Part 7

III. Perception is necessary. When the understanding and its objects are brought together, perception takes place according to the constituted laws of the intelligence.

IV. The acts of will or the affections are necessary. When this faculty of our being and its objects are brought together, volition or choice, emotions, passions, or desires take place, according to the constituted nature and laws of this faculty.

The objects and this faculty are correlates. In relation to the object, we may call this faculty subject. When subject and object are suited to each other, that is, are agreeable, affections are produced which we call pleasant; when they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable, affections take place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in relation to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.

In the perfection and harmony of our being, this correspondence is universal; that is, what is known to be agreeable is felt to be pleasant;--what is known to be disagreeable is felt to be painful. But, in the corruption of our being, this is reversed in respect of moral objects. Although what is right is known to be agreeable, that is, suited to us, it is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to be unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as synonymous terms. The distinction I have here made is at least convenient in describing the same objects as presented to the understanding and to the will.

V. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices, are thus produced in the correlation of subject, that is the will, and the object. In assigning the causes of these affections, we may refer to the nature of the will, which is such, as to receive such and such affections when in the presence of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects, and say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such and such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at once, and say that the affections arise from the state of the mind, and from the nature and circumstances of the object.

VI. The affections of the will stand connected with changes or effects in other parts of our being, as stated antecedents. First, they stand thus connected with muscular action,--as walking, talking, striking, resisting, &c. Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental operations,--as fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the memory.

VII. The affections of the will, when thus connected with effects in other parts of our being, have a peculiar and striking characteristic. It is this: that the effect contemplated takes place at the moment it appears the most agreeable,--the greatest apparent good; which, as Edwards uses these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect contemplated produces the most pleasant affection,--the most intense sense of the agreeable,--it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a particular subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the constitution and law of our being. The play of the different parts is reciprocal. Perception must bring up the objects, and the affections of will immediately follow. The most agreeable are dwelt upon by the mind, and perception again takes place particularly with regard to these; and according as objects affect the will, do all the activities of our being come forth.

VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can be easily explained by this system:--Choice is the sense or the affection of the most pleasant and agreeable. Preference is its synonyme, with scarcely a shade of difference. They both have respect to the act of selection. Volition is another name for this affection of will, and is used more particularly in relation to effects or changes following the affection. Desire is a nascent choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment, is choice. Emotion is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the first sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with respect to certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment possible in relation to them,--for example, the emotion of sublimity, produced by an object which can hold no other relation to us. But then the sublimity of the object may be the motive which causes the choice of gazing at it; that is, it connects this act of contemplation with the sense of the most agreeable.

Passion is emotion accompanied by desire in reference to other relations with the object. Thus the emotion of beauty awakened by a flower may be accompanied by the desire of possessing it; and if this desire becomes the strongest desire at the moment, then the passion has the characteristic which makes it choice, and some corresponding effects take place in order to possess it,--as walking towards it, stretching out the hand, &c.

The determination of will is the production or causation of choice. It is used in reference to the immediate and particular choice, in opposition to all other choices.

The will itself is the capacity of being affected by objects with emotion, passion, and desire,--and with that form of passion which we call the sense of the most agreeable or choice, and which is connected with effects or consequents as their stated antecedent.

The motive is the cause of choice, and is complex. It lies in the nature and susceptibilities of the will, and in the nature and circumstances Of the object chosen.

IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, what reason commands may seem disagreeable to the will, and of course reason cannot be obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when her commands produce the sense of the most agreeable.

X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are opposed in reference to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute of the man--the human soul. The man is free when his volitions or choices are unimpeded,--when, upon choosing to walk, he walks, &c. The man is not free, or is under necessity, when his volitions or choices are impeded,--when, upon choosing to walk, he finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is impossible for him to walk,--then he has no liberty to walk,--then he is under a necessity of remaining in one place.

Necessity in any other use is metaphysical or philosophical necessity, and is applied out of the sphere of the will: as the necessity of truth, the necessity of being,--the necessary connexion of cause and effect. Hence,

The connexion between volitions or choices, or the sense of the most agreeable with the motive or cause, is necessary with a philosophical necessity. The necessity of volitions in reference to motives is also called moral necessity. This term moral is given, not in reference to the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the terms connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings are thus distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly call natural.

XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A natural agent is that which produces effects without volition. A moral agent is one producing effects by volitions, accompanied with an intellectual perception of the volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a sense of desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account of the volitions and their effects.

Brutes or irresponsible beings are agents that have volitions, but have no reason to perceive right and wrong, and consequently have no sense of desert; and as they cannot perceive right and wrong, they cannot be made the subjects of moral appeals and inducements.

XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the possession of reason; secondly, from the capacity of choice; thirdly, from natural ability.

Natural ability exists when the effect or act commanded to be accomplished has an established connexion with volition or choice. Thus we say a man has natural ability to walk, because if he chooses to walk, he walks. Natural ability differs from freedom only in this:--The first refers to an established connexion between volitions and effects. The second refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting forces from between volitions and effects.

Hence a man is naturally unable to do anything when there is no established connexion between volition and that thing. A man is naturally unable to push a mountain from its seat. He has no liberty to move his arm when it is bound.

Moral inability is metaphysical or philosophical inability. Philosophical inability in general refers to the impossibility of a certain effect for the want of a cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there is a philosophical inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the decay of old age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have no cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a philosophical inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons weight with a pine lath, and by the hand of a single man, because we have not an adequate cause. Moral inability relates to the connexion between motives and volitions in distinction from natural ability, which relates to the connexion between volitions and actions consequent upon them: but the term moral as we have seen, does not characterize the nature of the connexion,--it only expresses the quality of terms connected. Hence moral inability, as philosophical inability, is the impossibility of a certain volition or choice for the want of a motive or cause, or an adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical inability of Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive or cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for fifty dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive is not adequate to produce a volition to such an act.

Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute in respect of us, because beyond the sphere of our volition.

XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness or guilt, apply only to volitions. This indeed is not formally brought out in the part of Edwards's work we have been examining. His discussion of it will be found in part IV. sec. I. But as it is necessary to a complete view of his system, we introduce it here.

He remarks in this part, "If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not in the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is our fault, &c." (page 190.) "Disposition of mind," or inclination, --"acts of the mind," "acts of will," here obviously mean the same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are distinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether the cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or viciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself. It plainly results from Edwards's psychology, and he has himself in the above quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the volition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these volitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of God, they are right; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The metaphysical questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the character of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are questions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do we do right? do we do wrong? What is the nature of our volitions?

Nor does the necessary connexion between the motives and the volitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the volitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character of the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the rule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist. The last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind, and not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency, responsibility, and duty.

And so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or not doing external actions, so far only as these actions are naturally connected with volitions, as sequents with their stated antecedents. If the action is one which ought to be done, we are responsible for the doing of it, if we know that upon our willing it, it will be done; although at this very moment there is no such correlation between the action and the will, as to form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act of willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, we are guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to will it, it would not be done; although at this very moment there is such a correlation between the action, and the state of the will, as to form the cause or motive by which the act of willing comes necessarily to exist. The metaphysical or philosophical inquiry respecting the correlation of the state of the will and any action, or respecting the want of such a correlation, is foreign to the question of duty and responsibility. This question relates only to the volition and its connexion with its consequents.

This does not clash at all with the common sentiment that our actions are to be judged of by our motives; for this sentiment does not respect volitions in relation to their cause, but external actions in relation to the volitions which produce them. These external actions may be in themselves good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force or power may have come in between the volition and its object, and changed the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an event different from the will or intention; although being in connexion with the agent, it may still be attributed to his will: or the immediate act which appears good, may, in the mind of the agent be merely part of an extended plan or chain of volitions, whose last action or result is evil. It is common, therefore, to say of an external action, we must know what the man intends, before we pronounce upon him; which is the same thing as to say we must know what his volition really is, or what his motive is--that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but the volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause of these effects;--which again, is the same thing as to say, that before we can pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what effects he really intends or wills, or desires, that is, what it is which is really connected in his mind with the sense of the most agreeable.