Part 5

It is clear that if you sell at a specified price for delivery at a certain time, your only protection is your belief that you'll be able to buy sugar cheaply enough to make a profit.

CHART 4

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- BUYING SUGAR FUTURES

1. Based on the expectation of higher prices. 2. To establish costs, pre-determine selling prices and protect profits on advance sales. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Initial | | | Transactions | Subsequent Transactions |Sugar Cost | Result -------------+------+----------+--------+-------+------+------------+------- | |Condition | Price |Result |Price | Figure it | In | |of market | you | of | you | this way |each | | when you | would |selling| pay | |case | |buy actual| obtain | your | for | |the | | sugar |for your|futures|actual| |same | | |futures | |sugar | | -------------+------+----------+--------+-------+------+------------+------- | | | | | |Price paid |Your | | | | | |for actual |sugar | | | |A | |sugar less |cost is You buy Sugar|When |If it has | |profit | |hedging |6.00 Futures at |you |advanced | |of | |profit |as pre- 6.00 to cover|buy |to 8.00 | 8.00 |2.00 | 8.00 |8-2=6 |deter- future |actual| | | | | |mined requirements;|sugar,| | |A | |Price paid | fix your |you |If it has | |loss | |for actual | price and |sell |declined | |of | |sugar plus | take orders |your |to | | | |hedging loss| on the basis |fu- |4.00 | 4.00 |2.00 | 4.00 |4+2=6 | of 6¢ sugar |tures | | | | | | | |If it is | |No | | | | |still at | |profit,| | | | |6.00 | 6.00 |no loss| 6.00 | 6.00 | -------------+------+----------+--------+-------+------+------------+-------

It is equally clear that if a manufacturer names a price and takes advance orders without pre-determining his sugar cost, his profit is a matter of guesswork. He is not going to know the cost of his manufactured product until he buys his sugar.

Assume that you have contracted to deliver sugar to a manufacturer or to any customer at a definite date and a specified price, without buying sugar to cover your requirements. If the price of sugar is favorable when you deliver it, you are fortunate and net a profit. But sugar may have advanced to a point where you are forced to pay such a price that your profit is lower than it should be. In fact there may not be any profit at all.

By conservative, wise use of the Sugar Exchange, most of this risk and uncertainty can be eliminated and both you and your customer can go ahead with your plans with your prices determined through a known sugar cost.

Suppose that in March or April, for example, the market appears strong and you find that some of your manufacturing customers are anxious to be assured of an adequate supply of sugar at a definite price. In such a case, if these advance orders called for a sufficient volume, and provided Exchange prices were favorable, you could take care of your trade's future requirements at a fixed price, without yourself taking a speculative position. We also believe that buyers making these arrangements with any of their trade would be justified in requesting the same proportionate marginal protection which it is necessary for jobbers themselves to give the seller on the Exchange. There will no doubt be many occasions when it would be worth while to solicit orders on this basis.

With your own sugar cost fixed by the use of the Exchange, you could take proper care of these buyers without worrying about subsequent fluctuations of the market, as you would know that your sugar cost would be about the price paid for your futures which, let us say, is 6.00. (See Chart 4.)

The market may advance so that by September, sugar is selling at 8.00. (You are now making deliveries to your trade as contracted). So you sell your futures at 8.00, go into the market and buy actual sugar for about the same figure, assuming, of course, that actual sugar has also advanced in relative proportion, which is likely. You pay 2.00 more for your actual sugar than you had figured but you have profited to the extent of 2.00 on the sale of futures. Profit and loss cancel each other and you have your sugar at 6.00. In other words, although the market is now 8.00 you are delivering 6.00 sugar to your customers, with a profit to yourself.

If the market declines after your original purchase at 6.00 so that in September sugar is selling at 4.00, you will sell your futures at 4.00, taking a loss of 2.00. But you will buy your actual sugar at about 4.00, also, which is 2.00 lower than you planned for. This gain of 2.00, while not to be termed an actual profit, may certainly be considered as canceling the loss on the sale of your futures, so that the cost of your sugar is really 6.00, your original price.

Another way of looking at this is to add the loss of 2.00 on the sale of your futures to 4.00, the cost of your actual sugar, making 6.00, the price upon which you had based your plans. If you had waited, you would have been able to get your sugar for 4.00, but by buying it ahead you have had the benefits of protection and the elimination of speculation and risk.

If the market remains steady after your June purchase, or after various fluctuations, returns to 6.00 by September, you sell your futures at 6.00 and buy spot sugar for about the same amount. Thus you have neither gained nor lost, but you have been protected in your sugar cost.

This is essentially a "playing-safe" operation. It results in profit insurance for the jobber who is willing to sacrifice the possibility of a speculative gain on advance sales to customers. It is thoroughly sound business policy and is neither expensive nor difficult to carry out.

Point of Delivery

Although Chicago is the delivery point in all Exchange contracts for refined sugar, it should be plainly understood that the Exchange is for anyone, anywhere. Whether located in Chicago, or in Rochester, Baltimore, New York or even San Francisco, a jobber can advantageously use the Exchange.

Deliveries of Refined Sugar Futures will be made only from the Exchange-licensed warehouses in Chicago. But, regardless of the prospective buyer's location, the delivery point is not of any material importance as it is an established fact that in operations on all exchanges the percentage of actual deliveries taken is exceptionally small. In fact, the examples used in this booklet are all based on the supposition that the buyer may find it more convenient not to take delivery.

The usual procedure followed in sugar exchange operations is for the buyer to close out his exchange transaction prior to the period calling for delivery and purchasing actual sugar from the refiners, executing both transactions practically simultaneously.

Possibly the most important problem in connection with the organization of any commodity exchange is to reduce the possibility of corners, however remote, to the smallest possible degree.

In the case under discussion, the Chicago delivery point, by virtue of its accessibility for producers and consumers from all parts of the country, operates to that end.

Practically every refiner of cane sugars in the East and West, as well as the Southern refiners, carries large stocks in Chicago, and its favorable location in connection with the beet sugar industry also makes it highly desirable. Its situation in regard to the offerings of the Louisiana producers is also an additional protection and advantage of considerable importance.

The Exchange-licensed warehouses in Chicago are under the direct and constant supervision of Exchange representatives. Facilities are provided for testing and grading sugar so as to maintain Exchange quality standards.

When are Refiners' Prices and Exchange Quotations in line?

Since exchange quotations for refined sugar futures are net cash ex-exchange-licensed warehouse, Chicago, while refiners' quotations are f.o.b. refinery, less 2% for cash, it is obvious that there must be a difference between refiners' prices and exchange quotations.

It is equally obvious that the differential should approximate the freight rate between Chicago and the Seaboard, where the refiners are located, with allowance also for the cash discount. When the markets are in line such is the case. Conversely, when the differential is higher or lower, the markets are out of line.

Therefore, in order to tell whether the markets are out of line, or to what extent, it is necessary to determine on a differential to represent the normal difference between the two markets. There is no one figure, however, that will satisfy all conditions at all times, for the reason that there are various freight rates between the Seaboard and Chicago. It is inaccurate, for instance, to use 63¢ as the basis for the normal differential. The 63¢ rate is one rate--the all-rail freight rate from New York to Chicago.

Other important routes and rates are as follows:

Routing: Freight Rate: