Part 153

Indeed, sir, I confess I am not altogether convinced, that, if Congress have this power, it ought to be thus exerted; because it is not clear to me that those fishermen would not be more profitable to the United States, if they were cultivating the lands which now lie waste, and raising families, which would be of ten times more value than their fisheries. A nursery of virtuous families, which will produce soldiers, sailors, husbandmen, and statesmen, must be preferable to a mere nursery of sailors, who generally live single, and often perish at sea. I always look upon the loss of a crew to an infant Republic as the loss almost of a new State.

I speak of this question, however, as a citizen of the United States, as a member of this House. Were I to discuss it as a citizen of Massachusetts, and in their Legislature, I should say, as the State is nearly filled with inhabitants, and our fishermen increase our commerce in peace, protect us in war, and, indeed, even enrich us by their prizes, it is our interest to encourage them to the utmost, and to prevent their going into the service of other countries. I might, therefore, as a member of the Legislature of that State, do all in my power to procure bounties for them, and indeed for all the sailors belonging to that State; but I should not think of applying to Congress for their assistance; not only because I doubt their right to afford it, but because I should look upon it as in some degree derogatory to the sovereignty and independence of the State. I should look upon such an interference of Congress as a step towards swallowing up the powers of the State Governments, and as consolidating the different States into one Government, which the wise and virtuous in every State always protested against as dangerous to their liberties; the fear of which consolidation prevented many good men from voting for the adoption of the new Government.

The framers of the constitution guarded so much against a possibility of such partial preferences as might be given, if Congress had the right to grant them, that, even to encourage learning and useful arts, the granting of patents is the extent of their power. And surely nothing could be less dangerous to the sovereignty or interests of the individual States than the encouragement which might be given to ingenious inventors or promoters of valuable inventions in the arts and sciences. The encouragement which the General Government might give to the fine arts, to commerce, to manufactures, and agriculture, might, if judiciously applied, redound to the honor of Congress, and the splendor, magnificence, and real advantage of the United States; but the wise framers of our constitution saw that, if Congress had the power of exerting what has been called a royal munificence for these purposes, Congress might, like many royal benefactors, misplace their munificence; might elevate sycophants, and be inattentive to men unfriendly to the views of Government; might reward the ingenuity of the citizens of one State, and neglect a much greater genius of another. A citizen of a powerful State, it might be said, was attended to, whilst that of one of less weight in the Federal scale was totally neglected. It is not sufficient to remove these objections, to say, as some gentlemen have said, that Congress is incapable of partiality or absurdities, and that they are as far from committing them as my colleagues or myself. I tell them the constitution was formed on a supposition of human frailty, and to restrain abuses of mistaken powers. The constitution has been said by some one to be, like answers of the oracles of old, capable of various and opposite constructions; that it has been ingeniously contrived, like some of them, to suit two events--a republican or a monarchical issue. I will not pretend to say that this is not, in some instances, too just an observation; nor will I undertake to deny that it was not the intention of some of the Convention that such ambiguities might be in their constitution, to correspond with the critical and ambiguous state of the American mind respecting government; but I will boldly affirm, that, whatever the theories of that day might lead some to think respecting the application of monarchical principles to the Government of the United States, no one can, at this day, pretend that they are applicable to their circumstances, their dispositions, or interests, or even are agreeable to the wishes of the people. Even before the adoption of the constitution, when the rights of men had not been so thoroughly investigated as they since have been, it must be remembered that whole States, and large and respectable minorities in other States complained of and objected to the aristocratical and monarchical features of the new Government. In vain did the friends of the new Government--friends of order, of union, or of liberty--contend that the powers granted by the constitution which appeared so alarming were such as would never be exerted but when all good men would acknowledge the necessity of exercising them, and that, indeed, they would be explained or restrained by some future amendments. The sagacious and eloquent HENRY shook his head at such promises, sighed and submitted to the will of the majority--a small one indeed--but foretold, from his knowledge of the human heart, what would be done and said in justification of every measure which might extend the power of Congress.

Is it politic and wise, then, Mr. Chairman, to exert the power contended for, even if it be authorized by the constitution? May not the interferences of Congress in the business of regulating the trade of the Eastern States, excite, if not envy on account of a supposed partiality, a jealousy lest Congress undertake to intermeddle in the commercial regulations of other States? May not Congress with equal propriety, undertake to regulate the tobacco, the rice, and indigo trade, as well as that of the fisheries? If they intermeddle in the business of sailors, why not in that of manufacturers and farmers? Where, I may ask with my colleague, may they not go on in their zeal, and, I may add, in their laudable pursuit, of promoting the general welfare--and how totally may they be mistaken? If jealousy of rival States, instead of mutual satisfaction and pleasure--if distrust and suspicion of Congress, instead of confidence in their measures, be the consequence--how will the Union be promoted, or the General Government secured? However virtuously disposed the present members may be, (and I am ready to applaud their honest intentions,) let them consider, sir, that they had better suppress their patriotic emotions, than give a pretext for their successors to abuse the powers which they now wish to exert for the public good. I know they will quote the opinion of as wise and virtuous a citizen as is in the United States. I know his patriotism, and know well his true Republican principles; but, sir, with the freedom of a fellow-citizen, I take the liberty of saying, that his honest zeal, like that of the friends of the bill, has led him into a mistake. That able statesman and virtuous citizen, like the eloquent advocates of the bill, has considered the acts now quoted as a full sanction for the one before the committee. But I am of opinion, that those acts had better be repealed than give a sanction to the enacting of a law which goes to the establishing of bounties, or drawbacks, or by whatever other name they are called, which may be used to the partial encouragement of any branch of trade or employment whatsoever. I shall therefore vote against the bill before us, and, to get rid of it shall vote for striking out of it the first section, according to the motion now before the committee. As a member of this House, I shall think it my duty to protect the fisheries, and every other branch of our commerce, the fisherman as well as every other citizen, as far as may be within my ability; but I am not permitted, as a member of Congress, I humbly conceive, to select the fisheries and fishermen as objects of more consequence than any other branches of trade, or persons employed in them, lest Congress should not only show a mistaken attachment, or, even if judiciously placed, excite jealousies and discontents between the States, and distrust, destructive of their weight and influence. My constant wish has been to see Congress confined to such acts as would form a more perfect union, promote the general welfare, ensure domestic tranquillity, and engage the confidence of our fellow-citizens.

My wish is, that the members of Congress would leave their respective States in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege they held before their adoption of the new constitution, which can be exercised without prejudice to the General Government. Let the Legislatures of the different States encourage, as far as in their power, the commerce, agriculture, or manufactures of their respective States? and let Congress, as far as can be consistent with the most steady impartiality, patronize their patriotic exertions, by wise regulations of their commerce with foreign nations, such as may open as full an intercourse with those nations as the States may desire. The emulation of the sister States in commerce, manufactures, or agriculture, would lead to the early establishment of that branch of either to which each State might be best adapted. This rivalship could produce no jealousy, no general national discontent in the States, no localities in Congress. Virginia would not attempt to rival Massachusetts in her fisheries or carrying business, nor will South Carolina and Georgia rival the manufactories of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Each State may rejoice to see its sister States enjoying the advantages with which Heaven has blessed them; and Congress, if confined to subjects which admit not of local considerations, may debate with temper and decide with unbiased judgment. I confess I have wished that Congress possessed the power that the friends of the bill tell us we do possess, and tell us we have exerted; but, on examining the constitution with a view to my wish, I found reason to think, not only that Congress has not that power, but that it ought not to possess it, unless the constitution was intended to establish a consolidated Government on the ruin of the State Legislatures; but this, I conceive, cannot be the case, because the constitution guarantees to the States their respective Republican Governments. The general powers of Congress, no doubt, ought to be (as they are) adequate to the purpose of forming a more perfect union than subsisted under the Confederation, to establish justice, &c.; but, as they are bound to guarantee to the States their respective Republican forms of Government, I cannot conceive how any of these powers can be employed, consistently with the ends for which they were given, in diminishing the power and sovereignty of the State Legislatures. How Congress can interfere in the regulations respecting the merchants and their sailors at Marblehead with more propriety than with those at Philadelphia, Norfolk, or Charleston, I cannot conceive; nor how this interference could take place without alarming those States, I know not. Viewing the bill before us in this light, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote against it, and, as I said before, to get rid of it, shall vote to strike out the first section, according to the motion now before the committee.

The question on striking out the first section was taken, and negatived--32 to 26.

WEDNESDAY, February 8.

A message was received from the President of the United States, together with a statement of certain articles of expense, which have occurred in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and for which no provision is made by law. [The expense alluded to was incurred for the relief of a number of American sailors, impressed in England to serve on board the British navy.] The message and accompanying papers were referred to a select committee, to examine and report.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, accompanying certain communications with the Executive of Virginia relative to the existing temporary defensive protection of the exposed frontiers of that State, pursuant to the orders of the President of the United States; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. WHITE, from the committee appointed, presented a bill providing for the settlement of the claims of persons under particular circumstances barred by the limitations heretofore established; which was read twice and committed.

Mr. BENSON, from the committee to whom was referred the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Comfort Sands, and others, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The Cod Fisheries.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

On a motion to strike out the words "bounty now allowed," and insert allowance now made, &c.--

Mr. GILES observed, that he conceived the vote of yesterday against striking out the first section, was a decision in favor of the policy of granting Governmental aid to the fisheries; the inquiry of to-day will be on what terms this aid shall be granted? He felt but little regret at the decision of yesterday, because he had himself previously contemplated some reasons, not unimportant, to justify that decision, and others had been suggested by several gentlemen in the course of the debate. The principles of this policy, he thought, however, might be combated by reasons of at least equal, and as far as he was able to judge, of paramount importance; but as he admitted considerable weight in the reasons on each side of the question, he was not particularly tenacious of the preference which his own opinion suggested. When he first mentioned his doubts respecting the principle of the bill, it was with diffidence, and those doubts in some measure arose from an idea that the bill contained a direct bounty upon occupation; upon a more minute examination, he thought the term bounty unnecessarily introduced into the bill, and that the object of it could be answered without the use of terms, which might hereafter be deemed to contain a decision upon the general principle of the constitutional right to grant bounties; it was to avoid any thing which might wear the appearance of such a decision, that induced him to make the present motion.

He proceeded to remark, that as great a difference of opinion often existed respecting the precise meaning of the terms used, as the consequences which flow from them after attaining such precision of meaning; and it is of importance to the present discussion that an accurate definition of the terms used in the bill, and those proposed to be used, should be had. The avowed object of the bill is not to increase, but to transmute the sum, or a portion thereof, now allowed to the fisheries in lieu of the drawback upon salt, from the merchant who is now supposed to receive the sole benefit, to the fishermen really employed in the fishing vessels. This is a mere chimerical project, but if it be admitted that this is the object to be effected by the bill, the term bounty is improperly applied.

A gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. AMES,) who rests the defence of this bill almost solely upon this position, that those who receive the benefit intended by it, are of right entitled to such benefit in consideration of a previous advancement in value, and that this bill contains a mere permission to them to retain their own, has at the same time declared, that he thought the term bounty the most proper and technical, to convey this idea. In this, the gentleman appears to have deviated from his usual accuracy. A bounty is the granting a benefit without a correspondent return in value; a drawback is the retaking of something in consideration of a previous advancement; this is always founded upon a consideration previously received--that is a grant of favor ex mero motu. But the great characteristic distinction between bounties and drawbacks as they essentially relate to the administration of this Government consists in the governmental objects to which they may severally be applied: drawbacks are necessarily confined to commercial regulations; bounties may be extended to every possible object of Government, and may pervade the whole minutiæ of police. They may not only be extended to commerce, but to learning, agriculture, manufactures, and even the sacredness of religion will be found too feeble to furnish complete protection from their influence. The people of the United States have always been scrupulously tenacious of a constitutional security for the most free and equal exercises of this right, but through the medium of bounties, even this right may be invaded, and the only security against such invasion must be governmental discretion. The same characteristic distinction will attend that species of bounty which may incidentally result from commercial regulations; and direct bounties upon occupation founded upon the broad basis of discretionary right. The specification in the constitution of the right to regulate commerce, may possibly in some cases give rise to this indirect species of bounty, not from any right in the constitution to grant bounties, but as the necessary result from the specified right to make commercial regulations; and this specification can be the only foundation of justification to this indirect species of bounty; but there is no specification in the constitution of a right to regulate learning, or agriculture, manufactures, or religion, and so far as the sense of the constitution can be collected, it rather forbids than authorizes the exercise of that right.

Arguments used to deduce any given authority from the term general welfare, abstractedly from the specification of some particular authority, are dangerous in the extreme to rights constitutionally reserved, and ought ever to be viewed with great caution and suspicion. They serve directly to show that this Government is not only consolidated in all its parts, but that it is a consolidated Government of unlimited discretion; that it contains no constitutional limitation or restriction. If any given authority be inferred from the term general welfare in the abstract, any other authority is equally deducible from it, because the term is applicable to every possible object of Government, and differs only in degree, as to the several Governmental objects.

He could not see the force of the novel and curious distinction taken by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HILLHOUSE) between general welfare and particular welfare; for every particular welfare, however minute, may be in a degree for the general welfare, and if the decision respecting the existence of this distinction, have no other limitation than Congressional discretion, it is equally destructive of all constitutional restraint. Gentlemen who have advocated this principle of construction, appear startled at some consequences suggested to result from it, and have denied that they have made the admission of such consequences. This is true, nor have those in reply so asserted, but they have taken up the principles of construction furnished by its advocates, and made the application of it to the consequences which they themselves infer; and if the principle be admitted, it is undeniable that the conclusions drawn from it will necessarily follow in their utmost latitude.

A gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. BARNWELL) confidently spoke of the inherent rights of this Government; this is a new source of authority, and totally inapplicable to this Government. If there be inherent rights in governments at all, they must belong to governments growing out of a state of society, and not to a government deriving all its authorities by charter from previously existing governments, or the people of those governments. In such a government, the exercise of every authority not contained in the instrument, or deducible from it by a fair and candid construction, is an unjustifiable assumption and usurpation. He did not mean to analyze this subject further at this time, and had been led into these general remarks, because the impatience of the committee to have the question upon striking out the section had caused him to refrain from delivering these sentiments at that time.

He would remark further, that bounties in all countries and at all times, have been the effect of favoritism; they have only served to divert the current of industry from its natural channel, into one less advantageous or productive; and in fact, they are nothing more than governmental thefts committed upon the rights of one part of the community, and an unmerited governmental munificence to the other. In this country, and under this Government, they present an aspect peculiarly dreadful and deformed.

To contemplate the subjects upon which bounties are to operate in the United States, the nature of the Government to dispense them, the State preferences which now do and will for ever, more or less, continue to exist, the impossibility of an equal operation of bounties throughout the United States, upon any subject whatever, should be considered; and one of these two effects will necessarily follow the exercise of them; either the very existence of the Government will be destroyed, or its administration must be radically changed, it must be converted into the most complex system of tyranny and favoritism.

He observed, that it is not unfrequent at this time to hear of an Eastern and Southern interest, and he had for some time silently and indignantly seen, or thought he saw, attempts by this means to influence the deliberations of this House upon almost every important question. So far as he was the insulted object of these attempts, he felt that contempt for their authors, which appeared to him to be the correspondent tribute to the impurity of their designs; yet he thought that this had been the most formidable and effectual ministerial machine which had been yet used in the administration of Government. But one great mischief he apprehended from establishing the principle of the unrestrained right to grant bounties, will be, that it will make the difference of interest between Eastern and Southern, so far as they differ in their respective States of manufacture and agriculture, real, which is now only ideal. It will make that party real, which is now artificial. The jealousies and suspicions arising from party, will then have a substantial foundation, which now have no foundation in fact, but are ingeniously stimulated by a few, for the purpose of effecting particular objects; as long as the Government shall be administered liberally and impartially, as long as the principle of reciprocal demand and supply between East and South shall remain inviolate, so long there can exist no essential distinct interest between them; but the instant bounties or governmental preferences are granted to occupation, that instant is created a separate and distinct interest, not wholly between East and South, but between the manufacturer and the cultivator of the soil. There will still exist a community of agricultural interests throughout the United States, and he hoped the time was not far distant, when a common sympathy will be felt by the whole of that class of the community. For these reasons, he hoped the motion would prevail.

The bill having been gone through with, and amended, the committee rose and reported it with amendments which the House immediately took into consideration and adopted. The bill was then further amended and the House adjourned.

THURSDAY, February 9.

The Cod Fisheries.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein," together with the amendments thereto, was read the third time; and the question being put that the same do pass, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 38, nays 21, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, Samuel Livermore, James Madison, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg Nathaniel Niles, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.