Part 287

Was it not strange, that, to this late hour, it should have been delayed, and that now, all at once, it should have been discovered, that no power was delegated to any person to regulate our foreign relations? That, although a power was granted to the PRESIDENT and Senate to form Treaties, that yet there were such reservations and restrictions, that there remained nothing on which this power could operate? Or was it true, that this power was competent to treat with every government on earth but that of Great Britain? Might he not be permitted further to inquire, if this Treaty had been formed with any other power, with the precise stipulations it now contained, whether there ever would have existed this doubt of constitutionality.

MARCH 14.--In Committee of the Whole on Mr. LIVINGSTON's resolution:

Mr. SAMUEL LYMAN said he rose only to make a few observations. He was against the resolution now on the table, as involving a doctrine, in his opinion, not only inconsistent with the principles of the constitution, but also inconsistent with the laws of nations. In debating the merits of this resolution, an exceedingly important abstract constitutional question had arisen, viz: How far that House had a right to exercise their Legislative discretion and judgment relative to carrying a Treaty into effect. In order to answer this question, he would raise two premises. And, first, by the constitution, the Legislative powers of that House, in co-operation with the other branches of the Legislature, extend to all objects within the reach of their sovereignty, excepting the reservations to the distinct sovereignties of the several States which compose the Union; but beyond those boundaries their powers could not extend. Secondly, there is, by the constitution, attached to the Legislature a subordinate kind of power, of a limited and ministerial, or Executive nature. At present, it did not occur to him that this subordinate power was to be exercised in its simplicity, excepting in two instances, viz: 1st, for calling a Convention under certain circumstances to amend the constitution; and, 2dly, for carrying into effect Treaties which are constitutionally made; for these two purposes, the people, who are the source of power, had stripped that House of all Legislative authority, and made them only the executors of their will; therefore, upon these premises he answered, if a Treaty was unconstitutional, they had an undoubted right to exercise a Legislative discretion and judgment relative to carrying it into operation, for they were sent there as the guardians of the rights of their fellow-citizens, and, for that purpose, are sworn to support the constitution; but if the Treaty was constitutional, they had not a right to exercise that discretion; for, without their intervention, it becomes the supreme law of the land, and virtually repeals all laws which are repugnant to it; and in that case that House is bound to obey it, and to carry it into complete execution; for, by the constitution, the power of making Treaties is vested solely and exclusively in the Executive Department. In the former case, they have a right to exercise a deliberative or Legislative power, but not in the latter case; they could there only exercise a ministerial or Executive power. So that herein, said he, lies the true distinction, and it arises from the nature and principles of the constitution.

He had not the least doubt of the constitutionality of a treaty, when the stipulations in it were of such a nature as not to respect objects of legislation, but only objects which lay beyond the bounds of their sovereignty; for beyond those limits their laws could not extend as rules to regulate the conduct of subjects of foreign Powers; and although some stipulations in a Treaty may respect objects which were within the reach of their sovereignty, yet it may be in such manner as to be strictly constitutional; for such stipulations may be not only pertinent, but absolutely necessary in forming the Treaty. This conclusion, he thought, was the natural and necessary result of a fair and liberal construction of the principles of the constitution, and especially of that paragraph which vests the power of making Treaties in the Supreme Executive, with the advice of the Senate.

Mr. L. said he was sensible he had been delivering an unpopular doctrine, but that he was deeply impressed with its truth, its reality, and its importance; and that the obligations of an oath had prevented his silence on the occasion.

Mr. BALDWIN said he had before expressed his opinion, in general terms, in favor of this question. It must have been observed that he had been for several days noting the debates, and preparing to take part in them. He had intended to have introduced the debate on Friday morning last, but a singular incident prevented him, which he felt it to be his duty to take this earliest opportunity to state to the House. Mr. B. then said: about five minutes before I expected to rise on the question, I was called out of the House by a person then unknown to me, who said his name was FRELINGHUYSEN, and whom I found to be a Senator of the United States. After a number of interviews, he observed, with great expressions of pain and regret, that he was at last obliged to the unwelcome office of delivering me that letter, which I opened and found to be a challenge directed to me from JAMES GUNN, who is also a Senator of the United States. The pretext for this transaction was, to extort from me some private letters which I had received early in the session from a number of my constituents, expressing their wish that I would endeavor to prevent any thing being done in Congress to validate the Mississippi Yazoo Land Speculation before the meeting of the State Legislature. There was no complaint of any personal indecorum or disrespect at all; whether they were actuated in their conduct solely by interest in Yazoo speculations, I will not pretend to judge. The revival of a transaction of so old a date at that particular moment, was to me surprising. Not knowing their degree of relation to this question between the two Houses, and not knowing the cast of character but of one of them, I am left only to conjecture. It was so peculiarly timed, and the professed object also of so peculiar a nature, to interrupt the channels of confidence for free communication between me and my constituents, that I have thought it my duty not to let the treatment of it depend on my own individual discretion. I consider it as in the discretion of the House. Mr. B. also observed that he felt himself under the necessity of using this as an apology for the apparent neglects of Friday, after the particular attention he had before appeared to pay to the discussion; and for his not being able to notice any of the proceedings in the debate of Friday, he had supposed he had lost the opportunity of offering his opinion, but was glad to find the question had not been taken, as he was unwilling to suffer this, or even a greater interruption, to prevent him from declaring his opinion, as he had before intended.

He said, it was remarkable that several gentlemen rose with very different expressions which had been said to contain the subject in discussion. It was certainly important to agree exactly on that point. The least variation in the point of departure would soon diverge till they were out of sight of each other, and yet each one keep a straight direction. One gentleman had stated, that the question was, whether this House should feel itself at liberty to judge over the heads of PRESIDENT and Senate on the subject of Treaties without restraint: his reasoning seemed to be built on that proposition. Another gentleman had said that the question was, whether the power of making Treaties was given by the constitution to the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate, or to the PRESIDENT and both branches of the Legislature. He might mention several others, but he called the attention of the House to the fact, to settle the point, that they might at least agree what they were talking about. The question, said he, on the table is, to request of the PRESIDENT papers respecting the Treaty: the objection is, you ought not to ask for the papers, because you have no right to touch the subject. He begged leave then to ask, with the utmost candor and respect, whether the real question now depending and brought into dispute by this motion, is not whether all questions relating to this subject are not so definitely and perfectly settled by the constitution, that there was nothing for that House to deliberate upon on the occasion, but only punctually to provide the funds to carry the Treaty into effect. If it were allowed that there might be any possible or extraordinary cases on the subject of Treaty-making, in which it might ever be proper for that House to deliberate--as, for instance, offensive Treaties which might bring the country into a war--subsidies and support of foreign armies--introduction of an established religion from a foreign country, or any other of those acts which are by the constitution prohibited to Congress, but not prohibited to the makers of Treaties; if it were allowed that there might possibly exist any such case, in which it might ever be proper for Congress to deliberate, it would seem to be giving up the ground on which the discussion of the present question has been placed; what agency the House should take, and when, would be other questions. Whether a case would probably occur once in a hundred years that would warrant the House in touching the subject, is of no consequence to the debate. The right is denied in the largest sense. The assertion is, that the House has no right to deliberate or to look into any papers on the subject; that the people have, by the constitution, reposed the whole of their confidence on this subject elsewhere; that, to attempt to deliberate upon it, or to ask for any papers respecting it, is treason and anarchy.

If this ground were once given up, he should be infinitely less anxious what the House might do in any particular case: these would rest on their individual merits. For his own part, he was by no means disposed to carry the interference of the House to any extreme; but he could not express his abhorrence of the doctrine in the extent to which some gentlemen have carried it in this discussion. He begged leave to entreat gentlemen again candidly to review the few words in the constitution on which they rested so much, and to ask whether they appeared to be such labored expressions as they supposed--so apt and definite as to mean exactly what they contend for, and nothing else; and whether all the words may not well be satisfied without, and stand more harmoniously connected with the other parts of the constitution.

How much they intended to incorporate with this power of Treaty-making, under cover of contract with foreign nations, he had not heard any one attempt to explain; it seemed designed to stand distinguished as an indefinite, uncontrolled branch of the Government, the extent of whose powers was to be known only by its own acts. Its definition was to be, that it was indefinite--like what is said of some branches of the powers of Parliament; that no one has pretended or ought to pretend to know their extent; that they are not to be submitted to the judgment of any one but themselves; and that they never develope them but by the particular exercise of them; that they were to be left in this state, because, if they were defined, they might be eluded. However this might be found respecting a foreign constitution, it is making a monster of our own. There was not another part or lineament in it which appeared to be in the same mould or proportion.

Mr. B. then undertook to state his own view of the subject, and what he thought ought to be done. Much, he said, depended on the words "make Treaties and supreme law of the land;" as to the words supreme law of the land, he had not much doubt for what purpose solely they were introduced. The words were satisfied, and he thought most naturally, by not suffering them to disturb the balance of the Federal Constitution, for that is not the subject which the section where these words are used is speaking of; but to consider them as giving to the Treaty-making power the same paramount authority over the laws and constitutions of the several States, that they give at the same time to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The words appear to be introduced for the express purpose of making the Constitution, laws, and Treaties of the United States, paramount to the constitutions and laws of the several States, and for no other purpose; this is all that the section appears to be speaking of; it satisfies the words, is the most obvious and natural meaning, and leaves the other parts of the constitution harmonious and undisturbed. As to the words "power to make Treaties," it was more difficult to ascertain precisely what the constitution meant to give by them. It had been argued that from the nature of governmental powers, the Treaty-making power must be paramount, and from the nature of contract it must be paramount. The truth is, the Treaty-making power must be what the constitution has made it. He did not hesitate to say, that the most natural meaning to give these words, was to consider them as borrowed from former use, and to give them the meaning which they had always before given them. Gentlemen had said that nothing useful could be derived from English books and explanations on these terms. This seemed to him an unreasonable assertion. It might as well be said that they could not use an English Dictionary to ascertain the meaning of words. In many sciences, said he, there are definite and appropriate phrases as well as definite and appropriate words; and, in fact, books which are dictionaries of phrases, ascertain the meaning of phrases with as much precision as dictionaries ascertain the meaning of words. It is exceedingly useful that it should be so. When such a precise meaning is fixed to a phrase, and publicly known, it is apt to remain a long time exact, as it is frequently employed, and is very useful as a medium of certainty. Many instances of this kind might be quoted, particularly from English books on law and government. He would observe further, these appropriate phrases had been for their certainty in many instances transferred into our constitution, and their meaning must be manifestly sought in those sources as in a dictionary. One remarkable instance occurred to him, and which, from the singularity of its garb, would be very discernible in the constitution--he meant the definition of treason in the third section of the third article of the constitution. The phrase is levying war, adhering to enemies, giving them aid and comfort. These are the very words of the English books, which have been so critically judged that they are not capable of the least variation in their meaning on that tremendous subject; but this meaning is to be sought from those sources; he might mention several instances, but it was unnecessary. He thought the phrase, power to make Treaties, should be ascertained in the same manner; and the English meaning, as it would naturally be understood at the time of making the constitution, should be affixed to it; that it should be considered as giving to the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate the same kind of power as the King of England possesses on the subject of Treaties, which it is known is in several cases subject to the control of Parliament. Here it is qualified by the powers specifically given to Congress.

Mr. HOLLAND said: It is with great diffidence I rise on this important subject, to submit some considerations to this committee. As it has now become a constitutional question, not with respect to the merits of the Treaty, but with respect to the constitutional right of this House to request the Executive to furnish us with papers that related to the Treaty antecedent to its ratification.

To this it is objected that this House has no discretionary power over the Treaty, and, on that account, has nothing to do with the papers.

The question is not whether the Treaty is a good or bad Treaty, but it is whether we have a right to exercise our judgments upon it. Then, without any regard to the Treaty, we must be governed by the rational construction of the fundamental principles of government.

To illustrate which, it may be necessary to examine what has been incident to the different kinds of government, according to the histories of those nations governed by despotism, monarchs, or republics; and from the Constitution of the United States as the fundamental maxims of the Republic, draw that construction that is most rational and natural.

It will also be proper to examine which of those governments preserves the most power in the people.

First, then, of monarchy. Where has that power been placed? According to the theory of the English Government it has been lodged in the Sovereign, for it is there expressly said (nor has it been denied on this floor) that the King is the source of all power; and it is also expressly declared that the King of Great Britain has sovereign and exclusive right to make Treaties. That, when they are made, they cannot be impeded or annulled by any existing power in the kingdom. This is the theory of that Government. But what has been the practice? I answer, the contrary; for it ever has been that, when a Treaty was made, the same has been submitted to the Parliament for concurrence; and Parliament, if they thought proper, admitted and sometimes annulled them, as in the Treaty of Utrecht, and sundry instances that the history of that nation affords us. The English Government, therefore, is in practice what it is not in theory. By the construction of the constitution, as contended for, by giving uncontrollable power to twenty Senators and the PRESIDENT, our Government will be in practice what the English Government is in theory. If this doctrine had been believed, that this was the true construction of the constitution, previous and at the time of its adoption, would the people of the United States have adopted it? If they had been informed that, by this instrument, they were ceding more power to two-thirds of the Senators and PRESIDENT, than even could be practised by the King of England, with his lords spiritual and temporal, under that impression would they have ceded that power? Or, if they had been told that the House of Representatives, under this constitution, had less power than was exercised by the House of Commons in England; that they would be less able to secure their liberties in this country against the approaches of prerogative, would they have, under that belief, accepted of this constitution? I think, Mr. Chairman, I may venture to say they would not.

With respect to the more absolute government of France, where has this power been lodged? In this, as in the monarchy of England, it was, in theory, lodged in a prince; but the theory, even in that despotic government, never could be carried into practice. According to Vattel, in the Treaty made by Francis I., in the Treaty of Madrid, on account of that Treaty encroaching on the fundamentals of their government, it was set aside. How was this done? It was not done by Parliament, for they had none; but the principal people of the kingdom met together at Cogniac and annulled it. I ask again, Mr. Chairman, if the people of this country possess less power than the people of that despotic Government? Or do they possess less power to withstand the usurpations of the Executive, on the subject of Treaties, in their Representatives in Congress, than has ever been maintained in the cramped situation of the people of England by the House of Commons?

Why were these rights ever maintained and so scrupulously attended to by the people of those countries? It was because they considered them as the palladium of their remaining liberty,--they therefore, would not let them go.

Then, with respect to a Republic, the sovereign power is in the people. It therefore follows that whatever can be effected by the people in those countries can be done here--they being the source of power.

Then, with regard to the constitution, it must be construed naturally and liberally in behalf of the people. Not as giving all power that can be given, but as retaining all power and natural right that ought to be retained. It would have been extremely improper to have wantonly discarded natural privilege, or ceded more power than was essential to government; nor was any more intended to be given.

The constitution, upon the face of it, shows that this is the case--limits are prescribed to governmental power. Not so in the countries spoken of, yet the people exercise it. But it is said our constitution has not retained this privilege, and it is the law and the testimony, sacred volume, &c. The sacredness depends upon the attention to the principles that procured its adoption; when that is contravened a violence is made upon the rights of the people. If, by any construction that can be given, these rights can be preserved, it is wise to consider it as the better opinion. But it is said to be impossible that this power has been ceded, subject to no control, to the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senators present; that, whatever may be the practice in other countries, it will not apply to this; that those countries have no constitution, and that we have, and must be governed by it. Unfortunate circumstance! why adopted? Was it wantonly to throw away a privilege and natural right? Certainly not, but the contrary. It was to secure natural right, and to establish a Republican form of Government.

I considered that the Executive had absolute power to make peace; as by the constitution he is declared Commander-in-chief of all the armies, his situation enabled him to be the best judge of the forces and of the force he had to contend with, and as secrecy was necessary to effecting a Treaty of Peace, that power was properly vested in him, guarded by two-thirds of the Senate. But a Treaty of Commerce presupposes an existing peace, and in those Treaties secrecy is not essential; but a competent knowledge of the produce of the respective States in all their remote situations was necessary; which would be best obtained by an association of the three branches of Government.

This is a Treaty of Commerce, and therefore has involved Legislative objects. It consequently requires Legislative sanction; a contrary construction would be a violation of the constitution and of the principles upon which it was adopted, and therefore a violation of the rights of the people.

I confess, on viewing the exception and force of the argument, that I had some doubt, that when the government became old and corrupt, that this perversion might be attempted; but had no idea that in the course of six years it would be contended for.

Mr. BRADBURY observed, that the most plausible reason that he had heard in support of the resolution under the consideration of the committee resulted from a principle advanced by a member from Pennsylvania, who spoke upon the subject last week. The principle was this; that where any articles of a Treaty were repugnant to prior existing acts of Congress, those acts must first be repealed by Congress before such Treaty can become the law of the land; and it was said some of the articles of the British Treaty were of this nature. He would not stay to examine the truth of the fact, for admitting it to be true, he altogether denied the principle; but yet he acknowledged that if it could be made out, it would afford the best reason yet given for calling for the papers. If their concurrence was necessary to give existence or legality to the Treaty, he saw not why they ought not to be favored with the papers as well as the Senate. But he asserted and would endeavor to prove, that the Treaty has already a legal existence; that it is now the law of the land; and that, therefore, no act of Congress is, or can be, necessary to make it so; and, therefore, that House could have no need of the papers, nor any right to call for them on that ground.

That the Treaty had already become the law of the land, and that no Legislative act of Congress was necessary to make it so, he argued wholly from the constitution itself, by which alone the question must at last be determined.

That instrument expressly declares, that all Treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land. He laid no stress upon the word supreme, admitting for argument's sake, that the supremacy ascribed to the constitution and laws, and Treaties made under it, meant a supremacy over the constitution and laws of individual States. All he asked to be granted him, and which he thought could not be denied, was that a Treaty made under the authority of the United States was the law of the land. If so, then all that needed to be proved was, that a Treaty made by the PRESIDENT, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, was a Treaty made under the authority of the United States. And to prove that, he needed only to mention another clause in the constitution, which expressly declares that the PRESIDENT, with such advice and consent, shall have power to make Treaties.

He nowhere read in the constitution that any act of Congress, in any possible case, was necessary to make a Treaty, so as that without it such Treaty could not be the law of the land. He nowhere read that prior acts of Congress repugnant to a Treaty must first be repealed before a Treaty could be a law.