Part 41

Mr. WHITE thought no office under the Government was to be held during pleasure, except those which are to be constituted by law; but all the heads of departments are to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He conceived that, in all cases, the party who appointed ought to judge of the removal, except in those cases which by the constitution are excepted; and in those cases impeachment and conviction are the only mode by which they can be removed.

Mr. THATCHER asked, why the Judges were particularly mentioned in the constitution as holding their offices during good behavior, if it was not supposed that, without this express declaration in their favor, they, in common with all other officers not immediately chosen by the State Legislatures and the people, would hold them during pleasure? The clause respecting impeachments was particularly calculated for removing unworthy officers of the other description. Holding this construction of the constitution to be right, he was in favor of the clause as it stood.

Mr. SYLVESTER thought the constitution ought to have a liberal construction, and therefore was of opinion that the clause relative to the removal by impeachment was intended as a check upon the President, as already mentioned by some gentlemen, and to secure to the people, by means of their representatives, a constitutional mode of obtaining justice against peculators and defaulters in office, who might be protected by the persons appointing them. He apprehended the doctrine held out by the gentleman from South Carolina would involve the Government in great difficulties, if not in ruin, and he did not see it was a necessary construction of the constitution. Why, then, should the House search for a meaning, to make the constitution inconsistent with itself, when a more rational one is at hand? He, however, inclined at present to the sentiments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BLAND,) who thought the Senate ought to be joined with the President in the removal, as they were joined by the constitution in the appointment to office.

Mr. GOODHUE was decidedly against combining the Senate in this business. He wished to make the President as responsible as possible for the conduct of the officers who were to execute the duties of his own branch of the Government. If the removal and appointment were placed in the hands of a numerous body, the responsibility would be lessened. He admitted there was a propriety in allowing the Senate to advise the President in the choice of officers; this the constitution had ordained for wise purposes; but there could be no real advantage arising from the concurrence of the Senate to the removal, but great disadvantages. It might beget faction and party, which would prevent the Senate from paying proper attention to the public business. Upon the whole, he concluded the community would be served by the best men when the Senate concurred with the President in the appointment; but if any oversight was committed, it could best be corrected by the superintending agent. It was the peculiar duty of the President to watch over the executive officers; but of what avail would be his inspection, unless he had a power to correct the abuses he might discover.

Mr. GERRY.--The constitution provides for the appointment of the public officers in this manner: The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. Now, if there be no other clause respecting the appointment, I shall be glad to see how the heads of departments are to be removed by the President alone. What clause is it that gives this power in express terms? I believe there is none such. If there is a power of removal, besides that by impeachment, it must vest somewhere. It must vest in the President, or in the President and Senate, or in the President, Senate, and House of Representatives. Now, there is no clause which expressly vests it in the President. I believe no gentleman contends it is in this House, because that would be that mingling of the executive and legislative powers gentlemen deprecate. I presume, then, gentlemen will grant, that if there is such a power, it vests with the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who are the body that appoints. I think we ought to be cautious how we step in between the President and the Senate, to abridge the power of the one, or increase the other. If the power of removal vests where I suppose, we, by this declaration, undertake to transfer it to the President alone.

It has been mentioned, that it is proper to give this power to the President, in order to make him more fully responsible for this officer. I am for supporting the President to the utmost of my power, and making him as responsible as possible. I would therefore vest every gift of office, in the power of the Legislature, in the President alone; but I cannot think we ought to attempt to give him authority to remove from office, in cases where the constitution has placed it in other hands.

Mr. LIVERMORE considered this as a constitutional question, and was of opinion, that the same power which appointed an officer, had the right of removal also, unless it was restrained by an express declaration to the contrary. As the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is empowered to appoint ambassadors, certainly they have a right to remove them and appoint others. In the case of the judges, they must be appointed for life, or during good behavior. He had no idea, that it could ever enter into the heart of any man living, that all officers appointed under the constitution were to have a perpetuity in office. The judges themselves would not have had this right, if it had not been expressly given by the constitution, but would be removable in like manner with ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. He took it, therefore, in the present case, that the President and the Senate would have the power of removing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The only question, therefore, which appears to be before the committee is, whether we shall give this power to the President alone? And with that he thought they had nothing to do. He supposed, if the clause was left out, the President and the Senate would proceed, as directed by the constitution, to appoint the officer; and hereafter, if they judged it necessary, would remove him; but if they neglected to do so, when it was necessary, by reason of his misdemeanors, this House would impeach him, and so get rid of him on conviction.

Mr. BLAND.--It seems to be agreed on all hands, that there does exist a power of removal; the contrary doctrine would be a solecism in Government. If an officer embezzles the public money, or neglects or refuses to do the duties of his appointment, can it be supposed there is no way of getting rid of such a person? He was certain it was essentially necessary such a power should be lodged somewhere, or it would be impossible to carry the Government into execution. Their inquiries were therefore reduced to this point: Does it reside, agreeably to the constitution, in the President, or in the President and the Senate? The constitution declares, that the President and the Senate shall appoint, and it naturally follows, that the power which appoints shall remove also. What would be the consequence of the removal by the President alone, he had already mentioned, and need not repeat. A new President might, by turning out the great officers, bring about a change of the ministry, and throw the affairs of the Union into disorder: would not this, in fact, make the President a monarch, and give him absolute power over all the great departments of Government? It signifies nothing that the Senate have a check over the appointment, because he can remove, and tire out the good disposition of the Senate.

Mr. CLYMER said, the power of removal was an executive power, and as such belonged to the President alone, by the express words of the constitution: "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Senate were not an executive body; they were a legislative one. It was true, in some instances, they held a qualified check over the executive power, but that was in consequence of an express declaration in the constitution; without such declaration, they would not have been called upon for advice and consent in the case of appointment. Why, then, shall we extend their power to control the removal which is naturally in the Executive, unless it is likewise expressly declared in the constitution?

The question on adding the words "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," as moved by Mr. BLAND, was put and lost.

The question was now taken, and carried by a considerable majority, in favor of declaring the power of removal to be in the President.

WEDNESDAY, May 20.

Treasury Department.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, Mr. TRUMBULL in the chair. The resolution for establishing the Treasury Department being under consideration:

Mr. GERRY.--We are now called upon, Mr. Speaker, to deliberate, whether we shall place this all-important department in the hands of a single individual, or in a Board of Commissioners. I presume the gentleman, who has brought forward this string of propositions, means, that this officer shall have power to examine into the state of the public debt and expenses, to receive and disburse the revenue, to devise plans for its improvement and expansion, and, in short, to superintend and direct the receipts and expenditure, and govern the finances of the United States; having under him officers to do the subordinate business of registering and recording his transactions, and a Comptroller to control his operations with respect to the accounts and vouchers.

Before this committee proceed one step farther in this business, they ought seriously to consider the situation of this country, and what will be the consequence of appointing such an officer; consider how it will affect the public in general, the revenue, and even the Government itself. He is declared, in the list of duties assigned him in the paper read yesterday by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. BENSON,) to have the power to form and digest the accounts, and to control all the officers of the department. It is evident, that we put his integrity to the trial, by such an arrangement. If he is disposed to embezzle the public money, it will be out of the power of the Executive itself to check or control him in his nefarious practices. The extension of his business to the collectors of at least fifty seaports, (over whom the naval officer can have no control, with respect to the money received,) will furnish abundant opportunities for peculation. In addition to the moneys arising from the impost, he may have to do with large sums derived from other quarters, from the sale of the vacant lands, the money of defaulters now due to the United States, and the revenue arising from taxes and excises. Admit these innumerable opportunities for defrauding the revenue, without check or control, and it is next to impossible he should remain unsullied in his reputation, or innoxious with respect to misapplying his trust.

Other great opportunities may arise in case of an anticipation of the public revenue; or, if it is necessary to prevent the injury which a rapid depreciation of the securities would occasion to public credit, he may be employed in purchasing them, in order to advance the credit of the Union. But what is to prevent the greatest imposition in this business? Charging them to the public at their nominal value, it is not in the power of the Government to check this species of speculation; what then is the situation of your officer? He must subject himself to suspicion: indeed, it is as much as his reputation is worth to come into a place of this kind; he can hardly preserve his integrity. His honor, credit, and character, must inevitably be injured. He cannot prove himself innocent of the suspicion, because it is the negative side of the question. He can offer nothing more in his defence than a mere denial of the crime.

There is another point which ought to be well considered: This officer is to digest and form the accounts. He can consequently give the business such complexity, as to render it impossible to detect his impositions; and as the inferior officers, who might discover the fraud, are to be appointed by the principal, will they not consequently be men after his own heart?

Taking these circumstances together, it must be very disagreeable to the person appointed, provided he is an honest, upright man; it will be disagreeable also to the people of the Union, who will always have reason to suspect, that a partiality is shown to the collectors, and other officers of the State to which he belonged. This has absolutely been the case, and was productive of very great dissatisfaction. I would be glad to know of the gentlemen, who are for vesting these powers in a single person, where they will find the man who is capable of performing the duties of a financier? For it is not the mere calling him a financier, and giving him a large salary, that will enable him to perform his functions in such a manner as to give satisfaction. We had once a gentleman who filled such a department, and I believe the only one in the United States who had knowledge and abilities by any means competent to the business; but that gentleman is now employed in another branch of the Government, and cannot be called to this trust. During the late war, Congress thinking it necessary to employ a financier, were led to inquire for a proper character to fill such an office; but not being able to discover such a one in this country, in whose abilities they had sufficient confidence, they wrote to Doctor Price a letter, to induce him to come to America, and accept of an appointment under them, for the superintendence of their finances. He wrote, in answer, that he felt with gratitude the honor which they had done him by their application, and signified, that he was desirous of rendering every service in his power to aid the glorious cause in which America was embarked; but, from his advanced situation in life, and infirmities of body, he was under the necessity of declining. This circumstance serves to show how difficult it is to get a proper person for so arduous an undertaking. But it appears to me, that if we could fix upon a person equal to the office, involving him in forming accounts, and such trifling business, would divert his attention from the more important duties he is called upon to perform. The proper business of finance, I take it, ought to be to consider of the means to improve the revenue, and introducing economy into the expenditures; to recommend general systems of finance, without having any thing to do with the actual administration of them, because, if he engages in the executive business, we shall be deprived of his talents in more important concerns. If it should be granted that there is a person of abilities to be found, adequate to the duties of the office, I want to know where the advantage arises of appointing him alone in preference to a Board? If you have commissioners, you have an opportunity of taking one from each grand division of the United States, namely, the Eastern, the Middle, and Southern Districts. If this person is a member of the Board, is it not evident you will have every advantage from his abilities in such a situation, as you would if he were placed in office without control? If he was possessed of such genius, he could employ it more usefully as a Commissioner of the Board of Treasury, than when left to perform all the drudgery of the executive part; because while his fine imagination was busied in reducing a chaos to a beautiful system, his colleagues might perform those parts which required less elevation of thought; by dividing the burthen, the business would be done with more regularity and facility. Surely no advantage to the public would arise from giving him the sole management of the business, but much inconvenience might; besides, it must unavoidably, as I said before, subject him to suspicions unfavorable to his reputation. This has absolutely been realized; it is not a mere chimera, a matter of speculation. We have had a Board of Treasury, and we have had a Financier. Have not express charges, as well as vague rumors, been brought against him at the bar of the public? They may be unfounded, it is true; but it shows that a man cannot serve in such a station without exciting popular clamor. It is very well known, I dare say, to many gentlemen in this House, that the noise and commotion were such as obliged Congress once more to alter their Treasury Department, and place it under the management of a Board of Commissioners. We have seen speculations excited from this quarter against the Government itself, and painful insinuations of design by his appointment to the Senate. I mention these circumstances to exhibit to your view the inconveniencies to which an officer is subjected by constituting an office of this nature. If the gentleman I have alluded to had been a member of the Board of Treasury, he would not have been subjected to the charges which were brought against him. In such a situation, he could have rendered the services his great abilities enabled him to do, without exposing his character to be torn to pieces by malevolence or detraction.

I am desirous of supporting the President; but the Senate requires to be supported also in their constitutional rights. To this body belongs the confidence of the States; while the President rests his support upon them he will be secure. They, with this House, can give him proper information of what is for the public interest, and, by pursuing their advice, he will continue to himself that good opinion which is justly entertained of him. If we are to establish a number of such grand officers as these, the consequences appear to me pretty plain. These officers, bearing the titles of minister at war, minister of state, minister for the finances, minister of foreign affairs, and how many more ministers I cannot say, will be made necessary to the President. If by this establishment we make them more respectable than the other branches of the Government, the President will be induced to place more confidence in them than in the Senate; the people will also be led to consider them as more consequential persons. But all high officers of this kind must have confidence placed in them; they will in fact be the chancellors, the ministers of the nation. It will lead to the establishment of a system of favoritism, and the principal magistrate will be governed by these men. An oligarchy will be confirmed upon the ruin of the democracy; a Government most hateful will descend to our posterity, and all our exertions in the glorious cause of freedom will be frustrated: we shall go on till we reduce the powers of the President and Senate to nothing but a name. This surely, sir, does not comport with the conduct of the House. We have been very tenacious of giving a title to the President, lest it should be implied we desired to increase his power. We would call him by no other appellation than merely President of the United States. I confess I was not such a stickler about titles as all this, because I did not consider that the liberties of the people could be hurt by such means; but I am not clear that the constitution authorizes us to bestow titles; it is not among the enumerated powers of Congress. But if the constitution did authorize it--[A call to order was made by some of the members, and Mr. GERRY was desired to confine himself to the point; the subject of titles was not before the House.] Mr. GERRY proceeded, and said the Senate were constitutionally the highest officers of Government, except the President and Vice President; that the House was about to supersede them, and place over their heads a set of ministers who were to hold the reins of Government, and all this to answer no good purpose whatever; because the same services could be obtained from subordinate officers.

In short, a Board of Treasury would conduct the business of finance with greater security and satisfaction than a single officer. He had a very good opinion of the gentleman who formerly administered the finances of the United States, and doubted if another of equal qualities could be found; but it was impossible for any person to give satisfaction in such a station. Jealousy would unavoidably be entertained; besides, no inconvenience resulted from the present arrangement of that department; therefore, there could be no good reason to induce a change. If the House was truly republican and consistent, they would not admit officers, with or without titles, to possess such amazing powers as would eventually end in the ruin of the Government. Under these impressions, he moved to amend the resolution so as to read, "there shall be established a Treasury Department, at the head of which there shall be three commissioners, to be denominated the Board of Treasury."

Mr. WADSWORTH.--My official duty has led me often to attend at the treasury of the United States, and, from my experience, I venture to pronounce that a Board of Treasury is the worst of all institutions. They have doubled our national debt. (I do not mean by this observation to censure any man who has been in that office: I presume they were honest men, and did as well as could be done under such a system.) But I do not remember a single instance, in any one board, that I found them to have a system that would give even tolerable satisfaction; there appeared a want of confidence in the members of them all: they seemed to have no fixed principles to guide them, nor responsibility for their conduct.

I have had also transactions at the treasury whilst it was managed by a Superintendent of Finance. As to what fell from the gentleman last up, (though without intention, I dare say, to affect or prejudice the character of that officer, it may possibly have such an effect,) I think it necessary to state my sentiments, which are formed from my own experience as well as from report. I had great transactions with him, and must say that there did appear to be system in his management, and responsibility in his negotiations. I dare risk my fortune and character with him, because there was unity in the officer, and somebody in whom I could confide. The nature of the office is better calculated to give satisfaction than the other. I will not pretend to enumerate the savings he made, by introducing economy throughout the whole departments under Congress, because I do not know them all; but they were very considerable. The administration of the finances was clear to the meanest capacity. Receipts and expenditures were stated simply; they were published to the world. The heads of the Treasury Department, the Board of Commissioners, I do not believe have closed their accounts to this very day. I do not say it is for want of ability, will, or honesty, that this event has not taken place. I conceive it to be owing to their want of system in conducting their business. I wish the committee had before them the transactions of the board for one single month; they would find what I have remarked to be too well founded. Instead of system and responsibility, they would find nothing but confusion and disorder, without a possibility of checking their accounts. I know I am heard by one gentleman who is acquainted with these truths by experience.

I beg leave to repeat once more, that under boards of treasury, there never was a possibility of the public knowing their situation; there is no possibility of getting on with the public accounts and closing them; there have not been the transactions of more than one of the great departments completely settled, owing to a radical defect in their constitution; they cannot proceed with that unity and decision necessary to insure justice. As to what the gentleman said, with respect to the difficulty of getting a proper officer to fill the department, I will just observe, that I do not believe it impossible, and am therefore prepared to attempt it.

Mr. BENSON stated, that in the year 1781, from the very great derangement of public affairs, Congress were induced to place the Treasury Department under the superintendence of an individual. It is true, after the conclusion of the war, in the latter end of 1783, or beginning of 1784, Congress again changed their system, and placed the department in the hands of three commissioners, to be taken, as the gentleman has said, one from the Eastern, one from the Middle, and one from the Southern district; which regulation I think induced above twenty applications. Some gentlemen on this floor will doubtless recollect an observation that was made at that time, that if this trust had been to be reposed in one responsible individual, not perhaps more than three of the candidates would have had confidence to come forward as applicants for the office.

For his part, he conceived, that it required the same abilities in every individual of the commissioners, as was necessary if a single person was placed at the head of the department. If men competent to the undertaking are so difficult to be found, you will increase the embarrassment of the President threefold by making the arrangement the gentleman contends for. The principle upon which the gentleman advocates the appointment of a Board of Treasury, would apply in favor of a change in the constitution, and we ought to have three Presidents of the United States instead of one, because their business might be done with more regularity and facility; but he did not think the argument to be well founded.

Mr. BALDWIN thought that there were very few gentlemen who had much to do with public business, but had turned their attention to this question. He had employed his reflection upon the subject for some time, and his sentiments were against the establishment of a Board of Treasury. He was persuaded there was not so much responsibility in boards as there was in individuals, nor is there such good ground for the exercise of the talents of a financier in that way. Boards were generally more destitute of energy than was an individual placed at the head of a department. The observations of the gentleman from Massachusetts were of great weight, so far as they inferred the necessity of proper checks in the department having care of the public money; if they had system, energy, and responsibility, he should be in favor of them; but his experience had convinced him of the contrary. He was not an advocate for an unlimited authority in this officer. He hoped to see proper checks provided; a Comptroller, Auditors, Register, and Treasurer. He would not suffer the Secretary to touch a farthing of the public money beyond his salary. The settling of the accounts should be in the Auditors and Comptroller; the registering them to be in another officer, and the cash in the hands of one unconnected with either. He was satisfied that in this way the treasury might be safe, and great improvements made in the business of revenue.

Mr. MADISON had intended to have given his sentiments on this subject; but he was anticipated in some things by the gentleman last up. He wished, in all cases of an executive nature, that the committee should consider the powers that were to be exercised, and where that power was too great to be trusted to an individual, proper care should be taken so to regulate and check the exercise, as would give indubitable security for the perfect preservation of the public interest, and to prevent that suspicion which men of integrity were ever desirous of avoiding. This was his intention in the present case. If the committee agreed to his proposition, he intended to introduce principles of caution, which he supposed would give satisfaction on that point. As far as was practicable, he would have the various business of this important branch of the Government divided and modified, so as to lull at least the jealousy expressed by the gentleman from Massachusetts; indeed, he supposed, with the assistance of the committee, it might be formed so as to give satisfaction. He had no doubt but that the offices might be so constituted as to restrain and check each other; and unless an unbounded combination took place, which he could by no means suppose was likely to be the case, that the public would be safe and secure under the administration. He would favor the arrangement mentioned by the worthy gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. BALDWIN,) and after that was separated from the Secretary's duties, he believed the officer would find sufficient business to employ his time and talents in rendering essential services to his country. This arrangement he considered would answer most of the objections which had been urged.