Part 238

Mr. S. in conclusion declared that he should not vote for this resolution; for, in any way, a procedure by this House on the subject would be incorrect.

Mr. RHEA, of Tennessee, called for the reading of the letter of ---- Duncan, contained in the evidence laid before the House this session relative to the late trial at Richmond; it might be satisfactory in explaining the differences between the version of the ciphered letter by the grand jury and the translation made by General Wilkinson.

Mr. LOVE said, that although the form of the question had been varied, by the resolution of the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. ROWAN,) yet the principles of decision remained nearly the same as on the original resolution; the same objections applied, as to the subject embraced by the present form, and, so long as it thus remained, those objections would continue to influence his determination.

These grounds of difficulty had been attempted to be removed by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) by arguing, that the investigation of the subject might lead to measures which no one would doubt it was competent to the House to act on. By pursuing the inquiry, it was said, it might be found that it would be expedient to disband the army, or withhold its necessary supplies: this, said Mr. L., is begging the question. The terms of the resolution, in their present shape, cannot possibly conduct a committee to any such inquiry: it is confined to a single object; it is, whether the present commander of the army has been guilty of corruptly receiving money from Spain. The charge alluded to is understood to be of an ancient date; it is not suggested by any one that the army is tainted with this crime, specially set forth in the resolution: the charge, if proven, could not then be a cause for disbanding the army, or withholding the necessary supplies. If an object of this kind is contemplated let it be so stated, and an inquiry into the grounds of such proposition, however strange in idea, would only be the exercise of a constitutional right.

The resolution, Mr. L. repeated, called the attention of the House to a single fact, it exhibited a charge already made penal, both by the military and civil code; it respects a character over whom we have no constitutional control, by impeachment or otherwise. If an improper character is commissioned to the command of our armies, and continues so, let the responsibility fall where the constitution has placed it, on the Executive; the attention of the Legislature must be called to other things than judging of the merits or crimes of the soldiery. But it is objected that the military tribunal appointed to make an inquiry on the demand of the person accused, and which the House understood was now engaged in the performance of that duty, has no power to compel the attendance of witnesses, or the production of papers. He would not for a moment so far impeach the patriotism of those gentlemen, who have declared themselves possessed of knowledge on the subject of the charge, as to suppose they would not attend the respectful summons of a tribunal erected by our own laws, for the investigation of crimes which they admit are of importance to their country. Those gentlemen surely too well understand the rights of others to object to a cross-examination; but if a military court is not possessed of a power sufficient to compel, if it should be necessary, the attendance of witnesses, the common judicial tribunals are so; the civil, as well as the martial code, has cognizance of such offences as are suggested; the same effect, as it respects a military officer, would follow the establishment of guilt before either tribunal. If gentlemen object to a military court, which the law has instituted, let them resort to a civil one; it is there they may without apprehension or difficulty make those disclosures which the good of their country requires; it is not here that a power is found, either to prosecute or punish the offences of military men. He hoped the time of this Legislature would be better employed than in the usurpation of the powers of the Judiciary or Executive, in the investigation of criminal charges against military men, whom they could neither hear the defence of, nor punish their crime, if proved.

Mr. L. said, that as to the truth and weight of the charges made against the military character in question, he felt no disposition to decide; to determine a man guilty of crimes of great enormity, without a hearing, without examination or testimony, and without a possibility of defence, was so hostile to every principle of justice, and common humanity even, that he had not permitted his mind to enter into any investigation of fact, or his feelings to enlist in the prosecution; much detail of circumstance had been used, which ought to put the House extremely on its guard against the influence of feeling in deciding the present question. A gentleman had the other day said, that he felt no delicacy towards a man, whom he had on his oath been obliged to say was guilty of misprision of treason; it was thus intimated that the grand jury of Virginia district, who investigated the subject of Burr’s conspiracy, had agitated the question of General Wilkinson’s criminality; (setting aside the observation which might well be made that Burr’s conspiracy was no part of the present inquiry) it appeared to Mr. L., that the question having been agitated, and no presentment being made of the officer now charged, a considerable portion of the grand jury must have said in like manner, on their oaths, that that officer was not guilty of misprision of treason; but to-day the same gentleman has informed us, that the reason why no presentment was preferred against Wilkinson was, that he escaped by a legal exception in his favor; that although the immorality of his act was complete, (as well as he could understand the gentleman at the distance he was from him,) the offence could not be located, or some other legal defect. Mr. L. said he confessed he was not well informed of the proceedings of the grand jury, he had heard some noise which he had scarcely listened to about them: he had never before heard, that the principal officers of the army were leagued in Burr’s conspiracy: he would say, however, that the grand jury assembled on that occasion, was as able and respectable a one as ever sat on any former occasion of the kind, and he confessed he was surprised to hear they had omitted to exercise a general power, which, when it appeared to them the officers of our army were actually conspirators against the Government, as we are now informed, it became imperiously their duty to exercise, by making a presentment of the dangers of the country: any general evil a grand jury may present, if they believe it to exist only in intention. The acts of a legislative body, and some he believed of Congress itself, had been presented by grand juries as of evil tendency; and one instance at least has occurred of a grand jury having presented the very court which presided over it. Certainly such an evil as a general conspiracy of the officers of our army required some public exhibition of the offence; even if it was such in them as well as the commander, as not to be brought, in the opinion of the jury, within the form of an efficient prosecution. Mr. L. said, he was sorry that he too had been led into the notice of facts by the surprising things he had heard. He hoped unnecessary delay would be avoided. The time occupied in the discussion of this dispute had already, he would presume, prevented some of the committees from reporting on subjects of the first consideration. The present eventful and threatening aspect of foreign affairs demanded attention; he particularly apprehended it might have prevented the report of the bill for arming the militia, as well as other subjects of national interest, from being taken up. Let us then, said Mr. L., meet this question, decide upon it, and send to the proper departments the information which will enable them to act in the manner we are told they have attempted, under the laws in existence. The question which they solely ought now to consider was their right to act. He believed there was no man in that House who did not, after what had been said, wish a thorough investigation, but certainly the mode to be pursued was obvious and easy. He conceived it would be entirely sufficient if the papers and information were transmitted to the proper department, and should, if the resolution was negatived, beg leave, if he could get the floor, to offer a resolution, with a preamble, detailing the reasons which governed him in his vote, by which it might appear, that although he felt as much anxiety as any man that the proper tribunals should act on the subject, yet his objection to the present mode proposed, arose from a source above mere matters of expediency or temporary feeling.

Mr. L. then said, as it was not in order in the then stage of the debate, to propose his resolution, he would read it, in order that the House might be apprised of his views. He then concluded by reading the following resolution:

Resolved, therefore, That the papers and information laid on the Clerk’s table of this House, relative to General James Wilkinson, be referred to the Secretary of the War Department of the United States.

Mr. LYON said, notwithstanding the impression made upon his mind by the statement read this day, he should vote in the same way as he should have done before he heard it, if the power of the House to make an inquiry were not called in question. He would as soon cut off his right hand as to say that this House had not the power to call in question the conduct of the Commander-in-chief. Was this House prepared to say that they had not the power to inquire whether or not the Commander-in-chief has sufficiently the confidence of the people and of the Army? He would not commit himself in this way; and, after what had been urged as reasons for voting against the resolution, he could not promise how he should vote. The question was altogether varied by the motion now under consideration; the former and original question was, whether they would request the President to perform certain duties; it was now moved that they should perform these duties themselves; and he should certainly vote in favor of it, if it were contended that this House had not the power to pass it.

As to the creed of the gentleman behind him, (Mr. LOVE,) he could not subscribe to it; it was too long for his comprehension; but if it were intelligible, he would tell the gentleman behind him that he could not agree with him.

He should be satisfied to see what the court of inquiry would do in this business; and if they did not do what would satisfy the nation, he should be perfectly willing to proceed in the inquiry. He thought that then, feeling as his colleague (Mr. ROWAN) must feel, it would come properly before the House. Mr. L. had long had a suspicion of this man, and his mind was much at variance on the subject. None of his feelings would induce him to surrender the right of the House to inquire, and if this were made a general ground of opposition to the motion, he should assuredly vote for it.

Mr. TAYLOR confessed that the importance of the subject was sufficient to claim his ardent attention, and from the consideration he had given it, he was opposed to the resolution, and felt it a duty not to give a silent vote on a measure, which by the terms of the resolution offered was not to inquire on a general subject, (which even on this subject unconnected with any individual, but as he might be incidentally concerned, might be excusable,) but to inquire about the conduct of a single individual; or in short and plain terms to denounce the man; a man, too, holding an office out of the immediate control of this House, amenable to other tribunals, and liable, if guilty of all that has been asserted against him, to the sentence of death, both by our civil and military courts.

This measure of denouncing an individual whom this House cannot impeach, said Mr. T., is then a new case, and one which, if adopted, will establish a precedent dangerous to this Government, dangerous to the life and liberty, the honor and reputation of the citizen, and calculated in its effects to put at hazard every institution and sacred provision in the constitution under which we profess to act.

We shall in the first place interfere with the Executive Department--with which department the constitution has expressly intrusted the care, the responsibility of watching over the army; and in respect to the inquiry proposed to be made by a committee of this House, when we have made it, we can pass no sentence, we can ground no impeachment against the denounced; we should then have to come back and acknowledge our imbecility, by asking, or requesting the President to do that which we found ourselves unable to perform.

We assume to ourselves the responsibility which properly attaches to that department. I rejoice that here the maxim is monstrous and exploded, that the Executive can do no wrong; that here the ministers are not liable for the acts of the superior, but the superior accountable for the acts of his ministers and agents. If General Wilkinson is the monster in iniquity his enemies state him to be, if the President has continued him in employment after he had evidence positive of his guilt, or if, as has been charged, he has turned a deaf ear to the proof about to be offered by an ardent, a disinterested friend to his country, why has not this blazing patriotism burst out in a direct and not an indirect impeachment of the Executive? But the sense of the nation is too well known to venture at this thing. No, say the advocates of the resolution, this has nothing to do with confidence in the Executive--and yet if the Executive has a spark of that patriotism which he ought to possess, if he is not the protector and upholder of a knowing traitor, would he dare to disregard the information, if legally substantiated, which the gentleman from Virginia and the delegate from Orleans had laid on your table? If confidence has nothing to do with this, why did not these gentlemen hand in to that department of the Government which had the constitutional cognizance and final control of this business, all the information they had on this subject? Why make this House the great gun from which to thunder their denunciations and fulminations against an individual, when there was a shorter and more easy way of getting at their object? A corrupt Executive would desire the very measure proposed. Interfere with his functions, assume his responsibility--what would be the result? You denounce the agent, the tool of such an Executive, (the Colonel Vernon of Cromwell, for example.) You order, or you request, that his conduct should be inquired into. Well, in obedience to your order, this corrupt Executive appoints a corrupt board of officers. The conduct is inquired into, and the accused comes out glossed over with an honorable acquittal from this court, and ready and more fitly prepared to execute the ambitious designs of his protector. Ask of the Executive why is this so? He answers, I have obeyed your orders, the responsibility is yours and not mine. This will be the effect of our travelling out of our defined orbit and taking upon ourselves what never was intrusted to us by the constitution under which we act--already, when gentlemen say that we are not to know that a court of inquiry is ordered in this case, but which every one does know, is now sitting--I say, already do they anticipate the result, and in a fore-handed way make it a theme of abuse against that Executive, with which they tell us confidence or diffidence has nothing to do in this question.

But to be done with these words, so offensive to the chaste ears of the supporters of this measure. Mr. T. said he would ask these gentlemen if they would allow their own judgment, views, and conduct to be judged of by those who by duty were compelled to decide upon the measures they proposed? They surely did not claim that infallibility which they denied to others. Well, then, said he, place them in one scale, with all their acts or with any particular act, and place the Executive in the other, with all or with any of his acts. Nay, sir, take the present subject only as a criterion. Let the nation hold the balance. I have no hesitation in saying that their scale would kick the beam. This I am compelled to say; I have more confidence in the present Administration than I have in those who brought forward and now support the presentation. I seek for nothing but truth--I would not kiss my hand for any thing that the Executive could do for me or mine. I am not one of those politicians who expect pay for doing nothing.

I come now, said Mr. T., to my second grand objection to this measure--that it will interfere also with the Judiciary Department of our Government. Treason and perjury have been alleged against this individual; by what tribunal are these crimes cognizable? Certainly by the courts of law. The constitution has guarantied to every citizen the right of a fair and impartial trial by his peers, a jury unbiased of his countrymen--will this right be preserved to General Wilkinson after the denunciatory speeches which have been uttered on this floor are published? Will this right be preserved to him, when the whole continent has been searched not only for all that Burr could collect, but for a new enlistment, a host of witnesses against this man? Your committee of denunciation collects the testimony, the committee makes report of the whole to this House, and it is published. I say, will not this be prejudging the man, and condemning him, before he has been brought before your judicial tribunal, to which he is amenable if guilty of all that has been urged against him on this floor? After such a procedure would there be a possibility of this man’s obtaining a fair trial, of his enjoying that right which is secured to him by the sacred provisions of the constitution, and which even in a country far less jealous of the liberties of the citizens than ours ought to be, he would have secured to him?

I come now, said Mr. T., to my third objection to this measure--and which is nearly allied to the last--and that is, that in our military courts too you deprive this man of a fair trial. Every observation I have made in respect to the right of a fair trial by jury, I contend applies equally strong to the trials in our military courts. But this man is a soldier, he is Commander-in-chief of your standing Army, therefore he is fair game--therefore we must hunt him down. Let us see what power the constitution gives us in this respect--we have the power of disbanding the Army at any time by denying the vote of supplies--we are forbid to part with that power for a longer term than for two years, we can then disband the Army, in its climax of misconduct and disaffection, in spite of the Executive. Mr. T. asked was this the object at present? If it was, why did the gentlemen make the terms of their resolution wide enough to embrace the whole Army? But he gave them the credit due to their candor--they drove openly and above board at the man.

There was another power given to the Legislature of the United States by our constitution--to pass laws for the regulation and government of the Army. Had this power been exercised? It had. Had the Legislature been restricted in the severity of the laws enacted for this body of men? They would see by looking over them. Mr. T. said he had looked over them. One hundred and one articles were contained in the statute book, every one of which (except about half a dozen) were distinct definitions of crimes. Of the statute book he wished to speak respectfully; the severity of this code might be necessary; but duty compelled him to speak of it as he found it. It would seem as if the Legislature in penning this law had borrowed the pen of Draco, dipped in blood. Every step they took, from article to article, was marked with blood, with scourges, and with death. No less than sixteen definitions were there contained of crimes capital and punishable with loss of life. After having armed the courts, which, said Mr. T., are appointed to sit in judgment on these soldiers, (and remember that not only the standing Army, but the militia also are at times subject to these rules,) with the power of life and death placed in their hands, the scourge, the halter, and the musket, for lacerating and destroying the infractors of these articles, the Legislature, with all this severity, tempered the whole with one divine, one beneficial principle. This box of Pandora contains hope--the hope of a fair, impartial, and unbiased trial, by their comrades, by their peers. But this hope, by your present resolution, is proposed to be destroyed: as if the gloom around the arrested soldier was not sufficiently dark, you now are about to establish a precedent, which whenever used will shut out every gleam of light. Would it be surprising that men thus proscribed, marked out as the fit objects on which to pour out your vials of wrath, should in time become disaffected, should turn their arms against their country? Yes, by the course proposed you prejudge a citizen--you mark your victim. What despotism can be worse than this? The pious Parliament of England who brought Cromwell into power did this very thing. They were not content with the uncertainty of the proceedings of the criminal courts of that day--they appointed a committee, (as is proposed now, sir,) a court of high commissions, to take care that the courts of law and the military courts should let none go whom they had marked for destruction. How did this business end? The very pious and country-loving Parliament, who were so intent upon the public good as to break down and trample on every opposing impediment either of law, religion, or morality, and all for the public safety, (the very motive we hear now urged,) were kicked out by Cromwell and that very army they had supported at one time and proscribed at another; and were sent, according to the language of that day, to seek the Lord elsewhere. And their degradation produced gratulations from every part of the Commonwealth to the Protector, and confirmed him in as absolute power as the Emperor of the French by similar means has at this day acquired.

Why should I go back, said he, to the days of Cromwell. The effects of the mistake in this respect of a gallant and infatuated nation now exist. History need not record it for our instruction; the fatal error happened in our time. It would be too painful to travel from step to step, and detail the whole of the misfortunes of this gallant people. I will take, I think, the most interesting incident in the French Revolution--the point of time which decided that France was not to be a Republic. The Girondists, who were the most enlightened, the most virtuous, perhaps the only real Republicans in France, denounced Marat. Marat and his friends made head against their opponents and in turn denounced them. Marat was destroyed by an enthusiast, but his party prevailed. Yes, from the rostrum in the conventional hall proceeded the poison, from the National Convention was administered the dose which annihilated all true Republicanism in that country--the system of prejudging the criminal before his trial. How was this denouncing system improved upon? At first, indeed, there was kept up the show of a trial in the courts below, but the victim was nevertheless as certainly marked, or certainly doomed to destruction. But the orators in the Convention, having a long session, and finding nothing better to employ themselves in, multiplied the victims so fast, that to be possessed of a handsome house or estate, a beautiful wife, sister, or daughter, was crime sufficient to incur denunciation--the courts became so crowded with victims, that to expedite the business, instead of formal trials, the courts condemned en masse: ten, twenty, or fifty, were delivered over to the public executioner, with only the ceremony of passing in review before the judge; a motion of his hand, or the waving of his bonnet rouge, was a sufficient signal for the executioners to lead the denounced to the guillotine.

We have a constitution, (said he,) we have laws enacted for the prevention and punishment of crimes. The rights of our citizens are, I hope, sacredly guarded by the provisions contained in them. Shall we then adopt this revolutionary measure?

All history shows--the experience of all ages ought to have impressed this important truth on our minds--that in religion anathemas, in politics denunciations, in popular assemblies, have led to the same slaughter-house--fell intolerance and bloody persecution. Shall we now throw aside our chart and compass, and venture in this wide, boisterous, and dangerous sea of expediency?

Look at the constitution--search for this denunciatory power vested in this House. What is it? We have a right to impeach a civil officer for misconduct. What punishment can we demand for him when convicted? Dismissal from office, and disqualification from holding any future office of trust and profit. In nothing does the wisdom, the inspiration of the framers of this instrument more appear than in this restriction. They well knew the danger of introducing personal feelings and resentments, of party rage and fury in this body; of gathering here armed with the power of destroying one another.

I have said, on a former occasion, that this House had no power itself; its committee cannot have the power of sending for persons, papers, and records; it is nowhere directly given; it cannot be derived incidentally, in a case, the cognizance of which is not given to us by the constitution. I then stated the cases where this incidental power is, ex necessitate rei, derived, viz: 1st. For collecting testimony whereon to form articles of impeachment. 2d. Testimony may be thus collected in deciding on the expulsion of a member, 3d. Where an election is contested.

The gentlemen who support the resolution have been desired to show the power of the House for this purpose in this constitution or in any law. They have not done so. They are obliged to resort to expediency, and that expediency, I have contended, will not hold them out. But, say they, the courts of inquiry and courts martial have no power of collecting testimony, and we must do it for them. Will the depositions taken before this House, or before your committee, be evidence in your courts? They will not. To sum up the whole, although I must acknowledge that the motives which actuated the mover and myself are, and must be the same; I declare I think he means as well as I, the good of his country; yet I would defy him to instance a more oppressive, a more unfair mode of procedure in the Spanish inquisition than the preliminary trial, for it is a trial of General Wilkinson, now carrying on, on this floor, and about to be prolonged by hanging it upon tenter hooks before a committee. Gracious God! what innocence can withstand this mode? He is charged with being a Spanish pensioner in 1796--again, on the river Sabine--a conspirator with Burr--a perjured man--a conspirator against the liberties of the citizens whom he arrested as traitors and coadjutors with Burr. These, denunciations are enforced with eloquence, mixed and commixed, compounded and animadverted upon by as great talents as any in the nation. No notice is given to him to attend and make defence. Thus, with accumulated denunciations, but with but one document before us which can look like evidence, and that ex parte, this House is to be pressed into a vote which is to fix the stamp upon the character of the man, is to mark him as the victim of the courts below. If he were a demon I would not use him thus unfairly.

TUESDAY, January 12.

General Wilkinson.

The House resumed the consideration of a resolution moved by Mr. ROWAN, for the appointment of a special committee to inquire into the conduct of Brigadier-General Wilkinson, with power to send for persons and papers, and to compel their attendance and production, which was depending yesterday at the time of adjournment: Whereupon, Mr. ROWAN moved to amend the resolution, to read as follows: