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Part 163

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16) · United States. Congress — chapter 163 of 283 · ~6,662 words · public domain

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“Resolved, That, until equitable and satisfactory arrangements on these points shall be made between the two Governments, it is expedient that, from and after the ---- day of ---- next, no goods, wares, or merchandise, of the growth, product or manufacture of Great Britain, or of any of the colonies or dependencies thereof, ought to be imported into the United States; provided, however, that whenever arrangements deemed satisfactory by the President of the United States shall take place, it shall be lawful for him by proclamation to fix a day on which the prohibition aforesaid shall cease.”

Mr. J. CLAY inquired whether it would not be in order to call up a resolution offered by him on the same subject.

The CHAIRMAN said it was not in order, after the committee had determined to consider the resolution just read.

Mr. GREGG then rose, and said: Mr. Chairman, I cannot but congratulate the committee on our having at length taken up the business to which I believe the people of this country universally expected we would have turned our attention on the first moment of assembling in our legislative capacity. Before we left our homes, we had learned, through the channel of newspapers, that outrages of a most atrocious kind had been committed on the persons and property of American citizens, by some of the belligerent nations of Europe. This intelligence has been officially confirmed by sundry communications which we have received from the President of the United States. From these sources we have derived the information that irruptions have been made into our territory, on its southern frontier, by subjects of Spain, and that depredations to a very considerable extent have been committed on our commerce by the cruisers of that nation. The manly spirit with which these irruptions were resisted by the officers of our Government appears, for the present, to have checked the further progress of that evil; and it seems that the system of depredation has been discontinued, in pursuance of instructions issued by the Minister of State and of Marine to the Director General of the Fleet. These orders were issued on the 3d day of September, 1805, and are understood to have been produced by the remonstrances of our Minister at that Court. From these favorable symptoms, a presumption naturally and necessarily arises that an amicable adjustment of the points in dispute between that Government and ours is not to be despaired of. Should we, however, be deceived in this calculation--should similar aggressions be repeated--we are not destitute of means to obtain redress; and on such an event taking place, I presume we would not hesitate in resorting to the complete exercise of these means.

I wish the prospect of an accommodation of our differences with Great Britain were equally bright and flattering. But the systematic hostility of that Government towards our commerce, and its obstinate perseverance in the impressment of our seamen, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of our ministers, leave no room to expect an accommodation until we resort to such measures as will make her feel our importance to her as the purchasers and consumers of her manufactures, and the great injury she will sustain through a total privation of our friendship.

In searching for materials to substantiate the facts stated in the preamble to the resolution, it is only necessary to refer to the history of the conduct of the British Government towards us for a very short period. By turning a few pages of that history we will find that a large number of our fellow-citizens have been forcibly taken from their homes--for his ship is a seaman’s home--have been put on board British ships of war and compelled to fight her battles against a power between whom and her own Government there exists no difference. The general notoriety of this truth precludes the necessity of a reference to any particular document to prove the correctness of the statement. Was such a reference necessary, I might point to a report from the Department of State, made at the last session of Congress. In that report we find that, at that time, fifteen hundred and thirty-eight persons, claiming to be American citizens, had been able to extend their application for relief to their own Government; and though Great Britain claimed some of these as her subjects, agreeably to her doctrine of non-expatriation, the great mass was acknowledged to be Americans, for whose detention no other cause could be assigned but because she stood in need of their service. And is it not a fair presumption that this number was but a small proportion of those who were actually impressed? Changed from ship to ship, and the vessels in which they are frequently changing their station, and guarded with the most scrupulous attention, it is almost impossible for them to find any opportunity of applying to their own Government or any of its officers for relief.

This open, this flagrant violation of our rights as men, and as citizens of an independent nation, certainly demands the interposition of Government. To what cause are we to ascribe the neglect with which these unfortunate men have been treated? A few years ago, when some of our people had the misfortune to be made prisoners by the Algerines, and at a later period, when some others fell into the hands of the Tripolitans, the feelings of the Government and of the whole country were alive. All voices united in requiring the energy of the Government to be exerted, and its purse to be opened, so that no means to obtain the liberty of the captives might be left untried. Success has crowned these endeavors, and those who were unfortunately slaves are now enjoying their freedom. In what respect, I would ask, does the situation of those who have been impressed from on board their own vessels, and who are forcibly detained on board British ships of war, differ from that of the Algerine and Tripolitan prisoners? So far as respects the Government, the infringements of its rights are greater in the former than in the latter case. The situation of the individual is no better. A wound inflicted by a British cat-of-nine-tails is not less severely felt than if it had proceeded from the lash of an Algerine. The patient submission with which we have so long endured this flagrant outrage on the feelings of humanity and on the honor of our country, must have excited the astonishment of the whole world; but it must also have impressed them very forcibly with an idea of the moderation of our Government, and of its strong predilection for peace. I trust, however, we will now show them that there is a point beyond which we will not suffer; that even although we may not think it advisable to make reprisals, we will at least withdraw our friendly intercourse from that Government, whose whole system of conduct towards us has been that of distress and degradation; and that, as the business is now taken up, it will be pursued with zeal and ardor, until relief is extended to this unhappy class of sufferers, and security obtained against similar aggressions on their persons in future, by such arrangements as ought to be deemed satisfactory.

In relation to the capture and condemnation of our vessels, contrary to what we consider, and to what I verily believe to be the law of nations, I shall not detain the committee with many observations. I have no intention of entering into a discussion of the abstract question, whether a trade is justifiable in war which is not open in time of peace. I will only observe, that on the principles of reason and justice, and from such authors as I have had an opportunity of consulting, the right for which we contend does appear to me to be clearly established. In some late publications, this question has received a very luminous and ample discussion, and the right insisted on by us has been placed on such ground, and supported by reasoning so clear, so cogent, and so conclusive, that Great Britain, with all her boasted talents, will find it extremely difficult to find answers for them.

But even admitting the British doctrine to be correct, what, I would ask, has been the conduct of that Government under it? Has it been that of a nation actuated by motives of liberality and friendship? Has it been that of a civilized and polished nation? Has it been such as justice and the fair and honorable conduct of our Government has given us a right to expect? No person, I think, is prepared to answer in the affirmative. It does not appear that the principle was practised on during the last, nor for some time after the commencement of the present war. I will not undertake absolutely to say that they relinquished it, but the trade which it now prohibits was permitted to be carried on to a great extent without any interruption from their cruisers. Numbers, allured by the prospect of gain, were induced to engage in the profitable business, and supposing themselves safe under the protection of law, had their vessels and effects seized to a large amount. The capture and condemnation of their property was to them the first promulgation of the law. Ignorance of what it was impossible for them to know, was imputed to them as a crime, and an honorable dependence on the justice of a Government professing to be friendly, was prosecuted with penalty and forfeiture.

But even independent of our just cause of complaint arising from this principle, apparently new, thus unjustly brought into operation, how has that Government conducted in relation to captures, in which, after the most minute investigation, all the ingenuity of her courts have not been able to discover any principle to warrant the condemnation? The perplexing difficulties, the vexatious delays, and the enormous expense attending the prosecution of a claim through every stage of its progress, place an almost insurmountable barrier in the way of obtaining justice. In fact, all her commercial maxims, and the whole system of her conduct, discover a manifest intention, a fixed determination, to consummate the ruin of the commerce of this country.

From this very brief view of the conduct of the British Government towards us, and I have confined it merely to the points stated in the preamble to the resolution; every candid, every unprejudiced person, I think, must acknowledge, that we are arrived at a crisis; that we have reached a period at which the honor, the interest, and the public sentiment of the country, so far as it has been expressed, call loudly on us to make a stand. The evil we have already suffered is great, and it is progressing. Like a cancerous complaint, it is penetrating still deeper towards our vitals. While we yield year after year, Great Britain advances step by step; yet a little longer and our commerce will be annihilated, and our independence subverted.

Here the great difficulty presents itself. What are the proper steps to be taken? what measures that we can adopt will be most likely to effect the object we have in view, and in its operation produce the smallest inconvenience to ourselves? I, sir, have reflected much on this subject. I have considered, so far as I was capable, the bearing which every measure which I have heard proposed would have on it. The result of my reflections is, that, under all the circumstances of the case, the resolution, which is now the subject of immediate discussion, ought to be adopted. What is the resolution? what does it say? It addresses Great Britain in this mild and moderate, though manly and firm language: You have insulted the dignity of our country by impressing our seamen, and compelling them to fight your battles against a power with whom we are at peace. You have plundered us of much property by that predatory war which you authorize to be carried on against our commerce. To these injuries, insults, and oppression, we will submit no longer. We do not, however, wish to destroy that friendly intercourse that ought to subsist between nations, connected by the ties of common interest, to which several considerations seem to give peculiar strength. The citizens of our country and the subjects of yours, from the long habit of supplying their mutual wants, no doubt feel a wish to preserve their intercourse without interruption. To prevent such interruption, and secure against future aggressions, we are now desirous of entering into such arrangements as ought to be deemed satisfactory by both parties. But if you persist in your hostile measures, if you absolutely refuse acceding to any propositions of compromise, we must slacken those bonds of friendship by which we have been connected, you must not expect hereafter to find us in your market, purchasing your manufactures to so large an amount. What will the people of this country say of this proposition? Will they not be ready to exclaim, that it is too mild for the present state of things? What will be the opinion of foreign Governments respecting it? Will they not say that we have extended the principle of moderation too far? What must be its impression on Great Britain herself? Sir, if she is not lost to every sense of national justice, she must acknowledge its equity and fairness. But I would inquire particularly what would be its operation on the people of that country? If carried into effect, I believe it will strike dismay throughout the Empire. Its operation will be felt by every description of people, but more especially by the commercial and manufacturing part of the community. The influence of these two classes is well known in that country. They are the main pillars of its support. They are the sources of its wealth. Their representations, therefore, are always attended to. And what language must they speak on this occasion? It must be evident that a regard to their own interest will lead them to remonstrate loudly against that system which will produce an annual defalcation in the sale of their manufactures, of thirty millions of dollars. This is their vulnerable part. By attacking them in their warehouses and workshops we can reach their vitals, and thus raise a set of advocates in our favor, whose remonstrance may produce an abandonment of those unjust principles and practices which have produced the solemn crisis.

Mr. J. CLAY.--By the resolution before us we are prohibited from importing from Great Britain any articles, however necessary or convenient they may be; while, at the same time, we are permitted to carry any articles to her market. The effect will be, that while our productions are accumulating in the hands of the British manufacturers and merchants, they will have no means of paying for them; and of consequence debts to a very large amount will become due from British merchants to American citizens. Even at the present day, I have great doubts whether there are not greater sums due by the merchants of Great Britain to the citizens of the United States than there are recoverable debts due by American citizens to them. If so, what will become of the second expedient proposed to be resorted to by my colleague, that of sequestration? The balance of injury, instead of being in our favor, will be against us. If my colleague had looked over the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and had attended to the amount of American property afloat, he would have seen that there is not less than one hundred millions of dollars worth of American property at the mercy of the cruisers of Britain. I believe that the naked vessels, independent of the products they carry, amount in value to more than thirty millions of dollars. It will be seen that the commerce of the United States in exports and imports amounts to one hundred and fifty millions, of which it is fair to calculate that one-third is constantly exposed on the ocean. Of this amount about forty millions is carried on between the United States and the power to whom it is proposed to cut off intercourse. With this fact staring us in the face, would it be politic to expose so much property to the retaliation of the British Ministry? When the gentleman spoke of the amount of British depredations, he ought to have stated the amount of those recently committed. I believe I am not very wrong in stating the whole amount of American property detained by British cruisers as not exceeding six millions of dollars. On balancing, therefore, their interests, ought the United States to resort to measures of hostility; to measures which, in the opinion of every man, will justify retaliation?

Mr. CROWNINSHIELD.--The gentleman from Pennsylvania, who has last spoken, regrets that this subject has been taken up so soon, but I regret it has not been taken up at an earlier period. Although, after I found certain information called for, I moved for other documents, calculated to shed further light on the subject, yet I then said, and I am still convinced that this information could not influence my decision on the subject under consideration. The documents called for are, however, now before us, and it appears that the balance of trade between the United States and Great Britain is from eleven to twelve millions against us. This difference we are obliged to make up by remittances in cash or bills from other countries; when, if we did not purchase of her more than we sell to her, we should not owe this annual balance, and the amount would surely be returned to the United States, very probably in cash, as a balance in our favor from other European nations. The trade, therefore, with Great Britain, so far as relates to the balance, is disadvantageous to us. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLAY) thinks that this resolution will materially injure us, while it will inflict little injury on Great Britain. But there can be no doubt the measure it contemplates will injure Great Britain vastly more than it will injure us. Great Britain has, without any cause whatever, condemned our vessels engaged in the carriage of colonial productions, the bona fide property of American citizens. The gentleman has acknowledged that these captures may amount to six millions of dollars. I do not know the amount, but if the adjudications continue, I believe it will soon exceed that sum. But if the amount did not exceed one million, we are bound in duty to protect our merchants. The gentleman, in his remarks, goes on the calculation that Great Britain will go to war with us if we adopt this resolution. But I have no such idea. If, however, I held that opinion, I should not on that account withhold my approbation from it. Because I believe if a war should take place, the United States will have a great advantage over Great Britain. We should be able, in that event, to fit out a great number of privateers, and we should make two captures to their one. If a war should take place, which I do not hesitate to say I should greatly deprecate, we should take twice as much of their property as they would take of ours. But we are not, by the adoption of this resolution, about to enter into war with Great Britain. No such thing is in the contemplation of any gentleman. We are merely about to prohibit the importation of British goods in consequence of her having seized our vessels engaged in carrying on a lawful commerce, and in consequence of her seizure of American citizens protected by the American flag.

In November, 1793, Great Britain adopted a similar principle with regard to the colonial trade, except that the orders issued at that time went further than the present principle. In consequence of these orders four or five hundred of our vessels were seized. Every one knows the conduct of the American Government at that time. A treaty was finally made in which Great Britain promised to pay for the aggressions committed by her vessels on neutral rights. But nearly ten years elapsed before our merchants received compensation for their losses. This principle slept till 1801. Great Britain did not find it convenient to call it again into existence before that time. It then appears by a correspondence between Mr. King, then our Minister at the Court of Great Britain, and Lord Hawkesbury, that she attempted to renew it at this time. Mr. King, however, remonstrated; and he finally received a note from Lord Hawkesbury who had referred the subject to the Attorney-General of Great Britain, admitting that the seizure, under this principle, was not warrantable. The opinion is this: that the neutral has a right to carry on a commerce with the enemies’ colonies. That the continuity of the voyage is broken when the return cargo is landed in the neutral country, and has paid duties there, and that the goods can afterwards be safely transported to any belligerent country in Europe, in the same bottom on which they were originally imported, or on any other neutral bottom whatever. This appears to have settled the question, and numerous decisions in England both before and since that time have confirmed the principle as a correct one.

As to the impressment of our seamen, that too is a subject of most serious complaint. We have called for a document on this point, which unfortunately is not yet on our tables. It is so extensive, and the information drawn from such various sources, that the Secretary of State has not yet been able to present it. We have, however, understood, that the number of our impressed seamen amounts to above 3,000. During the last war Great Britain impressed upwards of 2,000 of our seamen, of which she restored 1,200, proved to be American, and 800 remained in her possession at the peace. In the short period of two years she has impressed 3,000 seamen. I believe that we are bound, by all peaceable means, to obtain the liberation of these men. Lately, one of our frigates was shipwrecked off Tripoli, and 300 men taken captives. We immediately passed a new appropriation bill, and sent out several additional frigates. The affair has terminated honorably to our country, and our seamen are released. Will we not now do as much for 3,000 seamen, as we then did for 300, which are but a tenth part?

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I am extremely afraid, sir, that so far as it may depend on my acquaintance with details connected with the subject, I have very little right to address you, for in truth, I have not yet seen the documents from the Treasury, which were called for some time ago, to direct the judgment of this House in the decision of the question now before you; and, indeed, after what I have this day heard, I no longer require that document or any other document--indeed, I do not know that I ever should have required it--to vote on the resolution of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. If I had entertained any doubts, they would have been removed by the style in which the friends of the resolution have this morning discussed it. I am perfectly aware, that on entering upon this subject, we go into it manacled, handcuffed, and tongue-tied; gentlemen know that our lips are sealed on subjects of momentous foreign relations, which are indissolubly linked with the present question, and which would serve to throw a great light on it in every respect relevant to it. I will, however, endeavor to hobble over the subject, as well as my fettered limbs and palsied tongue will enable me to do it.

I am not surprised to hear this resolution discussed by its friends as a war measure. They say (it is true) that it is not a war measure; but they defend it on principles which would justify none but war measures, and seem pleased with the idea that it may prove the forerunner of war. If war is necessary--if we have reached this point--let us have war. But while I have life, I will never consent to these incipient war measures, which, in their commencement, breathe nothing but peace, though they plunge at last into war. It has been well observed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania behind me (Mr. J. CLAY), that the situation of this nation in 1793 was in every respect different from that in which it finds itself in 1806. Let me ask, too, if the situation of England is not since materially changed? Gentlemen who, it would appear from their language, have not got beyond the horn-book of politics, talk of our ability to cope with the British navy, and tell us of the war of our Revolution. What was the situation of Great Britain then? She was then contending for the empire of the British channel, barely able to maintain a doubtful equality with her enemies, over whom she never gained the superiority until Rodney’s victory of the twelfth of April. What is her present situation? The combined fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, are dissipated, they no longer exist. I am not surprised to hear men advocate these wild opinions, to see them goaded on by a spirit of mercantile avarice, straining their feeble strength to excite the nation to war, when they have reached this stage of infatuation, that we are an over-match for Great Britain on the ocean. It is mere waste of time to reason with such persons. They do not deserve any thing like serious refutation. The proper arguments for such statesmen are a straight waistcoat, a dark room, water gruel, and depletion.

It has always appeared to me that there are three points to be considered, and maturely considered, before we can be prepared to vote for the resolution of the gentleman from Pennsylvania: First. Our ability to contend with Great Britain for the question in dispute: Secondly. The policy of such a contest: Thirdly. In case both these shall be settled affirmatively, the manner in which we can, with the greatest effect, react upon and annoy our adversary.

Now the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CROWNINSHIELD) has settled at a single sweep, to use one of his favorite expressions, not only that we are capable of contending with Great Britain on the ocean, but that we are actually her superior. Whence does the gentleman deduce this inference? Because, truly, at that time when Great Britain was not mistress of the ocean, when a North was her prime minister, a Sandwich the first lord of her admiralty, when she was governed by a counting-house administration, privateers of this country trespassed on her commerce! So, too, did the cruisers of Dunkirk; at that day Suffrein held the mastery of the Indian seas. But what is the case now? Do gentlemen remember the capture of Cornwallis on land, because De Grasse maintained the dominion of the ocean? To my mind no position is more clear, than that if we go to war with Great Britain, Charleston and Boston, the Chesapeake and the Hudson, will be invested by British squadrons. Will you call on the Count de Grasse to relieve them, or shall we apply to Admiral Gravina, or Admiral Villeneuve to raise the blockade? But you have not only a prospect of gathering glory, and what seems to the gentleman from Massachusetts much dearer, profit, by privateering, but you will be able to make a conquest of Canada and Nova Scotia. Indeed! Then, sir, we shall catch a Tartar. I confess, however, I have no desire to see the Senators and Representatives of the Canadian French, or of the tories and refugees of Nova Scotia, sitting on this floor or that of the other House--to see them becoming members of the Union, and participating equally in our political rights. And on what other principle would the gentleman from Massachusetts be for incorporating those provinces with us? Or on what other principle could it be done under the constitution? If the gentleman has no other bounty to offer us for going to war, than the incorporation of Canada and Nova Scotia with the United States, I am for remaining at peace.

What is the question in dispute? The carrying trade. What part of it? The fair, the honest, and the useful trade that is engaged in carrying our own productions to foreign markets, and bringing back their productions in exchange? No, sir. It is that carrying trade which covers enemy’s property, and carries the coffee, the sugar, and other West India products, to the mother country. No, sir, if this great agricultural nation is to be governed by Salem and Boston, New York and Philadelphia, and Baltimore and Norfolk and Charleston, let gentlemen come out and say so; and let a committee of public safety be appointed from those towns to carry on the Government. I, for one, will not mortgage my property and my liberty, to carry on this trade. The nation said so seven years ago--I said so then, and I say so now. It is not for the honest carrying trade of America, but for this mushroom, this fungus of war--for a trade which, as soon as the nations of Europe are at peace, will no longer exist,--it is for this that the spirit of avaricious traffic would plunge us into war.

I am forcibly struck on this occasion by the recollection of a remark made by one of the ablest (if not the honestest) Ministers that England ever produced. I mean Sir Robert Walpole, who said that the country gentlemen (poor meek souls!) came up every year to be sheared--that they lay mute and patient whilst their fleeces were taking off--but that if he touched a single bristle of the commercial interest, the whole stye was in an uproar. It was indeed shearing the hog--“great cry and little wool.”

But we are asked, are we willing to bend the neck to England; to submit to her outrages? No, sir, I answer, that it will be time enough for us to vindicate the violation of our flag on the ocean, when they shall have told us what they have done in resentment of the violation of the actual territory of the United States by Spain--the true territory of the United States, not your new-fangled country over the Mississippi, but the good old United States--part of Georgia, of the old thirteen States--where citizens have been taken, not from our ships, but from our actual territory. When gentlemen have taken the padlock from our mouths, I shall be ready to tell them what I will do, relative to our dispute with Britain, on the law of nations, on contraband, and such stuff.

I have another objection to this course of proceeding. Great Britain, when she sees it, will say the American people have great cause of dissatisfaction with Spain. She will see by the documents furnished by the President, that Spain has outraged our Territory, pirated upon our commerce, and imprisoned our citizens; and she will inquire what we have done? It is true, she will receive no answer, but she must know what we have not done. She will see that we have not repelled these outrages, nor made any addition to our army and navy--nor even classed the militia. No, sir, not one of your militia generals in politics has marshalled a single brigade.

Although I have said it would be time enough to answer the question which gentlemen have put to me when they shall have answered mine, yet as I do not like long prorogations I will give them an answer now. I will never consent to go to war for that which I cannot protect. I deem it no sacrifice of dignity to say to the Leviathan of the deep--we are unable to contend with you in your own element, but if you come within our actual limits we will shed our last drop of blood in their defence. In such an event I would feel, not reason, and obey an impulse which never has, which never can deceive me.

France is at war with England--suppose her power on the continent of Europe no greater than it is on the ocean. How would she make her enemy feel it? There would be a perfect non-conductor between them. So with the United States and England--she scarcely presents to us a vulnerable point. Her commerce is now carried on for the most part in fleets--where in single ships they are stout and well armed--very different from the state of her trade during the American war, when her merchantmen became the prey of paltry privateers. Great Britain has been too long at war with the three most powerful maritime nations of Europe not to have learnt how to protect her trade. She can afford convoy to it all--she has eight hundred ships in commission, the navies of her enemies are annihilated. Thus this war has presented the new and curious political spectacle of a regular annual increase (and to an immense amount) of her imports and exports, and tonnage and revenue, and all the insignia of accumulating wealth, whilst in every former war, without exception, these have suffered a greater or less diminution. And wherefore? Because she has driven France, Spain, and Holland from the ocean. Their marine is no more. I verily believe that ten English ships-of-the-line would not decline a meeting with the combined fleets of those nations. I forewarn the gentleman from Massachusetts and his constituents of Salem, that all their golden hopes are vain. I forewarn them of the exposure of their trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope (or now doubling it) to capture and confiscation--of their unprotected seaport towns, exposed to contribution or bombardment. Are we to be legislated into war by a set of men, who in six weeks after its commencement may be compelled to take refuge with us up in the country? And for what? A mere fungus--a mushroom production of war in Europe, which will disappear with the first return of peace--an unfair trade. For is there a man so credulous as to believe that we possess a capital not only equal to what may be called our own proper trade, but large enough also to transmit to the respective parent states the vast and wealthy products of the French, Spanish and Dutch colonies? It is beyond the belief of any rational being. But this is not my only objection to entering upon this naval warfare; I am averse to a naval war with any nation whatever. I was opposed to the naval war of the last Administration, and I am as ready to oppose a naval war of the present Administration, should they meditate such a measure. What! shall this great mammoth of the American forest leave his native element and plunge into the water in a mad contest with the shark? Let him beware that his proboscis is not bitten off in the engagement. Let him stay on shore, and not be excited by the muscles and periwinkles on the strand, or political bears, in a boat to venture on the perils of the deep. Gentlemen say, will you not protect your violated rights? and I say, why take to water, where you can neither fight nor swim? Look at France--see her vessels stealing from port to port on her own coast--and remember that she is the first military power of the earth, and as a naval people second only to England. Take away the British navy, and France to-morrow is the tyrant of the ocean.

This brings me to the second point. How far is it politic in the United States to throw their weight into the scale of France at this moment, from whatever motive--to aid the views of her gigantic ambition--to make her mistress of the sea and land--to jeopardize the liberties of mankind? Sir, you may help to crush Great Britain, you may assist in breaking down her naval dominion, but you cannot succeed to it. The iron sceptre of the ocean will pass into his hands who wears the iron crown of the land. You may then expect a new code of maritime law. Where will you look for redress? I can tell the gentleman from Massachusetts that there is nothing in his rule of three that will save us, even although he should outdo himself, and exceed the financial ingenuity which he so memorably displayed on a recent occasion. No, sir, let the battle of Actium be once fought, and the whole line of seacoast will be at the mercy of the conqueror. The Atlantic, deep and wide as it is, will prove just as good a barrier against his ambition, if directed against you, as the Mediterranean to the power of the Cæsars. Do I mean (when I say so) to crouch to the invader? No! I will meet him at the water’s edge, and fight every inch of ground from thence to the mountains--from the mountains to the Mississippi. But after tamely submitting to an outrage on your domicil, will you bully and look big at an insult on your flag three thousand miles off?

But, sir, I have yet a more cogent reason against going to war, for the honor of the flag in the narrow seas, or any other maritime punctilio. It springs from my attachment to the Government under which I live. I declare, in the face of day, that this Government was not instituted for the purposes of offensive war. No! It was framed (to use its own language) “for the common defence and the general welfare,” which are inconsistent with offensive war. I call that offensive war, which goes out of our jurisdiction and limits for the attainment or protection of objects not within those limits, and that jurisdiction. As in 1798 I was opposed to this species of warfare, because I believed it would raze the constitution to its very foundation--so, in 1806, I am opposed to it, and on the same grounds. No sooner do you put the constitution to this use--to a test which it is by no means calculated to endure--than its incompetency becomes manifest, apparent to all. I fear if you go into a foreign war, for a circuitous, unfair carrying trade, you will come out without your constitution. Have not you contractors enough yet in this House? Or, do you want to be overrun and devoured by commissaries, and all the vermin of contract? I fear, sir, that what are called “the energy men” will rise up again--men who will burn the parchment. We shall be told that our Government is too free; or, as they would say, weak and inefficient. Much virtue, sir, in terms! That we must give the President power to call forth the resources of the nation. That is, to filch the last shilling from our pockets--to drain the last drop of blood from our veins. I am against giving this power to any man, be he who he may. The American people must either withhold this power, or resign their liberties. There is no other alternative. Nothing but the most imperious necessity will justify such a grant. And is there a powerful enemy at our doors? You may begin with a First Consul. From that chrysalis state he soon becomes an Emperor. You have your choice. It depends upon your election whether you will be a free, happy, and united people at home, or the light of your Executive Majesty shall beam across the Atlantic in one general blaze of the public liberty.

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Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.

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