A Treatise of Human Nature

Part Iii. of Knowledge and Probability.

SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE. SECT. II. OF PROBABILITY, AND OF THE IDEA OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. SECT. III. WHY A CAUSE IS ALWAYS NECESSARY. SECT. IV. OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OF OUR REASONINGS CONCERNING CAUSE AND EFFECT. SECT. V. OF THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE SENSES AND MEMORY. SECT. VI. OF THE INFERENCE FROM THE IMPRESSION TO THE IDEA. SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF. SECT. VIII. OF THE CAUSES OF BELIEF. SECT. IX. OF THE EFFECTS OF OTHER RELATIONS AND OTHER HABITS. SECT. X. OF THE INFLUENCE OF BELIEF. SECT. XI. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHANCES. SECT. XII. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSES. SECT. XIII. OF UNPHILOSOPHICAL PROBABILITY. SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION. SECT. XV. RULES BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS. SECT. XVI OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS

Part Iv. of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy.

SECT. I. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON. SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES. SECT. III. OF THE ANTIENT PHILOSOPHY. SECT. IV. OF THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY. SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL. SECT. VI. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY SECT. VII. CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK.

Volume Ii

BOOK II OF THE PASSIONS

PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY

SECT. I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT SECT. II OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY, THEIR OBJECTS AND CAUSES SECT. III WHENCE THESE OBJECTS AND CAUSES ARE DERIVED SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS SECT. V OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE RELATIONS ON PRIDE AND HUMILITY SECT. VI LIMITATIONS OF THIS SYSTEM SECT. VII OF VICE AND VIRTUE SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY SECT. IX OF EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES SECT. X OF PROPERTY AND RICHES SECT. XI OF THE LOVE OF FAME SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS

Part Ii of Love and Hatred

SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED SECT. II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM SECT. III DIFFICULTIES SOLVED SECT. IV OF THE LOVE OF RELATIONS SECT. V OF OUR ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER SECT. VII OF COMPASSION SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY SECT. IX OF THE MIXTURE OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER WITH COMPASSION AND MALICE SECT. X OF RESPECT AND CONTEMPT SECT. XI OF THE AMOROUS PASSION, OR LOVE BETWIXT THE SEXES SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF ANIMALS

Part Iii of the Will and Direct Passions

SECT. I OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY SECT. II THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED SECT. III OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF THE WILL SECT. IV OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENT PASSIONS SECT. V OF THE EFFECTS OF CUSTOM SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE PASSIONS SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED SECT. IX OF THE DIRECT PASSIONS SECT. X OF CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH

Book Iii of Morals

PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL

SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVED FROM REASON SECT. II MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVED FROM A MORAL SENSE

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? SECT. II OF THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE SECT. VII OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. IX OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. XI OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS SECT. XII OF CHASTITY AND MODESTY

Part Iii of the Other Virtues and Vices

SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES SECT. V SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING THE NATURAL VIRTUES SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK

APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

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VOL. I OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

ADVERTISEMENT.

My design in the present work is sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there planned out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction.

INTRODUCTION.

Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.

Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.

From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.

It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

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