Part 194

Accordingly, Mr. G. presented a written statement of facts which the PRESIDENT of the Senate read. It contained a narrative of several transactions from the time of Mr. G.'s arrival in the province of Maine, or Massachusetts, about thirteen years ago. Of his having contributed by money and his own services as a volunteer, in the cause of the revolution. Of his having taken oaths of allegiance and purchased lands in that State, and also in the State of Virginia. In the back parts of the last-mentioned State, he had formed an interesting settlement, and had been extremely useful in bringing settlers from Europe. The dates of those transactions and times of his arrival in Pennsylvania, and of being sent to the State Convention, are also recited, up to the time of his being chosen one of their Representatives in the Senate of the United States.

After the PRESIDENT had done reading the statement of facts, Mr. G. addressed the Senate, by observing, that he felt himself rather in an awkward predicament, not knowing whether the counsel for the prosecutors or himself were the proper person to speak the first, as this preliminary was not yet laid down by the Senate, neither had he provided any counsel. He should have supposed himself in the situation of defendant, were it not that the weight of proving the affirmative in regard to citizenship had been laid on him, under which predicament it might perhaps be necessary for him to begin, and after the counsel for the petitioners had spoken, that he should then be allowed to close the arguments.

Mr. LIVERMORE was of opinion, that the sitting member should begin to debate, as the onus probandi lay with him.

The counsel for the petitioners, Mr. LEWIS, rose. He was attended by Mr. Schmyser, one of the members of the Senate of Pennsylvania, who, we understand, manages the prosecution on the part of the petitioners. Mr. L. hoped he would be permitted to say a few words in the early stage of the business, in regard to the manner of conducting it. He recapitulated sundry offices and posts of honor that had been conferred on him, from which he humbly presumed he had gathered much experience, and particularly in cases of contested elections. He would, therefore, beg leave of the honorable Senate, to offer an observation before they should determine on the mode of conducting the trial. When the question for postponement, which was debated the other day, was before them, the sitting member did then consider himself as defendant, and for an hour had fought phantoms of his own imagination, but now he has changed his ground, and desires to have the privileges which belong to the petitioners only, namely, the right of opening the prosecution, and afterwards concluding the arguments.

Mr. GALLATIN submitted to the decision of the Senate, and said he did not wish to contend for mere matters of form.

Mr. MARTIN (from N. Carolina) thought it immaterial who began or concluded, if in the end the Senate should be enabled to arrive at a just degree of information.

Mr. JACKSON (from Georgia) made some observations on the manner of conducting the business. He thought it would be incumbent on the counsel for the petitioners to prove that Mr. GALLATIN was not a citizen, &c.

Mr. KING (from New York) and some other gentleman of the Senate, said a few more words on the motion; it was agreed that the sitting member should begin.

Mr. GALLATIN accordingly rose and recapitulated the facts stated in the written paper which he had presented to the PRESIDENT, commenting on each of them as he proceeded. He proved that he had been an inhabitant of the United States for thirteen years, and was one before the peace of 1783, and before the Confederation. He quoted the laws previous thereto respecting aliens, and also the British statutes, and he maintained that they were all done away by the Revolution. He conceived himself a citizen in common with the other citizens of the United States, from the time of his first qualifying after his arrival and attachment to the country. He concluded by saying, he would reserve the remainder of his defence until after he should hear the counsel on behalf of the petitioners.

Mr. Lewis commenced his speech by observing, that he appeared there on behalf of Conrad Laub, and other respectable men, who complained of the unconstitutionality of admitting Mr. GALLATIN to a seat in the Senate. He was glad to find, by the gentleman's expressions, that the ground of debate had been narrowed into so small a compass, and he would therefore take him up from the argument where he had left off speaking, that of his being a citizen in common of the United States, from the time of his qualifying in Massachusetts or Virginia. But in Virginia two oaths are required, and they must be taken in a court, not before a magistrate, to entitle a man to citizenship. He must also be possessed of a certain quantity of property and be a resident for two years. It appears Mr. G. did not remain in Virginia more than two months. (Here Mr. Lewis read the law of Virginia of the 20th October, 1783.) On this law Mr. L. argued that Mr. G. had not gone through the necessary qualifications to entitle him to citizenship there; and he observed, that he admired the gentleman's candor in not insisting on it here. In this State he had certainly not qualified himself agreeably to the law. Under these circumstances, Mr. L. for his part could never admit of the gentleman's right to citizenship so far back as to entitle him to the suffrage of a vote for a seat in the Senate, &c.

The mischievous consequences of permitting such innovations, he represented in strong terms; and he called to the recollection of the Senate, the conduct of ancient and modern governments on this question. One of the ancient republics made it death for an alien to intermeddle in their politics. The sentiments of antiquity, and those of men in modern days, proved the justice of these conclusions.

With regard to the arguments of the gentleman respecting his being entitled to be a citizen of the Union, or any individual State of it, because he had qualified himself to be citizen of one of them, Mr. L. said, was a mere bubble, for surely the gentleman was not one of the mass of citizens at the accomplishment of independence.

The doctrine of the old law, which the gentleman says was done away by the Revolution, in respect to aliens, may have been so with regard to the British King; it was still, however, virtually in force against the gentleman. But supposing it to be done away, how do the constitutions of the different States stand on this head? Is it not implied by all of them, that certain oaths, residence, and property, make the requisites to form citizenship? In Massachusetts a foreigner is not a citizen, without he complies with those terms. [Here he quoted p. 70 of the small volume of the Laws of Massachusetts. He also cited the act in favor of John Jarvis and others; also, p. 104 of the same book, and p. 191 and 192.] From these he maintained, that no such wild idea was ever contemplated by either the law of Massachusetts or Virginia, as to admit foreigners or persons from other States to citizenship, immediately on their entrance within their limits.

The situation of the sitting member, with respect to the constitution and laws of Pennsylvania, he had little doubt was similar to what he had mentioned in regard to the other States, although he would not assert it as a fact. [He read the 42d section, and also in p. 43 of the Law of Pennsylvania, 13th March, 1789, a proviso which contains some precautions requiring records to be kept by the master of the rolls of the persons admitted to citizenship.] The same principle pervades all the States as well as it does the Constitution of the United States. The absurdity of applying it in any other sense, was severely pictured by Mr. L., and to admit the idea advanced by the sitting member, was as inadmissible as it was novel. In support of what he wished to impress on the minds of the Senate, Mr. L. quoted the 1st vol. of the Journals of Congress in 1774 and 1775, pp. 28 and 29. He then recurred to Blackstone, vol. I, pp. 63, 64, and 69; also 73 and 79.

It was not his intention to quote the Parliamentary Laws of England in support of any thing, but such parts of their Common Law as could be got over--that Common Law of England which was imported by our ancestors, and handed down to them by the people, not the Parliament. The people had made the Common Law, from time to time. The Saxons, Normans, &c, were all concerned in making and improving it, until it had finally reached that degree of perfection in which it was given to us by our ancestors, and it was founded in wisdom and justice.

Mr. L. next quoted, first Blackstone, 402, which was one of the British laws that had never been admitted in this country, and which, he hoped, never would, viz: that wherein the distinction is drawn between the Commoner and the Peer, an oath being required of the Commoner, upon all occasions, and no more than "upon my honor" from a Peer, except in giving evidence in civil or criminal trials.

Mr. L. concluded, by saying that the difficulties which stood between Mr. GALLATIN and his seat, were insurmountable and could not be removed without showing a law of Massachusetts, Virginia, &c., repealing those laws in regard to the qualification of citizens, which he had mentioned, but which repeal he was certain did not exist. He therefore stated, that to insist upon the gentleman's right to a seat, was both novel and absurd. These were his opinions, which he had given in a perfectly extempore way, not having been allowed time nor expecting to meet the subject on the new ground which it had this day taken in the Senate.

Mr. GALLATIN said, he would pledge himself to the Senate, to prove that the grounds of his arguments and his construction of the Confederation and laws of the States, were neither novel nor absurd, except in Mr. L.'s construction of them, but had been admitted in many instances. However, as the Common Law of England was now introduced by Mr. L., which was new ground to him, and as the hour of adjournment was nearly approaching, he would beg leave to make his reply to-morrow.

On motion, the further consideration of this subject was postponed until to-morrow.

FRIDAY, February 21.

Contested Election.

Agreeably to the order of the day the Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee on the petition of Conrad Laub, and others, respecting the election of Mr. GALLATIN to be a Senator of the United States.

Mr. GALLATIN commenced his defence by laying down the principles on which he intended to argue. His was a very serious situation for a person to be placed in, who had been so long in America, and who had mingled with the inhabitants in the common cause, that he should afterwards be called before so solemn a tribunal, with an intention to wrest from him his right of citizenship. He confessed, that on this occasion his feelings were deeply interested, particularly as the manner of the counsel for the prosecutors was so personal, and went not only to deny him a seat in the Senate of the United States, but even to contest his citizenship, and denounce him as being yet an alien.

This was a matter of consequence to many thousands as well as himself, who have long considered themselves in possession of all the privileges of denizens, and yet may be deprived of their rights, if the doctrines of the counsel for the prosecutors should obtain any sanction from the body who were now to judge of its merits.

Mr. G. entered into a series of observations on the various points of law, &c., which had been adduced by Mr. LEWIS, and he particularly remarked, that the Common Law of England was entirely inapplicable to the subject under consideration. He read the laws of Virginia respecting naturalization, &c., from which he insisted that he had long since become a citizen of the United States. He also quoted 1st Blackstone, p. 374, and Viner's Abridgment, vol. ii. p. 266, respecting the different acceptations of denizen and citizen, and he went back so far as the British statutes in 1740, to show the intention of the old Government was to naturalize all persons who would go and reside in the Colonies. He next mentioned the act of Pennsylvania, of the 31st of August, 1778, and commented on the principles generally entertained by most writers on the subjects of allegiance and citizenship. Blackstone, 266, &c.

An alien is a man born out of the allegiance of the King. But allegiance in England is not an allegiance to the country or to society, as it is understood in this country.

In order to explain the principle of reciprocity, he observed, that when the two crowns of England and Scotland were united under James, the inhabitants of Scotland became naturalized in England, as if they had been natural-born subjects of that country. The allegiance in Britain was personal to the King, and it has there this remarkable quality, that by the British laws allegiance can never be shaken off.

This country, before the Revolution, owed allegiance to the King, but that was destroyed by the Declaration of Independence, and then the inhabitants of the States became mutually citizens of every State reciprocally; and they continued so until such time as the States made laws of their own afterwards respecting naturalization.