Part 474

Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat.

The history of France abounds with instances in which stratagems of every kind have been successfully practised.--It seems the peculiar talent of the inhabitants of that country to derive advantages from well concerted feints, &c. in war, and to secure their victories more by science than by downright hardihood.

It has been wisely observed, by a French writer, under the article of Stratagêmes de guerre, that a general who is defeated in a general action, may attribute his failure to fortune, although it is universally acknowleged, that chance or fortune has a very trifling share indeed in pitched battles, while art and science regulate the different movements, and finally determine their issue. Whoever, therefore, suffers himself to be surprised by his enemy, cannot be said to stand wholly exculpated from ignorance or neglect, since it must have been in his power to have avoided the snares laid for him, by means of vigilant spies, and unremitting attention. This remark appears to us not only to be generally correct, but it seems more immediately applicable to all generals that have secret service money at command. The influence of that commodity, (upon which no embargo can be laid) will be felt in every garrison, town, or sea-port; and those who have the management of it must be dull indeed, if they do not feel their way into the secret preparations of an enemy, before they hazard an attack against him.

Besides the different stratagems which may be used by an able general, to bring about the overthrow of the whole or part of an army, by leading it into an ambuscade, there are various ones which may be practised against a fortified place. To effect the latter purpose, you may contrive to get soldiers in disguise through the gates at unguarded hours; to introduce them through subterraneous passages, or by any other means that may offer. Before any attempt of this sort is made, every part of the fortifications should be narrowly reconnoitred, and as much knowlege be obtained of the interior situation of the place as can be procured by means of good spies, or from deserters. You must, above all things, be well assured, that the garrison does not strict duty; that the different guards are negligently attended to; that the soldiers who compose them are in the habits of drinking or gaming; that their officers miss their rounds, or go them without system or regularity; that the gates are ill guarded, and the avenues to them ill watched; and that there are certain places or entrances which are not watched at all; for it would be impossible to surprize any place that has been regularly fortified, while the garrison did its duty.

If it should appear practicable to surprise a town by taking advantage of the negligence of the sentries, &c. at some particular gate, previous means must be taken to introduce some soldiers dressed like market women, or in the garb of some religious order. You may then contrive to get a waggon or cart, seemingly loaded with hay or straw, but with soldiers concealed beneath it, so placed in the entrance of the gate that it will serve as an obstacle when it may be found necessary to shut it. In order to do this effectually, let a pin be taken out, so that the wheel comes off, or the axle tree gets broken. The instant this is done, the soldiers who had entered the town in disguise must join the drivers, the men that have been concealed in the waggon get out, and the whole must rush upon the port-guard. While this happens, the troops that have been placed in ambush round the fortifications, will advance with promptitude and firmness, and endeavor to get possession of the town before a sufficient force can be collected to repel the attack. In the year 1789, a rabble from Courtray took advantage of the carelessness of the imperial troops who were in garrison at Gand, in Flanders, and by seizing upon the gate and port-guard, brought about a temporary rebellion in the country. This indeed was done without stratagem; but the circumstance proves, that when the centries of a fortified place are negligent in their duty, a surprise is always practicable. We are precluded by the limits of our undertaking from going more fully into this important branch of military science. Several treatises have been written on the subject. Among others one appeared in 1756, intitled Stratagêmes de Guerre, illustrating from history the various stratagems which had been practised by some of the ablest generals during a long period of time down to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. It was published by M. Carlet de la Rousiere, an officer in the French service, and acting engineer in the isles of France and Bourbon. It contains much curious matter. See Am. Mil. Lib.

STRATAGEM and force united. Count Turpin, page 43, vol. I. in his essay on the Art of War, judiciously remarks, that when an enemy, superior in force, is in possession of a pass, from which he cannot be dislodged but by art, stratagem and force should be blended together as often as possible. Onosander, the Greek general, set fire to a wood which was at the foot of a mountain in the enemy’s possession, and which he wanted to go over; the flames and smoke forced the enemy to abandon it, and leave the passage free for him.

STRATARITHMOMETRY. In war, the art of drawing up an army, or any part of it, in any given geometrical figure; and of expressing the number of men contained in such a figure, as they stand in order of battle, either at hand, or at any distance assigned.

STRAW. According to the British regulations, published by authority in 1799, relative to the forage, &c. which troops are to receive in the home encampments, it is directed, that straw is to be allowed at the rate of one truss of 36 pounds to each paillasse for two men, being a full bedding; at the expiration of sixteen days to be refreshed with half a truss to each paillasse; at the expiration of 32 days to be removed, and a fresh bedding of one truss is to be given, and so on every succeeding period of sixteen and thirty-two days.

For the sick, in the hospital, the straw is to be changed as often as it may be deemed necessary.

Two trusses per troop or company are to be allowed for batmen, or servants, not soldiers; and three trusses per troop or company for the washerwomen, to be changed every sixteen days, not having paillasses.

Thirty trusses of straw per troop or company are allowed on first taking the field for thatching the women’s huts.

Regiments, not having paillasses, are allowed straw at the following rates:

On taking the field, two trusses of 36 pounds each to every five men, at the end of eight days to be refreshed by one truss, and at the end of eight days more to be refreshed again by the same quantity. At the end of twenty-four days the whole to be removed, and an entire new bedding to be given, and refreshed as before, viz. two trusses for every five men.

Four pounds of straw are to be added to the ration forage for the cavalry and artillery horses only.

Six pounds of straw are to be allowed to the general officers and staff, in addition to the prescribed ration of forage. See REGULATIONS.

STRAW. For straw! is a word of command in the British service, to dismiss the soldiers when they have stacked their arms, so that they may be ready on the first signal given.

STREAKS, are the iron bands on the outside of the wheel to bind the fellies strongly together.

STREAK-nails, are those driven through the streaks into the fellies.

STREET. See ENCAMPMENT.

STREET-firing. See FIRING.

STRELITZ. A Russian word, whose plural number is strelitzy, derived from strelai, an arrow, in the same language. An ancient militia, which was formerly kept in pay among the Muscovites both in time of peace and in time of war, was so called. The men who composed it always served on foot, and were originally armed, as their name indicates, with bows and arrows. They afterwards received musquets or firelocks, and laid aside the bow and arrow. The rest of the Russian army, which was only called together in cases of emergency, retained the bows, arrows, and lances; with which each soldier armed himself according to his own particular whim or notion.

In the remote periods of the Russian empire, the strelitzy were the only regular body of troops that formed any part of the standing army of that country. It consisted of twenty or twenty-four thousand men, who enjoyed a multiplicity of privileges and immunities, and were quartered in one of the suburbs of Moscow, which is still called Strelitzkaia Slaboda. From the latitude allowed them, and the peculiar indulgencies which these soldiers enjoyed, they might be well compared to the Prætorian bands under the first Roman emperors, and, in some degree, to the Janizaries of Constantinople. They frequently mutinied like the latter, and interfered in the management of public affairs. Their last revolt, however, was fatal to them. It happened in 1698, during the absence of the Czar Peter the first, who on his return into Russia, broke the whole corps, erased its name from the list of military establishments, and put his troops upon the same footing that those of the rest of Europe were.

The established pay of a strelitz was seven rubles, and twelve combs and bushels of grain every year.

Grain, even in these days, is given as a necessary ration to a Russian soldier, which he bakes or roasts upon thin plates of iron, and then reduces to meal, making therewith a sort of dough, called Toloqueno. Every man always carries a good portion of this subsistence about him, to which he adds a small cruet of vinegar. By soaking this meal in water mixed with a little vinegar, he contrives to make a sort of soup or broth, which the Russians, who are fond of acids, find extremely palatable; and by giving it the consistency of dough, it serves for bread and meat. When the Russian soldier can procure a few greens, such as cabbage, &c. to mix with his toloqueno, he makes a complete meal, which he calls Chety. A tcharotcheka, or small glass of brandy, makes up the measure of a full repast. It must be acknowleged, that where soldiers can be brought to satisfy the cravings of nature in this economical manner, great advantages must be derived, especially in long marches through an uncultivated or desert country. We cannot, however, recommend its adoption except in cases of urgent necessity, and on services where there might be a possibility of absolute want, from the destruction or poverty of a country into which an army marches. The fare itself is not calculated to add vigor and activity to the body, or to keep alive that promptitude and fire which are required in military operations.

STRENGTH. This word may be variously understood in military matters, viz.

STRENGTH. Fortification; fortress; stronghold. It likewise signifies armament; power; force. In all returns which are made of corps, strength implies the number of men that are borne upon the establishment, in contradistinction to effective force, which means the number fit for service. Hence, the strength of a battalion, troop, or company, &c. The allowance for the repair of arms, &c. is issued according to the return which is made, not of the effective force, but of the established strength of a troop or company.

STRICT. Exact, severe, rigorous; the contrary to mild, indulgent. Hence, a strict officer. It is sometimes used in a bad sense, to signify a petulant, troublesome commander.

To STRIKE. This word is variously used in military phraseology, viz.