Part 249

By the constitution, the power of borrowing money is in express terms exclusively vested in Congress. Yet this has been only exercised by a delegation of it, from the commencement of the Government till the time has ceased when it was necessary to exercise it. I hope, sir, it may never be necessary to do it again; but if it should, I ask gentlemen how it will be effected but by the intervention of an agency, although the words of the constitution permit Congress only “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.”

Other powers of great importance, solely confided to Congress, have been delegated, and not as now contemplated, in a restricted and limited degree, but in terms of the broadest and most absolute discretion; many instances have occurred of this in constant succession ever since the revolution, in political opinion, which has taken place in the Legislature of the Union; for scarcely were the Republicans warm in their seats before they made a delegation of the power to the President, more unlimited in principle and more dangerous in practice than that now advocated, for suspending the operation of the embargo law. In 1802 he was authorized to organize a military corps. In February, 1803, he was authorized to cause to be built several vessels of war, if the exigencies of the service should require it. In 1804 the same powers were repeated, and many others, equally dangerous and equally necessary, were delegated both these years. In March, 1805, he was authorized to permit or interdict at pleasure foreign vessels from coming into our ports. Compare the discretion either in extent or importance vested by those laws, with that now contemplated, and on the ground of precedent we are more than justified; even in the present session we have delegated the power of suspending or continuing a law, now certainly in operation, by authorizing the President to build and equip, or not, at his discretion, a number of gunboats, or he may, under the influence of the like discretion, for ever desist from the execution of it.

If this body is supposed to act under the regular impulse of any political principles, it appears to me, sir, that the numerous precedents to be found in our statutory code ought to have an effect. In those which I have mentioned, and many others which have been enumerated by the gentleman from Tennessee, the President was vested with the right, ad libitum, to continue, suspend, or terminate the operation of a law. In the present one the discretion is limited to the contingencies of peace in Europe, a suspension of hostilities, or such conduct and assurances on the part of the belligerents who have invaded our commercial rights, as will enable our vessels to pass with our produce in safety to a foreign market.

Let us now examine, sir, the other constitutional objection made by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) that Congress have not the power to lay an embargo. If indeed this novel position be correct, the question is at an end, and the people of the United States would be justified in the resistance the argument invites. I had indeed understood the gentleman, as others near me did, to found his idea of the unconstitutionality of this embargo, on the circumstance of the laws imposing it being unlimited as to time. He defined an embargo to mean an inhibition for a limited time, and this unlimited nature of the present embargo was dwelt on by him with peculiar emphasis; but when a gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. JOHNSON,) who followed him, had ably exposed the fallacy of this distinction, and completely sent the argument home to its author, the distinction was abandoned by explanation. I understand the explanation of the gentleman; but as the object in pressing the unlimited quality of this embargo on the sensibility of the nation, cannot be mistaken, I have too, sir, for reasons alike obvious, thought it proper to mention it.

But, sir, as to the power to lay an embargo. The first motives for a union of the States, imply this as indispensable. It would be enough to show it to be a measure of general defence and protection, to give Congress a right to act on the subject; as such, sir, it expressly ranks among the provisions assigned as the great causes for the adoption of the Federal Constitution; for in the preamble to this instrument, the people say, they have adopted it in order “to provide for the common defence and general welfare.”

In the first paragraph of the eighth section of the first article, the same words are repeated; common defence and common protection to the external interest of the United States, are then the peculiar objects of its Government. An embargo under some circumstances is not only a proper but a necessary and indispensable means of common defence and protection; I might say that the present crisis is a strong illustration of such necessity. But if the right to lay an embargo is controverted, I would ask by what means is the Government in time of war, or expected war, under the authority of law to secure the property of its citizens, which it is the business of all Governments to do, towards all who claim under it the protection of their rights? Where is the power lodged, if not in the National Legislature, which shall prohibit your own, or even your enemies’ vessels from leaving your ports, after a declaration of war? Are the States vested with, or do they generally retain the right to lay an embargo? No, sir, they cannot so far enter into the collisions of interests which would follow among each other by preventing the vessels from sailing from the ports of any of them. The effect of doing so would be too obviously an invasion of the general powers of commercial regulation solely intrusted to Congress. Can any man of rational mind suppose, then, that the Government of this country is really so defective in what is not only to common sense an obvious reason, but one of the express objects of its institution?

But to lay an embargo is unconstitutional, because Congress cannot lay an export duty! And it is argued by the same gentleman that the lesser power being thus provided against, the exercise of the greater must of course be included in the prohibition; the minor forming an objection, the major is, a fortiori, inadmissible. How easily, sir, is this argument of inference retorted on the gentleman; for, according to a familiar and certainly plain course of reasoning, it would seem, that if the subjects are the same as is said, when the framers of our constitution made an exception of the lesser power, if they had intended also to except the greater, they would not have forgotten it.

The reasons which influenced the framers of that instrument to provide against the power of laying an export duty, were obvious; the provision was adopted in that spirit of mutual accommodation, which was so necessary to the harmony of the whole. It would be difficult, it was easily foreseen, to devise an export duty, which would not bear harder on some of the States than others; it was better therefore not to resort at all to a mode of taxation which would afford so fruitless a source of contention. The policy too of taxing exports was perhaps radically inadmissible; yet I cannot, for my life, discern how an export duty has been drawn into analogy with an embargo.

That the embargo was a curse, and continues to be a most calamitous one to us all, I have heard no one deny; but until now, I have not heard the assertion advanced that our Government, by its conduct, was the author of that curse. Yes, sir, many evils which the injustice of other nations has inflicted on the peace and honor of the United States are acknowledged to be curses of the most irritating and affecting nature; but the gentleman has said more for England and France, than either of them has before said for itself, when he attributes to his own Government the misconduct which has produced those evils. It was scarcely to be expected that any state of internal division or any views of whatever description would have produced on this floor an assertion which has thus put a new argument in the hands of our enemies in justification of their aggressions on us; it is more than our enemies have asserted. We have heard indeed from France and England that their decrees and orders, which make the present voluntary retirement from the seas necessary on our part, were the effect of an unjustifiable attack, which each has attributed in the first instance to the other. Each criminates the other, and not America, with being the author of the peculiar mode of warfare which has proved so destructive to the rights of neutrals. The very language of their orders and decrees assumes this position, and they are all prefaced with the declaration, that their orders are enacted in the spirit of retaliation on each other, and not, sir, for any offence which our Government has been the author of, as the gentleman now tells the American people; for what purpose let the nation judge.

I may surely be permitted to express my surprise and astonishment at this assertion, sir, as it has never before been insinuated, on this floor at least; and as it forms so strong a contrast with the declarations which have been before made by the same gentleman, permit me to recall the gentleman’s attention to his arguments in conclave, and to notice, if it will not be out of order, (which I presume it will not, as all which then took place has since been directed to be published,) the grounds of his opposition to the embargo at that time.

It is recollected by us all that the honor of presenting a resolution in conformity to the policy recommended by the President, in his Message of the 18th of December last, was an object of emulation between the gentleman from Virginia and one from Massachusetts, (Mr. CROWNINSHIELD,) whose absence from the House the nation has so much cause to deplore, and we all so sensibly feel. I thought it then, and still think it an honorable emulation, arising from a patriotic sense of duty. The gentleman from Virginia finally succeeded, and became the author of the resolution in this House for laying the embargo; scarcely had he, however, presented the resolution, the necessity of which he at the same time took occasion to observe he had long foreseen, and, for two years at least, before the period when it was recommended, (and, of course, sir, prior to the rejection of this noted London Treaty of December, 1806, now so much eulogized,) scarcely had he thus expressed his approbation of the embargo, till he again doubted its policy, and soon after denounced its justice, not yet, indeed, for any of the reasons we now hear, respecting the rejection of the treaty, but because it was a measure said, or insinuated, to be dictated by France; and that it was to have an injurious operation solely on England. It was in vain that the friends of the embargo urged the probable existence of the very grounds that measure now more strongly rests on; that the hostile determination of France to enforce her decree of November 21, 1806, would probably be followed by orders as harsh on the part of Great Britain; that this was the course of policy the adoption of which England had already announced, and its execution might, therefore, be fairly anticipated; that the King’s proclamation of the 16th of October, 1807, a copy of which accompanied the President’s Message, was an evidence of the determination of that Government to offer no satisfactory accommodation of our differences, and of its determined usurpation of our maritime rights; to these arguments nothing was replied, but the repetitions in lengthened speeches of the same charges. The opinions then avowed, sir, by the advocates of the embargo, have met with support from the events which have since been developed, while the unjustifiable grounds of opposition are abandoned, even by their authors. But, sir, if there is any gentleman, who, with his eyes open to the situation of the commerce of the world, will say that the embargo ought to be removed, and that the policy is unsound, let me ask him to tell us what, in the embarrassing state in which we are placed by the efforts of France and England to involve us in their conflicts, we are to do? The gentleman from Virginia has hinted at arming our merchantmen! War, then, is the substitute; it is, indeed, the only one, I agree. To arm our merchantmen, leads to war--nay, sir, it is war, according to the interpretation nations have a right to put on such an act of a Government; it will be opposed by open war and undisguised hostility. If we are to have war, let it be in the direct tone and unequivocal language of a nation indignant at the insults it has received, not in the indirect manner of arming a few trading vessels, the masters of whom would choose for the nation its enemy, or involve us with both the belligerents at once, as their particular animosities might dictate; if we are to go to war, it might be well to fight one at a time at least. But, sir, I cannot but hope if our strong, but pacific policy is adhered to, cursed as it is said to be, it may yet preserve us from the conflicts of Europe. It is a curse, indeed, sir, under which we are compelled to labor, but what is the alternative? I have thought much, sir, on the subject; it has been my duty as well as that of every other gentleman to weigh it well. We hear its effects are severely felt, and we hear, too, what are the exertions of our opponents to seize the favorite opportunity which it is so well calculated to produce, to excite the sensibility of the people through the medium of their immediate interests. But remove the embargo, and we must arm our vessels, and war is at once declared. I have heard no one deny that this must be the alternative. Compare the evils, both of great extent. I admit, by the embargo, we lose half the value of the products of our country, or the receipt of it is suspended; by war, to admit the effect in this particular, no worse, at least it could be no better; but have we counted the costs of the armies we are to raise, and to pay, of the supplies we are to furnish, of the loss of our blood, and the diminution of our strength, of the reduction of the profits of agriculture itself, by calling men from their domestic occupations, and lessening the number of hands for tillage--have we calculated the thousand other evils which follow in the train of war? To plunge into war, sir, to escape the curse of the embargo, would be truly fulfilling the adage of old--“out of the frying-pan into the fire.” I do not hesitate to say that, if we have patriotism enough to pursue our own interests, better would it be for this country to remain under the truly calamitous curse of the embargo for years, than at once to launch itself into war. But if we must at length, after all our efforts to prevent it, have war, let it be a war dependent on national sentiment, and arising from no doubtful necessity, which must be produced by the conflicts of our vessels at sea. We all know, and have felt that it has required the exertion of an unparalleled fortitude, to resist the emotions which have impelled us to acts of vengeance and redress for our injuries; let us not, then, seek for new causes, of doubtful necessity, to place us at once at war, as would be the case by arming our vessels. No, sir, let it be a cause which, in spite of our divisions, so earnestly of late fomented, must unite us in one spirit of opposition, in one sentiment of indignation against the enemy who shall attack us, with the spirit of unanimity with which a sense of injury will inspire us. I do not too highly estimate our strength, or, I trust, our patriotism, when I say, that no army which Europe combined could transport across the Atlantic, could long withstand the American arms. That we have had ample cause, of war, wanton, unprovoked cause, I had not, till now, supposed had been doubted; we are now, indeed, informed that our Government is to blame, and that the insults and injuries to which we have been subjected, are, in a great measure, attributable to its misconduct. What the object is, in making these assertions, let the nation judge; believing them groundless, I do not fear to be able to prove them so. The non-importation law has been mentioned as one of the subjects of just umbrage to England, and as having had an embarrassing effect on the state of our negotiations there. The gentleman has certainly but little attended to the documents which have lately been read in this House; if he had, he would there have found, under the sanction of authority which he is not presumed to doubt, that it was a measure one of our Ministers in London has given his most unequivocal approbation to.

It was said that our Ministers were suppliants at a foreign Court--our Government must place an efficient instrument in their hands; and a coercive system of policy is recommended, with a direct allusion to the enaction of the non-importation law before the rising of the Congress then in session.

We are told, too, that a principal cause of our embarrassments is the rejection of the treaty concluded by our Ministers in London on the 31st of December, 1806. This assertion has been made here, sir, with such earnestness that it requires examination. The treaty which has been rejected by our Government has been eulogized, and a month’s discussion of it has been challenged; not, it is true, wholly on its intrinsic worth, or positive merits, but because the circumstances, also, under which it was concluded, made its provisions proper, and its adoption necessary. The Treaty of 1794, commonly called Jay’s Treaty, I understood the gentleman also to say, would under the existing circumstances of December, 1806, have been proper for our adoption. This was, indeed, sir, a necessary preface to his defence of the rejected treaty, for it is certainly susceptible of easy demonstration, that it is, in its features and provisions, far more objectionable and defective than the Treaty of 1794; and, whether we take it on the ground of peculiarity in the circumstances of the contracting parties, or on its intrinsic merits, it has less claim to our assent.

In the first place, let us examine the circumstances under which those two treaties were made, and then compare their respective provisions. From the retrospect I am at this time able to take of our situations at those different periods, I cannot hesitate to believe that the circumstances under which the Treaty of 1794 was made, were more unfavorable for negotiation on the part of the United States at that time, both as they respected England and America, than they were in December, 1806. As they respected England, her situation was at the former period infinitely more commanding. By her combinations with the great powers of Europe, as early as 1792, or perhaps antecedent to that year, she was perfectly secure against any annoyance from France, her only enemy in 1794. The Treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz, to which, it is believed, England early in 1792 acceded, and which certainly laid the groundwork of the conventions and coalitions of the spring of 1793, had produced the effect of uniting in concert with her against France, the powers of Russia, Germany, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and many of the minor States of Europe. England, then, felt no apprehensions for her own safety, none for the abridgment of her commerce, and seemed to be but little sensible to her interests in cultivating a good understanding with America: her single enemy was confined to his own territories, and threatened even with famine. The United States, in 1794, had not long commenced their existence as a nation, and their new Government might be said to be scarcely more than in a state of experiment. The debts which had been created by the Revolutionary war, we had undertaken the honorable discharge of, and we were then laboring under the immense load; our resources were comparatively small, our embarrassments great, our burdens by no means in a course of alleviation, and our situation totally defenceless; the savages who bordered on our frontiers were numerous, strong, and fierce, and our armies had but recently suffered a dreadful carnage and terrible defeat; we were destitute of manufactories which could supply us with arms, or the means of filling our arsenals; a civilized nation of Europe, then great and powerful, bordered her colonies on our Southern frontier, and disputed with us the navigation of our rivers. Sir, if circumstances could ever sanction a dereliction of right, and a compromitment of interest, those circumstances, then, might be said to exist. Then, indeed, there might have been a semblance of apology, in our infant and crippled state, for leaning, in some measure, on the strength of a nation which was supposed to stand firm. I confess, sir, I would rather, even at that time, have had no treaty, than such a one as was then made; it has set a bad example. But what was our situation in December, 1806--adverting again to circumstances, which are made the test in this case, when the treaty, since rejected, was signed in London? Our strength and population increased to a most envious and flattering degree; our foreign debts discharged, and our domestic one, which we had honorably assumed the payment of, reduced--our credit established abroad, our Treasury overflowing, and our resources flourishing; manufactories of arms were every where reared, and had furnished the nation with the best means of defence; the savages on our frontiers were subdued, or civilized; our Southern frontier was extended and had grown strong: England, instead of her prosperity and powerful combinations of 1793, was left almost single-handed; the subordinate powers of Europe had become a part of France, the great nations were either under her control, or struggling in their last efforts of disastrous conflict: France, instead of being confined to the defence of her own dominion, was carrying on offensive war, and England had been made to tremble for her own existence. What then are the circumstances alleged, to palliate the evils of such a treaty as was offered us? Was England about to be suddenly relieved in an instant from her embarrassments and burdens? How? We are told, indeed, that France had pushed her conquests too far, that her Emperor had so far stretched his arm of conquest, as to leave himself exposed to the most imminent danger at home; was it therefore that England elevated her hopes, and carried her demands? Stuff, sir, fit only for the cook-shops and coffee-houses of London; I should never have expected it to find its way into the semi-official letter which has been read to us, from a character who has deservedly stood high in the rank of politicians. But our own internal situation, threatened with conspiracy, the extent and magnitude of which was unknown, was another reason it has been suggested for hastening the execution of this treaty. How, in December, 1806, accounts so alarming could have reached England of the extent of Burr’s conspiracy, I cannot but be at a loss to conjecture. The alarm at that time here, was not I believe very serious; not such, at least, as would have been a reason with any man in this country to have thrown ourselves into the lap of a foreign nation, or to have made a treaty which compromitted our rights, and left our interests unprovided for. I must say I think too much alarm was felt on this subject, and that it would at least have been as honorable a sentiment towards the people and Government of America, to have entertained an entire confidence in them, that without any great or dangerous effort they were capable of quelling the conspiracies which might be engendered against their peace. I assert that independent of circumstances which I have endeavored to show were more unfavorable as they regarded the United States, and far more favorable as they regarded England in 1794, than in December, 1806, the treaty of the latter date is worse than that of the former. The former did provide redress in some sort for previous injuries. That of the latter date contains no provisions for any kind of redress or compensation, which was due to us, for the very many spoliations which had been committed on our commerce--it offers no alleviation to the evils of the former--is silent as to the injuries and insults which we had sustained in our waters; totally, sir, although these were subjects of special instruction from our Government, and although we were told by our embassy that a treaty was concluded on the different points of commercial interest. Was it forgotten, sir, to what an immense amount America had suffered under the different orders of the King in council, even from the very date of the former agreement for reparation? Were not our losses under the orders particularly of 1798, which gave rise to so much of the havoc our neutral commerce had groaned under, and which placed the nations of Europe in a better situation than the United States in the conveyance of colonial produce, known to our Ministers? It must have been recollected, for it was enforced in their instructions, how our vessels had been incessantly sent into the ports of Britain and her colonies for adjudication, and the unjust condemnations which had taken place, under the construction of those orders. It must have been recollected how far in the first instance the orders themselves had gone towards the subversion of the laws of nations. The time was, indeed, when a great jurist, Lord Mansfield, had declared, that neither the orders of the King in council nor even an act of Parliament which contravened the law of nations was binding on any one; this was said in the case of the Silesia loan, but those days were past. Sir William Scott has since told us, that the text of the instructions are his guide, and King George the Third is thus, by his single voice, to make and expound the law, which is adjudged to be paramount in modern times to the laws of nations. The adjudications, it is a well-known fact, have been in conformity to the Royal will, stimulated alone by the shipping interests of England; principles of adjudication have been established in the British Courts of Admiralty, which had on the most unjust pretensions wrested from our citizens many millions of their property. Why by this treaty give up our claims to reparation, as they were most emphatically, by signing a treaty which yielded no redress for them while the claims were still unsatisfied; by making a compact which wholly pretermitted them? It is said, sir, that the disputes respecting the colonial trade are adjusted by this treaty. How--by agreeing to a duty on exports? Where was our constitution, now so strongly pressed in discussion, when this stipulation was made; when it was solemnly covenanted, that we should directly invade one of its provisions by laying an export duty? And that, in addition to the deduction on drawbacks allowed by law, an export duty of one, two, or three per cent. should be imposed on colonial articles? Why make the extraordinary and vain stipulation too, contained in the fifth article, that we should have a right to lay the same export duty which England should have a right to impose, if we could lay none by our constitution?

The subject of blockades also, sir, was one on which some stipulation was made absolutely necessary, by the novel doctrines lately asserted, and insisted on by the nations of Europe; it was important that their extent should in some way have been defined, their nature described, when a blockade should be said to exist, and that it should not be a question left entirely to the discretion or interest of a belligerent, or the caprice of her officers. This single question had already led us at different times to the very brink of war with England. In June, 1793, she asserted all France to be in a state of blockade, and ordered our vessels to be captured which should attempt to enter any of her ports with our produce. France had in May of the same year issued an inhibitory order against our trade, of a nature but little less hostile, in consequence, as it was said, of the Russian convention made in London, I think in March of the same year. In the fall of 1793, the British had issued secret orders on the same principle of blockade, which entrapped our West India commerce, to an immense amount, before they were known by us to be in existence; this it was said was a principal reason for the proposition contained in a bill for prohibiting all intercourse with England, which had in the early part of 1794 received the sanction of the House of Representatives, and was rejected in the Senate but by the majority of one vote, and which was succeeded by Mr. Jay’s mission. To the same class, too, may be assigned the British orders of May 1795, against our vessels laden with provisions, which brought President WASHINGTON to a stand on the British Treaty, and caused him, it is said, to demand a previous explanation, which was at that time I presume, satisfactorily made, but which has been since in innumerable instances violated, and the same vague and undefined principles of blockade enforced; at one time by declaring a blockade to exist from Brest to the river Elbe, at others by proclamations of blockade equally extravagant, and more than once by the declaration of the British naval commanders, that a whole kingdom should be cut off, at a stroke of the pen, from all the trade of neutral nations. But, sir, if the general and extensive evils which the new doctrine of blockades had superinduced, were not of sufficient importance to claim a stipulation against their exercise in future, there was one species of injury which seemed really to merit, and to claim indispensably, some notice either by redress or stipulation against its future practice. I know not how to class it; it may be assimilated to a modern blockade, inasmuch as it assumes a jurisdiction wholly ideal; I mean that which was a particular subject of complaint, from the assumption made of a right by a British naval officer in the port of New York, in claiming jurisdiction and the exercise of the right of impressment, and of course every one less inimical to natural right, within the distance of the buoys from his ship. To this assertion of authority I see no disclaimer in this applauded treaty, or any hint at redress for the injury inflicted by the particular occasion on which it was exercised. If this new claim of naval sovereignty is insisted on, or thus tacitly permitted, it is time it should be so understood; for with the same propriety with which the British commander in New York claimed jurisdiction within his buoys, another might claim British jurisdiction from Boston to Charleston, if he could so far stretch a cable.

I come now, sir, to say something on the question of impressment, wholly omitted in the treaty, and which the gentleman from Virginia has said was informally and satisfactorily arranged by the note of the British Commissioners on that subject. He has said that their note contained a stipulation, “that they would order their naval commanders to abstain from the practice of impressments on board American vessels.” I confess I was astonished at the declaration. It is true the printed document has not been furnished till just now. I presume the note of the 8th of November, 1806, to have been alluded to, because something like the same defence on this subject has been used by one of the American Commissioners in his late letter to the Secretary of State, (although, indeed, until I heard that defence read, I had not understood that any improper dereliction of the American interests had been imputed to our Ministers; I had always understood, and, except in the letter alluded to, and the arguments of the gentleman, I have yet understood from every source of information open to me, that it was not expected by our Ministers that the treaty could be ratified by the American Government, but that it was the best they could obtain;) I could not think the quotation of the gentleman correct as to the language of that note. I mentioned then, sir, to those who sat near me, that I had understood it to convey no promise to abstain from the practice of impressment, but a vague and unsatisfactory declaration that the British naval commanders should be instructed to use caution in the impressments they made; as it was said they had been always before instructed; by that means, sir, placing ourselves, if we choose to recognize this informal stipulation, in a worse situation than before, inasmuch as it was an unequivocal acknowledgment of the right of impressment, when exercised under the caution of a British officer. And what, sir, is the language of this same note of November 8th--we have it now before us: “His Majesty’s Ministers give to Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney the most positive assurances, that instructions have been given and shall be repeated and enforced for the observance of the greatest caution in the impressing of British seamen, and that the strictest care shall be taken to preserve the citizens of the United States from any molestation or injury; and that immediate and prompt redress shall be afforded upon any representation of injury sustained by them.” How, sir, let me ask, have those officers conducted themselves under these repeated instructions? To say nothing of the continued violations committed on our merchant vessels, we have indeed had a most notable example of the extreme caution which her naval officers had no doubt been instructed, and were determined to observe, in the mode of impressments, in that excessively cautious plan adopted by Admiral Berkeley, to effect his honorable and loyal purposes, in the memorable attack upon the Chesapeake. Then, sir, I must admit, that in pursuance of what I now believe were his orders, the most cool and deliberate caution was used. Our frigate, on an outward voyage, on the very day she left her port, in the usual unprepared state in which I am told vessels of war sail in time of peace, is with the utmost caution pursued by the British ship of superior force, in sight of several others. The American frigate is overtaken; her men, proved to be American citizens, are demanded of her, as of right being the subjects of the King. They are refused, and indeed, sir, I must acknowledge, with peculiar caution, before it was possible for our frigate to prepare for action and the defence of the honor of her flag, the British commander fires three broadsides into her, and commits the murder of fifteen or twenty other American citizens, and no doubt most cautiously compels the United States frigate to strike her colors, goes on board, and takes off three of the native citizens of our country, none of whom have to this day been returned!

But, sir, if this treaty, with its appendages, had contained in it provisions and stipulations which were responsive to our injuries, and which comported with our rights, is there a man in this nation, who consults the dignity and honor of his country, who could have wished its assent to it, subject to the condition dictated by the King of England, and transmitted by a note of the British commissioners annexed to it? The gentleman from Virginia has spoken of the insult conveyed by the letter of Champagny of the 15th of January, 1808, to our Minister in Paris; its terms have been grammatically scanned. Sir, there was no need for this; we are at no loss for subjects of humiliation and insult, whether we look to France or to England. As early as 1793, attempts of the most unjustifiable nature were made to involve us in war by both these powers. Lord Grenville, so early as that time, expressly told our Minister, without disguise, that the British orders of November in that year were intended to have an internal effect upon the affairs of this country. Such has ever since been the conduct of the belligerents, constantly and undeviatingly pursued in the most disrespectful manner, towards us; such was certainly the object of the British Cabinet, in annexing the note of the 31st of December, 1806, to the treaty of that date; and certainly, sir, if a direct attempt to force us into war, is considered an insult to our independence, and an encroachment upon our rights of self-government, such was the language of that note, which, in open and unreserved terms, made it an indispensable condition to the ratification of the treaty, “that the Government of the United States, by its conduct or assurances, will have given security to his Majesty, that it will not submit to such innovations in the established system of maritime law,” as the French decree therein alluded to contained--his Majesty thus most graciously taking upon himself the right of determining for us what course of conduct we should pursue towards his enemy! I do not say, sir, that the letter of Champagny, which has been repeatedly mentioned with such asperity by the gentleman, is such a one as consists with the respect due to us; by some gentlemen its language has been construed to mean a proposition originating in a disposition of friendship, and to convey nothing more than an offer, founded on a supposition of the actual existence of war between Great Britain and the United States, and in that event, to take care of such of our property as should be exposed to capture, until there should be an opportunity of restoration; but to me, sir, I confess the language is not satisfactory. We have a right to expect from all nations something more, or something less than equivocal language. Our Government speaks in terms of friendship, and in the plain language which neither conveys a doubt as to its hostility or friendship; we have a right to expect the same frankness in others. But why, sir, should gentlemen who profess to feel, and I hope do feel only as Americans, suffer their sensibilities to transport them to battle with the Gallic Cock, while under heavier insults they seem disposed to succumb to the British Lion? Why is the letter of the British Minister of the 23d of February wholly forgotten, when we are undergoing the humiliating revival of insults and threats? Is it less awakening to our national sensibility, and to the alarms of honor or interest, to be told, as we are by that letter, that his Majesty the King of England is disappointed in his just expectation that we should have gone to war with France, than to be told through our Minister at the Court of France that the Emperor of that nation expected we were at war with England? If insult was intended by either, it seems to have been measured by the same equal standard with which they have by their hostile orders measured their injuries to our commerce; perfectly in the spirit of retaliation, sir.

My astonishment, sir, has indeed been excited more than on any former occasion, when I have heard a gentleman condemn our Government for the rejection of a treaty, which provided no redress for former injuries, no security against future ones, and which, by the conditions annexed to it, would have infallibly, by stipulating resistance against a belligerent, directly have involved us in war; and that not a war of self-defence, but a war of alliance with one of the powers, for the purpose of resistance and offence against the other. War, sir, I hope will be avoided, notwithstanding the bold attempts to involve us in it, and which have been so steadily pursued by the contending nations. It will I hope be avoided, unless our self-defence shall render it indispensably necessary. Attack or invasion from France cannot be rationally contemplated. War with England, we must all agree, rests on more uncertain grounds; if any thing will prevent it, I believe it to be the course pursued by our Government. The resolution under discussion explicitly avows the terms on which we will consent again to renew our intercourse with Europe. If Great Britain is induced to relax, France must and will pursue the same policy. I think, sir, we have a right to believe, from the best information from England, that this relaxation will take place. I am aware of that disposition in the ruling party in England to go to war with us. I have no right to doubt the truth of the declaration of Mr. Monroe, that there is a party in that country strong and active indeed, as he has described it to be, who are disposed to hostility with us, and who are at all hazards determined to support the maritime supremacy of Great Britain; they are described to be the navy interest, the East India chartered companies, the West India traders, and the shipping interest--strong and active indeed, sir; they sit at the elbow of Majesty, and influence his ready will; but their temptations to war are removed by the embargo, and I hope will continue to be so, until they rescind those orders which have cut us off from the commerce of the world.

But the power contemplated by the resolution, of meeting any friendly disposition on the part of the European powers, is to be withheld, because it would add too much to the already overgrown popularity of the President, who, like Julius Cæsar, has been offered the honor of a Crown! It is true, sir, the demonstrations of confidence in the present Chief Magistrate are general and sincere in many parts of the Union. At the time the only address of this kind was proposed, which I have ever understood originated in Virginia, I had the honor of a seat in her Legislature. It was introduced and supported by the description of politicians there denominated the Republican minority; in what spirit of sincerity I leave others to judge at this day. But, thank God, it was not permitted to progress; and thus the person to whom it was intended to be presented was saved the suffusion of a blush, which the evidence of such adulation from his own State would for its sake have infallibly produced.

On this occasion an attempt is made to alarm us, by the assertion that the administration of the Government is assimilating itself to that of a monarchy; and it is said that the power of the President is more dangerous than that of a British King. Has the gentleman weighed the extent of this assertion, or contemplated the powers of a British King? In power, unrestrained as he is by their constitution, (if constitution that can be called, which consists of unsettled and undefined practices, most of them originating, no one knows where, and founded on principles which cannot be traced to any rational ground--a constitution which, notwithstanding their declarations of rights, is perfectly incapable of restraint upon the Executive arm; which subjects the Parliament to the King; which makes it completely his Parliament, and deludes the people with the show of liberty, while they are governed by the single voice of a monarch--yes, sir, it is his Parliament,) has he committed any great act of outrage on the nations of the earth? He feels the pulse of his Parliament before he permits them to convene. His Parliament, I may again emphatically call it; for it is he who orders it into existence, and he who suspends its functions or dissolves it at will. If its pulse does not beat responsively to his wishes, he either dissolves it or postpones its meeting from time to time, as has been the policy with the present Parliament, which, if it had met at the time first appointed, scarcely less than a revolution might have been apprehended, from the general ferment the execrable conduct of England towards Denmark had excited, and the head of our old master might have atoned for that unprecedented act of criminality; for, as such, it had been contemplated with abhorrence by a magnanimous people--a people who felt for the character of Englishmen in the commission of it. There are men there, sir, I acknowledge, who do honor to human nature. When we read the speeches of Erskine, and other great men in the present opposition, we may yet hope that there may be found enough of integrity in the nation to redeem its character from the stains of murder and robbery, which the conduct of its monarch has marked it with. Yet this is the King to whose power that of a President of the United States is said to be assimilating itself. By what instance, let me ask, does it appear that we are verging to the practice of a corrupt monarchy? Is it in the proposition involved in this resolution? No, certainly; for I have before proved that the same powers, and much more extensive and unqualified, have been delegated at every period of our Government, from its commencement to the present session. Is it from any other general assumption of power? No; for it is acknowledged by all that the present Administration has acted in perfect consonance with the powers of the constitution, and I will add, (what its enemies have before allowed,) with the most strict and unceasing regard to the interests and happiness of the people.

Why are we warned, sir, on this floor, against authorizing the President to do an act which may enhance his popularity so much as the removal of the embargo, and that it is another mode of adding to that influence already so overbearing? If, indeed, the embargo operates most distressingly, (as we all know it does, on every part of the community,) it is he who in the first instance, from the strong sense of duty, assumed on himself the responsibility (the odium, the gentleman would call it) of the measure. It is but fair, then, however ludicrous the charge in itself, that he should be left to regain the popular favor he is supposed to have lost. It will only leave him where he was.

But, sir, seriously, let me ask gentlemen to tell the nation, before we separate, what they will do. Is there any one so desperate, inconsiderate, or so wild in his opinion, as to say the embargo ought at the present time to be removed, while the hostile Orders of France and England are both enforced with the utmost rigor against us, and when they have multiplied, and been extended in their effects since the expediency of the embargo was fully decided on? What is the obvious alternative? Either authorize its removal, when our safety will permit, or continue in session to wait that event. But why, sir, sit here, at the daily expense of many hundred dollars to the community, when we shall have transacted the business of the nation, merely because some gentlemen are now doubtful of the right or the policy of delegating to the President a power which has, in much stronger and more general terms, been before intrusted to him, and all who have preceded him? But, if any thing better than this can be devised, let it be submitted. For my own part, I promise to give it the attention its importance may merit. But, at the least, let us unite in the adoption of some measures for the safety and interest of our country, at this time so imminently jeopardized by the powers of Europe.

Mr. MASTERS.--Mr. Chairman, I shall not undertake to say that the rejected treaty is so advantageous as we had a right to expect. I do not hesitate to declare that, or even Jay’s Treaty, is preferable to the present state of our affairs. If we take into our view all the relative circumstances of the British nation with France, Russia, and the other belligerent powers, and pay proper attention to the unprotected and defenceless situation of our country and our commerce, in forming our ideas of what we ought to expect from that nation whose navy commands the seas, can we then expect she will sacrifice that navy, or any part of her power, by conceding the point of search for her seamen on board of neutral vessels? It is inconsistent with their interest, and it is inconsistent with their superiority. This right of search for her own subjects, Mr. M. considered as the main block in the way of negotiation, which sound policy and interest require we should clear away. The British and American Commissioners had informally put this point on as good footing as he expected. Although the resolution under consideration is not properly limited and defined, he should not vote against it. His wish was to raise the embargo and arm our vessels. The nation could not bear the pressure. The embargo virtually inhibits all intercourse with foreign nations; the effects are and will be pernicious to the agricultural productions of this country, and produce will fall to the lowest ebb, and enforce the most unparalleled distress on the community. Commerce ought always to be left to the merchant, unshackled and unembarrassed, as much as possible. Our commercial intercourse is the principal resource, both of revenue and commercial opulence. The embargo will tear up by the roots and annihilate the commerce of this country. And the effects will be heavy taxes, an exhausted Treasury, a diminished and ruined revenue. It weakens your own power, fetters your operations, and deludes your citizens; it devours not only the fruits but the seeds of industry. It will sink down and depress the nation to an absence of hope and a want of resources; it will be felt by the nation as a calamity, without deciding the general question of dispute. Prove to me the embargo is consistent with common sense, and will be the means of adjusting our differences with the belligerent powers, and I will then be an advocate for it. Though we have the constitutional right to lay an embargo, it is a matter which requires great consideration, whether the measure will have the effect to which it was seemingly intended. It may be good in theory; he esteemed it chimerical in practice, a mere speculative proposition. Wisdom is to be gained in politics, not by one rigid principle, but by looking attentively at causes and the effects they have or will produce; not by adopting that false philosophy, which seeks perfection out of that which, in its nature, is imperfect; which refers every thing to theory, and nothing to practice; which substitutes visionary schemes for solid tests of experiment, and bewilders the human mind in a chaos of opinions. Search all the histories of the world, and you will not find eleven hundred thousand tons of shipping, of one of the greatest commercial nations, embargoed for an unlimited time.

Mr. Chairman, the season of our severe trial is not at an end, nor are we yet relieved from the dejection and gloom which hangs over our heads; doubts and uncertainty mingle with the hopes and expectations of the people. If you bring our commerce into the situation of the Chinese, you will end in the wild state of nature, that mocks the name of liberty, and the human character will be degraded, instead of being free.

If you entertain a sense of the many blessings which you have enjoyed; if you value a continuance of that commerce which is the source of so much opulence; if you wish to preserve that high state of prosperity by which the country has, for some years past, been so eminently blessed, you lose all these advantages by continuing the embargo and neglecting to arm your vessels. Restore, then, confidence and vigor to commerce. You are at war with your own interest and every idea of policy; instead of protecting commerce you destroy it.

In whatever view the embargo presents itself, it appears to me to be fraught with impolicy; it was laid at midnight; that miserable scene was closed under the darkness which suits with it, and under the secret shelter of our own walls. If we are to go to war, you have, instead of warlike preparations and exerting every sinew of national ability, laid an embargo, and obtained just nothing.

The policy of France, as regards Great Britain, is to make a warlike non-intercourse, and we have, by a side-wind, fallen into the measure, adopted and sanctified it; we have abandoned the great highway of nations: our dispute with Great Britain is about commercial rights; we have given them up.

Is this country at that crisis when we shall surrender all those rights her citizens hold most dear? God forbid! I have contemplated upon the embargo, which is hazardous and impolitic, with great pain and anxiety, and I turn my face from it with horror. If there are any who improperly foster and countenance the threatening storm, whatever consequences may follow, they are answerable to their country and their God.