CHAPTER XXXV. Conkling Down and Out

CONKLING DOWN AND OUT

1881

In the speakership contest of January, 1881, the anti-Conkling leaders discovered a disposition to profit by the election of Garfield. They wanted to learn their voting strength, and to encourage assemblymen to oppose George H. Sharpe, the Stalwart candidate, the Tribune, in double-leaded type, announced, apparently with authority, that the President-elect would not allow them to suffer. This sounded a trifle warlike. It also quickly enhanced the stress between the opposing factions, for those who are themselves not averse to wire-pulling are morbidly suspicious of intrigue in others.

But nothing came of the Tribune's announcement. Sharpe's creditable service on Grant's staff, his cleverness as a Stalwart manager, and his acceptability as a speaker of the preceding Assembly, brought him troops of friends. Although making no pretensions to the gift of oratory, he possessed qualities needed for oratorical success. He was forceful, remarkably clear, with impressive manners and a winning voice. As a campaign speaker few persons in the State excelled him. Men, too, generally found him easy of approach and ready to listen. At all events his tactful management won a majority of the Republican assemblymen before the opposition got a candidate into the field. Under these circumstances members did not fancy staking good committee appointments against the uncertainty of Presidential favours, and in the end Sharpe's election followed without dissent.

In the election of a United States senator to succeed Francis Kernan on March 4, the Stalwarts did not find such smooth sailing. For several years, ever since the gubernatorial nomination in 1876, jealousy, accumulated resentment, and inevitable distrust had divided them, but not until Thomas C. Platt of Owego and Richard Crowley of Niagara announced their candidacy did the smouldering bitterness burst into a blaze. Cornell and his friends promptly declared for Platt, while Arthur, Sharpe, Thomas Murphy, and John F. Smyth, known as ultra Conkling men, wheeled into line for Crowley. Conkling held aloof. He probably preferred Levi P. Morton, although each candidate claimed to be his preference. In the end Morton's name was tangled up in the controversy, but he did not really get into it. Besides, a place in the Cabinet seemed open to him.

At this time Cornell was at the height of his power. Prior to his inauguration he had not stood for much in the way of statesmanship. He was known principally as the maker and chauffeur of Conkling's machine, which he subsequently turned over to Arthur, who came later into the Conkling connection from the Morgan wing. Moreover, the manner of his election, the loss of many thousand Republican votes, and his reappointment of Smyth seriously discredited him. But friend and foe admitted that he had shown real ability as governor. He had about him no angles and no surprises. He exercised authority cautiously, marshalled facts with skill, and presented clear and enlightened reasons for his action. He seemed to be above rather than below the level of his party, and his official colleagues, working in harmony with his policies, found him honourable, if sometimes stubborn and aggressive.

But in his relations to men as well as to policies he had betrayed a disposition to change position. He did not attend the Chicago convention. Nor did Arthur's nomination, brought about largely by Sharpe's activity, particularly please him. While he behaved with decorum and perhaps with loyalty, it was evident that if he did not raise the standard of revolt, he had chosen to fight for his hand. This became the more apparent as the senatorial contest progressed. A grim darksomeness about the expression of his countenance showed that he took a sullen satisfaction in humiliating those who had humiliated him. It was deftly done, but in the result it left its impression.

Crowley, then in his forty-sixth year, was well equipped for the Senate. As a forceful speaker he was an object of respect even by his opponents. In whatever legislative body he appeared he ranked amongst the foremost debaters, generally speaking with an enlightenment and a moderation that did credit to his intellect and to the sweetness of his nature. He had served four years in the State Senate, one term in Congress, and eight years as United States attorney in the Northern District, being justly distinguished as one of the able men of Western New York. He was sadly handicapped, however, by the infirmity of his backers. Sharpe excited the deepest resentment by withholding the appointment of the Assembly committees; and Smyth and Murphy represented all that was undesirable in politics.

Cornell was fortunate in his candidate. Platt's cool, quiet methods had aroused little antipathy, while around him gathered loyalty and gratitude. Very early in the contest, too, it began to be whispered that if elected he might act independently of Conkling. To think of a light-weight sparring up to a recognised champion tickled the imagination of the Independents who numbered about forty, of whom Chauncey M. Depew was the choice of a majority. Ira Davenport of Steuben, a State senator of decided character and strength, supported his brother-in-law, Sherman S. Rogers of Erie, and others talked of Vice-President Wheeler. George William Curtis argued that the aim of the Independents should be to vote for the cause even if they voted for different candidates, and thus show to the country and to Garfield that a large and resolute opposition to the ruling organisation existed in the party.

On the other hand, Depew's friends thought it wiser to "split the machine." It was a taking proposition. If the two senators, they argued, differed upon questions of patronage, the one agreeing with the President would undoubtedly prevail. Thus the Senator and the Governor, backed by the patronage of the State and Federal administrations, would control a machine of great possibilities. Conkling appreciated the danger, and Warner Miller and William H. Robertson approved the plan.

Miller was then in the prime of life. He combined the occupations of manufacturer and farmer, evidenced marked capacity for business, and gave substantial promise of growing leadership. From the schools of Oswego he had entered Union College, and after teaching in Fort Edward Collegiate Institute he became a soldier. Since 1874 he had been in the Assembly and in Congress. He was fully six feet tall, well proportioned, with a large head, a noticeably high forehead, a strong, self-reliant, colourless face, and a resolute chin. A blond moustache covered a firm mouth. He had the appearance of a man of reserve power, and as a speaker, although without the gift of brilliantly phrased sentences, he made a favourable impression. His easy, simple manner added to the vigour and clearness of his words. Perhaps in the end he fell short of realising the full measure of strength that his ardent friends anticipated, for he possessed none of the characteristics of the boss and seemed incapable of submitting to the daily drudgery that political leadership demands. But for several years the reasonableness of his opinions had an unmistakable influence upon the judgment of men. Certainly, in 1881, his opinion greatly strengthened the Depew scheme, and it soon became apparent that a sufficient number of Independents could be relied upon to choose Platt. In the conference that followed the latter promised to support the Garfield administration. "Does that statement cover appointments?" asked Woodin. Platt said it did. "Even if Judge Robertson's name should be sent in?" insisted Woodin. Platt replied, "Yes." That settled it, and Platt's nomination occurred on the first ballot. Among the earliest to send him congratulations was Senator Conkling.

The election, which occurred on January 18, resulted: Senate, Platt, 25; Kernan, 6; Assembly, Platt, 79, Kernan, 44.]

After the campaign of 1880 Conkling seemed to dismiss the feeling exhibited toward Garfield at Chicago, and in February (1881), at the invitation of the President-elect, he visited Mentor. The Senator asked the appointment of Levi P. Morton as secretary of the treasury, and Garfield consented to give him the Navy, or select Thomas L. James for postmaster-general. "This conference was not wholly satisfactory," but Conkling's position at the inauguration ceremonies, voluntarily taken directly behind Garfield while the latter read his inaugural address, indicated a real friendship. His motion in the Senate that James be confirmed as postmaster-general without the usual reference to a committee seemed to support this belief, an impression subsequently stimulated by the prompt confirmation of William M. Evarts for commissioner to the International Monetary Conference, Henry G. Pearson for postmaster of New York, and Levi P. Morton for minister to France. Two weeks later came a bunch of five Stalwarts. The next day (March 23) Garfield nominated William H. Robertson for collector of customs at New York and Edwin A. Merritt for consul-general to London. "That evens things up," said Dennis McCarthy, the well-known Half-breed of the State Senate. "This is a complete surprise," added Robertson. "To my knowledge no one has solicited for me any place under Garfield. It comes entirely unsought." It was no less a surprise to the Stalwarts. Not a hint of it had been dropped by the President. "We had been told only a few hours before," wrote Conkling, "that no removals in the New York offices were soon to be made or even considered, and had been requested to withhold the papers and suggestions bearing on the subject until we had notice from the President of his readiness to receive them." Indeed, the nomination came with such suddenness that the action seemed to be hasty and ill considered.

There is much literature on the subject. Reminiscences of public men during the last decade have opened a flood of memories, some of them giving specific statements from the principal actors. Blaine assured George S. Boutwell that he had no knowledge of Robertson's nomination until it had been made, and Garfield told Marshall Jewell that Blaine, hearing of the nomination, came in very pale and much astonished. Garfield wrote (May 29, 1881) Thomas M. Nichols, once his private secretary, that "the attempt to shift the fight to Blaine's shoulders is as weak as it is unjust. The fact is, no member of the Cabinet behaves with more careful respect for the rights of his brother men than Blaine. It should be understood that the Administration is not meddling in New York politics. It only defends itself when assailed." The President said to Conkling, declares Hoar, that he desired to make one conspicuous appointment of a New York man who had supported him against Grant, and that thereafter, upon consultation with the two Senators, appointments should be made of fit men without regard to factions. To this Conkling refused his consent, stoutly objecting to Robertson's appointment to any important office in this country. "Conkling's behaviour in the interview," said President Garfield "was so insolent that it was difficult for him to control himself and keep from ordering him out of his presence." Conkling says the President, on the Sunday preceding the appointment, informed him "that the collectorship of New York would be left for another time." In a statement purporting to come from the President, Jewell relates that when the five Stalwart nominations went to the Senate, Garfield was immediately burdened with letters and despatches in protest, coupled with the suggestion that everything had been surrendered to Conkling, and that without delay or consultation he sent in Robertson's name. "It was only an instance," says Boutwell, "of General Garfield's impulsive and unreasoning submission to an expression of public opinion, without waiting for evidence of the nature and value of that opinion."

On the other hand, the country at large accepted it as a Blaine triumph. Senators, especially those who had served in the House with the President and his Secretary of State, had no doubt of it. Such a tremendously bold act was entirely foreign to Garfield's character. Nor could it have but one meaning. The man who had split the New York delegation for Blaine was to have his reward and to occupy the place of patronage and of power. More than that it was Blaine's long look ahead. Such action required the highest order of political courage. It opened an old quarrel, it invited opposition, it challenged to battle. Men like Senator Frye of Maine, who had many times witnessed the resolution and dominating fearlessness of Blaine, knew that it was his act. "For sixteen years," said Frye, "the sting of Blaine's attack kept Conkling unfriendly. Besides, he had no confidence in him. Whenever reconciliation seemed imminent, it vanished like a cloud-shadow. I could never unite them. Blaine was ready, but Conkling would accept no advances. When Robertson's appointment came he knew as well as I that it was the act of Blaine." Depew, with whom Blaine had conferred, took the same view. On the day after the nomination was sent in, Mrs. Blaine, rather exultingly and without any expression of surprise, wrote her daughter of the incident. "Your father has just gone to the Department. Did you notice the nominations sent in yesterday? They mean business and strength."

Boutwell illustrates Conkling's lack of confidence in Blaine. After the latter had become secretary of state he said to the Massachusetts Senator that Conkling was the only man who had had three elections to the Senate, and that he and his friends would be considered fairly in the New York appointments. "When in conversation with Conkling, I mentioned Blaine's remark, he said, 'Do you believe one word of that?' I said, 'Yes, I believe Mr. Blaine.' He said with emphasis, 'I don't.' Subsequent events strengthened Mr. Conkling in his opinion."

The cordial relations apparently existing until then between the President and the Senator encouraged the hope that confirmation of the nomination might not be opposed. Because of this feeling the New York Legislature, by a formal resolution, endorsed it, and Republicans generally spoke not unkindly of it. But Conkling, knowing that though the voice was Garfield's, the hand was Blaine's, quickly precipitated a contest in which the interest of the whole country centred. It recalled the Arthur controversy, renewed the feverish energy of Stalwart and Half-breed, and furnished glimpses of the dramatic discord which stirred restlessly behind the curtains of Senate secrecy. Under the rules of the Senate, Robertson's nomination went to the Committee on Commerce, of which Conkling was chairman and in control. Here the matter could be held in abeyance, at least until the Stalwarts marshalled their influence to have it withdrawn. For this purpose Vice-President Arthur and Postmaster-General James called at the White House. Governor Cornell, through a personal friend, sent a message to the President, declaring the nomination a great mistake and urging its withdrawal. Other distinguished men, including Senator Allison of Iowa, visited the President on a similar mission. When these overtures failed compromises were suggested, such as making Robertson a Federal judge, a district attorney, a foreign minister, or the solicitor general.

Meanwhile assuring messages and comforting letters from Blaine's New York friends stimulated Garfield's courage. On March 27, four days after the nomination, Whitelaw Reid, the accomplished editor of the Tribune, telegraphed John Hay, in part, as follows: "From indications here and at Albany we have concluded that the Conkling plan is: First, to make tremendous pressure on the President for withdrawal of Robertson's name under threats from Conkling and persuasion from James. Second, if this fail, then to make their indignation useful by extorting from the President, as a means of placating them, the surveyorship and naval office. With these two they think they could largely neutralise Robertson. Cornell is believed willing to acquiesce in Robertson, hoping to get other offices.

"I wish to say to the President in my judgment this is the turning point of his whole administration--the crisis of his fate. If he surrenders now Conkling is president for the rest of the term and Garfield becomes a laughing stock. On the other hand, he has only to stand firm to succeed. With the unanimous action of the New York Legislature, Conkling cannot make an effectual fight. That action came solely from the belief that Garfield, unlike Hayes, meant to defend his own administration. The Assembly is overwhelmingly Conkling, but they did not dare go on the record against Robertson so long as they thought the Administration meant business. Robertson should be held firm. Boldness and tenacity now insure victory. The least wavering would be fatal."

When Hay read this message to Garfield, the latter said, "They may take him out of the Senate head first or feet first; I will never withdraw him." That the President might not weaken, Depew and other Independents spent much time in Washington during the controversy. "The party standing of Blaine's New York supporters at Chicago absolutely depended upon Robertson's confirmation," declared Depew.

Conkling had not been idle. As usual he cast an anchor to the windward by coquetting with Democratic senators and soothing his Republican colleagues. He knew how to control in caucus as well as in committee, and on May 2, the Republican senators appointed a Committee of Safety, which recommended that a majority decide the order of executive business including "uncontested nominations." These nominations, it was explained, embraced such as were favourably reported by a committee or accepted by the Republican senators of the State from which the nominee hailed. In other words, the caucus action practically notified the President that no nomination would be confirmed that did not please a senator, if a Republican. To exclude Robertson under such a rule it was only necessary that the New York senators object to his confirmation. Immediately the press of the country teemed with protests. The Constitution, it declared, imposed a moral obligation upon senators to confirm a nomination which was not personally unfit or improper, or which did not imperil the public interest, and it was puerile for a majority to agree in advance to refuse to consider any nomination to which any member, for any reason whatever, saw fit to object. Such a rule substantially transferred the Executive power to one branch of Congress, making the President the agent of the Senate. It was "senatorial courtesy" run mad.

As the days passed senators exhibited, under pressure from the country as well as from the White House, a growing desire to have the matter settled, and as a final effort in the interest of harmony the Committee of Safety itself called upon the President, proposing that he withdraw Robertson's name and have the others confirmed. To this Garfield emphatically declined to accede. A few days later (May 5) Vice-President Arthur and Senator Platt suggested that he withdraw all the New York nominations. The President replied that he would willingly withdraw all except Robertson's, and if the latter failed an entire new slate could then be made up. This did not satisfy, but within an hour after his visitors had departed, the President, to prevent the confirmation of some while Robertson's was left tied up in committee, put his suggestion into a message, withdrawing the names of the five Stalwarts. This was another surprise, more alarming than the first, since it showed the Administration's readiness to fight.

Meantime the Republican majority exhibited signs of disintegration. The session was running into hot weather, Democrats had demonstrated their power to prevent a reorganisation of the Senate, and discord in Republican States threatened disaster. Until recently Conkling had felt sure of victory. But now, appreciating the delicacy of the situation, he opened the caucus (May 9) with an earnest, conciliatory speech. He disclaimed desiring any conflict with the President, against whom he made no accusations of bad faith; described the impracticability of his sustaining any relations with Robertson, in whose way, however, he would place no obstacle to any office other than that of collector; discussed the danger to which a lack of political harmony would expose the party in New York; and in almost pathetic tones urged that the courtesy of the Senate be not withheld from him in this hour of his extreme need.

It was plain that he had won the sympathy of his colleagues, but succeeding caucuses, now held daily, lined his pathway with portents and warnings. The iron-clad rule ceased to be operative; a resolution to postpone action until the next session avoided defeat because hastily withdrawn; and a compromise, the last to be suggested, proposing confirmation on condition that Robertson then decline the office, met with no favour. It was plain that at last the stress had reached a climax. Senators no longer exchanged their impressions, or asked "How long?" or "What next?" In their opinion either Garfield or Conkling must recede, and they had learned that the President would not. Moreover, it was rumored, after the caucus of May 13, that Conkling had talked harshly, with much of the temper of a spoiled child. As senators separated on that eventful Friday they declared without hesitation, though not without misgiving, that the last caucus had been held and the last obstacle to Robertson's confirmation removed.

The position of Platt had at last become intolerable. Mindful of the promise to Depew and his friends he had tactfully and patiently sought to avoid a contest by satisfactorily arranging matters between the President and Conkling. Now the end of compromises had come and a vote impended. At this critical if not desperate moment he suggested resignation. The Legislature that chose him in January was still in session, and the combined votes of the Stalwarts would be sufficient to re-elect them. This would liberate him from a promise and strengthen both with a legislative endorsement. It was neither an intrepid nor an exalted proposition, but Conkling accepted it. Perhaps his nature required a relief from its high-strung irritability in some sort of violence, and resignation backed by the assurance that he would soon be restored to office and to greater power on the shoulders of the party offered the seductive form which that violence could take.

It was at this time that Platt's opponents gave him the sobriquet of "Me Too," meaning that he merely followed Conkling's lead. This was unjust to the junior Senator, who at least took the lead in suggesting and insisting upon resigning.]

Before the Senate reconvened on Monday (May 16) the resignation of Conkling and Platt was in the hands of Governor Cornell. It came with the suddenness of Robertson's nomination. Neither Vice-President Arthur shared their intention, nor did Cornell suspect it. The first intimation came in two brief notes, read by the clerk, informing the Senate of their action. But the crash--the consternation, if any were anticipated, did not appear. No doubt many senators sincerely regretted the manner of Conkling's going, but that all were weary of his restless predominance soon became an open secret. Nor did his reasons appeal to any one except as regarded his own personality and power, since the Senator's statement showed a deliberate, personal choice, not based on a question of public policy.

Robertson and Merritt were promptly and unanimously confirmed on May 18. Two days afterward the names of the five Stalwarts, which had been withdrawn, were resubmitted, except those of Payn and Tyler.]

Stripped of its rhetoric and historicity the letter of Conkling and Platt presented but two causes of complaint, one that the President, in withdrawing some of the New York nominations, tried to coerce the Senate to vote for Robertson; second, that Robertson, in voting and procuring others to vote against Grant at Chicago, was guilty of "a dishonest and dishonourable act." The poverty of these reasons excited more surprise than the folly of their resignation. Every one knew that in urging senators to say by their vote whether William H. Robertson was a fit person to be collector, the President kept strictly within his constitutional prerogative, and that in withdrawing the earlier nominations he exercised his undoubted right to determine the order in which he should ask the Senate's advice. Moreover, if any doubt ever existed as to Robertson's right to represent the sentiment of his district instead of the decree of the State convention, the national convention had settled it in his favour.

Conkling's friends are credited with having overborne his purpose, expressed soon after the election of Garfield, to leave the Senate and engage in the practice of his profession. But that such intention did not influence his resignation was evidenced by the fact that immediately afterward he bivouacked at Albany and sought a re-election. With his faithful lieutenants he constantly conferred, while the faithless ones, scarcely less conspicuous, who openly refused their support, he stigmatised. From the first Cornell was an object of distrust. He had wired Conkling advising Robertson's confirmation, and the Senator crushed the telegram in his hand. This put the Governor into the disloyal class. It added to Conkling's irritation also that Cornell remained silent. The Governor's friends expressed some surprise that the Senator did not suggest an interview. It would have been much more surprising if he had, for it is doubtful if Conkling ever suggested an interview in his life. On the other hand, Cornell, unwilling to use the machinery of his great office to force Conkling's return, did not care to approach the Senator. It was not unknown, however, that he refused to become a candidate for United States senator, and that, although ten or fifteen members continued to vote for him, he steadily encouraged his Stalwart friends not to desert Conkling.

Although the Legislature which elected Platt on January 18 was still in session, the sentiment dominating it had radically changed. The party was deeply stirred. The Senator's sudden resignation had added to the indignation aroused by his opposition to the Administration, and members had heard from their constituents. Besides, a once powerful Senator was now a private citizen. At the outset Independents and several Stalwarts refused to enter a caucus, and early in the contest the Democrats, marshalled by Manning, refused to come to the rescue. Thus, without organisation, Republicans began voting on May 31. Seven weeks and four days later (July 22), after fifty-six ballots, their work was concluded. The first ballot marked the highest score for Conkling and Platt, the former receiving 39 and the latter 29 out of 105 Republican votes. This severe comment upon their course plainly reflected the general sentiment of the party. It showed especially the dissatisfaction existing toward Conkling. Yet a few Stalwarts remained steadfast to the end. On the morning of July 1, when Platt, to the surprise of his friends, suddenly withdrew, he had 28 votes. On July 22 Conkling had the same.

To succeed Conkling (short term), Roscoe Conkling, 39; William A. Wheeler, 19; Alonzo B. Cornell, 9; Richard Crowley, 5; Warner Miller, 1; scattering 37. John C. Jacobs (Dem.), 53. Total, 159.]

The act of the assassin of President Garfield on the morning of July 2 had a visible effect upon the proceedings at Albany. Although for a time conditions indicated that the distinguished sufferer might recover, legislators evinced a great desire to conclude the disagreeable work, and on July 5, sixty-six Republicans held a conference. Up to this time Depew had been the favourite for the long term, registering fifty-five votes on the fourteenth ballot (June 14), but in the interest of harmony he now withdrew his name.

This opened the way for Warner Miller, who received in caucus on the fifth ballot sixty-two of the sixty-six votes cast for the long term. By previous agreement a Stalwart was entitled to the short term, and had Cornell allowed his Stalwart friends to enter the caucus he might have had the nomination. But he would not oppose Conkling. Moreover, the belief obtained that the Democrats and Stalwarts would yet unite and adjourn the session without day, thus giving the Senator time to elect other friends to a new Legislature, and the Governor would not disturb this hallucination. With Cornell out of the way Elbridge G. Lapham easily won the nomination on the second ballot. Lapham had been the first to desert Conkling, who now exclaimed, not without the bitter herb of truth: "That man must not reap the reward of his perfidy."

The caucus did not at once bring union, but on July 12 Miller's vote reached seventy; on the 15th it registered seventy-four; and on the 16th, with the help of Speaker Sharpe, who had encouraged Conkling's going to Albany, Miller was elected. Lapham's vote, however, hung fire until July 22, when, during a brief and most exciting conference in the Assembly Chamber, State Senator Halbert, the Conkling Gibraltar, exclaimed with the suddenness of a squall at sea: "We must come together or the party is divided in the State. I am willing to vote now." Reason and good nature being thus restored, each Republican present rose and voted his choice, Lapham receiving sixty-one, Conkling twenty-eight. In the general rejoicing State Senator Pitts, a leader of the Independents, no doubt voiced the feeling of all at that moment: "I am as happy as Mr. Halbert. This nomination has been made good-naturedly. It is an augury of good feeling in the future. New York proposes to stand by the Republican administration. I hope we shall never hear more the words Stalwart, Featherhead, Half-breed." When the joint convention again reassembled the fifty-sixth ballot gave Elbridge G. Lapham ninety-two, and Clarkson N. Potter, the new Democratic nominee, forty-two.

"Payn warned both Conkling and Platt that they would be defeated. Speaker Sharpe admonished Payn that he was wrong. Payn predicted that while he and other friends were still battling for the organisation Sharpe would desert them. Payn proved himself a prophet. Sharpe went over to the opposition." Platt's Reminiscences.--Cosmopolitan Magazine, April, 1909, p. 517.]

For Conkling it was worse than defeat. The humiliation of having gone to Albany, of being deserted by friend after friend, of enduring the taunts of an inhospitable press, and, finally, of having his place taken by one, who, in his opinion, had proven most faithless, was like the torture of an unquenchable fire. Lord Randolph Churchill, after his historic resignation as chancellor of the exchequer, declared that he would not live it over again for a million a year. It is likewise a matter of history that Senator Conkling never ceased to deplore his mistake.

"We have followed poor Conkling down to the gates of death and have been truly sorry to see them close upon him. I have never heard your father, in all the twenty-two years since he spoke hard words to him, say a syllable which he need regret, but his deathbed seemed hardly less inaccessible than his life."--Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters, Vol. 2, p. 203. Dated, San Remo, May 1, 1888. Addressed to Walker Blaine.]