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Part 177

A Military Dictionary · William Duane — chapter 177 of 547 · ~2,196 words · public domain

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“These instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not require the least elucidation in writing. They constitute the A, B, C, of soldiers. Nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects in order to attend to such minutiæ. His functions in the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled to watch the countenance of the enemy, to observe his movements, and to see with an eagle’s, or a king of Prussia’s eye, all the relative directions that his opponents take. It must be his business to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy’s line in one quarter, whilst his real intention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans; to take advantage of the manifold openings, which his feints have produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable of plunging with effect, upon the weakest part, and of carrying the sword of death where its blows is certain of being mortal. But to accomplish these important and indispensible points, his judgment must be clear, his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day.

“I am not, however, an advocate for pitched battles, especially at the commencement of a war. A skilful general might, I am persuaded, carry on a contest between two rival nations during the whole of his life, without being once obliged to come to a decisive action. Nothing harrasses and eventually distresses an enemy so much as this species of warfare. He must, in fact, be frequently attacked, and by degrees, be broken and unnerved; so that in a short time he will not be able to shew himself.

“It must not generally be inferred from this opinion, that when an opportunity presents itself, whereby an enemy may be crushed at once, the attack should not be made, or that advantage should not be taken of the errors he may commit; all I mean to prove is, that war can be carried on without leaving any thing to chance; and in this consists the perfection and highest point of ability belonging to a general. But when a battle is risked, the triumphant party ought well to know all the advantages which may be derived from his victory. A wise general, indeed, will not remain satisfied in having made himself master of the mere field of battle. This, I am sorry to observe, is too often the custom; and, strange to say, that custom is not without its advocates.

“It is too much the practice of some governments, and as often the custom of generals, to follow the old proverb, which says, that in order to gain your ends, you must make some sacrifices, and even facilitate the retreat of your enemy. Nothing can be more impolitic or more absurd. An able surgeon might as well tamper with a mortification, and by endeavoring to save an useless limb, run the hazard of destroying all the vital parts.

“An enemy, on the contrary, ought to be vigorously pushed, harrassed night and day, and pursued through every winding he can make. By a conduct of this sort, the advancing army will drive him from all his holds and fastnesses, and the conclusion of his brilliant retreat, will ultimately turn out a complete and total overthrow. Ten thousand well trained and disciplined troops, that are sent forward from the main army, to hang upon the rear of a retiring enemy, will be able to destroy an army of an hundred thousand men, when that army has once been forced to make retrograde movements. A want of confidence in their generals, added to many other disheartening circumstances, will naturally possess the minds of the latter, while implicit faith and warm affection must influence the former. A first defeat well followed up, almost always terminates in a total rout, and finishes the contest. But some generals do not wish to bring war to a speedy issue. Public misfortunes too frequently produce private emoluments, and the accumulation of the latter is too endearing to suffer itself to be superseded by the former.”

In order to substantiate what he thus advances with much good sense, the Marshal cites the following particular instance, from among an infinity of others.

“When the French army, at the battle of Ramillies, was retiring in good order over an eminence that was rather confined, and on both sides of which there were deep ravines, the cavalry belonging to the allies followed its track leisurely, without even appearing to wish to harrass or attack its rear. The French continued their march with the same composure; retreating upon more than twenty lines, on account of the narrowness of the ground.

“On this occasion, a squadron of English horse got close to two French battalions, and began to fire upon them. The two battalions, naturally presuming that they were going to be attacked, came to the right about, and fired a volley at the squadron. What was the consequence? the whole of the French army took to its heels; the cavalry went off full gallop, and all the infantry, instead of patiently retiring over the heights, threw itself into the ravines in such dreadful disorder, that the ground above was almost instantly abandoned, and not a French soldier was seen upon it.

“Let any military man consider this notorious event, and then praise the regularity of a retreat and the prudent foresight of those who, after an enemy has been vanquished in the field, relax in their exertions, and give him time to breathe. I do not, however, pretend to maintain, that all the forces of a victorious army should be employed to follow up the pursuit; but I am decidedly of opinion, that large bodies should be detached for that purpose, and that the flying enemy should be annoyed as long as the day lasts. This must be done in good order. And let it be remembered, that when an enemy has once taken to his heels in real earnest, you may drive him before you by the mere noise of empty bladders.

“If the officer who is detached in pursuit of an enemy, begins to manœuvre after prescribed rules and regulations, and operate with slowness and precaution, he had better be recalled; for the sole purpose of his employment is to push on vigorously, to harrass and distress the foe. Every species of evolution will do on this occasion; if any can be defective, the regular system might prove so.

“I shall conclude these observations by saying, that all retreats depend wholly upon the talents and abilities of generals, who must themselves be governed by circumstances and situations; but I will venture to assert, that no retreat can eventually succeed, unless it be made before an enemy who acts with extreme caution; for if the latter follow up his first blow, the vanquished army must soon be thrown into utter confusion.”

These are the sentiments of Marshal Saxe, as far as they relate to the qualifications which the general of an army should indispensibly possess. And no man we are persuaded was better enabled to form an opinion on so important a subject; for as baron Espagnac has justly observed in his Supplément aux Rêveries de ce Mar, p. 166, he possessed uncommon courage, was fertile in expedients and resources; he knew how to distinguish and to make use of the abilities of individuals, was unshaken in his determinations; and when the good of the service required chastisement or severity, was not influenced by private feelings, or hurried away by a sanguinary temper; he was uncommonly attentive to his men, watchful of their health, and provident to supply their wants; sparing of their blood in the day of battle, and always inspiring them, by the liveliness of his mind, tempered by experience, with confidence and attachment to his measures. He knew the cast of each man’s character, particularly so of his officers; and whilst he directed the former with consummate knowlege and consequent success, he never lost sight of the merits of the latter, when they co-operated with his designs. If the natural vivacity of his mind sometimes led him into temporary neglect, good sense and a marked anxiety to be just, soon made amends for apparent slights, by rendering the most important services; he was ingenious and subtle in all his manœuvres before an enemy, skilful in his choice of camps, and equally intelligent in that of posts; he was plain in his instructions previous to an engagement, simple in his disposition of the order of battle; and he was never known to lose an opportunity, through the want of prompt decision, whereby a contest might be ended by a bold and daring evolution. When it appeared necessary to give weight to his orders, and to turn the balance of fortune by personal exposure, no man became less fearful of his own destiny, than Marshal Saxe. On these occasions he was daring to an extreme, heedless of danger, but full of judgment, and a calm presence of mind. Such, in our humble opinion, are the outlines of a real general, how well they were exemplified and filled up by the subject of this article, time and the concurring testimony of events have proved.

GENERAL’S Guard. It was customary among the French, for the oldest regiment to give one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, two serjeants, and fifty privates, as a general’s guard. Whenever the marshals of France were on service under the immediate orders of the king, or of the princes belonging to the royal household, they always retained the rank of general.

GENERAL d’armée, Fr. the commander in chief of any army.

Battre la GENERAL, Fr. to beat the general. See DRUM.

GENERAL court-martial. See COURTS MARTIAL.

GENERAL formations of the battalion, are from line into column, and from column into line by echellon; to either flank, to the front, or on a line oblique to any given point front or rear.

GENERAL, is also used for a particular beat of the drum. See DRUM.

GENETTE, Fr. a particular sort of snaffle, which is used among the Turks; it resembles a large ring, and serves to confine the horse’s tongue.

GENIE, Fr. The art of engineering. It consists in a knowlege of lines so as to be able to trace out all that is requisite for the attack or defence of places, according to established rules in fortification. Marshal Vauban and the marquis of Louvois, have particularly distinguished themselves in this art.

GENIUS, in a military sense, a natural talent or disposition to every kind of warlike employment, more than any other; or the aptitude a man has received from nature to perform well, and easily, that which others can do but indifferently, and with a great deal of pains.

From the diversity of genius, the difference of inclination arises in men whom nature has had the precaution of leading to the employment for which she designs them, with more or less impetuosity, in proportion to the greater or lesser number of obstacles they have to surmount, in order to render themselves capable of answering this occasion. Thus the inclinations of men are so very different, because they follow the same mover, that is the impulse of their genius. This is what renders one officer more pleasing, even though he trespasses against the rules of war; while others are disagreeable notwithstanding their strict regularity.

GENOUILLIERE, Fr. the lower part of the embrasure of a battery. The genouilliere is about 2¹⁄₂ or 3 French feet high from the platform to the opening of the embrasure. It lies immediately under the arch of the fortification. Its thickness, which usually consists of fascines well put together, is of the same dimensions that merlons bear; namely from 18 to 22 feet. The term genouilliere is derived from genou, signifying the knee, to the height of which it is generally raised.

GENS, Fr. a word in much desultory use among the French, signifying in a general acceptation of it, folks, people, servants, soldiers, &c.

GENS d’armes. See GENDARMES.

GENS de guerre, Fr. men attached to a military profession.

Mes GENS, Fr. an affected phrase, which was formerly used among the French, to signify their servants or attendants. It seems to have been an arrogant and foolish imitation of mon peuple, my people. During the monarchy of France, this term was in much vogue at Paris, and was afterwards adopted by almost all the petits maitres, or coxcombs belonging to the church, state, and army.

GENS de sac et de corde, Fr. an opprobrious term which the French apply to men that deserve chastisement. In former times, the cord or rope, and the sack, were the common instruments and means of punishment. The ropes served to hang up malefactors: and the sack was used to contain their bodies when it was ordained that they should be thrown into a river.

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