Part 40

After this the Attorney General wrote a letter to Messrs. Dallas and Lewis, requesting them to furnish their notes and opinions for the use of the President. They drew up an answer, in which they stated that the acts charged against Fries did not amount to treason, but were only sedition; and that they were so considered in the British courts. This letter was read to me by Mr. Dallas. After receiving the letter the President pardoned the man.

Mr. J. CLAY.--This debate appears to me to arise from causes the most extraordinary, and such as we are not accustomed to hear assigned on this floor. The gentleman from Virginia has made a motion justified by his own knowledge as well as that of my colleague; and this motion is opposed in a most extraordinary manner. I believe this is the first instance in which a motion to appoint a committee of inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer has been opposed. We are told by the gentleman from Vermont that this House has no right to pass a censure on a judge, and that judges should be highly independent. I am afraid that unless great care be taken the doctrine of judicial independence will be carried so far as to become dangerous to the liberties of the country. This motion does not, however, affect the character of the judge. Let it also be recollected, that if the reputation of the judge be at stake, the reputation of this House also is implicated. I consider this House as the constitutional guardians of the morality of the Judiciary. Whenever even suspicion exists as to that morality, a committee of inquiry should be appointed. For the pure administration of justice is surely more important than the reputation of any particular judge. I am sorry my colleague thought it necessary to make any statement of facts to the House. I believe that more important facts than he has mentioned will be stated by witnesses. I believe likewise the reputation of the judge will be better preserved by the appointment of a committee than by assertions made on this floor by particular members, not responsible elsewhere for what they allege.

With regard to my opinions in this case, whatever my political impressions may be, they are entirely unbiassed. I have heard facts stated, but I cannot say that they have been satisfactorily proved to my mind. There are other charges equally reprehensible. Under these circumstances, I ask if the character of the judge is not more implicated by a discussion of his official conduct on this floor than by appointing a committee to obtain facts. If he is guilty of the facts alleged against him, no gentleman will say that he is not impeachable. If he is only suspected of them, there ought to be a committee, that if guilty he may be impeached, and if innocent, be freed from the imputation thrown upon him.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD.--Gentlemen will acknowledge that this is a subject of great importance and delicacy. No one will doubt but that we ought to execute our duty so as to preserve the fountains of justice pure, and that we ought at the same time to treat the important character of a judge, or of any other high officer, with respect. I do not know but that this mode of procedure is warranted by precedent. But if it is, it is unknown to me. As the resolution now stands, I do not think it perfectly correct. The honorable gentleman from Virginia says he is acquainted with facts that warrant the proposed inquiry. The question is whether the House ought to be governed by the opinions of any one member. We know not what those facts are; the gentleman declines stating them. I do think, as the subject now strikes me, that the conviction of any one member of the propriety of this measure cannot warrant the interposition of the House. Instead of taking the individual opinion of a member, it ought to be stated that certain facts exist, which, if proved, will justify an impeachment. I do not know whether these ideas are not incorrect, having never before contemplated, or had a suspicion that such a motion would be made.

As to the remarks of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I do not consider them as entitled to much weight. If the facts stated by him were of his personal knowledge, they would undoubtedly merit attention. But he merely states that which he has received from others, and which amounts to nothing more than that the judge refused liberty to the counsel to argue a point of law after it was decided, and confined their argument to facts. In so doing the judge may have erred, but it was an error of judgment, for which he cannot be impeached. No lawyer will perhaps say that it was not the province of the judge to decide the law, and that he has not the right to prevent counsel from arguing it after his mind is made up. But this information is not of the knowledge of the gentleman. Are we then to institute an inquiry into the conduct of a high officer of the Government merely on hearsay? This has never been done under our Government. In the late case of Judge Pickering proof was furnished by the affidavits of witnesses testifying certain facts. I do not therefore consider it correct to proceed to inquire on the opinion of any gentleman. The proper course is first to have proofs which will justify ourselves to our own consciences in making the inquiry--for we ought not to touch the character of a judge, unless we are satisfied from facts that there is good reason for an investigation into his conduct. Gentlemen will not say that making an inquiry into the official conduct of a judge does not touch his character.

Gentlemen say if this committee find the conduct of the judge to have been correct, they will make a report to that effect; but it does not follow that the report will contain all the evidence adduced, and suspicion may still rest on the character of the judge, and that some facts may not be stated, which, if stated, would show his misconduct. Whereas, if the business be brought generally before the House, on the exhibition of certain facts, the public will be enabled to decide whether they warrant impeachment or even suspicion. With this view of the subject, I am of opinion that it will be best to delay acting in this affair until facts shall be disclosed which will justify the step now proposed to be taken. I have as high a respect for the opinion of the gentleman from Virginia as for that of any other member on this floor; but I doubt whether we can justify our votes on the opinion of any single member; facts alone ought to govern our opinions. I, therefore, for the purpose of considering the course most proper to be pursued, move a postponement of the further consideration of the motion until to-morrow.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--Were I the personal enemy of the gentleman who is the object of this resolution, I should take precisely that course which, on this occasion, the gentleman from Connecticut seems more than half inclined to take. That gentleman wishes the resolution to lay until to-morrow, in order that he may have time to consider whether he can bring himself to refuse the inquiry altogether. He says that he cannot, or rather (for he speaks doubtingly) he thinks he cannot see the propriety of instituting an inquiry without evidence. What evidence? Nothing short of legal proof--testimony on oath. And what is the object of the resolution? To acquire that very evidence. If we had the evidence, to what purpose make inquiry? As, however, the evidence cannot be had without inquiry, and the gentleman will not grant the inquiry but upon the evidence, it is plain that if we take the course which he recommends, we must go without both. Will gentlemen offer objections against inquiry which are applicable only to impeachment? If an impeachment were moved, they would have a right to call for evidence. But what is the object of the present motion? Merely to inquire whether there exists evidence which will justify an impeachment. But this inquiry we are told cannot be instituted on mere hearsay, although we have the declaration of a member in his place. What would be said of a grand jury, who being informed by one of their body that A or B could testify to the fact of a murder being committed within their jurisdiction, should refuse an application to the court to have them summoned, and because they could not find a bill of indictment unsupported by evidence, should reject that evidence which might be within their reach? I profess not that tenderness of conscience which has been displayed by the gentleman from Connecticut. My conscience teaches me to accuse no man wrongfully, but to deny inquiry into the official conduct of no one, however exalted his station; and I had supposed, from his practice, that the gentleman held the same opinion. For it will be recollected that on the eve of the close of the last session he had himself instituted an inquiry which went to impeach the conduct of some of the first officers of the Government. No one on that occasion stepped in between the demand for an inquiry and those officers implicated in it. No inquiry was made, and it precluded any further proceeding on the part of the House, since the charges which had been attempted to be brought forward would not bear examination. Mr. R. concluded by calling for the yeas and nays.

Mr. GREGG said he should vote against the postponement, and in favor of the resolution. The case was somewhat new, but he perceived no impropriety in giving it the same direction with all the other business originated in the House. What is this committee to be appointed for? To investigate facts and report them to the House. Was it not most proper that gentlemen whose characters were implicated should have, in the first instance, facts stated privately before a committee, than that parts of their character should be immediately brought into view before the House? He recollected one fact not yet alluded to in debate. In 1792, after the army under the command of General St. Clair was defeated, great dissatisfaction arose, and the character of the commander was implicated. The idea was that the expedition had not been conducted with propriety. The business was brought before Congress. It was understood at that time, whether justly or not, Mr. G. would not pretend to say, that the commander-in-chief could not be tried by a court martial. Congress therefore took up the business, and appointed a committee of inquiry, who went through a lengthy examination of the subject. Mr. G. mentioned this precedent that gentlemen might turn their attention to it.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD said--I had hoped that the language used by me, when I was up before, would not have led gentlemen to suppose that I was acting as the friend or the enemy of Judge Chase. I am acting in neither capacity. I am acting only as a member of this House, who ought to be anxious on an occasion of such importance to take that course which is most consistent with propriety; that course which results from the duty this House owes the nation, and that duty which they owe the character of a judge. It did appear to me that it was not correct to call the character of a public officer into question unless some necessity should first appear. No facts are presented on this occasion. The gentleman from Virginia has said that he is in possession of facts, or of something which makes him believe that an inquiry is proper, but he does not choose to communicate those facts. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has given us his information. The question is, whether it is proper on these light suggestions to institute a solemn inquiry into the character of this judge. It appears to me that we ought not to throw any imputation on the character of any officer without evidence that such an inquiry is necessary. The case mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GREGG) does not apply. Dissatisfaction existed in the country and in this House on the events of a campaign; an inquiry was instituted; but what was its object? The committee were appointed to inquire into the general causes of the failure of the expedition; they were not instructed to inquire into the character of a particular officer.

The gentleman from Virginia has referred to another case, when he says that we were ready enough to institute an inquiry, and has left it to be inferred that the inquiry was made without any previous proofs of its necessity. But certainly on that occasion inquiry was not made without proof. I suppose the inquiry alluded to was that which related to the conduct of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. It was instituted on a report made by them, and which we thought was not satisfactory. The resolution offered was adopted, and inquiry was made, the result of which is well known to every gentleman. It follows, therefore, that there are no precedents adduced which apply to the present case.

It is my wish that the proceedings of this House may on this occasion be perfectly correct, and that we may not be precipitated into the adoption of this resolution without due consideration. If it is correct to vote an inquiry in all cases where a member rises on this floor and desires it, it is correct to vote it in this case. In this case a gentleman rises and says that he is satisfied an inquiry ought to take place. The question is, whether it is proper to inquire on the suggestion of a member? If it is proper, without facts being adduced, then it will be always proper to inquire whenever any member requires it, and it will be also proper whenever any individual citizen requires it. This course I have never thought correct. On the contrary, I think some facts ought to be previously presented to establish the necessity of an inquiry before it is voted. In the case of Judge Pickering a very different course has been pursued. The appointment of a committee of inquiry originated from a Message of the President. We find in February, 1803, the House received the following Message:

“The enclosed letter and affidavits, exhibiting matter against John Pickering, District Judge of New Hampshire, which is now within Executive cognizance, I transmit them to the House of Representatives, to whom the constitution has confided a power of instituting proceedings of redress, if they shall be of opinion that the case calls for them.”

This Message was referred to a committee, with the accompanying papers, furnishing evidence of the necessity of an inquiry. But the course pursued to-day is very different. A gentleman gets up and moves an inquiry into the conduct of Judge Chase, and says that he is of the opinion that it ought to be made. The course, I think, is incorrect. Some facts ought first to be adduced. I repeat it, I am on this occasion neither the friend nor the enemy of Judge Chase. I am the friend of this House; I wish its proceedings to be correct, and I hope they will not do hastily what they may hereafter regret.

Mr. DENNIS.--The only question now before the House is, whether they will postpone the consideration of the motion on the table. I cannot but express my surprise that the gentleman from Virginia should oppose this motion, when several have declared that they are not prepared to vote on this resolution. Gentlemen ought to recollect that, according to our rules, on all motions which require the concurrence of the two Houses, one day’s delay is necessary. Although this resolution is not of this kind, yet it surely is not of inferior importance.

I believe that the gentleman alluded to by the motion would rather court than shrink from an investigation of his official conduct. I believe, also, that it has become necessary, from the discussion of this day, that an investigation should take place. I am not, therefore, prepared at this time to say whether I shall not ultimately vote for an inquiry. But it appears to me that the course proposed is inverting the natural order of things, inasmuch as it institutes an inquiry not growing out of facts, but for facts. I believe also that the facts stated, if authenticated, will furnish no ground for an impeachment. Circumstances attending this motion show that the gentleman from Virginia does not consider them as a sufficient ground for an impeachment. The refusal to hear the point of law discussed was the act of the court. Mr. Chase did not sit alone on the bench. Another judge must have been associated with and have concurred with him. If so, why does not the resolution allude to the other judge? Why select one judge, when both are equally implicated in the charges?

I believe the most parliamentary way would be for a gentleman to state, in the form of a resolution, the grounds of impeachment, and then to refer such a resolution to a select committee for investigation. In this mode the House may correctly institute an inquiry, and send for persons and papers. This is the only parliamentary mode of proceeding. In every case where impeachments have been made, the facts have been stated in a resolution, concluding with a motion for an impeachment. The House possesses no censorial power over the judges, except as incidental to the power of impeachment. If gentlemen are possessed of facts, why not state them in the form of a resolution, and move an impeachment? Then, if the facts appeared to me to warrant an impeachment, I would not object to their going to a select committee, though I believe the most proper course would be for the House to send for persons and papers, and to examine for themselves. But it is extremely novel and unprecedented for the House, without facts, to institute an inquiry into the character of a high officer of the Government.

May they not, in the same way, extend their inquiry into the conduct of every judge in the United States, without stating any facts on which the inquiry is founded? For these reasons I shall vote for postponing the further consideration of this resolution for one day, on account of the importance and delicacy of the subject, and the serious deliberation it is entitled to. I do not know whether, if sufficient time is allowed for consideration, and I shall be convinced that this course is consistent with parliamentary usage, I shall not be in favor of an investigation.

Mr. ELLIOT.--When the yeas and nays are called, I shall on every occasion rise in favor of taking them. I wish the votes I give in this House entered on the Journal, and known to every citizen of America. The more I contemplate the course pursued on this occasion, the more extraordinary and unprecedented it appears to me. The gentleman from Virginia rose, and, after an elegant exordium, stating that the streams of justice should be preserved pure, and other fine things, told us that he had received information of facts that convinced his mind that an inquiry ought to be made into the conduct of a judge. Suppose the gentleman, on facts known to himself, had stated his opinion, that an inquiry ought to be made into the conduct of the President of the United States; we have the same right to impeach the President as a judge. If the inquiry would be improper in the one instance, without facts being adduced, it would be equally so in the other. For we possess no censorial or inquisitorial powers over the conduct of the judges of the Supreme Court. If Judge Chase has been guilty of misconduct, let it be stated. If that misconduct be of a private nature, let the House assume the character of a grand jury, hold private sittings, receive evidence, and determine whether the judge shall be impeached or not. The gentleman asks whether a grand jury in the case of a charge of murder can send for persons. Undoubtedly they can. But did gentlemen ever hear of their appointing a committee to inquire whether a man charged with a partial offence ought to be indicted? We are called on as the grand inquisitors of the nation, to appoint an inquisitorial committee to get evidence; for it is granted that as yet we have none. I believe that no committee of this nature ought to be constituted, without previously ascertaining facts that will warrant the delegation of such great power. No accusation, even, is before us; but we are called upon to appoint a committee to look one up--a committee to be invested with power to send for persons and papers--a committee to inquire in private. I will never consent to the appointment of such a committee, until facts that will justify the inquiry are stated.

The facts adduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if proved, could not induce me to believe that the judge is impeachable. I may suspect that his conduct was erroneous and improper, but I cannot conceive it proper to impeach a single judge for the act of the court. Believing, therefore, this conduct unprecedented, unparliamentary, and replete with improprieties; believing it novel; believing that, in an affair of so much consequence, we ought not to proceed with precipitation; believing that we are entitled to demand one day to reflect upon it--I am proud, on this occasion, to record my vote in favor of the postponement until to-morrow; and if it were for a week, I should with equal pride and pleasure vote for it.

Mr. HOLLAND moved an adjournment.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said, that considering a motion to adjourn equivalent to a postponement for a day, he moved the taking the yeas and nays upon it.

Mr. HOLLAND moved an adjournment, on which the question was taken--yeas 52, nays 62.

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, Simeon Baldwin, George W. Campbell, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dennis, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Edwin Gray, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, John A. Hanna, Seth Hastings, James Holland, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Joseph Lewis, jun., Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Matthew Lyon, Nahum Mitchell, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Erastus Root, Tompson J. Skinner, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of Virginia, Joseph Stanton, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, David Thomas, George Tibbits, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Daniel C. Verplanck, Peleg Wadsworth, Matthew Walton, Lemuel Williams, Marmaduke Williams, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS.--David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Joseph Clay, John Clopton, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William Dickson, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Griffin, Samuel Hammond, Josiah Hasbrouck, William Hoge, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, Richard Stanford, John Stewart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, John Whitehill, and Richard Wynn.

The question of postponement recurring,

Mr. HUGER considered the course contemplated by the resolution as improper, unparliamentary, and unprecedented. To make up his mind on the course proper to be pursued, he was in favor of the postponement.

Mr. HOLLAND observed that he had moved an adjournment to allow those gentlemen time for reflection who had not yet made up their minds on the propriety of the motion. He was himself of this number. Having been allowed no time for reflection, he did not feel perfectly satisfied with the appointment of a committee of inquiry before any facts had been substantiated. Desiring further time to form his judgment, and seeing no occasion for precipitation, he should vote in favor of a postponement.

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL.--I will not, at this late hour, detain the House with the expression of my ideas in detail. I am as desirous as any member of this House that the streams of justice should flow pure and unsullied, as on their purity depend the safety and liberties of the people of the United States. But when we are about to enter into measures for preserving them clear, we owe it to ourselves to preserve order in our conduct, and to act in such a manner as we shall be able to justify to our constituents. Every member of this House, on such an occasion, ought to be as cautious in his proceeding as a judge in delivering his opinions, lest, while we are condemning the conduct of the judge, we ourselves go astray from our duty. For this reason, I am against the adoption of a measure which may throw a censure on a character invested by the United States with high authority, until I am convinced we have sufficient grounds for doing so. The resolution on the table can have but one object, to wit: the direction of an inquiry whether sufficient evidence can be procured to authorize an impeachment. I conceive that this House cannot proceed in any other way. I am therefore of opinion, that, before the vote for an inquiry, there ought to be probable grounds that facts exist that authorize an impeachment, and that evidence can be procured of their existence. I am not prepared to say, from any thing which has been adduced, that such evidence does exist. I conceive that until probable grounds are shown, we ought not to authorize such a procedure, inasmuch as it may establish a precedent that we may hereafter regret--a precedent which will put it in the power of any member to move and obtain an inquiry into the conduct of the President, a judge, or any other officer under the Government. Under these circumstances, I am not prepared to say this is the regular course of proceeding. I do not profess to have much knowledge of parliamentary proceedings, and have therefore waited, before I expressed my opinions, to hear such precedents as gentlemen could adduce. Having heard none, I conclude none exist.