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Part 29

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16) · United States. Congress — chapter 29 of 283 · ~3,078 words · public domain

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And lost--yeas 57, nays 59.

Amendment to the Constitution.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of a select committee on propositions of amendment to the constitution.

The report was read, as follows:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the different States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the said constitution, viz:

“In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person having a majority of all the Electors for President shall be the President; and if there shall be no such majority, the President shall be chosen from the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list for President, by the House of Representatives, in the manner directed by the constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice President, and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the constitution.”

Mr. DAWSON observed, that at the time of the adoption of the constitution, that part of it which related to the election of a President and Vice President had been objected to; and evils likely to occur had been foreseen by some gentlemen at that day. Experience had shown that they were not mistaken. Every gentleman in that House knew the situation in which the country had been placed by the controverted election of a Chief Magistrate; it was one which he trusted never would return. It had been a subject much reflected on by the people, and by the State Legislatures, several of which had declared their approbation of the principle contained in the resolution reported by the committee. The House had two years since ratified a similar amendment by a constitutional majority of two-thirds. At that time no objections were made to the principle of the amendment. All the objection then made was on account of the lateness of the day and thinness of the House. Mr. D. considered it unnecessary to make any further remarks at that time, as he could not anticipate any objections that might be urged. He moved that the Committee should rise and report the resolution without amendment.

Mr. J. CLAY, though in favor of the principle of the amendment, was of opinion that, as to some of its parts, it required alteration. He therefore moved:

“But if no person have such majority, then the House of Representatives shall immediately proceed to choose by ballot from the two persons having the greatest number of votes, one of them for President; or if there be three or more persons having an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall in like manner, from the persons having such equality of votes, choose the President; or if there be one person having a greater number of votes--not being a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed--than any other person, and two or more persons who have an equal number of votes one with the other, then the House of Representatives shall in like manner, from among such persons having the greater number of votes and such other persons having an equality of votes, choose the President.”

Mr. VAN CORTLANDT thought the amendment liable to objection.

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL was in favor of the principle contained in the amendment. He considered it to be the duty of this House, in introducing an amendment to the constitution on this point, to secure to the people the benefits of choosing the President, so as to prevent a contravention of their will as expressed by Electors chosen by them; resorting to legislative interposition only in extraordinary cases: and when this should be rendered necessary, so guarding the exercise of legislative power, that those only should be capable of legislative election who possessed a strong evidence of enjoying the confidence of the people. This was the true spirit and principle of the constitution, whose object was, through the several organs of the Government, faithfully to express the public opinion. For this reason he was in favor of the proposed amendment. By it we shall make a less innovation on the spirit of the constitution than by rejecting it, and adopting the report of the select committee. There were obvious reasons why the persons from whom a choice may be made should be fewer in case of a designation of the office than heretofore. At present the whole number of electoral votes is one hundred and seventy-six. As the constitution now stands, four candidates might have an equal number of votes, or three might have a majority, viz: one hundred and seventeen each. According to the proposed amendment, but one can have a majority, and if two persons should be equal and highest, it is not probable that the third candidate will have many votes.

Mr. GRISWOLD said it was very difficult to ascertain the precise import of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania by barely hearing it read from the Chair. In the meaning therefore which he gave it, he might perhaps be mistaken. If not mistaken, it involved a principle and implied a change, which he had never before heard suggested on that floor, or in the part of the country from which he came. It is well known to every member, that under the constitution as it at present stands, the votes given for a President in this House are by States, and not according to the majority of the members of the whole body. The amendment, as reported by the select committee, preserves this original feature of the constitution by prescribing that the election shall be proceeded with as pointed out by the constitution. But the present amendment varies this mode, according to which it is to be made without respect to States. Of course a majority of the members are to decide. He submitted it to gentlemen whether they were willing in this way to sacrifice the interests and rights of the smaller States. If this be the intention of gentlemen, we ought to have time to deliberate on the subject before it is pressed to a decision. The gentleman from Pennsylvania will explain whether this is his intention.

Mr. J. CLAY begged leave explicitly to state, for the satisfaction of the gentleman from Connecticut, that it was not his intention to change that part of the constitution which prescribed that the votes should be by States; and if it would induce the gentleman to vote for the resolution he had moved, he would add the words of the constitution, viz:

“But in choosing the President the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice.”

These words were accordingly added.

Mr. DAWSON observed that this proposition had been submitted to the select committee, who had considered it more objectionable than that reported. Their object was to innovate as little as possible on the constitution. A great part of it referred to cases so extremely remote as were not likely to happen. The only material change it made was to reduce the number of persons from whom a choice should be made from three to two. At present the election for a President and Vice President was made from the five highest on the list. As, according to the proposed amendment, a designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President was to be made, it was considered that by giving the three highest to the House of Representatives, from which to choose a President, and the two highest to the Senate, from which to choose a Vice President, the spirit of the constitution would not be changed. He hoped therefore the report of the committee would be agreed to. He believed it comprehended all cases which were probable; and he further believed that if they spent a month they would not devise an amendment that would provide for all possible cases that may happen.

Mr. CLOPTON said he rose to express his approbation of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLAY.) He said that indeed the amendment could not but be acceptable to him, inasmuch as it corresponded with the ideas he had the honor to express to the committee on this subject the other day. He begged leave now to make a few remarks in addition to those which he had then stated. He said, if any thing is to be lamented as a defect in the fundamental principles of our Government, that defect perhaps consists in a departure from the plain and simple modes of immediate election by the people as to some of the branches of the Government. He did not mean however now to discuss, nor did he know that he ever should discuss, this point. The Constitution of the United States having established a different principle in respect to the election of the several departments of the Government, except that branch of the Legislature which this House composes; and the object of the proposed amendment to the constitution not being the transmutation of a fundamental principle, but merely an alteration in the mode heretofore directed of electing one branch of the Government according to the principle already established, his business and his object was to state to this committee those ideas which occurred to him on this occasion as suited to the subject as it now stands before the committee.

Mr. C. said that most seriously considering the principles of the Government in such a point of view as he had the honor to state to the committee, he was irresistibly impressed with the opinion that a legislative election of President or Vice President, whenever resorted to, should be restrained to the smallest number above a unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes. He considered it as a position clearly and unquestionably true, that if the field of election, when not decided by the voice of the people themselves, should be left too wide, more chances will there always be for the introduction of abuses in determining on a choice, if those whose province it shall be to decide, should be actuated by a spirit adverse to the public sentiment. Results ungrateful to the public feeling might indeed become sources of discontent truly to be lamented. The demon of discord might be called forth, and stalking over our land, might unfortunately produce a state of things very different from that peaceful, tranquil state, which would follow a decision more conformable to the will of the people. Such a decision he believed would be ensured were the election to be confined to those two persons only who had received the most ample testimony of the public confidence, or to those who had been stamped with equal testimonials of that confidence.

Mr. SMILIE would wish one principle altered in the report of the select committee, viz: that which confined the election of the President to the three highest persons voted for. It was impossible for human wisdom to provide for all cases that might occur. Their time was not well spent in providing for cases extremely remote. He had but one object in view, the designation of office; and the more simple the proposition, the more likely they were to obtain this object. It should be recollected that the constitution was the act of the people, and ought not to be altered till inconveniences actually arise under it. He believed, though particular parts might be defective in theory, they ought not to be changed till practical inconveniences had been experienced. No such inconvenience had yet been felt from choosing the President from the five highest on the list. Is it, then, prudent to embarrass the great principle, in which they generally concurred, with incidental propositions, when there was no necessity for them? This amendment was to obtain the assent of thirteen legislative bodies before it would be binding. The simpler, then, the proposition, the more likely it was to succeed. His idea, therefore, was to leave the constitution as it now stood, so far as it related to a choice being made from the five highest, and only so far to change it as related to a designation of the office.

Mr. SANFORD said the great object of the amendment ought to be to prevent persons voted for as Vice President from becoming President. If the amendment effected this, it was sufficient. All other innovation upon the constitution was improper; and no danger could arise from extending the right of the House of Representatives to making a choice from the five highest.

Mr. RODNEY said that in the select committee he had been in favor of the number stated in the constitution. He was not for innovating on the constitution one tittle more than was absolutely necessary. As to the mere designation of office, the people looked for and expected it; and if that were obtained, they would be satisfied. He well knew that if amendments to this simple proposition were multiplied, objections to the whole would also be increased. Having been originally in favor of five, and thinking the inconveniences apprehended by some gentlemen not likely to occur, he should vote in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland, principally for the reason assigned by the gentleman from Connecticut, that it would allow to the smaller States a larger scope of choice.

Mr. ELLIOT hoped the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland would not prevail; and coming, as he did himself, from a small State, he trusted the House would pardon him for assigning his reasons for that hope. He felt as much confidence in the House of Representatives as the gentleman from Connecticut; but he was of opinion that their discretion ought to be limited. The amendment will give the House of Representatives the unqualified power of electing from the whole number on the list of persons voted for as President, and on that ground he opposed it. It was said to be a question of larger and smaller States, and those who represent the smaller States were called upon to check the usurpation of the larger States. Our system was undoubtedly federative, and there might be danger of a usurpation of the large States if the small ones were not protected by the constitution. His wish was that they might be so guarded.

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL said he, too, represented a small State, and was anxious to preserve the rights of the small States. But in a great constitutional question, while these rights were not lost sight of, principle ought also to be regarded. This he conceived to be his duty, whatever effect it might have upon the State he represented. For this reason he considered it proper to express his opinions on the present occasion. It was a vital principle to preserve the constitution as pure as possible. This rendered it necessary to show that the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLAY) came nearer to the principle of the constitution than that offered by the gentleman from Maryland. He had already observed that, there being at present no designation, four was the smallest possible number from which a choice could be made: to this number but one was added, making, altogether, five. In future elections there will be one hundred and seventy-six Electors, and if there be a designation of office, but one person can have a majority. To confine the choice to two persons will, therefore, in principle, approach as near as possible to the original principle of the constitution.

Mr. C. was in favor of preserving that part of the constitution which directed the election to be made by States, wishing as little innovation as possible on the principles of the constitution. He did not, however, conceive a mere change of words dangerous, but the establishment of a principle that deprived the people of the power of electing those who possessed the largest share of their confidence. He was decidedly in favor of whatever had this effect, as according with the true spirit of the constitution; and he was, therefore, opposed to the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland. His own opinion, too, was that it was best to express in one article whatever related to the election of President and Vice President, than refer to the constitution; by which the provisions on that subject would be rendered much clearer.

The question was then taken on Mr. NICHOLSON’s amendment, and lost--ayes, 29, noes 77.

Mr. RANDOLPH said he came to the House under the impression that another subject would have occupied their attention on account of its primary importance, not meaning, however, to disparage the importance of an amendment to the constitution. But on a subject which must be discussed in a few days, if at all, it was improper that time should be lost. The proposed amendment to the constitution was not, he believed, so extremely pressing as to require immediate attention. The subject to which Mr. R. had expected the attention of the House would have been first directed, was the Treaty with France. Hoping that the committee would have decided on the amendment at an early hour, he had refrained from any motion. But perceiving that a decision was not likely soon to be made, he would move that the committee should rise, for the purpose of taking up the treaty respecting Louisiana.

Mr. DAWSON opposed the rising of the committee.

The question was taken on Mr. RANDOLPH’s motion, and carried--yeas 60, nays 55. When the committee rose.

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