Part 4

(3.) The intervals between the columns are so many gaps, through which cavalry could easily penetrate, and take the columns in rear.

The line of division columns appears to have been first suggested by Marshal Marmont, who was a good artillery commander, but not necessarily, for that reason, a weighty authority on a point of Infantry Tactics.

15. The manoeuvre of Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions is obnoxious to all the objections just pointed out in regard to Division Columns. On being threatened by cavalry, though the troops would have no intermediate formation to pass through to prepare for forming square, they would have to face into column and close to half distance, which there would often not be time to do.

In addition to this, the flank march being habitually by fours, the subdivisions would offer a tolerable mark for the enemy's artillery, and thus be exposed to a destructive enfilade.

And in forming into line, where the leading guides have not accurately preserved both their alignment and their intervals, which must be the usual case in the field, there must be more or less delay and confusion, of which a prompt and active enemy would not fail to take fatal advantage.

The mode prescribed by the Tactics (Par. 150, School of the Battalion), for executing the manoeuvre of forming line while advancing by subdivision flanks, seems also to call for remark; it being "by company (or division) into line." In other words, each individual soldier brings a shoulder forward, breaks off from his comrades, and hurries up, not on a line with them, but detached from them, and moving independently, to find his proper place. This destroys for the time being, and at a critical moment, the unity of the subdivisions, and so impairs the confidence soldiers derive from realizing that they form part of a compact mass. In thus executing this manoeuvre under fire, and near the enemy, there is danger of the men becoming confused and bewildered. For this reason, a better method of forming line would seem to be to re-form the column by a simple facing, and then to wheel into line by subdivisions.

16. The worst possible order of marching in battle, for any considerable number of men, as a battalion, for instance, is by the flank. Such a line, advancing in what is really a column of fours, would be rolled up and crushed, on the enemy's attacking its head; and would, meanwhile, be exposed to enfilade. Marching to a flank, it would be running the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and musketry fire. In forming into line in either case, much time would be lost; as in flank marching in the field, especially when the ground is ragged or obstructed, distances cannot be preserved.

It may be here remarked, that marching to a flank in column also, whether by division, company, or platoon, is highly objectionable, as it constantly exposes the column to an enfilading fire, as well as to be suddenly charged in flank by cavalry.

III.--The Attack, how made.

1. The speed of a column of attack must never be checked for a moment, to enable it to reply to the enemy's fire. The fire of the column will be ineffective, for it will be the fire of excited men, and very limited in extent, as it can proceed from the leading division only; and the fire once begun, it will be hard to stop it. If, in order to fire, we halt the column, re-forming it under the excitement of the fire will be very difficult; and the enemy's least forward movement may then cause a rout.

At Maida, in Calabria, in 1806, the French columns attacked the English under General Stuart. When within thirty paces, the English gave them a volley. The French, stunned, as it were, began, at once, to deploy. The English fired again, and the French retreated.

At Waterloo, in the last grand attack by the French, the advance column of the Imperial Guard was decisively repulsed by the British Guards. These had been lying on the ground behind the crest of the slope until the French appeared, when they suddenly rose up and poured in a murderous volley at short range. Instead of instantly charging with the bayonet, the French hesitated, then began to deploy. The British charged at once, and drove them down the hill.

2. This dangerous halt and deployment is apt also to occur when the column finds sheltering objects by the way. Therefore, hurry by these, and hasten the step.

3. It will also tend to prevent such an untoward accident, if we furnish the columns of attack, where several are employed, with skirmishers in their intervals, as well as on their outer flanks, to draw the enemy's fire. Otherwise, the column fired into will be apt, in order to return the fire, to halt instinctively and deploy into line, which breaks up the attack.

4. From this it appears that the limited fire of a column of attack is, in fact, no defect, the highest offensive power of infantry being in the bayonet. Fire, in the attack, is generally ineffective, and sometimes injurious. It should rarely be used till the enemy has turned his back.

5. As to attacking cavalry:

Infantry may advance in line and attack cavalry safely, provided its flanks are protected. Before a long line of infantry, cavalry must retreat, or be destroyed by its fire. In the Austrian service it is said to be a received maxim, that horses will not stand before the steady approach of a mass of infantry, with bayonets at the charge, but will always retire before the infantry closes on them.

6. So, infantry in column, either closed in mass, or at half distance, may attack cavalry successfully; taking care to be ready to form square, or "column against cavalry," at the first symptom of their preparing to charge.

7. As to attacking artillery:

Before charging, the infantry sometimes first seeks the shelter of ground, using its sharpshooters to annoy it, and, if possible, to silence its fire.

Or, when circumstances are favorable, as when it can get a position near its flank, it attacks it vigorously, at once, with fire and bayonet.

But when infantry has to advance to the attack of a battery in front, it should never be in any compact formation, but always deployed as skirmishers. Otherwise, it would usually meet with a bloody repulse; especially where any considerable space of ground is to be cleared.

At the battle of Malvern Hill, the rebel General Magruder's division was sent, either in column or in line, to charge a powerful Union battery just beyond an open field a mile and three-quarters in length. The rebels rushed into the field at a full run, but encountered a murderous fire from the guns they were sent to attack, which mowed them down by hundreds. By the time they had cleared two-thirds of the ground, the carnage was so dreadful as to drive them back to the woods from which they had started. Twice more they were sent forward in the same manner, but with the same result; when the undertaking was abandoned.

8. In attacking a battery, we may often secure its capture by a volley aimed at the horses; the effect of which may prevent the enemy from carrying it off. But this should be avoided when there is a good prospect of capturing the battery without disabling the horses; since then, if we succeed, we shall be able to immediately use the battery against the enemy ourselves.

9. In the French Revolution, the Chouans of La Vendée attacked the Republican batteries in several single files, of one or two hundred men each, at intervals of fifty paces. Such a formation protects the attacking columns, to a great extent, from the enemy's fire, but exposes them to destruction by a charge from the battery supports. In the absence of these, it would often be very advantageous; since, by proper drilling, these columns in one rank could be made, on arriving near the enemy, to rapidly double in two or four ranks, without halting, and then, by filing to a flank and facing, to advance by the front in a compact line.

The same formation would be useful for troops advancing to assault an intrenchment; but, as in the case of a battery, subject to the risk of being destroyed by a sudden sortie from the work.

10. Artillery is never without supports. One part of the infantry, therefore, deployed as skirmishers, should attack the guns, circling round them, and opening fire on the men and horses; while the other part attacks the support in flank. On getting sufficiently near, the assailants should try to draw the fire of the guns, and then rush on them before they have time to reload.

If a battery gets into confusion, or there is any delay in unlimbering or limbering up, then is the most favorable time to capture it by a vigorous charge with the bayonet.