Part 175

A petition of the inhabitants of the city of Hudson, in the State of New York, was presented to the House and read, stating the inconveniences under which they labor, from being obliged to register, enter, and clear their vessels at the port of New York, and praying that the said city of Hudson may be made a port of entry. Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, with instruction to examine the same, and report his opinion thereupon to the House.

An engrossed bill to make compensation to the widows and orphans of certain persons who were killed by Indians, under the sanction of flags of truce, was read the third time and passed.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, accompanying the copy of a message of Cornplanter and New Arrow to Major General Wayne, dated the 8th of December last, relative to the measures which they have taken to conclude a peace, on behalf of the United States, with certain tribes of hostile Indians; which were read and ordered to lie on the table.

Military Establishment.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the motion of the 28th ultimo, for reducing the military establishment of the United States.

Mr. MOORE said, that there was not sufficient information before the House respecting the prospect of a peace, to warrant a sudden reduction of the army. He referred to the abuses which had been hinted at in some of the branches dependent on the War Establishment, but he did not believe there had been any worth much notice. He also mentioned the abstruseness of attempting an investigation into the origin of the war--whether the frontier settlers, or the Indians, were in fault, was a difficult thing to determine; but from many circumstances, it appeared to him, the white people were often guilty of committing depredations. This was, in his opinion, a good reason why the protection of those frontiers should not be intrusted to the militia that would be raised there. Shall we intrust the conduct of that matter to the very persons who it has been alleged are often the aggressors? Can the President, at the distance he is situated from the Western territory, check all the irregular proceedings that might happen amongst such a militia? There were two obvious reasons for passing the law of the 5th of March, 1792, for the protection of the frontiers by regular forces. First, it could not be expected that militia would always prove successful against the Indians, because the latter are gaining more experience every day in the mode of warfare, and there can be no dependence on a treaty between those militia and the Indians. The second reason was, that the President was strongly impressed with the necessity of establishing the greatest degree of harmony between the United States and the Indians, by encouraging and protecting a trade with them, and that this could be easiest and best effected by establishing a line of forts along the frontiers, to be garrisoned by regular troops. Mr. M. next mentioned something of the manners and customs of the Indians, whose practice it is to spend most of their time on their hunting grounds, leaving their old men, women, and children, in their towns. They have no regular plan of government, and can only be attached by influencing some of their chiefs. The system of harassing them by burning and destroying their towns at the time they are employed in hunting, has come recommended to us by experience, and regular troops are the best to be employed in this service. Their present inexperience will soon be done away by a proper mode of discipline, and why may not these troops be soon instructed? Are they not as capable of receiving instructions as militia, and may we not expect more subordination amongst them, than could possibly be established over militia? He concluded by declaring himself against the motion.

The House having gone into Committee, the debate was renewed by Mr. WILLIAMSON, Mr. MADISON, and Mr. STEELE.

Mr. STEELE rose after Mr. MADISON, and said he was perfectly in sentiment with that gentleman, in regard to the propriety of inserting an amendment to the motion, which might secure a sufficient appropriation to carry on offensive operations against the hostile Indians, by the militia of the frontiers; and if an alteration was proposed to that effect, he would second it. The attention of the House to this question speaks its importance; it is probable one more important will not occur during the present session. On its decision are suspended the hopes and fears of the people of this country, their hopes of a speedy and honorable peace, and their fears of a standing army, with its usual retinue of political evils.

The present is regarded as an interesting epoch in the affairs of the United States; and it has been perceived, with serious regret, that while our national character is forming, (he hoped it was not yet formed,) it seems to partake, in some respects, more of the unnatural spirit of monarchy, than of the mild and conciliatory temper of a republic. The principle of keeping up standing armies, though highly obnoxious to the great body of the people, has not been equally so to the Government; they have been maintained and increased without affording protection, or even defence to the frontiers. The supplies necessary to support the establishment begin to discover an alarming derangement of the public finances, and it is now incumbent on the House of Representatives to check this growing mischief.

Mr. S. then adverted to the effects of standing armies on the morals and political sentiments of the people, wherever they had been employed; of the expensiveness of all such establishments, and of the wicked purposes to which they had been, and might be subservient. He said he had prepared himself to have spoken largely to this point, and to have quoted the pernicious effects of such a policy in other nations; but the debate having been already lengthy, and the committee probably fatigued, it would be sufficient for his present purpose, for the members to make their own reflections, and to mark the rapid progress of the army from 1789 to 1792, both in numbers and expenses. Instances from foreign history are superfluous, when our own affords such ample testimony. The establishment began with one regiment: it is now five. The House was called on in 1789 to appropriate a little more than $100,000 for that Department; in the present year, above $1,000,000 is demanded. The reason of this extraordinary additional expenditure, this unexpected increase of the army, if not enveloped in darkness, has been founded on policy hitherto not satisfactorily explained. He said, however lightly he was disposed to touch this part of the subject, he could not avoid reminding the committee of the memorable sentiments of 1776, in regard to standing armies; of the universal abhorrence of the Americans to them at that time; and, to illustrate it more clearly, he read the expressions of some of the States in their Bills of Right. These were the sentiments of the Whigs of 1776, and to such Whigs he wished to appeal on this occasion. He also reminded the committee of the recent debates of 1788, of the amendments proposed in several of the State Conventions; of the unanimity which prevailed among all ranks of people on this particular point; and it is now to be lamented, said he, that while the ink which recorded these objections to the constitution is yet drying, the evil then predicted has taken place.

If there is a subject on which much deliberation is unnecessary, in order to form a right opinion, it would be in regard to military establishments. The feelings of a free people revolt at their continuance, and every man who reads or thinks, can point out their dangers. He said he felt more anxiety for the fate of this motion, than commonly marks his conduct, because this is the last session that will ever afford him an opportunity to trouble the House with his sentiments on this or any other subject. The motion was brought forward to discharge a duty which he owed to his constituents, to satisfy his own conscience, and to afford that protection to the frontiers which they deserved, and to save the public money. If an uncommon degree of zeal was discovered in supporting the motion, it ought to be attributed to these, and no other motives.

The question will now soon be taken; if adopted, I shall be among those who rejoice; if rejected, among those who have always submitted with a proper degree of decency to the decision of the majority. But in any event, the public will know that we have asserted the sense of the people against standing armies; that we are anxious to defend the frontiers against their enemies; that we have recommended a system of economy and efficiency, instead of profusion and delay; that we have recommended a system calculated to produce victory and peace, instead of disgrace and war; and that we wish to rescue the Government from the intoxication of the times, and all the apery of military establishments.

He said he had been attentive to the arguments of the opposition, and they led principally to four points. If neither of these positions be found tenable, the motion will certainly succeed; and that they are not tenable, is believed and will be shown.

1st. It has been boldly asserted that the PRESIDENT is the author of the existing system.

2dly. They call in question the sincerity of our declarations in wishing to afford effectual protection to the frontiers.

3dly. They deny the competency of the militia.

4thly. The impolicy of reducing the establishment, when a treaty is expected.

In regard to the first, we deny that the PRESIDENT is the author of this plan of prosecuting the war. Not having avowed explicitly himself that he is so, no document appearing to confirm that opinion, we are justified in attributing a system which appears to us ineffectual to his Secretary, and not to him.

It is true, that the Secretary is only a finger of his hand, and the intimate connection which must of necessity subsist between them, perhaps, is the ground upon which the assertion has been made. The Secretaries are all equally near to the PRESIDENT, and if it be admitted that he is the author of this, he may, with equal propriety, be said to have been the author of every system on general subjects which either of them have recommended.

Was he the author of the report on the fisheries? Was he the author of the plan for establishing the National Bank? It is known that he was not, and circumstances might be mentioned (which are withheld from delicacy) to confirm this opinion.

Was he the author of the Funding System? Some gentlemen in the opposition to this motion, would not be willing to give the PRESIDENT that credit if he claimed it, and some who support this motion would not only be sorry that the PRESIDENT had even claimed such a credit, but believe that it was in no respect attributable to him. The same gentleman (Mr. WADSWORTH) who first asserted that the PRESIDENT was the author of this military plan, in the same speech admitted it to be the war, as well as the plan of the House, and then argued on the necessity of stability in our measures. It is not very material to the present question whose plan it is; being a public measure, we are justified in offering our objections to it; and this is the first time that I have heard it publicly asserted that a Government should persevere in an error, because they had undertaken it. If the plan be a good one, it may be supported by reason; if a bad one, no name ought to be called in to prop it up.

The inconsistency of that gentleman's (Mr. WADSWORTH's) arguments not only supports the motion before the committee, but shows the wretched shifts which have been used to defeat it.

It has been said, in the course of the debate, that individual members, and even this House, are incompetent to decide upon the efficacy or inefficacy of military plans. In answer to this it may be said, that if we are not all Generals, we are all members, and that we have the privilege of thinking for ourselves and for our constituents. To admit this doctrine in the latitude which has been expressed, would be to introduce military ideas indeed; it would be to make soldiers of us, instead of Legislators: nay, worse than that, it would be to revive the exploded doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance.

In regard to the sincerity of his intentions to afford effectual protection to the frontiers, Mr. S. said that he had been sufficiently explicit; that a feeling for the sufferers had dictated this motion; that he was sorry that it had been whispered in the ears of some of the members that it was intended to withhold the necessary appropriations, and divert them to other purposes.

If two regiments were insufficient to garrison all the posts necessary for defence, he would even, under certain restrictions, consent to continue the three sub-legions, thereby enabling the PRESIDENT to establish double the number of posts now erected, if he should deem it advisable. Regular troops being incapable of active expeditions against Indians in the wilderness, his wish was to abandon that system and confine them entirely to the garrison.

The next objection to the motion is the incompetency of the militia; and to support this opinion the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. WADSWORTH) has made this expression, "that as to the expedition under General St. Clair, the regulars were few, and not to be named when compared with the number of the militia." The truth is, there was not a man engaged that day as a militia man, except the advance guard commanded by Colonel Oldham, which consisted of about three hundred, perhaps a few more. The field return of the day preceding the action being in the War Office, this can be ascertained with precision. The balance of the army on that unfortunate day, had been enlisted as regulars, were fought as regulars, even clothed as regulars, and, poor fellows, died like regulars. They suffered the fate which awaits every regular army destined for similar expeditions. Even the handful of militia employed that day, did not deserve that name; they were chiefly substitutes for drafted men from the ceded territory. This draft became unavoidable, from a misfortune to General Sevier, which Mr. STEELE related.

The attack on Major Adair has also been mentioned as a proof of the incompetency of militia, and Mr. S. insisted that the only inference which could be drawn from thence was, that one hundred militia were able to repel, but not destroy, near two hundred Indians. This event he conceived was in favor of and not against his motion.

He next adverted to the arguments of Mr. WADSWORTH, in regard to the war of 1762; of the establishment of posts in Pennsylvania and Virginia, and of the success of Colonel Boquet's expedition. If two worn-out regiments at that time were sufficient to defend the frontiers, and, with the aid of the militia, to terminate the war, two new regiments, with all the vigor which the gentleman described them to possess, with the aid of established posts, and a much more effective militia, can certainly be equal to the same end. After examining Mr. W.'s arguments for some time, Mr. S. said, that when analyzed, it would be found that they proved more than they were intended to prove; but the merits of this motion did not require that he should take advantage of these indiscretions.