Part 179

One of the alleged infractions stated in the subsequent resolution, namely, the drawing part of the loans into the United States without the instructions of the PRESIDENT, evinces that the opposite construction is not a sound one. For suppose the fact proved, and suppose it a violation of the law, it certainly would be a very different thing from drawing money out of the Treasury without an appropriation by law; for in this case, there would be no drawing money from the Treasury at all, the money never having been in the Treasury.

Mr. S. then, said, he should also object to referring the last resolution, which is in these words,

"Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions be transmitted to the PRESIDENT."

The object of this resolution went clearly to direct the PRESIDENT to remove the Secretary from office; the foregoing were to determine the guilt, the last to inflict the punishment, and both the one and other without the accused being heard in his defence. When the violation of the constitution was so uppermost in our minds, it would be indeed astonishing that we should be so hoodwinked as to commit such a palpable violation of it in this instance. The principles of that constitution, careful of the lives and liberties of the citizens, and what is dearer to every man of honor, his reputation, secure to every individual in every class of society, the precious advantage of being heard before he is condemned.

That constitution, peculiarly careful of the reputation of great public functionaries, directs that when accused of a breach of duty, the impeachment must be voted by a majority of the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate, who are to be on oath, and two-thirds of whom must concur before a sentence can pass, by which the officer is to be deemed guilty. The officer is to be furnished with a copy of the charge, and is heard by himself or his counsel in vindication of his conduct. Such are the solemnities and guards by which they are protected, and which precede a sentence, the only effect of which is a removal from office. But if the House proceed in the manner contemplated by this resolution; if they first vote the charges, and send a copy of them to the PRESIDENT, as an instruction to him to remove the officer, they will violate the sacred and fundamental principles of this, and every free Government. They will condemn a man unheard, nay, without his having even been furnished with the charges against him; they will condemn to infamy a high and responsible officer convicted by the Representatives of the people, of a violation of the important trusts committed to him, without affording him one opportunity of vindicating his character and justifying his conduct.

Mr. MURRAY said he was opposed to the reference of the resolutions to the Committee of the Whole. He had, as far as the time permitted, examined the several reports on which the examination depended, and was then ready to vote on them, though he confessed, from the intricacy which was inherent in such a subject, as well as from the vast variety of the detail involved, he had not had sufficient time for a complete investigation. Nor did he imagine that any man who had not previously meditated on the subject for a length of time, and made choice of his ground of attack, could say he was completely master of the subject. Some vote, however, was now rendered essential to the character, not only of Government, but of the gentleman who presided over the finances of the country. But three days were left for this inquiry, and to finish a great deal of other business; and he thought that despatch which was usual in the House ought to be used in preference to the indulgence which a committee afforded. As to the abstract propositions, if it were necessary now to go into them, he thought it would be proper to decide on them first. He thought it most logical to lay down principles of reasoning before facts were developed. Were they agreed to by the House, it would be under provisions and restrictions. They could not have the implicit force of axioms, but at most must be yielded to as wholesome maxims, the application of which must be frequently modified by a certain degree of discretion. With respect to all the other resolutions, he imagined they would, on examination, be found to be unwarranted by facts. He hoped the movers and supporters of the resolutions would not be gratified at so late a season by the House in resolving itself into a Committee of the Whole. The mode in which they were brought forward did not entitle them to much confidence. He said, a more unhandsome proceeding he had never seen in Congress. It had been a practice, derived from the lights of common liberty, common right, and the first principles of justice, that whoever was charged with a violation of law on which a punishment ensued, should have some mode of answering to the charge. It had, in a recent instance, been the practice of Congress, when an officer's conduct was even in the first instance inquired into, to afford the officer an opportunity of attending upon the examination on which his offence or his freedom from blame was to appear. He alluded to the conduct of the House when an examination took place relatively to the failure of General St. Clair's expedition. Suspicions were entertained that blame lay somewhere. A committee was appointed to examine. The three officers particularly concerned were, he understood, invited, as it were, to come before the committee, to explain, to interrogate, and to give information. Though the Secretary of War was not permitted to explain on this floor, justice and delicacy, and the most common principles of jurisprudence, to which we attempted to hold some analogy, demanded that he should be heard somewhere, and the committee was renewed for this purpose. The Quartermaster General asked to be heard on this floor. Though refused, he was permitted to attend that committee on whose examination his character as a Quartermaster depended. Were any man responsible as an officer to this House to fall under the suspicion of its members, a regard to decency and to the established rights of citizenship, would teach gentlemen to inquire formally before they hastily laid a charge on the table, to which they might move the assent of the House. But in this proceeding a Legislative charge was gone into before inquiry had been instituted. Every rule of justice, and all that delicacy which ought ever to attend her progress, had been disregarded, and in the very first instance, a number of charges are brought forward, not for inquiry, but conviction, which, if sanctioned by a majority of the House, are to be followed by the dismission of one of the highest officers in the Government. This mode was as tyrannical as it was new, and if any thing could throw a bias against the resolutions, independent of inquiry, it was the partial and unjust form in which the proceeding had commenced. Resolutions of conviction might rise out of the report of a committee of inquiry, who would act as a Grand Jury to the House, but could never precede it. He hoped the House would not refer to a Committee of the Whole what might be decided in the House with more despatch.

Mr. PAGE in reply to Mr. SMITH, spoke, in substance, as follows:

Mr. Chairman: The more precious our time, the more readily shall I vote for a consideration of the first resolution; for I think it of more consequence that we should decide on it, than on any other before us. We find, from the inquiry which has been set on foot into the conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury, that he differs from the mover of the resolution in opinion respecting his powers, and the constitutional obligation he may be under of regarding acts of appropriation; it therefore must be the wish of the Secretary himself, whether we agree with him or not; and it is our duty, as soon as possible, I conceive, to let our constituents know whether we approve, or not, of his opinion. The Secretary himself, I think, confesses "that a strict adherence to appropriations, in certain cases, would be pusillanimity." He preferred, no doubt, the public good, which he thought he had in view, to a strict compliance with an act of appropriation. It becomes us, then, to determine whether we wish that the Secretary shall hereafter be bound by our acts of appropriation or not.

I cannot conceive that the rejection of the first resolution can alter the nature of the case before us, or in any manner confirm or invalidate the truth of facts which some gentlemen seem so apprehensive may lead to an impeachment. For my part, I keep in view the first resolution, without thinking a moment of the last, or the intermediate propositions. When they shall come under consideration, I shall be ready to show a proper attention to them. How the first resolution can be called an abstract proposition, I know not, when the nature of the last before us requires a decision on it. The Secretary himself should desire it, and our constituents must expect it. If the Committee of the Whole shall be of opinion that appropriations ought to be sacredly regarded, they will agree to the resolution; if they think they may be dispensed with "in certain cases," they may amend the resolution, and qualify it so as to justify the conduct of the Secretary. To call the resolution a preamble, and to object to it as such, appears to me as extraordinary as to call it an abstract proposition; for I have always thought it inconsistent with Republican principles to object to preambles. I have remarked, sir, when they have been objected to, it became the Representatives of a free people to show on what principles and with what views their laws are enacted, and, not in a dictatorial manner enact that it shall be so and so. The framers of our constitution have set us an example of an excellent preamble; and, as it has been remarked by several members, this House has occasionally used them; I think, therefore, that none of the objections to the commitment of the first resolution are of sufficient weight to induce the House to agree to the motion for striking out the two first resolutions.

The question was now taken on committing the first two resolutions, and negatived--25 to 32. On the question of referring the last, only fourteen members voted in the affirmative.

Ordered, That the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth resolutions contained in the said motion be committed to a Committee of the whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into the said committee; and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

FRIDAY, March 1.

Official conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth resolutions contained in the motion of yesterday, respecting the official conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The third resolution being under consideration, in the words following, viz:

"Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury has violated the law, passed the fourth of August, one thousand seven hundred and ninety, making appropriations of certain moneys authorized to be borrowed by the same law, in the following particulars, to wit:

"1. By applying a certain portion of the principal borrowed to the payment of the interest falling due upon that principal, which was not authorized by that or any other law.

"2. By drawing part of the same moneys into the United States without the instructions of the President of the United States."

Mr. BARNWELL.--Mr. Chairman, before I proceed to discuss the observations which yesterday fell from the gentleman who introduced the resolutions now before us, I cannot refrain from saying that I am extremely happy that, in passing through the medium of that gentleman's examination, this subject has changed its hue from the foul stain of peculation to the milder coloring of an illegal exercise of discretion, and a want of politeness in the Secretary of the Treasury. I feel happy, because I always am so when any man charged with guilt can acquit himself; and the more so now, when a man in a high responsible office, and high in the estimation of his countrymen, can reduce a charge from a quality calculated to have excited an alarm, even in Pandemonium, to such a shape as I fancy will scarce serve to satisfy the uncommon curiosity which it appears to have excited. As I have never been in the habit of taking notes, I shall depend upon memory in answering the gentleman from Virginia; although I imagine, as that gentleman usually sticks very close to his point, whatever it may be, that, in pursuing his charges, I shall substantially answer his arguments. In commenting upon the two first resolutions, to which I am by order confined, I shall consider, in the first instance, what regards the right of drawing money into this country. The gentleman appears not to have considered the law properly, for there cannot be a doubt that the PRESIDENT had a right to make what arrangements he pleased, in order to attain what he might consider a proper modification of the debt due by the United States abroad. He might have borrowed the money here, or have paid it here; he might have borrowed the money in England, or wherever he thought fit. I will ask the gentleman by what precise authority he borrowed the money in Amsterdam and Antwerp, and paid it in Paris? Certainly by none but that discretion which has been depended upon to modify the debt in the manner most conducive to the interest of the United States. I take it, then, for granted, Mr. Chairman, that the right of the PRESIDENT to draw the money borrowed here, or to send it any where, must be conceded. The question will then arise, whether the Secretary of the Treasury had a right to do this or not, and whether this has not been done without, nay, against the instructions of the PRESIDENT? I really consider this as one of the most extraordinary cases that I have ever known exhibited. Let us consider its form. A highly important trust, of no less import than the discretionary use of fourteen millions of dollars, is placed in the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; he, by a general commission, and by special instruction, deputes this power to the Secretary of the Treasury, stating that he is to conform to these and whatever instructions he might from time to time give him. Let any man seriously examine these powers, and I am of opinion that the Secretary, under these, had a right to draw, if he thought proper, unless instructed to the contrary; for the PRESIDENT conveys a complete power to modify the debt, provided that it should be, with all convenient despatch, applied to pay the principal and interest due to France; for where the payments are to be made is certainly left to the Secretary. If this has not been exercised advantageously, this is another circumstance which the gentleman himself has not questioned. But, says the gentleman, the Secretary, under these instructions, had no special authority to draw; notwithstanding which, he began to draw in 1790, and has continued to draw, at different times, into this country the enormous sum of three millions of dollars, and therefore he must have done this without, nay, against the instructions of the PRESIDENT, who, it is presumed, having delegated this great trust, has never, for three years, inquired into the performance of it. Can this be the inference of common sense? Can this be the inference of the experience which we have had of the PRESIDENT, one of the prominent features of whose character always has been an industry to investigate particulars, as remarkable as his sagacity to frame generals? If, then, instructions have not been given, or have been exceeded, was it necessary for us to come in aid of the PRESIDENT, he who by our law has the power, which we ourselves cannot exercise, of removing any of the Executive officers at pleasure? It certainly cannot be necessary; for, as this officer continues to act, we must conclude that he has either acted by instructions, or in such manner as to have given satisfaction to his principal without them. Really, Mr. Chairman, I cannot but believe that if suspicion had not led the gentleman from Virginia astray, the usual correctness of his understanding would have prevented him from pursuing such an ignis fatuus as this.

Mr. W. SMITH regretted that so important an inquiry had been instituted at the very close of the session, when the members were thronged with business of an indispensable nature, and it was scarcely possible for them to bestow that attention and deliberation which the nature of the subject called for. But, while he expressed this regret, he assured the committee that it was mingled with much satisfaction, in finding that the vague charges of mismanagement, with which the public had long been alarmed, were at length cast into a shape susceptible of investigation and decision. Previous to an examination of the specific charge then under consideration, he claimed the indulgence of the committee in offering a few preliminary remarks, which, though they did not bear precisely upon the charge itself, yet were intimately connected with the subject-matter of the inquiry, and were justified by the general remarks of gentlemen who had preceded him.

In recurring back to the origin and progress of this examination, it must appear somewhat surprising that that which, in the commencement of the session, was sounded forth as gross peculation, now turned out to be nothing more than a mere substitution of funds, and that that which was announced as abominable corruption, was dwindled away into a mere drawing of money from Europe into this country, to be applied here according to law.

Whatever credit might be due to the motives which had originated this inquiry, every member would concur in the sentiment, that in a government constituted like that of the United States, which had nothing but the public confidence for its basis, premature alarms and groundless suspicions respecting the conduct of public officers were pregnant with the most injurious consequences. This opinion was more peculiarly applicable to the important station of Secretary of the Treasury. Intrusted with the management of a large revenue, and necessarily clothed with some latitude of discretion, it was to be expected that he would excite the jealousy of the public vigilance; but as long as he kept in view the injunctions of law, and the public good, his reputation was entitled to that security which is due to every citizen.

An officer, intrusted with the care and distribution of public moneys, is generally looked at with a watchful eye; mankind are too prone to suspect the purity of his conduct; slight insinuations are but too often sufficient to injure him in the public estimation. Such being the natural propensity of things, it doubtless behoved those who wished for tranquillity in the country to withhold charges not clearly warranted by proof--to suspend animadversions which were not likely to terminate in conviction. A contrary proceeding had an inevitable tendency unnecessarily to alarm the public mind, to instil into it suspicions against the integrity of men in high stations, to weaken their public confidence in the Government, and to enervate its operations.

There was something remarkable in the nature of the present allegations against the Secretary. Taking them all into view, they presented nothing which involved self-interested, pecuniary considerations; and in this, they essentially differed from accusations against financiers in other countries, to whom motives of interest were generally ascribed as the source of their peculations. To the Secretary, no such motive was imputed; notwithstanding former insinuations against his integrity, the sum of all the charges now amounted to nothing more than arrogance, or an assumption of power, or an exercise of unauthorized discretion.

Mr. S. proceeded next to examine the charge under consideration. It consisted of two items: the first, the application of a certain portion of the principal sum borrowed in Europe to the payment of interest falling due upon that principal, which it was contended was not authorized by any law; the second, the drawing part of the same moneys into the United States, without the instructions of the PRESIDENT.

The first item of this supposed violation of law appeared of so frivolous a nature that it did not merit much discussion; at any rate, it was more an objection of form than of substance. If he comprehended well the purport of the charge, it was nothing more than this--that the Secretary having moneys at his disposal in Europe applicable to the purchase of stock in this country, and having at the same time moneys in this country applicable to the payment of the interest abroad, had substituted the one for the other. He had paid the foreign interest out of the foreign funds, and he had purchased stock with the domestic funds. This was the heinous offence with which he was charged, and which was thought sufficient to remove him from office. If the moneys in Europe might have been drawn to this country by bills, for the purchase of the debt, it might have equally been drawn here, by ordering the application of a sum in Europe, for a purpose which would be represented by an equal sum here, to be applied to the purchase. The substance, not the form, is to decide whether this mode of negotiating the matter was proper. Suppose bills had been ordered to be drawn on the commissioners, and remitted to them on account of the foreign interest, would not this have been as regular as to draw them for sale? Did the execution of the law require that the Secretary, having funds in Europe with which the foreign interest might be discharged, should nevertheless remit moneys abroad for that purpose, and then, having funds in this country with which the purchases of the debt might be made, should draw bills to bring the foreign funds here? Was there any necessity for this complex operation, for the expense of remittance, the probable loss on the sale of bills, the loss of interest while the money was in transitu, when the whole matter could be negotiated by the simple and economical mode pursued? So far from this arrangement being a ground of censure, Mr. S. asserted that, had the Secretary pursued the other mode, he would have been animadverted upon with great severity for such an extraordinary course. He would have been accused of ignorance of his duty, and every loss incidental to the transaction would have been charged to his account.

The second division of the charge, being of more magnitude, required a more lengthy discussion. This instance of violation consisted in a supposed deviation from the instructions of the PRESIDENT, or a supposed acting without any instruction whatever. It was, however, begging the question; it was taking for granted that which did not appear, and which ought not to be presumed. And here, Mr. S. observed, the gentlemen on the other side had entirely reversed one of the fundamental maxims of criminal jurisprudence, which declared that innocence should be presumed and guilt proved; whereas they had presumed guilt, and called upon the accused to prove his innocence.