Part 483

Let the files of this body of eight thousand, be afterwards divided, and let it be reduced to three in depth, its front will then be found five times more extensive, and its depth five times less: we may, therefore, conclude, that the defects of the phalanx were evidently multiplied in the discipline of Europe, at the expence of its advantages, which consisted in the depth of its files.

The progress which has taken place in the artillery, has contributed greatly to this revolution. As cannon multiplied, it was necessary to avoid its effects; and the method of avoiding, or at least of lessening them, was to diminish the depth of the files.

The musquet, likewise, has a great share in the alteration; the half-pike was entirely laid aside for the bayonet; and in order to have no fire unemployed, it was thought necessary to put it in the power of every soldier to make use of his firelock.

Those are, we think, the two principal causes of the little solidity, or depth given to the battalion.

Thus the defects of the phalanx were multiplied in the European discipline, and its advantages and perfections injudiciously diminished. The system of Prussia, made some alterations, but with every other power until the French revived the principles of the phalanx in their columns of attack, the system was much inferior to the phalanx, and had nothing but the single effect of fire-arms to counterbalance all its advantages. The effect, however, of fire-arms is a partial power, and does not originally belong to the manner of disciplining troops, the sole aim of which, should be to employ man’s natural action. It is man, therefore, and not his fire, which is to be considered as the principal agent; and from hence the European systems before the French revolution were very much inferior to the phalanx, and still more to the Roman arrangement, which so far surpassed that of Greece.

The light troops of both those people were much heavier than modern battalions, and had more power and solidity for a shock or conflict. However, the Roman discipline, notwithstanding its superiority, is not calculated for our times; because, as we are obliged to engage first at a distance, ours, by its cannon, would destroy the Roman order of battle in a very short time, and would be exposed to a loss much less considerable itself, supposing even the artillery was equal on both sides; we should then, in order to perfect our arrangements, endeavor to procure them all the advantageous qualities of the legionary regulations, as the only means of giving them the superiority.

Many people are of opinion, that we now imitate the Romans, and that we give battle according to their system, because our troops are drawn up in lines, some of which are full, and others vacant. But it is shewn, that three battalions have the same front, and the same inconveniences that eight thousand men ranged in the phalanx order. Our lines are formed by brigades, regiments, or battalions, and the distance of one corps from the other is equal to the front of one of those corps: so that those lines, both full and vacant, are composed of detachments equal in front; each has a phalanx of six, eight, or twelve thousand men. This order of battle consequently, can be no more at most than a kind of medium between those of Greece and Rome.

TACTICS of Bonaparte. It is well known that the greater part of the victories of Bonaparte may be imputed to the admirable system adopted by this general; a system which, however often repeated, has still been attended with the same success--a system, to which the established tactics have as yet applied no remedy, or rather, to which the confirmed habits of men, educated in the ancient system, are as unwilling as unable to accommodate themselves.

The minor discipline is his great secret; the simple methods of the first drills, are merely facings and wheelings in a discretionary order, all his rules, are like general principles, the results of which may be produced by a different process of the same elements. All his movements are at rapid time; and the rotation of evolutions, though laid down in regulation, is not pursued in practice, the soldier is taught not so much how to execute a set of movements, as how to perform any that the variety of ground and the incidents of action, never twice alike, call for. These are the elementary rules, on which the system is founded.

His system of action is comprehended in the following principles:

1st. To select some partial point of attack, most frequently the enemy’s centre, but occasionally one or other of the wings--and then, strengthening that part of his own army which is opposed to the point of attack, by drafts from the other divisions, to bear down upon the point of attack, with the advantage of numbers, and consequently of greater physical force.

2d. To counteract the effect of the weakness of the other divisions, by assigning them a defensive part only; a purpose which evidently requires a less power than is necessary to attack.

2. By some advantage of position. This is either natural, as a strong position properly so called, or relative, as where the weaker divisions are so placed as either to be protected by the stronger, or, in case of dispersion, to be enabled to fall in with the main body.

3d. The necessary, the inevitable effects of this system are--

That the part of the enemy, which is the point of attack, is almost invariably broken, driven back, in a word, defeated.

That, in the mean time, the weaker divisions of the army which attack, according to this system, are either enabled to maintain their ground, against the strongest wings of the enemy, or they are repulsed.

That, if the divisions maintain the ground, the defeat of their enemy is certain, complete, and irrecoverable.

The main body of the attacking army, having driven before it the point of attack, has now become the rear of those other divisions of the enemy which are contending with its own divisions. The divisions of the enemy are thus between two bodies. The divisions they are in the act of attacking, and the victorious main body, which, having accomplished its own part, is hastening to the relief of its divisions.

That, on the other hand, if the weaker divisions of the attacking army, (attacking according to the system) should happen to be dispersed; confident of their final victory, they exert themselves like conquerors, with the spirit of hope, and courage of assured victory. They dispute the ground, retreat inch by inch, and, if they cannot prevent, still protract their defeat, till the victorious main body shall come to their aid.

Finally, and indeed, most materially, though the weaker divisions of the attacking army should be absolutely defeated, the victorious main body cannot but necessarily recover every thing. The divisions of the enemy, which have succeeded in defeating the divisions of the attacking army, must be equally dispersed by pursuit, as the defeated divisions by defeat. It is, indeed, an essential part of this system, to contrive that they should so be dispersed, by the scattered flight of the divisions defeated. By this means the victorious main body, formed by the exactest discipline to keep their ranks, returning from their pursuit at the word of command, and in the very moment of opportunity have an easy conquest over scattered divisions, which are thus likewise under the circumstance of being placed between two fires.

Such is the celebrated system. Three singular inferences must be deduced from it:--

That, where an army attacks according to this system, the defeat of one part of the army of its enemy is the defeat of the whole.

That the defeat of the smaller divisions by the defending army, is no defeat at all; the defeat, or at least, repulse of these divisions, being one of the means of the victory of the attaching army.

That it is the event of the main attack, and not the repulse or even defeat of the subordinate and merely defensive divisions that should decide the victory.

Maritime TACTICS, or manœuvres, &c. at sea. Like those practised on land may be considered under two heads. The first contains what the French term historique or detail, in which are included the orders and signals directed to be observed by fleets going into action; together with a specific account of the different manœuvres which have been executed in the principal engagements. The second comprehends a knowlege of the rates of ships, and of the method of constructing them.

The vessels of the ancients made their way by means of sails and oars. The rows of oars were proportioned to the different sizes, from what was called unus-ramus, which was the smallest, and had only one row; to the quinque-rami, which had five rows.

The particular method in which these ships were constructed, as well as of the arrangements that were made within, in order that a sufficient number of rowers might be commodiously placed to work them, is not perfectly known to the moderns; nor have the ancients left us documents sufficiently clear and accurate on that head.

With respect to naval tactics, or the art of fighting at sea, it is confessedly less ancient than tactics on shore, or what is generally called land service. Mankind were accustomed to contend for the possession of territory long before they determined on, or even dreamed of, making the sea a theatre of war and bloodshed.