Part 140

I am under no apprehensions from the stockholders of the bank, or the speculators in the funds; for it is their interest to have a wise and good representation. The people who are employed in the more simple path of agriculture, removed at a great distance, are not more interested in the security of the Government than the more informed stockholder. As an example of the discernment of the great commercial people of London and Bristol, I need only mention their choice of a FOX and a BURKE, for until a late day Mr. Burke was the champion of the people and the friend of liberty.

If our Senate should take any unwarrantable stride towards aristocracy, have we not the power to check them? No President can very well attempt it at any time hereafter; and we are perfectly secure in the present time from all suspicion of corruption.

Mr. HILLHOUSE said he had ever been a friend to a Republican form of Government, and God forbid, that he should ever give his vote for any measure that should endanger the liberties of his country. He was in favor of an energetic government, as that alone can secure the blessings of liberty. As to the dread of corruption in this House, which some gentlemen appeared to entertain, he thought there was no foundation for such an apprehension; at least as the idea refers to one or two hundred Representatives--two hundred he contended, were as easily corrupted as one. But the corruption contemplated was a mere matter of opinion; no facts, he presumed, existed in this country to justify a positive assertion; and as to foreign countries, it seems to be conceded that a larger number than any that has been mentioned is susceptible of undue influence. He then adverted to the restrictions on the President of the United States, and the Senate, in respect to the means of corrupting the Legislature. The constitution has also made provision to secure the independence of the members, &c. He then urged some difficulties which would be occasioned by a small ratio. He observed that the population of some of the States is nearly stationary: if a small ratio is now established, the consequence will be, when it is augmented, that the representation of those States must be diminished. This would be a measure that would be greatly disliked. With respect to the proposed amendment, he thought it was entirely out of the question, till it was ratified by three-fourths of the States. A very numerous representation would tend to weaken, if not destroy the State Governments, and, in the issue, would destroy the General Government. For, said he, they mutually depend on each other for support.

Mr. KITCHELL was in favor of a numerous representation. He thought the amendment proposed to the constitution ought to be the guide to the House on this occasion. He did not draw his ideas of what should constitute a proper representation, from the examples cited from foreign countries; nor was he actuated by an apprehension of corruption, as more applicable to a small number than to a large one; but when he considered the various objects, views, denominations, professions, callings and interests of the citizens of the United States, he was fully convinced that a large representation was necessary to embrace the wishes and answer the expectations of the people. He should, therefore, vote against the motion for striking out thirty thousand.

Mr. GERRY took a general survey of the arguments against the proposed ratio of one to thirty thousand. In noticing the objection from the instability of the State Legislatures, he said it was not owing to their numbers, but to the mode in which they are elected. Were the Senates and Executives of the several States chosen as those of the General Government, there would have been as much stability and consistency in their transactions, as in those of the Government of the Union. A gentleman had said that the proposed amendments to the constitution had been adopted with reluctance by some of the States which had accepted them. He called on the gentleman to produce his authorities for this assertion. A relative proportion between the members of the House and the Senate had been suggested; this idea had no foundation in the constitution. And he further observed, that the constitution has so completely guarded and secured the rights and independence of the Senate, that he could not conceive of the apprehensions of gentlemen, who appear to think that an increase of the members of this House will overwhelm that branch of the Legislature. In all events, the privileges of that body will remain the same. The States, it is said, have reduced their Representative Assemblies. This, so far from being an argument against the proposed ratio, was directly in favor of it. The diminution of the State Legislatures has been occasioned by the idea which the people entertain of the increasing importance of the General Government. The objects of legislation to both Governments are nearly similar; they relate to those important concerns which interest the feelings of every citizen of the United States; all the difference lies in the magnitude of their respective spheres of action. Hence, it must evidently be the wish and expectation of the people, that their interests in every point of view, should be fully and adequately represented in this House.

The resolution being again read, in the following words:

"Resolved, That the number of Representatives shall, until the next enumeration, be one for thirty thousand."

The question was taken thereupon and agreed to by the House; yeas 35, nays 23, as follows:

YEAS.--Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, John Brown, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Daniel Heister, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, Thomas Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, Alexander White, and Francis Willis.

NAYS.--Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Robert Barnwell, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, James Hillhouse, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Jonathan Sturges, George Thatcher, John Vining, and Artemas Ward.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. PAGE, Mr. MURRAY, and Mr. MACON do prepare and bring in the same.

TUESDAY, November 22.

A memorial of the committee of the counties of Washington, Westmoreland, Fayette, and Alleghany, in the State of Pennsylvania, was presented to the House and read, stating their objections to an act, passed at the last session, imposing a duty on spirits distilled within the United States, and praying that the same may be repealed. Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for his information.

Representative from Maryland.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the report of the standing Committee of Elections, to whom was referred the Letter from the Executive of the State of Maryland, containing the resignation of WILLIAM PINKNEY, a member returned to serve in this House for the said State; and also a certificate of the election of JOHN FRANCIS MERCER, in the room of the said WILLIAM PINKNEY.

The law of the State of Maryland regulating elections being called for, was produced and read; by which it appeared that the Governor and Council of that State were authorized to fill up vacancies in the representation of that State in Congress.

Some objections having been offered against accepting the report,

Mr. SENEY observed, that the case appeared to him to be so plain that he was surprised to find gentlemen objecting to an acceptation of the report of the committee. He then stated the whole process of the business, in the resignation of Mr. PINKNEY and the election of Mr. MERCER, in which the law of the State had been strictly adhered to. He concluded by saying, that two cases in point had already occurred in the State of Connecticut, and no difficulty respecting them had taken place in the House.

Mr. GILES said, that he was a member of the select committee which had made the report; and from an accurate attention to all the circumstances of the case, he was led to think the report a very improper one. From recurring to the constitution, he was of opinion that a resignation did not constitute a vacancy. The constitution speaks only of vacancies in general, and does not contemplate one as resulting from a resignation. Adverting to the British House of Commons, he observed that in that body there could be no resignation. This is an established principle. The people having once chosen their representatives, their power ceases, and consequently the body to which the resignation ought to be made no longer exists. From the experience of the British Government in this respect, he argued against a deviation from this rule. He showed from the constitution, that the Executives of the States who are empowered to fill vacancies, are not at all authorized to declare the existence of such vacancies; for, if they are to judge in the case, the whole power is invested in them of determining the whole business of vacancies--an idea that materially and essentially affects the privileges of the members of the House. He remarked that, even by the law of Maryland, the requisite steps had not been pursued by the Executive of that State. He concluded by saying that, if the principles he had advanced were just, he hoped the report would not be accepted.

Mr. SMITH (S. C.) had had his doubts on the report; but on more mature consideration he was convinced that on account of the inconvenience which would result from rejecting it, and from other considerations, it was proper to adopt it, but not without a full discussion. He then stated some particulars to show that the vacancy which had occurred on this occasion could not properly be called a resignation. Mr. PINKNEY had never taken his seat, nor the requisite oath. He said that there was no analogy between the Parliament of Great Britain and this House; the mode of issuing the writs originally, and of filling up vacancies, is essentially different. No part of the constitution prohibits a member from resigning, and for convenience it ought to be concluded that he may resign. The public interest may suffer extremely in cases of sickness or embarrassments, which may prevent a member from attending. This argument from the body's not existing to whom the resignation ought to be made, will apply to the President of the United States, whose resignation is expressly mentioned in the constitution. The objection urged from the Executives of the States judging of vacancies, he conceived had no great force, for Congress would finally judge in every case of election. It is uncertain how the practice of the British Parliament originated. Blackstone says nothing of resignations. When a member wants to resign in that Legislature, he gets appointed to some fictitious office which disqualifies him from sitting in the House. He thought it best to establish some precedent, rather than oblige members who may wish to resign to have recourse to some familiar method, by accepting of some appointment in the State which is incompatible with a seat.

Mr. MURRAY said he was in favor of accepting the report, both on account of propriety and conveniency. Vacancies may happen from various causes--by resignation, by death, or by expulsion--the Executive of the State is the proper judge in the first case. He stated certain differences between a resignation after a person has taken his seat, and a resignation before that event. In the former case Congress will of course give notice to the Executive of the State; in the latter, the Executive alone can take cognizance of the resignation. He stated the extreme inconveniency which would result from the ideas of the gentleman from Virginia, as it would respect the State of Georgia. He then stated several particulars to show that Mr. PINKNEY was not a member of the House agreeably to the constitution, and therefore the House cannot proceed with him as one. He said that we ought to be willing to derive information from the experience of every country; but he conceived that no precedents could be drawn that would apply in the present case from a country which had none, to one which had a constitution that so clearly defined and guarded the rights of the citizens. The custom which had been mentioned as obtaining in that country, arose from a wish to prevent a frequency of elections. From what had been offered by the gentleman from South Carolina, and the ideas he had suggested, he hoped the committee would be induced to accept the report.

Mr. WILLIAMSON said, that it appeared to him that the constitution contemplates that a member may resign. He read the clause, which says that no member of the Legislature shall accept of an office made during the time for which he was chosen--from hence he inferred that resignations were clearly contemplated.

Mr. GERRY said that he had heard nothing to show that Mr. PINKNEY had ever accepted of his appointment, and therefore it ought to have been expressed that he had declined; but, granting he had resigned after accepting his appointment, he asserted that nothing had been offered to prove that resignations might not take place in one House as well as in the other; and the constitution plainly expresses that a Senator may resign. The House of Commons originated with the Kings, who formed that body to control the Lords; and hence arose the prohibition against resignations, as they would weaken the body, and the expense of a new election would fall on the King. With respect to the Executive declaring improper vacancies, he observed that Congress was invested with full power to control the Executives of the States in respect to such declarations.

Mr. SENEY observed upon a distinction made by Mr. GILES between a resignation on the part of a Senator and a Member of the House, he supposed a resignation in either would equally vacate a seat, and that no difference did really exist.

Mr. SEDGWICK observed that, if a power of adjudication was vested in the Executives of the States to determine on a vacancy in cases of resignation, it would involve this consequence, that a power of judging of vacancies in all possible cases would be the necessary result. He thought the proposition involved the most serious effects with respect to the privileges and independency of this House.

This subject was further discussed the next day, and ended in an acceptation of the report of the committee, which was in favor of Mr. MERCER's election.

MONDAY, December 5.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill making appropriations for the support of Government, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two; and, after some time spent therein,