Part 148

WEDNESDAY, February 1.

Mr. PAGE, from the committee to whom was referred the petition of John Churchman, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Protection of the Frontiers.

An engrossed bill for making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States, was read the third time, and the blanks therein filled up; and on the question that the said bill do pass,

It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 29, nays 19.

FRIDAY, February 3.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from their amendments, disagreed to by this House, to the bill to establish Post Offices and Post Roads within the United States, and do agree to the amendments proposed by the House to their amendment to the said bill.

The Cod Fisheries.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

The first section being read as follows:

"Be it enacted, &c., That the bounty, now allowed upon the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the United States, shall cease on all dried fish exported after the tenth day of June next; and in lieu thereof, and for the more immediate encouragement of the said fisheries, there shall be afterwards paid, on the last day of December annually, to the owner of every vessel or his agent, by the collector of the district where such vessel may belong, that shall be qualified agreeably to law, for carrying on the Bank and other cod fisheries, and that shall actually have been employed therein at sea, for the term of four months at least, of the fishing season next preceding (which season is accounted to be from the last day of February, to the last day of November in every year) for each and every ton of such vessel's burden, according to her admeasurement, as licensed or enrolled; if of twenty tons and not exceeding thirty tons, one and a half dollars, and if above thirty tons, two and a half dollars, of which bounty three-eighth parts shall accrue and belong to the owner of such fishing vessel, and the other five-eighths thereof shall be divided by him, his agent or lawful representative, to and among the several fishermen who shall have been employed in such vessel, during the season aforesaid, or a part thereof, as the case may be, in such proportions as the fish they shall respectively have taken may bear to the whole quantity of fish taken on board such vessel during such season. Provided, That the bounty, to be allowed, and paid on any vessel for one season, shall not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars."

Mr. GILES expressed some doubt respecting the principle of the bill; and for the purpose of collecting the sense of the committee on the subject, he thought the most effectual means would be a motion to amend the bill, by striking out the whole section. He accordingly made the motion, observing at the same time, that he could not positively assert, whether the reasons which determined him against the principle of the bill, were well founded or not; that, in matters where a local preference is given, it is necessary to accommodate; and he would be happy if his objections could be removed. The present section of the bill appears to contain a direct bounty on occupations; and if that be its object, it is the first attempt as yet made by this Government to exercise such authority; and its constitutionality struck him in a doubtful point of view; for in no part of the constitution could he, in express terms, find a power given to Congress to grant bounties on occupations: the power is neither directly granted, nor (by any reasonable construction that he could give) annexed to any other power specified in the constitution. It might perhaps be brought in under a mode of construction already adopted by the House, viz: that of "ways and ends," by which any power whatever might be equally implied; but he wished ever to see some connection between a specified power, and the means adopted for carrying it into execution. There is a great difference between giving encouragement, and granting a direct bounty. Congress have a right to regulate commerce; and any advantage thereby resulting to a particular occupation connected with commerce, comes within that authority; but when a bounty is proposed to a particular employment or occupation, this is stepping beyond the circle of commerce; and such a measure will affect the whole manufacturing and agricultural system. In all cases, the revenue, to be employed in this bounty, is drawn from all the sources of revenue in the United States, and confined to a particular object. He was averse to bounties in almost every shape, as derogations from the common right; and he thought there would be no great difficulty in proving, that a government is both unjust and oppressive in establishing exclusive rights, monopolies, &c., without some very substantial merit in the persons to whom they are granted; although even in that case, the propriety of such grants is still questionable. Under a just and equal government, every individual is entitled to protection in the enjoyment of the whole product of his labor, except such portion of it as is necessary to enable Government to protect the rest; this is given only in consideration of the protection offered. In every bounty, exclusive right, or monopoly, Government violates the stipulation on her part; for, by such a regulation, the product of one man's labor is transferred to the use and enjoyment of another. The exercise of such a right on the part of Government can be justified on no other principle, than that the whole product of the labor of every individual is the real property of Government, and may be distributed among the several parts of the community by governmental discretion; such a supposition would directly involve the idea that every individual in the community is merely a slave and bondman to Government, who, although he may labor, is not to expect protection in the product of his labor. An authority given to any government to exercise such a principle, would lead to a complete system of tyranny.

He entertained fewer doubts, respecting the principle, as it regards political economy. All occupations that stand in need of bounties, instead of increasing the real wealth of a country, rather tend to lessen it; the real wealth of every country consisting in the active product of useful labor employed in it. It is therefore bad policy to encourage any occupation that would diminish, instead of increasing the aggregate wealth of the community; and if an occupation is really productive, and augments the general wealth, bounties are unnecessary for its support; for when it reimburses the capital employed, and yields a profit besides, it may be said to support itself. When it fails in these points, any forced advantage that is given to it by the Government, only tends to decrease the wealth of the country. The subject, however, might be considered in a more favorable point of view: and that is, whether the provision be essential to the defence of the United States, and whether the bounties proposed in the bill were more than equivalent to the portion of defence that would be procured by them. The bill does not (in his opinion) contain that kind of encouragement, which is essential to the national defence. Any man who takes a view of this country, must be convinced that its real support rises from the land, and not from the sea; and the opposite mistake must have arisen merely from a servile imitation of the conduct of Great Britain: the inhabitants of this country heretofore thought favorably of her Government, and the Revolution has not yet altered their former ideas respecting it. But the circumstances of the two countries will, on examination, be found widely different; Britain, surrounded by the sea on every side, finds a navy necessary to support her commerce; whilst America, possessed of an immense territory, and having yet ample room to cultivate that territory, has no occasion to contend by sea with any European power: her strength and her resources are all to be found within the United States; and if she but attends to her internal resources, the object of national defence will be much better answered.

Mr. G. next proceeded to consider whether that portion of the national defence which might be derived from the fisheries, would not be purchased at too high a price. Although the apparent intention of the bill is only to convert the present existing drawbacks into a bounty; yet the drawbacks being allowed only to the actual exportation of the fish, and the bounty being granted on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, there can be no comparative value between the drawback and the bounty; they have no necessary relation to each other, and the latter may exceed the former, or the former exceed the latter. He had made a calculation, and upon the most favorable principles, grounded on the Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State. Here he produced a calculation, tending to show that the proposed bounty on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, would considerably exceed the amount of the present drawbacks. From a comparison between the bounty, and the number of sailors employed in the fisheries, he showed what an expense each man would be to the United States; and, after other remarks, observed, that even Great Britain, whose whole national support and defence depends on her navy, had found, that the men employed in the fisheries, though so necessary for that defence, had cost her too much; that America, whose consequence, as a nation, does not depend on a navy, ought to take a lesson from the experience of Britain: that he did not wish to enter into a competition with Britain and France, in supplying the different markets with fish; that, as those nations are able to hold out greater encouragement to their fishermen, than we can to ours, we would, by such a competition, only exhaust the Treasury of the United States to no purpose; and upon this principle alone, he thought there was some reason to doubt the policy of the measure proposed in the section under consideration, which therefore he hoped the committee would agree to strike out, unless his objection could be obviated.

Mr. MURRAY observed, that in order to demonstrate the propriety of the measure, it would be incumbent on the friends of the bill, first, to prove that the fishery trade is in a state of decay, that the stock employed in it does not yield the ordinary profits, so as to justify the merchants in embarking their capital in this branch of trade: that there is a system of defence in contemplation, which the circumstances of the country call for, and which this trade is calculated to furnish; that other branches of trade, which do not stand in need of encouragement, are not equally capable of furnishing seamen for the purpose: that this particular object so peculiarly claims the attention and encouragement of the United States, as to leave far behind every consideration of the manufacturing interest, the agricultural, &c. All this he thought necessary for gentlemen to prove, and to show some very strong necessity for encouraging one particular class of men, in preference to all others.

Mr. GOODHUE.--It happens that the fisheries of the United States are almost entirely confined to the State of Massachusetts; and they furnish a considerable, a principal portion of our export trade. As we are a part of the United States, the United States in general are interested in the prosperity of that branch of business, so far at least as it contributes to the national defence: it furnishes a copious nursery of hardy seamen, and offers a never-failing source of protection to the commerce of the United States. If we engage in a war with any European power, those seamen will be excluded from their ordinary employment, and must have recourse to privateering. During the late war with Great Britain, we annoyed the enemy more in that line than in all others; and had it not been for privateering, it would often have been impossible to keep together our armies, who frequently, in the hour of need, were supplied by the privateers with ammunition and clothing, of which they were wholly destitute. All that we wish to obtain by this bill is, that we may not be burdened with duties. An opinion has been entertained, that no drawbacks ought to be allowed on the re-exportation of articles imported from foreign countries; but if this opinion were to obtain in practice, and no drawbacks were to be admitted, we must confine our importation to articles for our own consumption. The drawback allowed by the existing law, on the exportation of salt fish, was calculated to be only equal to the duty beforehand paid on the quantity of salt used in curing the fish; but the fishermen complain that, as the act now stands, they are wholly excluded from any participation in the benefit, which centres entirely in the coffers of the merchants. The object of the present bill is, only to repay the same money into the hands of those persons who are immediately concerned in catching the fish; and there can no reasonable objection be made to such a transfer of the drawback, as Government will not lose a single dollar by the change. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) talks of the unconstitutionality of granting bounties; but no bounty is required. We only ask, in another mode, the usual drawback for the salt used on the fish. If we can make it appear that the bill does not contemplate any greater sums to be drawn from the Treasury, than are already allowed, it is to be hoped that no further opposition will be made to the measure; and that this is really the case, can be proved by documents from the Treasury office. Here he read a statement and calculation to prove his assertion; and to show that the United States will probably pay one thousand dollars per annum less in the proposed bounties on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, than they would in the drawbacks on the exportation of the fish. The fishermen, he continued, are now under no control; and in consequence of this want of a proper restraint, they often take whims into their heads and quit the vessels during the fishing season. To prevent the inconveniences of this practice, the bill contemplates their exclusion from the bounty, unless they enter into such contracts and regulations, as may be found necessary for the proper and successful conducting of the business, which, from our advantageous situation, would be entirely in our hands, if we did not meet with such opposition and discouragement from foreign nations, whose bounties to their own fishermen, together with the duties laid upon our fish, would, to persons less advantageously situated than us, amount almost to a total prohibition.

In the Report from the Secretary of State, a drawback is contemplated of the duties on all foreign articles, used by the seamen employed in the fishing trade, such as coffee, rum, &c.; but we ask it on the salt alone; nor is it asked as a bounty, but merely as a transfer from the hand of the merchant to that of the fishermen.

Mr. WHITE had no objection to give the trade a proper degree of encouragement; but he did not relish the idea of granting bounties; if any gentleman would prepare an amendment, so as to make them drawbacks in fact, as well as in words, he would consent to the measure.

Mr. AMES, after some introductory observations, adverted to the necessity of fixing some point in which both sides would agree. Disputes, he said, could not be terminated--or, more properly, they could not be managed at all, if some first principles were not conceded. The parties would want weapons for the controversy.

Law is in some countries the yoke of government, which bends or breaks the necks of the people; but, thank Heaven, in this country, it is a man's shield--his coat of mail--his castle of safety. It is more than his defence: it is his weapon to punish those who invade his rights--it is the instrument which assists--it is the price that rewards his industry.

If I say that fishermen have equal rights with other men, every gentleman feels in his own bosom a principle of assent. If I say that no man shall pay a tax on sending his property out of the country, the constitution will confirm it; for the constitution says, no duty shall be laid on exports. If I say, that on exporting dried fish, the exporter is entitled to drawback the duty paid on the salt, I say no more than the law of the land has confirmed. Plain and short as these principles are, they include the whole controversy. For I consider the law allowing the drawback as the right of the fishery, the defects of that law as the wrong suffered, and the bill before us as the remedy. The defects of the law are many and grievous. Supposing 340,000 quintals exported----

The salt duty is $42,744 The drawback is only 34,000 -------- Loss to the fishery 8,744

Whereas Government pays $45,900, at 13-1/2 cents, including charges, which are 3-1/2 cents on a quintal: which is beyond what the fishery receives 11,900 -------- Being a clear loss to the Government of 3,156

So that, though the whole is intended for the benefit of the fishery, about one-fourth of what is paid is not so applied: there is a heavy loss both to Government and the fishery. Even what is paid on the export is nearly lost money; the bounty is not paid till the exportation, nor then, till six months have elapsed; whereas the duty on salt is paid before the fish is taken: it is paid to the exporter, not to the fisherman. The bounty is so indirect, that the poor fisherman loses sight of it. It is paid to such persons, in such places, and at such periods, as to disappoint its good effects; passing through so many hands, and paying so many profits to each, it is almost absorbed. The encouragement, too, is greatest in successful years, when least needed; and is least in bad fishing seasons, when it is most needed. It is a very perplexed, embarrassing regulation to the officers of Government and to the exporter; hence the great charge: and, with all this charge and trouble, it is liable to many frauds. Four hundred miles of coast, little towns, no officer. All these defects the bill remedies; and, besides, gives the money on condition that certain regulations are submitted to, which are worth almost as much as the money.

The bill is defended on three grounds. First, it will promote the national wealth; second, the national safety; third, justice requires it: the last is fully relied on.

To show that the fishery will increase the wealth of the nation, it cannot be improper to mention its great value. The export before the war brought more than a million of dollars into this country; probably it is not less at present, and no small part in gold and silver. It is computed that thirty thousand persons, including four thousand seamen, subsist by it. Many say, very composedly, if it will not maintain itself, let it fall. But we should not only lose the annual million of dollars which it brings us; an immense capital would be lost. The fishing towns are built on the naked rocks, or barren sands, on the side of the sea. Those spots, however, where trade would sicken and die--which husbandry scorns to till--and which nature seems to have devoted to eternal barrenness, are selected by industry to work miracles on. Houses, stores, and wharves, are erected, and a vast property created, all depending on this business. Before you think it a light thing to consign them to ruin, see if you can compute what they cost; if they outrun your figures, then confess that it would be bad economy, as well as bad policy, to suffer rival nations to ruin our fishery. The regulations of foreign nations tend to bring this ruin about. France and England equally endeavor, in the language of the Secretary of State, to mount their marine on the destruction of our fishery. The fishers at Newfoundland are allowed liberal bounties by the English Government; and, in the French West Indies, we meet bounties on their fish and duties on our own, and these amount to the price of the fish. From the English islands we are quite shut out; yet such is the force of our natural advantages, that we have not yielded to these rivals. The Secretary of State has made these statements in his Report.

The more fish we catch, the cheaper; the English fish will need a greater bounty: whereas if we should yield, the English would probably need no bounty at all; they would have the monopoly. For example; suppose the English can fish at two dollars the quintal--we catch so much that we sell at one dollar and two-thirds: the loss to them is one-third of a dollar on each quintal. They must have that sum as a bounty. Whereas, if we increase our fishery, a greater and a greater bounty is needed by foreign nations. The contest so painfully sustained by them must be yielded at last, and we shall enjoy alone an immense fund of wealth to the nation, which nature has made ours; and though foreigners disturb the possession, we shall finally enjoy it peaceably and exclusively. If the lands of Kentucky are invaded, you drive off the invader; and so you ought. Why not protect this property as well? These opinions are supported by no common authority. The State of Massachusetts having represented the discouragements of the fishery, the subject has received the sanction of the Secretary of State; he confirms the facts stated in the petition; he says it is too poor a business to pay any thing to Government.

Yet, instead of asking bounties, or a remission of the duties on the articles consumed, we ask nothing but to give us our own money back, which you received under an engagement to pay it back, in case the article should be exported. If nothing was in view, therefore, but to promote national wealth, it seems plain that this branch ought to be protected and preserved; because, under all the discouragements it suffers, it increases, and every year more and more enriches the country, and promises to become an inexhaustible fund of wealth.