Part 120

If banks were among the known and usual means to effectuate or facilitate the ends which had been mentioned, to enable the Government, with the greatest ease and least burden to the people, to collect taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, raise and support armies, provide and maintain fleets, he thought the argument irrefragable and conclusive to prove the constitutionality of the bill. Pursuing further the same idea, he asked for what purposes were banks instituted and patronized by Governments which were unrestricted by constitutional limitations? Were they not employed as the means and the most useful engines to facilitate the collection of taxes, borrowing money, and the other enumerated powers? Besides, he said, it was to be observed that the constitution had expressly declared the ends of legislation; but in almost every instance had left the means to the honest and sober discretion of the Legislature. From the nature of things this must ever be the case; for otherwise the constitution must contain not only all the necessary laws under the existing circumstances of the community, but also a code so extensive as to adapt itself to all future possible contingencies. By our constitution, Congress has not only the power to lay and collect taxes, but to do every thing subordinate to that end; the objects, the means, the instruments, and the purposes, are left to the honest and sober discretion of the Legislature. The power of borrowing money was expressly granted; but all the known and usual means to that end were left in silence. The same observations might with truth be made respecting the other delegated powers. The great ends to be obtained as means to effectuate the ultimate end--the public good and general welfare--are capable, under general terms, of constitutional specification; but the subordinate means are so numerous, and capable of such infinite variation, as to render an enumeration impracticable, and must therefore be left to construction and necessary implication. He said, on this ground, he was willing to leave the general argument; it was simple, intelligible, and he hoped would be thought conclusive.

He said the constitutionality had been attacked from another quarter. It was said, we could not give commercial advantages to one port above another. The constitutional provision which had been quoted was undoubtedly intended to prevent a partial regulation of commerce; if extended to the case under consideration, it would much more strongly prove that Congress ought not to reside in any commercial city; for he verily believed that the commercial advantages of Philadelphia were incomparably greater from that residence than they could be supposed from the institution of a National Bank. Indeed, it was his opinion that, considering that this city had a bank, the capital of which was adequate to all her commercial exigencies; that she could enlarge that capital as her necessity should require; and that her bank will, if this bill should be rejected, receive the benefit of national operations, the measure will not advance her individual interest.

With regard to the utility of banks, he observed that he would not attempt to display a knowledge of the subject by repeating all he had read and heard in relation to it, nor fatigue the House by a detail of his own reflections and reasoning upon it; the causes were unnecessary to be explained; the effects had been such in all countries where banks had been instituted, as to produce a unanimous opinion that they were alike useful for all the great purposes of Government, and to promote the general happiness of the people. Nor was our own experience wanting to the same purpose. At a time when our public resources were almost annihilated, our credit prostrate, our Government imbecile, and its patronage inconsiderable, a bank of small capital was among the most operative causes which produced that first dawn that ultimately terminated in meridian splendor by the establishment of peace, independence, and freedom. There were two circumstances which he would take the liberty to mention, which would render banks of more importance in this country than in any other country where they are at present in use: the first, the commercial enterprise of our merchants compared with the smallness of their capitals, which, as we had no large manufacturing capitals, whereby the precious metals could be retained in circulation, would frequently, by their exportation, greatly distress the people; the other originated from a measure of the Government. Congress, from a laudable intention of accommodating their constituents, instituted Treasuries in all the States; in some of these there would be, in the ordinary course of events, a deficiency, and in others a redundancy. To keep them in equilibrium by the transportation of the precious metals, or by the purchase of bills in the market, would be not only inconvenient and expensive, but would keep out of circulation a considerable part of the medium of the country.

Gentlemen had been pleased to consider the proposed terms as giving an undue advantage to the stockholders. He would leave this part of the subject to gentlemen who better understood it; only observing, that as Government must rely principally on merchants to obtain the proposed stock, it would be necessary to afford to them sufficient motives to withdraw from their commercial pursuits a part of their capitals.

He would attempt an answer to some of those desultory objections which had been made, and in doing this, he would omit to answer such as had been, in his opinion, already refuted. He observed, that it had been said that granting charters of incorporation was a high prerogative of Government. He supposed it was not intended that it was, in the nature of things, too transcendent a power to be exercised by a National Government, but that the exercise of it should only be in consequence of express delegation. Let this objection be compared with the conduct of Congress on another subject, in all respects at least as important. There is not, by the constitution, any power expressly delegated to mortgage our revenues, and yet, without any question being made on the constitutionality of the measure, we have mortgaged them to an immense amount. From whence, he asked, do we acquire the authority to exercise this power? Not from express grants, but being empowered to borrow money on the credit of the United States, we have very properly considered the pledging funds as among the known and usual means necessary and proper to be employed for the attainment of the end expressly delegated.

It has been said that the bill authorized the stockholders to purchase real estate. He considered the provision in the bill in that regard, not a grant, but a limitation of power. Any man, or body of men, might, by the existing laws, purchase, in their own private capacities, real estate to any amount. This right was limited as it respected the proposed corporation.

It is said there are banks already, and therefore the proposed incorporation is unnecessary. To this he answered, that if the Government should agree to receive all its demands in the paper of the existing banks, it would give to them every advantage which, in the opinion of gentlemen, renders the present system objectionable, without stipulating for any equivalent to the Government. But are, he asked, gentlemen serious in these observations? Do they believe the capitals of those banks adequate to the exigencies of the nation? Do they believe that those banks possess any powers by which they can give a projectile force to their paper, so as to extend its circulation throughout the United States? Or do they really wish to have the Government repose itself on institutions with which they have no intimate connection, and over which they have no control?

Mr. S. concluded by observing he was very confident a majority of the House could never be induced to believe that it was the intention of the constitution to deprive the Legislature of one of the most important and necessary means of executing the powers expressly delegated.

Mr. LAWRENCE.--The advocates of this measure stand in an unfortunate situation; for being those who in general advocate national measures, they are charged with designs to extend the powers of the Government unduly. He, however, consoled himself with a conscious attachment to the constitution, and with the reflection that their conduct received the approbation of their constituents. If the present be contrasted with the former circumstances of this country, he doubted not the measures of this Government would continue to receive the approbation of the people of the United States.

The silence of the people on the subject now before the House is strongly presumptive that the measure of the Bank is not considered by them as unconstitutional. He then endeavored to show the constitutionality of the bank system. It must be conceded that there is nothing in the constitution that is expressly against it, and therefore we ought not to deduce a prohibition by construction; he adverted to the amendment proposed by Congress to the constitution, which says, "powers not delegated are retained;" here, said he, to prove that the Bank is unconstitutional, the constructive interpretation so much objected against is recurred to.

The great objects of this Government are contained in the context of the constitution. He recapitulated those objects, and inferred that every power necessary to secure these must necessarily follow; for as to the great objects for which this Government was instituted, it is as full and complete in all its parts as any system that could be devised; a full, uncontrollable power to regulate the fiscal concerns of this Union, is a primary consideration in this Government, and from hence it clearly follows that it must possess the power to make every possible arrangement conducive to that great object.

He then adverted to the late Confederation, and pointed out its defects and incompetency; and hence the old Congress called on the States to enact certain laws which they had not power to enact; from hence he inferred, that as the late Confederation could not pass those laws, and to capacitate the Government of the United States, and form a more perfect union, the constitution under which we now act was formed. To suppose that this Government does not possess the powers for which the constitution was adopted, involves the grossest absurdity.

The deviation from charters, and the infringement of parchment rights, which had been justified on the principle of necessity by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) he said had been made on different principles from those now mentioned; the necessity, he contended, did not at the time exist; the old Congress exercised the power, as they thought, by a fair construction of the Confederation.

On constructions, he observed, it was to be lamented that they should ever be necessary; but they had been made; he instanced the power of removability, which had been an act of the three branches, and has not been complained of. It was at least as important a one as the present.

But the construction now proposed, he contended, was an easy and natural construction. Recurring to the collection law, he observed, that it was by construction that the receipts are ordered to be made in gold and silver.

With respect to creating a mass of capital, he supposed just and upright national measures would create a will to form this capital.

Adverting to the idea that Congress has not the power to establish companies with exclusive privileges, he observed, that by the amendments proposed by New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, it plainly appears that these States considered that Congress does possess the power to establish such companies.

The constitution vests Congress with power to dispose of certain property in lands, and to make all useful rules and regulations for that purpose; can its power be less over one species of its own property than over another?

With respect to giving preference to one State over another, he observed, that ten years hence the seat of Government is to be on the Potomac, and wherever the Government is finally settled, the place will enjoy superior advantages; but still the Government must go thither, and the places not enjoying those advantages must be satisfied.

It is said we must not pass a problematical bill, which is liable to a supervision by the Judges of the Supreme Court; but he conceived there was no force in this, as those judges are invested by the Constitution with a power to pass their judgment on all laws that may be passed.

It is said that this law may interfere with the State Governments; but this may or may not be the case; and in all interference of the kind the particular interest of a State must give way to the general interest.

With respect to the corporation possessing the power of passing laws, this, he observed, is a power incidental to all corporations; and in the instance of the Western Territory, Congress have exercised the power of instituting corporations or bodies politic, to the greatest possible extent.

He defended the right of Congress to purchase and possess property, and quoted a passage in the Constitution to show that they possess this right.

He then touched on the expediency of banks, and of that proposed in particular. The advantages generally derived from these institutions, he believed, applied peculiarly to this country. He noticed the objection from banks banishing the specie; he said the surplus only would be sent out of the country; but is it given away? No, sir, it is sent off for articles which are wanted, and which will enrich the country.

With respect to a run on the Bank, he mentioned the circumstances under which those runs on the British banks, which had been noticed, took place; and showed there was no parallel that would probably ever take place in this country.

For several particulars he showed that the objection which arose from the United States not having a good bargain by the system was not well founded. He then mentioned the peculiar advantages which the United States will enjoy over common subscribers.

The objection from banks being already established in the several States he obviated by stating the mischiefs which might arise from an ignorance of the situation of those banks; and concluded by some remarks on the inexpediency of the General Government having recourse to institutions of merely a local nature.

Mr. JACKSON said, that having been the person who brought forward the constitutional objection against the bill, he thought himself bound to notice the answers which had been offered to that objection. Newspaper authorities, said he, have been alluded to, and their silence on the subject considered as indicating the approbation of the people. He would meet the gentlemen on that ground; and, though he did not consider newspapers as an authority to be depended on, yet if opinions through that channel were to be regarded, he would refer the gentlemen to those of this city; the expediency and constitutionality of the bill have been called in question by the newspapers of this city.