfied in having done his duty, and the House, he supposed, would feel equally satisfied in having discharged theirs. It was asked, where was the mover of this resolution at the time when the alleged misconduct took place? Did it not, said the gentleman, pass under their own eyes? Were not their deliberations held on the very spot? and why had the motion slept until this day? He hoped he should be permitted to say that it did not pass under his eyes; although he knew, at the time of the condemnation in question, he did not become acquainted with the circumstances under which it took place until long after their occurrence. It was true that the deliberations of Congress were then held in Philadelphia, the scene of this alleged iniquity, but, with other members he was employed in discharging his duties to his constituents, not in witnessing, in any court, the triumph of his principles. He could not have been so employed. It would be recollected, that the information given by the gentleman from Pennsylvania formed the groundwork of his proceedings, and he asked whether it was more the duty of the mover of the resolution to have brought it forward than every other member of the House who was a witness of the statement made by that gentleman? This information, of an official nature, given by a member in his place, of a transaction in open court, and which it was the duty of them all to have noticed, had been called a story related on hearsay; a rumor of an affair which had happened in a corner; and the House was asked if they would take such evidence as ground of proceeding, on the dictum of any one member, however great their confidence in him might be? If he really felt that respect for the House which the gentleman from Connecticut had professed, he would not have insulted their understandings by such language. He would not have stood up, as amicus curiæ, to prevent their being precipitated into absurdity and injustice by an influential member of their body. That, however, was the station which the gentleman had assumed, and he hoped the duties of it would be discharged with the fidelity which they required. After clothing himself with this character, Mr. R. said he expected to have seen him at his post--he regretted that he did not see him there, and that his duty did not permit him to withhold the observations which he was compelled to make. Whilst, however, the gentleman was engaged in discharging the new and important function with which he stood self-invested, he seemed cautious of replying to the masterly statement of his venerable friend from Pennsylvania, and which he believed had remained unanswered because it was unanswerable. It must, said Mr. R., be a subject of high gratification to us all, and I congratulate this House upon it, that age has not yet dimmed the lustre of those talents which have so long presided in the councils of this country. And if the time shall come when we are to resign our understandings, and place ourselves under the direction of an individual, I hope to be permitted to range myself under the banners of that tried patriot, and not under those of the gentleman from Connecticut. In the same spirit with which he challenged the confidence of the House, as a friend unwilling to see them led into error and absurdity, that gentleman had endeavored to alarm their pride by representing the motion as a demand made upon them. It was so. It was (if he might so express it) a writ of right, not of favor--and as such he demanded it, as such he urged it. But an objection was taken that no act of misconduct had been alleged. With his friend from Maryland he would say, that a fact of the first importance had been adduced, on which he was sorry his friend had not dwelled longer. It could not receive too much attention. On a trial for life and death, the jury, who were the constitutional judges both of the law and fact, were deprived of the right of a discussion of the point of law, “what constitutes treason?” The rights of the jury and of the accused were equally invaded. It was conduct not dissimilar to this, in a case of libel, which drew forth from the English Parliament the famous declaratory bill of Mr. Fox. Lord Mansfield had laid down the doctrine that the jury had a right to decide only upon the bare facts of printing and publishing, and not upon the question of guilt, which was compounded of the law and the fact. This produced the declaratory act which passed a strong censure on the practices of courts--since it did not amend or alter the law, but declared what the law was--and established the point resisted by the court, that the jury was the judge both of the fact and of the law. If, then, on a question of criminal law, where the punishment was only fine and imprisonment, the conduct of a judge was deemed highly reprehensible in encroaching upon the rights of the jury, what shall we say of him who usurps those rights in a case of life and death, in a case of treason? This denial to the prisoner and the jury of the right of having the point of law discussed, seemed to be the first step towards assuming those powers in cases of treason, the exercise of which, in cases of libel, had drawn down upon the English courts the censure of their Parliament. Would the gentleman say this was nothing? Would he affirm that if a man were under trial for murder, the court would be justified in saying to his counsel, You may, if you can, disprove the fact with which the prisoner stands charged, but you shall not endeavor to show that it does not amount to the crime with which he stands charged? If you admit the killing, you shall not argue the point that such killing does not constitute murder. Would the gentleman contend that treason is better defined than murder? What is murder? Killing with malice aforethought; can any definition be clearer? What is burglary? Breaking in during the night. What is treason? The constitution defines it as levying war against the United States; adhering to their enemies; giving them aid and comfort. But what had definitions to do with the case? Because murder was defined, had counsel ever been stopped in an attempt to show that the killing with which their client stood charged was not a killing with prepensive malice, a killing which constituted murder? What was more common than to see the facts admitted, and the crime not only denied, but disproved to the satisfaction of the jury; and upon what principle shall counsel be arrested in the attempt to show that the facts charged in an indictment for treason do not amount to such a levying of war, or an adherence or aid to such enemies as would constitute treason? Mr. R. said that the fact mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania was of a remarkable nature. He had never heard of a similar proceeding, and he rejoiced that another instance of so black a nature could not probably be furnished by any tribunal in this country.

The gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. DENNIS,) however, had entirely abandoned the ground taken by his friend. He agrees that there is a charge of an important nature exhibited, and if it was incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to that subject only, he would vote for it. The object of the one gentleman was only to confine the inquiry, whilst that of his friend was to deny it altogether. He could not thank the gentleman for his liberality. He would have what he asked or nothing. He would never consent to confine the inquiry; if it could not be full and free, let it be denied.

The gentleman from Maryland had, with very little dexterity, endeavored to confound the resolution of inquiry with the articles of impeachment which may follow from it, and said that if the House would consent to confine the inquiry to any particular charge he would vote for it. It was true that after articles of impeachment should have been exhibited against the accused, the House would not be permitted to prefer any new accusation, or to adduce testimony to prove any guilt other than that which was charged in those articles. In the same manner as when a criminal was indicted, evidence would not be suffered to be brought forward to prove any act of criminality not contained in some one of the counts of the indictment. But would gentlemen persist in confounding things so entirely different, as to confine an incipient inquiry by the same rigid rules which would govern a criminal trial? It was trifling with the judgment of the House. The gentleman was eager for inquiring, but the charge must be incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to a specific point, before he could be brought to consent to it. Whatever other misdemeanors might come to the knowledge of the committee in the course of the investigation, he would not agree to have them reported to the House. And at the same time he told them of the struggle between his inclination and his sense of duty--his inclination as a friend of the accused to grant the inquiry, his duty as a member of the House and a friend of justice to refuse it. Mr. R. was sorry to find the gentleman in this awkward predicament; he regretted that it was out of his power to gratify him by narrowing the inquiry. This his duty would not suffer him to do. He hoped, however, the strength of the gentleman’s constitution would carry him through the arduous struggle in which he was involved, by his wishes on the one hand, and his principles on the other.

Whilst so much was said on the subject of precedent, he hoped he might offer a few cases to their consideration. He did not come to the House armed with precedents. Neither his health nor leisure permitted him to search for them. Gentlemen of greater industry, and who attached more importance to them than himself, had furnished him with them. For his part he thought precedents had nothing to do with the case, but for the sake of those who thought differently, he would show the course which he advocated was not destitute even of their support. Here Mr. R. referred to Mr. Hatsell’s precedents. “On the 21st of April, 1626, Mr. Glanvylee, from the select committee appointed to consider of the charges against the Duke of Buckingham, reports that they desire the House will resolve whether common fame is a ground for this House to proceed upon?” It is resolved to consider this the next day. After a long debate the House resolve that, “common fame is good ground of proceeding of this House, either to inquire of here, or to transmit the complaint, if the House find cause, to the King or Lords.”

Mr. R. begged to call the attention of the House to the opinion of a gentleman, delivered during the debate, to which he must be permitted to attach more importance than to that of the gentleman from Connecticut. When he mentioned the name of Selden, he believed he should stand justified in the opinion of the gentleman himself, and in that of his warmest admirers. “These cases (said Mr. Selden) are to be ruled by the law of Parliament and not by the common or civil law.” Mr. Littleton says, “this is not a House for definitive judgment, but for information, denunciation, or presentment, for which common fame is sufficient.” Mr. Noy says, “There are two questions--first, Whether a common fame? Second, Whether this fame be true? We will not transmit without the first inquiry: but without the second we may; for peradventure we cannot come by the witnesses; as if the witnesses be in the Lords’ House.”

Again, on the 16th October, 1667, the House being informed “that there have been some innovations of late in the trials of men for their lives and deaths, and in some particular cases restraints have been put upon juries, the matter is referred to a committee.” This case (Mr. R. said) was precisely in point. “On the 18th of November, this committee are empowered ‘to receive information against the Lord Chief Justice Keeling, for any other misdemeanors besides those concerning juries.’” Thus on a particular fact, innovation in trials for life and death, a committee was raised, and yet they were not confined to the examination of that single charge, but empowered to inquire generally into the misconduct of the judge. A stronger or more pointed precedent could not be conceived.

By the constitution, Mr. Randolph said, that House was vested with the sole power of impeachment. How this power was to be exercised must depend on their discretion, and on no other law or principle whatever: for “these cases are not to be ruled by the common or civil law, but by the law of Parliament.” That law of Parliament it remained with them to establish. It could not be matter of surprise that he, one of the leading principles of whose politics it was to support the weight of that branch of the Government, and to be jealous of executive influence--it could not surprise any one, that he should exert himself in behalf of the constitutional rights of that House. When he saw the importance which was attached to precedent, he was more than ever solicitous for that which they were then about to establish. He trusted that they would not consent to abridge the power with which the constitution had invested them--to reduce it below the standard which the English House of Commons had fixed as the measure of their own power in similar cases. A time might come when a wicked President and his flagitious ministers might so conduct themselves in office, as to make every man regret the proceedings of that day, in case they should suffer their power to sleep. The refusing to exercise it, then, would hereafter be adduced as a denial of its existence. Such might be the circumstances of the times, that no private man would dare to step forward with a specific charge against the Executive. If they should deny an inquiry without a specific charge, they would do all in their power to screen such a President and such ministers at a future day. It had been remarked that, in this government, an officer found guilty, on an impeachment, could not be punished capitally. The sentence could only remove him from office, and disqualify him, for ever after, from holding one under the United States. If, in a country where the accused may be brought to the block, free, unfettered inquiry is warranted against any rank however exalted--would it be denied here, where the punishment was comparatively light? Should they hold the other departments of the Government more inviolable than they were considered even in England? Would they afford to a criminal, Executive or Judiciary, a shelter denied by the law of that government? He hoped they would not. He trusted that they would give an example of their readiness to bring every offender to justice, however great might be his station.

Mr. GRIFFIN.--I had hoped that no subject would have been agitated during this session which should have interrupted the tranquillity or disturbed the harmony of this House, so necessary to the faithful and correct discharge of our public duties; but, sir, I perceive, from the turn which the debate upon the resolution now before the House has taken, that sensations have been excited which I fear it will be difficult to allay.

The proposition now before the House, nursed with so much secrecy, and forced on us so suddenly and unexpectedly, comes in such a questionable shape, that I must beg the attention of the House for a few moments while “I speak to it.”

What, sir, does the resolution demand of us? That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, &c. But how is this inquiry to be conducted? Are there any data by which the committee are to be guided? Is there any specific charge to which their attention or inquiries are to be directed? None. And who, sir, before this enlightened day ever heard of a committee of inquiry being raised, without possession of a single subject to direct or guide the inquiry? What, sir, erect an inquiring committee vested with all the rights of a Star Chamber, and yet assign them no specific objects of their duty! But, sir, the official conduct of these judges has given offence--and are we now, sir, to probe and search the whole judicial lives of these gentlemen, for causes of complaint and censure? Are the records of the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania now to be ransacked, for evidences of their guilt and cause of impeachment? I never have and never shall deny the right of this House to inquire into the conduct of public officers--but, sir, if the honorable mover of the resolution is serious----

Mr. GRIFFIN continued. I will answer the gentleman: my meaning is, that if the gentleman believes there are just grounds for impeachment--if he is in possession of information or facts, let him declare them, and if they appear to my mind to be sufficient whereon to ground an impeachment, let him demand it and I will join with him. Let him specify the instances of malfeasance of which these judges have been guilty, and I will unite with him--let him declare the malconduct of these public functionaries, and I will cordially co-operate with him. If these judges have travelled beyond the line of their duty, if they have wantonly exceeded the limits of their power, I will aid in the infliction of such punishment as they may merit; but, sir, I cannot, I will not, in this indirect manner, wound the feelings or censure the characters of men, holding high responsible offices under your Government. Could I induce myself to believe that the course now proposed to be pursued is correct, I will gladly give it my assent; but for reasons very different from those the advocates of this measure adduce: could I deem it correct, I would support the resolution because I believe the characters implicated therein will safely pass the ordeal preparing for them, and that the inquiry will redound to their honor. I would cheerfully support the resolution, because, by the impeachment which I predict will follow, an opportunity will be offered to remove the load of unmerited calumny under which the Federal Judiciary of the United States have too long labored, and with which our public prints have been long filled. But the course is incorrect--the measure in its present shape appears to me to be fraught with incalculable mischief to our country, and I never will assist in the establishment of a precedent which may at some future day be made an engine of persecution, as “wicked as intolerant.” Mr. Speaker, let me ask of you, sir, to remember the consequences which may flow from the adoption of this resolution--let me conjure this House to reflect upon the dreadful effects which must arise to us, if, upon the bare assertion of a single gentleman, unsupported by any direct allegation, a committee of this nature shall be raised, a precedent of this kind established, what public character will be safe? nay, sir, how soon may not we ourselves feel its baneful influence? Far be it from me, sir, to impute to the honorable mover of the resolution any impurity of motives. I believe his conduct has proceeded from a consciousness of duty, and from a similar consciousness of duty I must oppose the measure. I cannot deny the power of this House to adopt the resolution upon your table, but I beg of you to pause ere you take the fatal step, and do not, because “dressed with a little brief authority, play such fantastic tricks before high heaven as make e’en angels weep.”

Sir, I have endeavored to discharge what I conceived to be my duty upon this occasion, and when experience shall fatally convince us of the dreadful effects of the precedent we are now about to establish, I shall derive consolation from the reflection, that I lent my feeble aid to check the overwhelming torrent.

Mr. EUSTIS said, he did not view this subject in the same light with the gentleman last up; he did not see those awful consequences which he had pointed out. He hoped the time would never come, when an inquiry into the conduct of an officer of the Government should be deemed a subject of alarm in that House. It was the first principle of the constitution, that every man was amenable to the constitution and laws of his country; and however elevated any one might be, that he could not be raised above the reach of inquiry. The observations of the gentleman who had last spoken, and of others who had preceded him, were predicated on a principle that was not correct. If the resolution on the table was to impeach the judge, those observations would be relevant, but they were incorrect on the preliminary motion to inquire.

In making up, said Mr. E., my judgment on this subject, I have endeavored altogether to avoid the inquiry, whether the officer implicated in this resolution, has so conducted himself as to require impeachment by this House. I have not accepted the opinion of the mover of the resolution, and I have excluded all the other information adduced in the debate; because I consider it as alone applicable to the question of impeachment, which is not now before the House. The question before the House is a very different one, and, in my opinion, it is plain and simple. What is it? It is that a committee be raised to inquire into the official conduct of a certain public officer. When a member of this House, under the obligations of honor, and the additional obligations of an oath, rises and takes upon himself the responsibility of moving an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, which can only be effected in virtue of the impeaching power of this House, which power it exclusively possesses, I view the request for an inquiry in the nature of an information laid before the House as the grand inquest of the nation.

When this proposition was made, the mind of every gentleman was naturally cast about for the situation of the officers in question. If it shall be the opinion of the House that their conduct is such as to afford grounds for an impeachment, it will be granted that it is an indispensable duty to make the inquiry. If, on the other hand, the House are of opinion that no testimony can be produced which will lead to an impeachment, then it is due to the officers to institute an inquiry. The object of an inquiry is two-fold--arising from the duty to the people, and that due to the officer whose conduct is impeached. If gentlemen are of opinion that, in this case, there are no grounds for impeachment, then it is clear that the conduct and character of the officer ought to be vindicated, and the inquiry instituted to afford him the means. If they are of opinion that there are grounds for an impeachment, then the duty they owe to the people urges them to the inquiry. In the constitution I find no excuse, no justification, on which to ground a refusal to institute an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer charged with misbehavior.

To such an inquiry, what is objected? That the power may be abused. Indeed, the objection is, that it is abused in this instance. How abused? To argue from abuse of the power against the use of it, is no argument at all. If the House believe either alternative I have mentioned, and one or the other you must believe, it is their duty to make the inquiry. But it is said that the committee are to be clothed with power to send for persons and papers. Granted. That power is indispensably necessary. It is said their powers are to be inquisitorial. This is not true. Will not the committee be accessible by every member of the House, and what are their ulterior powers but to collect facts, and to express an opinion whether they afford grounds for an impeachment? That opinion they will eventually submit to the House, and, without its approbation, it will be settled.