Part 292

He quoted authorities to prove that there never was but one precedent in Great Britain of a negotiator's papers being given up; that was in the last year of the reign of Queen Anne when the Ministry were soon afterwards obliged to fly their country. He was sorry that a gentleman returned by the Republican interest of one of the first cities of the Union should have had recourse to a desperate Tory faction for a precedent.

Some gentlemen had observed that the papers ought to be obtained, because the PRESIDENT had intimated, in his Speech, that he would lay the papers before the House with the Treaty; but they were mistaken in their observations, because the papers had not been laid before us.

A gentleman from Pennsylvania said, because the King of England laid the papers relative to a negotiation before Parliament along with the Treaty to which they related, they had also a right to papers, the Governments being similar; but when the King did this, he informed them that he had concluded such a Treaty; and after a thing was concluded, he did not know what could remain for Parliament to do. He would refer to a recent authority, and not go back to 1714; it was to the case of the Treaty with Great Britain respecting American loyalists, when papers were refused to be given up, and it was deemed a most inconsistent thing to require them. This business caused great debates in Parliament, and the motion for papers was lost, there being only sixty-three for it, and one hundred and four against it. Mr. W. read the observations of different members of Parliament on the occasion, and observed, that although he was unwilling to quote precedents from a Government not similar to ours, yet this was a case in point, and this Treaty was negotiated between Mr. JAY, on the part of the United States, and Mr. OSWALD, on the part of Great Britain.

The resolution before them called for all papers, whether public or private, except such as related to any existing negotiation; but as the Treaty was completed, the resolution included all papers. He should have had less objection to the motion, if the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Virginia had been adopted. He did not see the use the papers would be of if they were got. The House was not vested with either the power to alter or amend the Treaty. But, say gentlemen, they are wanted for information. But he believed they ought to form their judgments of the Treaty from the instrument itself. Suppose I were to employ an agent, and give him instructions to make a contract for me, on condition that it should not be binding until I had approved it; and my agent return and I approve of the contract, what light can be thrown upon it by the instructions which were given to the agent? The instrument alone was what must be had recourse to; because he had it in his power to have withheld his sanction.

If his information was right, when certain resolutions were brought forward in the year 1793, a gentleman from Virginia said that Great Britain would refuse to negotiate with this country; but immediately upon the Treaty being made known, it was every thing that was bad.

He would endeavor to answer some observations which had fallen from a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. GILES.) It was asked if the Treaty power could receive any check? He conceived the will of the people ought to be obeyed. They had given power to the PRESIDENT and Senate to make Treaties, which if not complied with, would be to oppose their will. In speaking of the amendments proposed to the constitution by the Legislature of Virginia, it was said they were only intended to make the check more certain than at present; but he read the resolution, viz: "That no Treaty containing any stipulations upon the subject of the powers vested in Congress by the eighth section of the first article, shall become the supreme law of the land, until it shall have been approved in those particulars by a majority in the House of Representatives. That the PRESIDENT, before he shall ratify any Treaty, shall submit the same to the House of Representatives; and insisted that it might be clearly deduced from them, that they did not conceive the Treaty power to have any check in that House. That State had kept uniformly the same ground in all their actions; but the different State Legislatures to which their amendments had been proposed, had determined the Treaty power rightly placed where it is at present. But because the people will not agree that they should have a check upon the Treaty power, gentlemen seem disposed to usurp it by their present doctrines."

The same gentleman (Mr. GILES) observed, that the checks in the Government of the United States had been completely routed for these six years. He was exceedingly sorry that the PRESIDENT could bind that House, but he said that was a sword that cut two ways. It was too late in the day to assert this doctrine, when the people were become so enlightened as to be better acquainted with the nature of Government, and better educated, than the people of any other nation in the world. They would, therefore, take care of themselves.

He said that a gentleman from South Carolina had observed that the Treaty was put into operation by the Proclamation of the PRESIDENT, and made a part of the laws of the land. An honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) granted that, when completed, the Treaty ought to be annexed to the laws. Mr. W. asked, was this not done? It had been promulgated in the way in which Treaties are directed to be promulgated; and he would ask, if a case were to come before the Judges upon it, whether they would not be bound to consider it as the law of the land? If the member from Virginia (Mr. GILES) had been opposed to the Treaty going into operation, why did he not take the proper mode to prevent it? He knew of the resolution which directed how Treaties are to be promulgated and annexed to our code of laws, he knew the Treaty had arrived, and he might have had the subject discussed. If a majority were for preventing the Treaty from being promulgated in the ordinary way, then the resolution might have been done away, and some other mode adopted which was thought most prudent.

The same gentleman next contended that law can annul Treaties. But he believed that the constitution decided that there was no other way of repealing Treaties but by mutual agreement of the parties, or by war. To break one article of a Treaty was to break the whole, and war, or a new Treaty must be the consequence. The reason he gave why laws could repeal Treaties, was, because laws were the will of the people. Treaties, Mr. W. said, were as much the will of the people as laws. The people had fixed barriers to the different branches of the constitution, which could not be overleaped without endangering the whole fabric.

In speaking of power, gentlemen say it is more likely to be abused in the Executive than in that House. But, in the year 1789, when amendments were first proposed to the States, a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MADISON) asserted "that it was less necessary to guard against abuse in the Executive Department than any other, because it was not the stronger branch of the system, but the weaker; it therefore must be levelled against the Legislative, for it is the most powerful, and the most likely to be abused, because it is under the least control;" and Mr. W. quoted several laws which had originated in that House, by which very large sums of money had been expended to little purpose, which he would explain when they were in a Committee of the Whole on the report from the Committee of Ways and Means.

But gentlemen say, "Have we not as much power as the House of Commons in Great Britain?" He answered, their powers were limited; the constitution was their guide. He thought gentlemen proceeded as if they were about to form a constitution rather than discuss a constitutional question. Some gentlemen had said, Treaties of Amity ought to be vested in the PRESIDENT and Senate; others, that Treaties for a cessation of arms ought to be vested in the Executive; thus they wander, well knowing the ground they had taken was not tenable. It brought to his mind an observation made by an Indian Chief, in a Treaty at Albany, since the late war, who, after thanking the Great Spirit for directing them back in the good old path, which made them happy, lamented, that ever since they had wandered from that path, they had been miserable. So it would be with them if they left the constitution; they would wander from the right path, and involve themselves in difficulties. Appropriations for the army and navy in Great Britain must be made annually, without which they must be discharged. By our constitution we may appropriate for two years for the army, and no mention as to what time for the navy; so that we can make appropriations for a longer time for our army and navy than in Great Britain.

The gentleman (Mr. GILES) further observed, that the opinions entertained in that House three years ago, were not to influence them now; it was necessary however, in Mr. W.'s opinion, that whenever nations changed their customs, some notice ought to be given of the change, that it might be known by nations with whom they may have any transactions. To prove this, he quoted Marten's Law of Nations. The Treaty had been laid before them, that they might appropriate money for carrying it into effect. On the first of June, the British were to give up the Western posts; if money was not appropriated, would they not be deceived?

Before he proceeded to remark on what had fallen from his colleague (Mr. LIVINGSTON) he would mention, that they had, for some years, in general concurred in their political opinions, and during the present session they had varied very little; in the question before the House, however, they should differ very considerably. Soon after the constitution was framed, a Convention was held in the State of New York, in which he had the honor to be a member. He was fully of opinion at that time, as he was now, that the Treaty power was a dangerous power, and, in consequence, gave his dissent to it.

He would proceed to remark on what had fallen from his colleague. He had said, how could they determine whether the Treaty was constitutional or not, or whether an impeachment was necessary, without information? The papers, as he had said before, were open for ten weeks, during which time gentlemen might have had access to them. But that gentleman said, they had denied him of late, and so they had been to him; but he understood they were at the Secretary of State's office, and might be seen there. He mentioned a case of a Treaty with a foreign country, in which their Minister might have received presents; but declared, that he did not believe there was any corruption in the negotiation of the Treaty in question. It appeared to him, therefore, inconsistent still to talk of impeachment.

Suppose, for instance, his colleague was Attorney General of the State of New York, and a man were to charge another with being guilty of burglary, whose character, reputation, and standing in life were irreproachable, would he subpoena him to meet the charge? No, he would not. And still the case is exactly similar to the present.

If, said Mr. W., his colleague or any member of the House wanted the papers, they had only to rise in their place and declare there were grounds of suspicion for an impeachment; would any member refuse the call? But he presumed no such thing was thought of. Why, then, expend so much precious time unnecessarily? The gentleman believed that the Minister had deviated from the instructions originally given him; but that he received new instructions. Whatever instructions were given to him, it appears, by the Treaty being ratified, that he executed them to the satisfaction of his employer.

It may be, said Mr. W., that this House may determine that it has a check on the Treaty-making power; but the next Congress may say there is no such thing. Whether there is, or there is not this check, it is necessary for the stability of the Government to have it determined; and he would join in sentiment with the gentleman from Maryland in a wish that it might be settled. But he would have the amendment constitutionally made; for, if we ourselves do not understand the constitution, it is not likely that our constituents at large should understand it. If I am wrong now in the true meaning of the constitution, I have been wrong since its adoption. The people are the sovereign; their will shall be my guide, from which I will not, knowingly, depart. I live in the midst of a body of plain but intelligent freemen, whose employment is the cultivation of the earth, and who prize nothing beyond the freedom they enjoy. They are jealous of their liberties, but they are obedient to, and willing to respect and support the laws of the land. How will they know the laws, if we do not understand the constitution after it has been in operation for nearly eight years?

Gentlemen observed, that if the Treaty-making power was meant to be vested solely in the PRESIDENT and Senate, it would have been said so explicitly; but, he thought, if the constitution had intended that House to have interfered in Treaties, that would have been expressed, as a few words would have done it.

His colleague asserted, that that House had the power of carrying into effect or not any Treaty; but he thought the House obliged to carry into effect all Treaties constitutionally and completely made. To support his doctrine, Mr. LIVINGSTON had referred to the practice of Great Britain, and singled out the Treaty of Utrecht.

In England, said Mr. W., the Treaty-making power is in the King. A Treaty, when made by him, pledges the public faith and binds the nation; but the Courts of Law and the officers of the revenue do not consider Treaties as the supreme law (when they change the regulations of commerce or interfere with previous acts of Parliament) until Parliament has passed acts conformably to such stipulations of a Treaty. The propriety, and, indeed, necessity of this rule, results from the monarchical form of that Government, the power of the King alone to repeal existing laws being a just ground of apprehension. From a like apprehension, a Treaty, though negotiated and made in all its parts by the PRESIDENT, must be submitted to the Senate for their ratification. The Senate is a popular assembly, and representing the States. The concurrence of two-thirds is equal on every principle of combining the public will with the acts of the constituted authorities to the sanction of Parliament.

In England, Treaties of Peace, of Alliance, and, perhaps, many others, are perfect and binding without co-operation of Parliament. The opinion of some is understood to be, and Blackstone seems to be of the number, that every Treaty, when made by the King, is obligatory without the concurrence of Parliament. The practice, however, is to lay Treaties before Parliament when laws are necessary to carry them into effect, and for Parliament to pass such laws. And, although a very broad discretion has been claimed in Parliament to pass or reject such laws, the uniform practice, except in one instance, has been to pass them. The faith of the nation is considered as pledged. The case where laws to carry the Treaty into effect have been refused, is the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1714. The credit of the example is much abated by the circumstances of the times when it happened. The Duke of Marlborough had been displaced, but his friends were powerful; a Tory Minister was in power and much hated; Queen Anne was decaying, and died that year, and the succession to the Crown was doubtful. Parties were ready to draw the sword against each other, and the most distinguished Ministers were soon proscribed and fled the country. A civil war broke out in 1715, the next year. One only example in such times, and the forerunner and cause of such events, weighs little against the course of practice in numberless cases, all issuing another way. It proves that the practice of Parliament corresponds with our doctrine. If, however, their maxims are different, so is their constitution in this particular. The act of the King should be compared with the act of the PRESIDENT alone; and the ratification of the Senate should be, and, by our constitution, it must be, considered equal to the sanction of Parliament. The doctrine ascribed by Mr. GALLATIN to the Parliament affords a reason for their calling for papers; because, he says, they are to act upon them. Yet such call is seldom made, and would probably be refused, if made without manifest occasion for the papers. Our constitution has settled a different doctrine; and, as the papers cannot be needed, they cannot properly be asked for.

He doubted not that the Treaty lately concluded with Great Britain had ere now been laid before Parliament, and a sum of money granted for recompensing spoliations committed in this country. Should they then attempt to refuse appropriations for carrying the Treaty into effect, on their part, where would be their national honor, their national faith? Suppose the Treaty were a bad bargain, that would not authorize them to break it. No: if a bad bargain be made to-day, make a better to-morrow. Neither should they determine the thing before it came before them. Probably they may not find it so bad as it had been represented; for though it might, in some respects, narrow our commercial intercourse, yet, perhaps, by so doing, the agricultural interest would be proportionally benefited. He was convinced that the agricultural interest was the true interest of this country. If by the Treaty we find that it tends to the welfare of the farmer, we may conclude our negotiator had the true interest of his country in view; and it was his (Mr. W.'s) opinion that a man taken from the plough and put on board a vessel was a man lost to the true interest of this country. This country is not like that of Great Britain: they are confined to small islands; we have a country extensive and fertile, and it is our duty to encourage settlers, increase our numbers, and, by so doing, we shall soon be in a situation to bid defiance to all the world. He was willing to encourage commerce to its full proportion, but not so as to injure the agricultural interest. The third article in the Treaty had been quoted by a gentleman from Maryland (Mr. S. SMITH) as having a tendency to operate unequally in our impost duties; Mr. W. observed he did not think that was very exceptionable, so far as it had been explained. He did not think the third clause of the Treaty a bad one: it only went to this, that when Great Britain carried goods through our country they were to pay the same duty as American citizens. And would not this be a greater advantage to the United States than if they went up the rivers St. Lawrence or Mississippi, and paid no duty? All the duty received of them would be so much gain to the country.

His colleague (Mr. LIVINGSTON) went on too contemporaneous a construction, and said that the House were better able to judge of the meaning of the constitution than the conventions which were held to consider upon its adoption. He did not think so. He said, he had always been called an anti-Federalist, and was so considered to this day. He would willingly join to obtain an amendment to the constitution with respect to the Treaty power; but, because he did not believe the constitution contemplated an interference in that House in respect to Treaties, he could not agree to the proposed doctrine.

Mr. W. said, it was not necessary for him to go into the argument which induced the convention to fix the Treaty-making power: it need only be mentioned that they knew how and where that power was exercised in Great Britain; and, in order to avert the difficulties which had arisen there, the convention vested the power with the PRESIDENT and Senate; and, to guard against undue influence, directed that two-thirds of the Senators present should concur with the PRESIDENT. The convention had many difficulties to surmount in this article; they had to do away the equal power the small States shared, under the Confederation, with the large States. But, to do away the discordant interests of the different States and to give the small States satisfaction, agreed that all the States should be equally represented in the Senate. In the Treaty-making power each State hath an equal voice. To extend it further, for another check, without the consent of the smaller States, would be doing away, in part, that power which the small States had retained.

He read the observations of one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, when debating on the merits of the constitution in the convention held in that State, to prove that Treaties were considered to be paramount to any law. Among the several passages from the debates of the Convention of New York, Mr. W. read the following proposed amendment of Mr. Lansing, who was a member of the convention that formed the constitution of the United States, whose abilities and candor were not doubted by any who knew him:

"Resolved, As the opinion of this committee, that no Treaty ought to operate so as to alter the constitution of any State; nor ought any commercial Treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the United States."

He believed that the amendments proposed in the Virginia Convention arose from their considering that there was no check in that House: the contrary supposition, he said, would be like rowing a boat one way and looking another.

His colleagues read extracts from the journals to prove that the PRESIDENT had laid before that House instructions which he had given his Ministers employed on the Treaty business. He believed, when much money was likely to be wanted, it was prudent and right to do so. It was as if he asked that House whether it would agree to a proposed negotiation or declare war--as if he had said, "I cannot unlock your Treasury; which way would you have me act?" It was inconsistent to say that he had diminished his power by asking advice. Books, he said, might be produced without number; but nothing could be brought to justify the breaking of a contract constitutionally made. It has become the law of the land. The House has, indeed, the physical power to refuse to appropriate to carry such a Treaty into effect; but the constitution meant that what was done by one branch of the Legislature should be confirmed by the others, except the act was unconstitutional. If a Treaty was constitutional, they were therefore impliedly bound to carry it into effect.